Maximal matchings

Anh Triêu; Iwan Bos; Marc Schröder; Dries Vermeulen

doi:10.26481/umagsb.2024004

Maximal matchings

Anh Triêu, Iwan Bos, Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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Abstract

There are many situations in which policymakers are primarily concerned with the availability and accessibility of goods or services. Examples include electricity, food, housing, medical supplies, et cetera. In such cases, the social goal may be to maximize the number of transactions, which we refer to as a maximal matching. This paper presents a mechanism that implements this objective. The mechanism satisfies the incentive and participation constraints, but requires external funding.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Maastricht
Publisher	Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages	26
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2024004
Publication status	Published - 11 Apr 2024

Publication series

Series	GSBE Research Memoranda
Number	004
ISSN	2666-8807

JEL classifications

c72 - Noncooperative Games
d47 - Market Design
d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

Keywords

double auction
egalitarian rule
mechanism design
Myerson's Lemma
welfare economics

Access to Document

10.26481/umagsb.2024004

RM24004Final published version, 644 KB

Cite this

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