Matchings and Preferences of Couples

B.E. Klaus; F. Klijn

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006

Matchings and Preferences of Couples

B.E. Klaus^*, F. Klijn

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	75-106
Number of pages	32
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	121
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2005

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006

Cite this

@article{f1ad6a8c520840c4a9833a35aa1ad53d,

title = "Matchings and Preferences of Couples",

abstract = "Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.",

author = "B.E. Klaus and F. Klijn",

year = "2005",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006",

language = "English",

volume = "121",

pages = "75--106",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Elsevier Science",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Matchings and Preferences of Couples

AU - Klaus, B.E.

AU - Klijn, F.

PY - 2005/1/1

Y1 - 2005/1/1

N2 - Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.

AB - Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 121

SP - 75

EP - 106

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

ER -