We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in the form of types (signals). We assume that types are distributed from a state-dependent continuous distribution. In this model, Bayesian equilibrium voting and efficient voting coincide, and informative voting means that a voter votes in favor of the issue if and only if the signal exceeds a cut-point level. Our main result is an answer, in the form of a condition on the parameters of the model, to the question when informative voting is efficient.
|Series||GSBE Research Memoranda|
- c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
- d80 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
- d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
- private information
- efficient information aggregation
- strategic voting