@techreport{d46d777c3e79452bbfb14c8961f939bc,
title = "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped",
abstract = "One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.",
keywords = "resource allocation, single-dipped preferences, Pareto optimality, fairness",
author = "Bas Dietzenbacher and Yuki Tamura",
year = "2023",
month = jun,
day = "19",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2023009",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "009",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}