### Abstract

We provide an existence result for the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium, which can be viewed as the direct incomplete information analogue of Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, a tuple consisting of a probability measure for every player on his choices and utility functions is a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever some mutual optimality property is satisfied. This incomplete information solution concept is then epistemically characterized in a way that common belief in rationality is neither used nor implied. For the special case of complete information, an epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary.

Original language | English |
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Article number | 108526 |

Number of pages | 6 |

Journal | Economics Letters |

Volume | 186 |

Early online date | 15 Jul 2019 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - Jan 2020 |

### JEL classifications

- c72 - Noncooperative Games

### Keywords

- common belief in rationality
- complete information
- epistemic characterization
- epistemic game theory
- generalized Nash equilibrium
- Common belief in rationality
- Epistemic game theory
- Complete information
- Interactive epistemology
- Static games
- EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS
- Nash equilibrium
- Generalized Nash equilibrium
- Epistemic characterization
- Solution concepts
- Incomplete information
- Existence

## Cite this

Perea y Monsuwé, A., & Bach, C. (2020). Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality.

*Economics Letters*,*186*, [108526]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526