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ESSAYS ON CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND GENDER IN COLOMBIA



Eliana Rubiano-Matulevich

Essays on Conflict-Induced Displacement and Gender in Colombia

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Essays on Conflict-Induced Displacement and Gender in Colombia

Dissertation

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on the authority of the Rector Magnificus Prof. Dr. Rianne M. Letschert
in accordance with the decision of the Board of Deans,
to be defended in public on Friday, the 25th of June 2021 at 9.30 hrs

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To Ezequiel, Nicolas, and Siena

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| ATT | Average Treatment on the Treated |
| DHS | Demographic and Health Survey |
| DID | Differences-in-differences |
| DNP | Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Planning Department) |
| ELCA | Encuesta Longitudinal Colombiana (Colombian Longitudinal Survey) |
| ELN | Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) |
| ERP | Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army) |
| FARC | Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces) |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GRI | Gender Roles Index |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| ODI | Overseas Development Institute |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PRIO | Peace Research Institute Oslo |
| PSM | Propensity Score Matching |
| SEM | Simultaneous Equation Model |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNRISD | United Nations Research Institute for Social Development |
| US | United States |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WDI | World Development Indicators |

1 Introduction

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that as of December 2019, the number of people displaced due to war, conflict, persecution, and human rights violations had amounted to a staggering 79.5 million, the highest number on record according to available data (UNHCR, 2020). Several crises in different parts of the world contributed to these numbers over the past decade. These crises include, among others, the Syrian conflict that started in 2011 and continues today; the displacement crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo; the outflow of Venezuelans across Latin America; and the protracted conflict in Colombia, the setting of this study.

Conflict-induced displacement is a phenomenon with long-term consequences, including psychological trauma and catastrophic loss of human and physical capital. Many reports highlight the fact that women's and men's experience of and response to displacement is highly differentiated (El-Bushra, 2000; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014; Gururaja, 2000; Levine et al., 2019). However, the empirical literature on the impacts of displacement is still in its early stages and even fewer studies consider gender-specific effects, partly due to the lack of sex-disaggregated data in the contexts where displacement takes places (Brück & Schindler, 2009; Buvinic et al., 2013; Gulesci, 2018; Ruiz et al., 2015; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2013, 2018).

In all countries around the world, gender inequality is embedded into social structures through the relations of power, the intra-household division of work, and gender norms that dictate appropriate behaviors for women and men (Connell & Pearse, 2015; Kabeer, 1997, 2015; Sen, 1990). Research on the gender dimensions of displacement is thus needed to identify and understand the relationship between the socio-economic characteristics of displaced persons, poverty, and vulnerability to inform policy responses that can succeed in creating durable solutions.

This dissertation contributes to the literature by exploring the gender dimensions of conflict-induced displacement in Colombia, a middle-income country with a long history of conflict and the second largest internally displaced population (IDP) in the world. Given the lack of rigorous evidence in this area, this study brings together and builds on various academic disciplines, including studies on conflict, migration, and economic shocks, as well as the literature of feminist economics and social norms. While displacement could affect multiple groups of the population, this study focuses on empirically estimating the impacts of displacement on the displaced.

Following this introduction, the dissertation is organized into four empirical chapters covering different angles of analysis, including household structures, gender roles, poverty, and gender norms. Each chapter takes a quantitative approach to examine eight research questions for which there is limited empirical evidence in the economics literature. Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures and the role of divorces or separations in explaining the change in household structures stemming from displacement. Chapter 3 addresses the extent to which conflict-induced displacement changes gender roles within a household and the extent to which it changes them at the community level. There are three research questions examined in Chapter 4. First, it is estimated to what extent displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty. Second, it is assessed to which extent poverty dynamics differ between displaced and non-displaced households and, third, Chapter 4 examines the role of household structures in explaining the likelihood of experiencing poverty in situations of displacement. Chapter 5 evaluates the extent to which gender norms become less traditional in situations of conflict-induced displacement. Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the main findings, a discussion of the limitations of the study, suggestions for future research, and policy implications.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 presents the overall research context. Section 1.2 formulates the problem statement and introduces the theoretical framework that guides the research. Section 1.3 defines key concepts relevant for this dissertation, followed by a description of the data and methodology in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the structure of the dissertation in detail.

