Shortest path to mechanism design

Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

Mechanism design is concerned with computing desired outcomes in situations where data is distributed among selfish agents. We discuss some of the most fundamental questions in the design of mechanisms, and derive simple answers by interpreting the problem in graph-theoretic terms. Specifically, much of mechanism design is thereby reformulated as shortest path problems.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages83-94
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9783319249711
ISBN (Print)9783319249704
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jan 2016

Keywords

  • allocation rule
  • type space
  • type graph
  • true type
  • Vickrey auction

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