Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium

Christian W. Bach; Andres Perea

doi:10.4204/EPTCS.379.1

Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium

Christian W. Bach^*, Andres Perea

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceeding › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Bayesian equilibrium constitutes the prevailing solution concept for games with incomplete information. It is known that from an ex-ante perspective Harsanyi's seminal notion is related both to Nash equilibrium as well as to canonical correlated equilibrium. We provide an epistemic characterization of Bayesian equilibrium from an interim perspective by means of common belief in rationality and a common prior. Since these epistemic conditions also characterize correlated equilibrium in the special case of complete information, our result substantiates that Bayesian equilibrium forms the incomplete information analogue to correlated equilibrium - and not to Nash equilibrium - in terms of reasoning.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379)
Subtitle of host publication	Proceedings Nineteenth conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Oxford, United Kingdom, 28-30th June 2023
Publisher	Open Publishing Association
Pages	1-1
Number of pages	1
Edition	379
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.1
Publication status	Published - 2023
Event	19th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge - Worcester College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Duration: 28 Jun 2023 → 30 Jun 2023 Conference number: 19 https://sites.google.com/view/tark-2023

Publication series

Series	Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
ISSN	2075-2180

Conference

Conference	19th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Abbreviated title	TARK-2023
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
Period	28/06/23 → 30/06/23
Internet address	https://sites.google.com/view/tark-2023

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10.4204/EPTCS.379.1Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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Bach, Christian W. ; Perea, Andres. / Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium. ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379): Proceedings Nineteenth conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Oxford, United Kingdom, 28-30th June 2023. 379. ed. Open Publishing Association, 2023. pp. 1-1 (Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science).

@inproceedings{22c6111d75bd4122bbf1d37bf0b13376,

title = "Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium",

abstract = "Bayesian equilibrium constitutes the prevailing solution concept for games with incomplete information. It is known that from an ex-ante perspective Harsanyi's seminal notion is related both to Nash equilibrium as well as to canonical correlated equilibrium. We provide an epistemic characterization of Bayesian equilibrium from an interim perspective by means of common belief in rationality and a common prior. Since these epistemic conditions also characterize correlated equilibrium in the special case of complete information, our result substantiates that Bayesian equilibrium forms the incomplete information analogue to correlated equilibrium - and not to Nash equilibrium - in terms of reasoning.",

author = "Bach, {Christian W.} and Andres Perea",

note = "data source: no data used; 19th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK-2023 ; Conference date: 28-06-2023 Through 30-06-2023",

year = "2023",

doi = "10.4204/EPTCS.379.1",

language = "English",

series = "Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science",

publisher = "Open Publishing Association",

pages = "1--1",

booktitle = "ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379)",

address = "Australia",

edition = "379",

url = "https://sites.google.com/view/tark-2023",

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Bach, CW & Perea, A 2023, Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium. in ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379): Proceedings Nineteenth conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Oxford, United Kingdom, 28-30th June 2023. 379 edn, Open Publishing Association, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, pp. 1-1, 19th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, United Kingdom, 28/06/23. https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.1

Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium. / Bach, Christian W.; Perea, Andres.
ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379): Proceedings Nineteenth conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Oxford, United Kingdom, 28-30th June 2023. 379. ed. Open Publishing Association, 2023. p. 1-1 (Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceeding › Academic › peer-review

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T1 - Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium

AU - Bach, Christian W.

AU - Perea, Andres

N1 - Conference code: 19

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - Bayesian equilibrium constitutes the prevailing solution concept for games with incomplete information. It is known that from an ex-ante perspective Harsanyi's seminal notion is related both to Nash equilibrium as well as to canonical correlated equilibrium. We provide an epistemic characterization of Bayesian equilibrium from an interim perspective by means of common belief in rationality and a common prior. Since these epistemic conditions also characterize correlated equilibrium in the special case of complete information, our result substantiates that Bayesian equilibrium forms the incomplete information analogue to correlated equilibrium - and not to Nash equilibrium - in terms of reasoning.

AB - Bayesian equilibrium constitutes the prevailing solution concept for games with incomplete information. It is known that from an ex-ante perspective Harsanyi's seminal notion is related both to Nash equilibrium as well as to canonical correlated equilibrium. We provide an epistemic characterization of Bayesian equilibrium from an interim perspective by means of common belief in rationality and a common prior. Since these epistemic conditions also characterize correlated equilibrium in the special case of complete information, our result substantiates that Bayesian equilibrium forms the incomplete information analogue to correlated equilibrium - and not to Nash equilibrium - in terms of reasoning.

U2 - 10.4204/EPTCS.379.1

DO - 10.4204/EPTCS.379.1

M3 - Conference article in proceeding

T3 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science

SP - 1

EP - 1

BT - ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379)

PB - Open Publishing Association

T2 - 19th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge

Y2 - 28 June 2023 through 30 June 2023

ER -

Bach CW, Perea A. Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium. In ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE (EPTCS 379): Proceedings Nineteenth conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Oxford, United Kingdom, 28-30th June 2023. 379 ed. Open Publishing Association. 2023. p. 1-1. (Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science). doi: 10.4204/EPTCS.379.1

Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium

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