TY - JOUR
T1 - Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
AU - Peleg, B.
AU - Peters, H.J.M.
AU - Storcken, A.J.A.
PY - 2005/1/1
Y1 - 2005/1/1
N2 - A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto social choice correspondences.
AB - A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto social choice correspondences.
U2 - 10.1007/s001820400179
DO - 10.1007/s001820400179
M3 - Article
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 33
SP - 381
EP - 396
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
ER -