Common belief in future and restricted past rationality

Ruben Becerril-Borja, Andres Perea*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)711-747
Number of pages37
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume49
Issue number3
Early online date10 Mar 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2020

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games
  • c73 - "Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"

Keywords

  • Epistemic game theory
  • Dynamic games
  • Proper rationalizability
  • Belief in future rationality
  • Belief in restricted past rationality
  • PROPER RATIONALIZABILITY
  • BEHAVIOR

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