Micro-evidence on product and labor market regime differences between Chile and France

Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American and Western European countries. Such institutional and organizational differences might shape firms’ operational environment in general and the type of competition in product and labor markets in particular. The purpose of this paper is to identify and quantify industry differences in product and labor market imperfections in Chile and France. Design/methodology/approach – The authors rely on two extensions of Hall’s econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins by nesting three labor market settings (LMS) (perfect competition (PC) or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining (EB) and monopsony). Using an unbalanced panel of 1,737 firms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile and 14,270 firms over the period 1994-2001 in France, the authors first classify 20 comparable manufacturing industries in six distinct regimes that differ in the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. The authors then investigate industry differences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters. Findings – Consistent with differences in institutions and in the industrial relations system in the two countries, the authors find regime differences across the two countries and cross-country differences in the levels of product and labor market imperfection parameters within regimes. Originality/value – This study is the first to compare the type and the degree of industry-level product and labor market imperfections inferred from consistent estimation of firm-level production functions in a Latin American and a Western European country. Using firm-level output price indices, the microeconomic production function estimates for Chile are not subject to the omitted output price bias, as is often a major drawback in microeconometric studies of firm behavior. © 2016, © Emerald Group Publishing Limited.