Reward and punishment in a team contest

Florian Heine; Martin Strobel

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0236544

Reward and punishment in a team contest

Florian Heine^*, Martin Strobel

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.

Original language	English
Article number	0236544
Number of pages	25
Journal	PLOS ONE
Volume	15
Issue number	9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236544
Publication status	Published - 17 Sept 2020

Keywords

ECONOMIC SHOCKS
CIVIL CONFLICT
RENT-SEEKING
COOPERATION
COMMUNICATION
PREFERENCES
GAMES

Access to Document

10.1371/journal.pone.0236544Licence: CC BY

Data: Reward and punishment in a team contest
Heine, F. (Creator) & Strobel, M. (Creator), DANS, 6 Aug 2020
DOI: 10.17026/dans-zmp-8vyv
Dataset/Software: Dataset

Cite this

@article{9238007098694fb298297aa8dedfd499,

title = "Reward and punishment in a team contest",

abstract = "A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.",

keywords = "ECONOMIC SHOCKS, CIVIL CONFLICT, RENT-SEEKING, COOPERATION, COMMUNICATION, PREFERENCES, GAMES",

author = "Florian Heine and Martin Strobel",

note = "Data source: data from lab experiment Data Availability: We have published the data and code at the DANS repository under Heine, Dr. F.A. (Tilburg University); Strobel, Dr. M.A. (Maastricht University) (2014): Data: Reward and Punishment in a Team Contest. DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zmp-8vyv.",

year = "2020",

month = sep,

day = "17",

doi = "10.1371/journal.pone.0236544",

language = "English",

volume = "15",

journal = "PLOS ONE",

issn = "1932-6203",

publisher = "Public Library of Science",

number = "9",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reward and punishment in a team contest

AU - Heine, Florian

AU - Strobel, Martin

N1 - Data source: data from lab experiment Data Availability: We have published the data and code at the DANS repository under Heine, Dr. F.A. (Tilburg University); Strobel, Dr. M.A. (Maastricht University) (2014): Data: Reward and Punishment in a Team Contest. DANS. https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zmp-8vyv.

PY - 2020/9/17

Y1 - 2020/9/17

N2 - A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.

AB - A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.

KW - ECONOMIC SHOCKS

KW - CIVIL CONFLICT

KW - RENT-SEEKING

KW - COOPERATION

KW - COMMUNICATION

KW - PREFERENCES

KW - GAMES

U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0236544

DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0236544

M3 - Article

C2 - 32941442

SN - 1932-6203

VL - 15

JO - PLOS ONE

JF - PLOS ONE

IS - 9

M1 - 0236544

ER -

Reward and punishment in a team contest

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Datasets

Data: Reward and punishment in a team contest

Cite this