Abstract
Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are
uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.
uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
Number of pages | 19 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 8 Feb 2018 |
Publication series
Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
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Number | 004 |
JEL classifications
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- random social choice function
- single-peaked domain
- trees
- strategy-proofness