Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences

B. Peleg*, H.J.M. Peters, A.J.A. Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto social choice correspondences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)381-396
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2005

Cite this