Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

Laura Kasper, Hans Peters*, Dries Vermeulen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Web of Science)

Abstract

We identify the maximal voting correspondence which is Condorcet Consistent and satisfies two participation conditions, namely the Top Property and the Bottom Property thereby extending a result in Perez (2001). The former participation condition says that if an alternative is in the chosen set at a profile of rankings and a ranking is added with that alternative on top, then it remains to be a member of the chosen set. The latter says that if an alternative is not in the chosen set at a profile of rankings and a ranking is added with that alternative at bottom, then the alternative is again not in the chosen set. In particular, voting functions (single-valued voting correspondences) with these three properties select from this maximal correspondence, and we demonstrate several ways in which this can or cannot be done.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-42
Number of pages7
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume99
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2019

Keywords

  • PRINCIPLE
  • CHOICE

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