Abstract
Dubins and Savage (How to gamble if you must: inequalities for stochastic processes, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965) found an optimal strategy for limsup gambling problems in which a player has at most two choices at every state x at most one of which could differ from the point mass δ(x). Their result is extended here to a family of two-person, zero-sum stochastic games in which each player is similarly restricted. For these games we show that player 1 always has a pure optimal stationary strategy and that player 2 has a pure ϵ-optimal stationary strategy for every ϵ>0. However, player 2 has no optimal strategy in general. A generalization to n-person games is formulated and ϵ-equilibria are constructed.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 559-579 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 24 Mar 2021 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2021 |
Keywords
- Stochastic game
- Optimal strategy
- Equilibrium
- Limsup payoff
- Liminf payoff