Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

C.J. Haake, B.E. Klaus

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5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by hatfield and milgrom (in a econ rev, 95(4), 913–935, 2005), and analyze (maskin) monotonic and nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable. Furthermore, any solution that is pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence. In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)393-410
Number of pages18
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume41
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2009

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