Reasoning-based introspection

O. Gossner, E. Tsakas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules, the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of partitional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth and introspection that is partly based on reasoning.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)513-523
Number of pages11
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume73
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2012

Keywords

  • Knowledge
  • Introspection
  • Truth axiom
  • Partitional information structures
  • Epistemic game theory
  • BAYESIAN PLAYERS
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • KNOWLEDGE
  • DISAGREE
  • GAMES

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