1.1 Research Context

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), 45.7 million people had been internally displaced due to conflict and violence worldwide by the end of 2019. The stock of IDPs in Colombia, the setting of this study, constitutes 12 percent of that population, resulting in the second largest displacement in the world, behind only Syria (IDMC, 2020). Conflict-induced displacement in Colombia is directly linked to violence, but the underlying causes are as complex as the protracted conflict itself. Some of the factors that explain the complexity and evolution of the conflict include illicit drugs, weak institutions, the presence of multiple armed groups, and high levels of poverty and inequality (Ibáñez, 2008; LeGrand, 2003).

As explained by Ibáñez (2009), Colombia suffered from internal conflicts for most of the twentieth century. The first half of the 1900s was characterized by the fight to

control land, resources, and institutions. None of the events during this period, however, inflicted the level of violence on civilians observed with two specific conflicts during the second half of the century. The first one is “*La Violencia*” (1946-1966),¹ a period characterized by hostility between the two traditional political parties and high homicide rates (Roldán, 2002; Sánchez et al., 2001). The second conflict emerged during the 1960s with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), three guerrilla groups whose main objective was to seize power with attacks to the military and the occupation of rural areas. The violence intensified and expanded during the 1970s and 1980s with illegal drug trafficking, the main source of financing for these armed groups. Illegal drugs trade also led to the creation of right-wing paramilitary groups by drug lords and landowners to defend their territory from guerrilla attacks, which in turn, intensified the violence on civilians.

Similar to other situations of conflict in the world, the attacks on civilians are the main triggers for displacement in Colombia (Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011; Czaika & Kis-Katos, 2009; Engel & Ibáñez, 2007; Lischer, 2007; Shultz et al., 2014). The violence is directly linked to land disputes and drug trafficking, but it is also used as a strategy of armed groups to exert greater power and destroy social networks. At the same time, civilians often flee for security reasons or to avoid their children’s recruitment by armed groups (Ibáñez, 2008; Kay, 2001; Perez, 2002). Official figures indicate that when the main responsible for the displacement are guerilla and paramilitary groups (Ibáñez, 2009).

The nature of the conflict implies that displacement is not confined to specific areas of the country. Between 1997 and 2018, more than 6 million people were forced to flee their homes from 90 percent of the country’s 1,123 municipalities (Figure 1.1). While the phenomenon of internal displacement affects almost all municipalities in Colombia, its incidence has been more intense in areas of the territory characterized by weak institutional presence, where violence against civilians most often occurs (Angrist & Kugler, 2008; Ibáñez, 2009). For example, in places such as Bojayá and Riosucio, two municipalities on the Pacific coast of the country, on average more than 150 persons for every 1,000 inhabitants were displaced between 1997 and 2018.

¹¹ Exact dates might vary depending upon the source.




Figure 1.1. Number of IDP expulsions, 1997-2018

Source: Author based on data from the Colombian Registry of Victims (RUV).

As articulated by Shultz et al. (2014), conflict-induced displacement in Colombia differs from situations in other countries with large IDP populations in various aspects. First, people do not migrate *en mass* and they rarely cross international borders. The Colombian government estimates that between 1985 and 2012, 86 percent of displacements involved individuals and families (Acción Social, 2013). Massive displacements were more frequent in the early 2000s, when entire communities had to abandon their property following massacres, death threats, and disappearances (Ibáñez, 2009; Shultz et al., 2014). Second, the nature of the conflict in Colombia implies that displacement spans across generations. Only a few times in the last decades, has displacement in other countries surpassed Colombia's population of IDPs, as it was the case of Darfur in 2009 (IDMC, 2011; Shultz et al., 2014). In those countries, displacement has usually been prompted by wars or genocides; the number of IDPs escalated with the crisis, but then declined as the conflict resolved. Third, unlike other countries with large populations of IDPs, displaced individuals in Colombia are not singled out for their ethnic or religious

background; they do not fight the State and they are not militants. Most of them are peasants who seek safety in metropolitan areas. Fourth, while the incidence of displacement is lower in urban settings, cities hosting large populations of IDPs, such as Medellín, Cali and Bogotá, have experienced violence by parties of the armed conflict and criminal groups, which has led the phenomenon of intra-urban displacement (Atehortúa et al., 2013; Jacobsen, 2011).

