Abstract
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a novel class of threshold rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules impose that a delegation is chosen when its combined support in the society first reaches a particular percentage of the public opinion
- depending on the size of the delegation. Conversely, minority opinions that are not reflected in the delegation should always be below a threshold, which follows a geometric series.
- depending on the size of the delegation. Conversely, minority opinions that are not reflected in the delegation should always be below a threshold, which follows a geometric series.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 6 Apr 2017 |
Publication series
Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
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Number | 008 |
JEL classifications
- c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
Keywords
- aggregation rules
- committee selection
- conflict management
- Kemeny Distance
- strategy-proofness