Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks

C. Fosco, F. Mengel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We study the coevolution of networks and action choices in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents in our model learn about both action choices and choices of interaction partners (links) by imitating successful behavior of others. The resulting dynamics yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors coexist under a wide range of parameters. Two scenarios can arise. Either there is "full separation" of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is "marginalization" of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. 

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)641-658
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics & Control
Volume35
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2011

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Cooperation
  • Imitation learning
  • Network formation
  • COORDINATION
  • MODEL

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