Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis

Giacomo Bonanno, Elias Tsakas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231-241
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume112
Issue numberNovember 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018

Keywords

  • Ordinal payoffs
  • Rationality
  • Common belief
  • Dominance
  • Iterated deletion procedure
  • RATIONALIZABILITY
  • PROBABILITY
  • LOGIC

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