Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees

Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are
uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages19
Publication statusPublished - 8 Feb 2018

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda

JEL classifications

  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"


  • random social choice function
  • single-peaked domain
  • trees
  • strategy-proofness

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