Strategy-Proof Voting for Single Issues and Cabinets

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Abstract

In a model with a continuum of voters with symmetric single-peaked preferences on the one-dimensional unit interval (representing the political spectrum) a voting rule assigns to each profile of votes a point in the interval. We characterize all voting rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, pareto optimal, and which satisfy a weak form of continuity. This result paves the way for studying cabinet formation rules. A cabinet is an interval which has obtained sufficiently many votes. The main result on cabinet formation is a characterization of all cabinet formation rules that are strategy-proof with respect to the endpoints of the cabinet, anonymous, pareto optimal, and continuous.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-43
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number126
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

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