Reward and punishment in a team contest

Florian Heine*, Martin Strobel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.
Original languageEnglish
Article number0236544
Number of pages25
JournalPLOS ONE
Volume15
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Sep 2020

Keywords

  • ECONOMIC SHOCKS
  • CIVIL CONFLICT
  • RENT-SEEKING
  • COOPERATION
  • COMMUNICATION
  • PREFERENCES
  • GAMES

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