The decades-long armed conflict in Colombia has affected men and women in a number of ways. Men have been more likely than women to be kidnapped, killed, and forcibly recruited by armed actors. They constitute most combatants and civilians who have been injured and disabled (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2020). Women and girls, on the other hand, are more likely to be victims of sexual violence and forced labor. They often assume the role of household heads and they tend to be the caregivers for family members disabled by war (Bouvier, 2016). Rural women are particularly vulnerable to the conflict, as they have limited access to, and control over, land and other assets (World Bank, 2019). This situation is aggravated by the dynamics of displacement, which often force women to flee because of sexual violence (ABColombia & US Office in Colombia, 2013).

Over the last 20 years, the Colombian government introduced various policies related to displacement. First, there is the passage of Law 387 of 1997 that recognizes displacement as a significant problem and assigns to the state the responsibility for the assistance and protection of IDPs.² Second, there is the Constitutional Court Judgment T-025 of 2004, which mandates national and regional entities to address the basic needs of displaced persons and any violations of their fundamental rights. Follow-up policies have set guidelines to recognize specific vulnerabilities of women and children, as well as of Indigenous and Afro descendants. Third, the Law 1448 of 2011 (the Victims and Land Restitution Law) enables victims of the armed conflict to receive assistance and reparation. This law recognizes victims' right to access truth and justice, and establishes concrete reparation measures including a program of land restitution (Arango, 2009; Engel & Ibáñez, 2007; Valcarcel & Samudio, 2017). Under this law, those who were dispossessed of or forced to abandon their land can apply for restitution or the legal and material return of their property. It also promises institutional accompaniment and support, including subsidies for acquiring or rebuilding homes for those who were forced to flee, whether they choose to return or resettle in another place (Thomson, 2017).

Despite the progress in the legislative framework, the living conditions of victims have not improved as expected. There are several factors that prevent the legislation from working. Overall, there appears to be a gap in the implementation of national

² Diario Oficial No. 43,091 (July 24, 1997). Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a255b374.pdf>.

policies due to the lack of funding and coordination between the various entities involved, poorly trained officials, and a weak culture of monitoring and evaluation (Koser, 2012; OECD, 2020). Similarly, policies have focused more on the provision of aid, rather than on developing strategies for people to become self-sufficient (Valcarcel & Samudio, 2017). When it comes to land restitution, fewer-than-expected applications have been received. Lack of trust in the government, especially in areas with the presence of armed groups, lack of information about the law, and difficulties in accessing relevant institutions are some of the reasons behind the low number of applicants according to potential beneficiaries (Amnesty International, 2014; Thomson, 2017). Furthermore, some claims are in areas that are still being fought over by the Colombian armed forces, guerrillas, and paramilitaries. Hence, having a land title granted by the government does not imply that families will be able to move (Amnesty International, 2013).

Following the enactment of Law 1448 of 2011, the government of Colombia established exclusive annual appropriations in the national budget for the displaced population. Similarly, the Annual Budget Law established guidelines to prioritize the execution of resources dedicated to assist IDPs. According to the National Planning Department, the value of resources allocated to the assistance and reparation of the victims of displacement in 2020 amounted to USD\$13.7 billion, representing 1.2 percent of Colombia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Furthermore, Figure 1.2 shows that appropriations and executions for the assistance of the displaced population increased by 85.2 percent between 2012 and 2020 (Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP], 2020).

In 2016, the government of Colombia and the FARC signed the peace accord that put an end to the armed conflict between both parties. According to official figures, the civil conflict left 8,405,265 victims, 80 percent of whom have been internally displaced, while 20 percent have been victims of other types of abuses such as attacks, homicides, threats or disappearances (Valcarcel & Samudio, 2017). Unfortunately, even after the peace accord has been signed, displacement continues as guerilla dissidents and new paramilitary groups fight in specific areas of the country (Campos, 2017; UNHCR, 2017).




