Abstract
Purpose
Buyers and suppliers often perceive relationship governance mechanisms, such as trust and contractual fairness, in different ways. These differences in perception create an extra layer of complexity that is often ignored in the extant literature. This study adds to the understanding of how perceived asymmetries in trust and contractual fairness, two key relationship governance mechanisms, impact relational rents. This study also analyzes how boundary spanners aid managers to deal with these perceived asymmetries.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on survey data of 103 buyer–supplier dyads from a single global manufacturer of industrial equipment, the authors test hypotheses of perceived asymmetries in trust and contractual fairness, as well as the moderating effect of boundary spanners, on relational rents.
Findings
This research challenges the belief that asymmetries negatively impact or lead to unstable buyer–supplier relationships. Furthermore, it explains how preferential treatment and length of the relationship could reduce the impact of asymmetric perceptions.
Practical implications
This study stresses that open communication, which considers different viewpoints, helps to overcome the negative differences in attitude and perception. In addition, the authors found that long-term relationships seem to be far more resilient in dealing with asymmetries and that preferential treatments are best applied in (approximately) symmetric relationships in terms of contractual fairness.
Originality/value
While studies on buyer–supplier relationships often assume symmetric perceptions of governance mechanisms, asymmetric perceptions are far more prominent in reality. This study aims to improve one’s understanding of the impact of these asymmetries as well as how boundary spanners can affect these perceptions.
Buyers and suppliers often perceive relationship governance mechanisms, such as trust and contractual fairness, in different ways. These differences in perception create an extra layer of complexity that is often ignored in the extant literature. This study adds to the understanding of how perceived asymmetries in trust and contractual fairness, two key relationship governance mechanisms, impact relational rents. This study also analyzes how boundary spanners aid managers to deal with these perceived asymmetries.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on survey data of 103 buyer–supplier dyads from a single global manufacturer of industrial equipment, the authors test hypotheses of perceived asymmetries in trust and contractual fairness, as well as the moderating effect of boundary spanners, on relational rents.
Findings
This research challenges the belief that asymmetries negatively impact or lead to unstable buyer–supplier relationships. Furthermore, it explains how preferential treatment and length of the relationship could reduce the impact of asymmetric perceptions.
Practical implications
This study stresses that open communication, which considers different viewpoints, helps to overcome the negative differences in attitude and perception. In addition, the authors found that long-term relationships seem to be far more resilient in dealing with asymmetries and that preferential treatments are best applied in (approximately) symmetric relationships in terms of contractual fairness.
Originality/value
While studies on buyer–supplier relationships often assume symmetric perceptions of governance mechanisms, asymmetric perceptions are far more prominent in reality. This study aims to improve one’s understanding of the impact of these asymmetries as well as how boundary spanners can affect these perceptions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 91-121 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | International Journal of Operations & Production Management |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 1 Dec 2021 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 3 Jan 2022 |
Keywords
- Buyer-supplier relationships
- Governance mechanisms
- Trust
- Contractual fairness
- Relational rents
- TRANSACTION COSTS
- PERFORMANCE
- FAIRNESS
- POWER
- MODEL
- INTEGRATION
- DEPENDENCE
- CONTRACTS
- JUSTICE
- INTERDEPENDENCE