The possibility of judgment agregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

F.K. Dietrich

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14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)603-638
Number of pages36
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume145
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2010

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