TY - JOUR
T1 - Fairly taking turns
AU - Mackenzie, Andrew
AU - Komornik, Vilmos
N1 - Funding Information:
The work of V.K. was partially supported by the grant No. 11871348 of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). We thank two anonymous referees, Steven Brams, Jens Gudmundsson, Ehud Lehrer, Mihai Manea, William Thomson, Christian Trudeau, Yu Zhou, Bill Zwicker, and participants at the 2023 Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference.
No data was used for the research described in the article.
PY - 2023/11/1
Y1 - 2023/11/1
N2 - We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy-free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.
AB - We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy-free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time period, strategy-proofness, and a notion of computational simplicity.
KW - Fair division
KW - Intertemporal choice
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.005
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 142
SP - 743
EP - 764
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -