Executive accountability to national parliaments in post-crisis EU affairs: The persistent shortcomings in the Councial and the European Council oversight

Diane Fromage*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

This chapter analyses the ability, or inability, of five national parliaments (nps)—the british, french, german, italian, and spanish—to influence and hold their governments accountable for their action in the council of the eu (council) and the european council. The analysis suggests that a mandating system in all parliamentary chambers is not desirable since it would eventually impair negotiations in council and european council meetings. Yet it does show that even after the lisbon treaty and the euro crisis, the existing scrutiny mechanisms remain insufficient for all parliaments to exert substantial influence on eu affairs. Most importantly, there are times when these mechanisms are not even fully used, although some progress can be observed in recent years. The chapter concludes by proposing a way forward in enhancing national parliamentary control over their government’s eu policy.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNational parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro crisis: Resilience or resignation?
EditorsDavor Jancic
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages159-175
Number of pages17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • National parliaments
  • European Union
  • Accountability
  • European Council

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