Competition policy and cartel size

A.M. Bos, J.E. Harrington Jr.

Research output: Working paperProfessional

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Abstract

This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy makes the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either increase or decrease their inclusiveness. Highly inelastic market demand is sufficient for the presence of a competition authority to cause the least inclusive stable cartels to increase in size.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number027

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