Contract Prolongation in Scientific Institutions: The Principal's Optimum under Moral Harzard

T.H.W. Ziesemer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

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Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInstitutional Economics: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Applications
EditorsD Ipsen, H Peukert
Place of PublicationFrankfurt/Main
PublisherHaag & Herchen
Pages105-115
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002

Cite this

Ziesemer, T. H. W. (2002). Contract Prolongation in Scientific Institutions: The Principal's Optimum under Moral Harzard. In D. Ipsen, & H. Peukert (Eds.), Institutional Economics: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Applications (pp. 105-115). Haag & Herchen.