Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher; Yuki Tamura

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher^*, Yuki Tamura

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Imagine a group of agents, each being endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. Each agent has single-dipped preferences. We characterize the Pareto optimal allocations that satisfy individual rationality or coalitional rationality. In particular, we show that Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations always exist, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core.

Original language	English
Article number	111293
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	231
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293
Publication status	Published - Oct 2023

JEL classifications

d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"

Keywords

resource reallocation
single-dipped preferences
Pareto optimality
core

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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