Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis

Giacomo Bonanno*, Elias Tsakas

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231-241
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue numberNovember 2018
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018


  • Ordinal payoffs
  • Rationality
  • Common belief
  • Dominance
  • Iterated deletion procedure

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