Abstract
Collusion theory robustly predicts non-cartel rivals to raise their price and increase their output. As the typical cartel cuts back production, its competitors are expected to gain market share during the collusive period and to lose market share in
the period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by showing that it applied to the European truck cartel. We also illustrate how our analysis can be used in the prosecution stage. One truck manufacturer
denied cartel participation, whereas the proposed market share test supports the European Commission's finding that this firm was, in fact, a member.
the period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by showing that it applied to the European truck cartel. We also illustrate how our analysis can be used in the prosecution stage. One truck manufacturer
denied cartel participation, whereas the proposed market share test supports the European Commission's finding that this firm was, in fact, a member.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
Number of pages | 26 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 11 Jul 2023 |
Publication series
Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
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Number | 011 |
ISSN | 2666-8807 |
JEL classifications
- l10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
- l40 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Keywords
- cartel detection
- competition law enforcement
- European truck cartel
- incomplete cartels
- umbrella pricing