Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

L.H. Ehlers; B.E. Klaus

doi:10.1111/1097-3923.00060

Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

L.H. Ehlers, B.E. Klaus

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies pareto efficiency and “solidarity” (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	167-184
Journal	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume	3
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00060
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2001

Access to Document

10.1111/1097-3923.00060

Cite this

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