How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?

Burak Can, Péter Csóka, Emre Ergin

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

985 Downloads (Pure)


This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a novel class of threshold rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules impose that a delegation is chosen when its combined support in the society first reaches a particular percentage of the public opinion
- depending on the size of the delegation. Conversely, minority opinions that are not reflected in the delegation should always be below a threshold, which follows a geometric series.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Publication statusPublished - 6 Apr 2017

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda

JEL classifications

  • c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"


  • aggregation rules
  • committee selection
  • conflict management
  • Kemeny Distance
  • strategy-proofness

Cite this