Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market

Ralph De Haas*, Matteo Millone*, Jaap Bos*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We analyze contract-level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a competitive microcredit market. Our findings are threefold. First, information sharing reduces defaults, especially among new borrowers, and increases the return on lending. Second, lending tightens at the extensive margin as loan officers, using the new registry, reject more applications. Third, lending also tightens at the intensive margin: microloans become smaller, shorter, and more expensive. This affects both new borrowers and lending relationships established before the registry. In contrast, repeat borrowers whose lending relationship started after the registry introduction begin to benefit from larger loans at lower interest rates.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages41
JournalJournal of Money Credit and Banking
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 8 Jun 2021

JEL classifications

  • d04 - "Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation"
  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
  • g21 - "Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages"
  • g28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Keywords

  • credit registry
  • information sharing
  • overborrowing

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