Abstract
We study repeated zero-sum games where one of the players pays a certain cost each time he changes his action. We derive the properties of the value and optimal strategies as a function of the ratio between the switching costs and the stage payoffs. In particular, the strategies exhibit a robustness property and typically do not change with a small perturbation of this ratio. Our analysis extends partially to the case where the players are limited to simpler strategies that are history independent-namely, static strategies. In this case, we also characterize the (minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1811-2382 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 1 Nov 2022 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2023 |
Keywords
- switching costs
- repeated games
- stochastic games
- zero-sum games