PERFECT EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES

F THUIJSMAN*, SH TIJS, OJ VRIEZE

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examine stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. For the beta-discounted case, as well as for the irreducible limiting average case, we show the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria and give characterizations of those equilibria. In the final section, we give an example which illustrates that the existence of stationary limiting average equilibria in a nonirreducible stochastic game does not imply the existence of a perfect limiting average equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)311-324
JournalJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume69
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 1991

Keywords

  • STOCHASTIC GAMES
  • EQUILIBRIA
  • TREMBLING-HAND PERFECT EQUILIBRIA

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