Figure 1.2. National budget allocated to the IDP, 2002-2020
Source: DNP (2020).

1.2 Problem Statement

When it comes to the gender dimensions of displacement, much of the discussion centers around gender-based violence (GBV). Previous studies have documented increased levels of intimate partner violence, sexual violence and other forms of violence, including child marriage and sexual exploitation (Annan & Brier, 2010; Callaway & Martin, 2011; Cohen et al., 2013; Vu et al., 2014; Wirtz et al., 2014). Notwithstanding, displacement is also associated with shifts that would be expected to affect the risk of experiencing poverty, access to services, health outcomes, as well as potential changes in the drivers of inequality. And these shifts, *some* of which are discussed in detail in this dissertation, have a gender dimension. Importantly, displaced women and men, girls and boys often acquire vulnerabilities that are specific to them, such as psychological trauma, exposure to GBV, and catastrophic losses of physical and human capital. These vulnerabilities set them apart from other non-displaced populations, affect their ability to seize opportunities, and can trap them into chronic poverty (Moya & Carter, 2019; World Bank, 2017).

Building on Buvinić et al. (2013), Figure 1.3 presents the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 2 to 4 to outline the main mechanisms of transmission for the impacts of conflict-induced displacement on household structures, gender roles, and poverty. First-round effects include: (1) mortality due to violence, disappearances, and family separation; (2) GBV experienced in the process of migrating; (3) psychological trauma; (4) income, assets and networks loss; (5) lack of food,

livelihoods, and basic services; and (6) exposure to a different context. The diagram also illustrates a series of second-round effects (derived from the first-round of effects) that range from unbalanced sex ratios to intra-household tensions, divorces, and poor health. For example, adult men typically suffer the highest mortality in conflicts, creating a shortage of working-age males and a high share of widow-headed households (Box 1). This disruption in household structures can alter traditional gender roles and the risk of experiencing poverty. This point can be illustrated with the Rwandan genocide. The excess male mortality and family separations caused highly unbalanced sex ratios and a substantial increase in widow- or single female-headed households with large numbers of dependents, including orphans. In the aftermath of displacement, these households showed a less biased division of housework along gender lines, suggesting a change in traditional roles (Schindler, 2010). Following through the same example, the disruption of household structures and changes in traditional gender roles can affect the risk of experiencing poverty. If prior to displacement, the husband was the main breadwinner or the means to acquire livelihoods and assets, the newly formed female-headed household will experience a high poverty risk, particularly when it has dependents.

All these elements converge in Chapter 5 through the study of gender norms. Conflict-induced displacement changes material conditions and alters dynamics at the individual and community levels, where gender norms are produced and reproduced by women and men. Depending on the context, the disruptions in household structures, social networks, and living conditions can accelerate change in people's attitudes and behaviors. They can promote a positive change, that is, gender norms become less discriminatory and new attitudes and practices emerge or a negative change, which entails more discriminatory or rigid attitudes and practices. For instance, a qualitative study with Nuer IDPs in South Sudan reveals that not only women have adopted the role of breadwinner for their households, but they have also assumed traditionally male responsibilities, such as negotiating bride wealth payments (Grabska, 2013). Similarly, following the military assault of the Islamic State in 2014 and subsequent displacement, Iraqi women of the Yazidis minority group joined military units and took on responsibility jointly with men for keeping their families and communities safe (Černý, 2020).

