TY - JOUR
T1 - Rules Rather Than Discretion in Audit Standards: Going-Concenr Opinions in Belgium
AU - Vanstraelen, A.
AU - Carcello, J.A.
AU - Willenborg, M.
PY - 2009/1/1
Y1 - 2009/1/1
N2 - We study going-concern (GC) reporting in Belgium to examine the effects associated with a shift toward rules-based audit standards. Beginning in 2000, a major revision in Belgian GC audit standards took effect. Among its changes, auditors must ascertain whether their clients are in compliance with two "financial-juridical criteria'' for board of directors' GC disclosures. In a study of a sample of private Belgian companies, we report two major findings. First, there is a decrease in auditor Type II errors, particularly by non-Big 6/5 auditors for their clients that fail both criteria. Second, there is an increase in Type I errors, again particularly for companies that fail both criteria. We also conduct an ex post analysis of the decrease in Type II errors and the increase in Type I errors. Our findings suggest the standard engenders both favorable and un-favorable effects, the net of which depends on the priorities assigned to the affected parties (creditors, auditors, companies, and employees).
AB - We study going-concern (GC) reporting in Belgium to examine the effects associated with a shift toward rules-based audit standards. Beginning in 2000, a major revision in Belgian GC audit standards took effect. Among its changes, auditors must ascertain whether their clients are in compliance with two "financial-juridical criteria'' for board of directors' GC disclosures. In a study of a sample of private Belgian companies, we report two major findings. First, there is a decrease in auditor Type II errors, particularly by non-Big 6/5 auditors for their clients that fail both criteria. Second, there is an increase in Type I errors, again particularly for companies that fail both criteria. We also conduct an ex post analysis of the decrease in Type II errors and the increase in Type I errors. Our findings suggest the standard engenders both favorable and un-favorable effects, the net of which depends on the priorities assigned to the affected parties (creditors, auditors, companies, and employees).
U2 - 10.2308/accr.2009.84.5.1395
DO - 10.2308/accr.2009.84.5.1395
M3 - Article
SN - 0001-4826
VL - 84
SP - 1395
EP - 1428
JO - Accounting Review
JF - Accounting Review
IS - 5
ER -