Abstract
We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to operate on a common platform. Adopting new platforms is costly. We first provide an algorithm that determines the efficient outcome. Then we prove that no individually rational and feasible Groves mechanism exists. We provide sufficient conditions that determine when an individually rational Groves mechanism runs a deficit and we characterize the individually rational Groves mechanism that minimizes such deficit whenever it occurs. Moreover, for 2-agent economies, we single out the only feasible and symmetrical Groves mechanism that is not Pareto dominated by another strategy-proof, feasible and symmetrical mechanism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-37 |
Number of pages | 37 |
Journal | Review of Economic Design |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2016 |
JEL classifications
- d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- d62 - Externalities
- c60 - "Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General"
Keywords
- Groves mechanisms
- Externality
- Budget surplus or deficit
- Pareto undominated mechanisms