The disruption of household structures is a distinguishing feature of conflict-induced displacement, which can drastically affect the household's size and composition, and relationships between household members. As previously mentioned, these disruptions are often caused by the separation or death of household members and, in many cases, tend to be reflected in a higher number of female-headed households and single caregivers (Buvinić et al., 2013). However,

partly due to the lack of appropriate data, most empirical studies on the consequences of displacement take this disruption as a given or approach it through descriptive analyses. The study presented in Chapter 2 takes this gap in the literature as a departing point and focuses on estimating the **effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures in Colombia**. Evidence from two interconnected strands of the economics literature, namely conflict and shocks studies, regarding the effects of both phenomena on household structures yield mixed results. Conflict studies often refer to increases in the share of female-headed households without male presence in the aftermath of civil wars (Brück & Schindler, 2009; Buvinić et al., 2013; Greenberg & Zuckerman, 2009; Ramnarain, 2016; Ruwanpura & Humphries, 2004). The literature on shocks, on the other hand, suggests that household structures have a cyclical behavior which is context specific. For instance, the average household size increased during Indonesia's 1998 economic crisis, as dependents moved to lower cost locations, while working age members joined other households that could absorb them (Frankenberg et al., 2003). In contrast, the average household size or traditional living arrangements were not altered by the 1994 Peso Crisis in Mexico (McKenzie, 2003).

The few studies investigating the effect of displacement on household structures focus on disruptions emanating from deaths or migration. The **second research question** in Chapter 2 delves into the dynamics of conflict-induced displacement to estimate **the extent to which divorces or marital separations explain the disruptions in household structures**. Knowledge about the composition of households, the gender and age distribution of household members, dependency ratios, and the proportion of different household types among the displaced is essential for the design of development programs. Unexpected demographic characteristics of displaced populations as well as the reasons behind the disruption if their households affect power dynamics and women's and men's ability to access economic opportunities and basic services.




Figure 1.3. Mechanisms of transmission for the gender impacts of displacement
Source: Author based on Buvinić et al. (2013).

Notwithstanding these dynamics, the household is often considered a black box in the literature of peacetime and even more so in conflict and post-conflict settings (Brück & Schindler, 2009). Some studies indicate that, in conflict settings, households reallocate labor and resources to cope with the loss of assets and the lack of income-generating opportunities (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Buvinic et al., 2013). In the absence of able-bodied working-age men or as a result of labor market dynamics, whereby displaced men's job insertion at the destination is slow, women often become primary breadwinners even in traditionally patriarchal societies (Grabska, 2013; Justino, 2017; Ruwanpura & Humphries, 2004). Qualitative research with Syrian refugees in Jordan, IDP widows in Nepal, Chechen refugees in the Czech Republic and IDPs in Darfur suggests that many displaced women become income providers for the first time in their lives, while also maintaining their roles as primary caregivers, leading to a double burden compounded by limited transport and public services, as well as gender norms that dictate their role in society (Culcasi, 2019; De La Puente, 2011; Petesch, 2017; Pirtskhalava, 2015; Ramnarain, 2016; Szczepanikova, 2005).

Although women and men experience and respond differently to displacement, the impact of this phenomenon on traditional gender roles is relatively under-researched (Gulesci, 2018; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2018). With the aim of bridging this knowledge gap, the study presented in Chapter 3 examines two research questions, namely, **the extent to which conflict-induced displacement alters traditional gender roles within the household** and **the extent to which displacement alters gender roles at the community level**. Studying gender roles in situations of displacement is important to understand how individuals and their households experience and respond to an extreme form of shock that entails significant losses and trauma. Furthermore, gender roles can help to explain the interaction between displacement and poverty and the channels through which displacement can perpetuate household poverty (Buvinic et al., 2013).

Indeed, many of the challenges presented by conflict-induced displacement affect victims' ability to escape poverty and set them apart from other non-displaced poor populations. In Colombia, for example, previous studies have found that displaced populations often become poorer after having fled rural areas (Ibáñez, 2008). Notwithstanding, most studies on displacement have researched income poverty rates at one point in time—as a snapshot of poverty—hence, little is known about the nature and dynamics of poverty for those who experience it over time, largely due to the lack of longitudinal survey data (Bussolo & Lopez-Calva, 2014; Hanmer et al., 2020; Ibáñez, 2008; Pape et al., 2019; Verme et al., 2016). The study presented in Chapter 4 contributes to understanding these dynamics by employing a longitudinal analysis to estimate **the extent to which conflict-induced displacement reduces the**

likelihood of escaping poverty and the extent to which poverty dynamics differ between IDP and non-IDP households. At the same time, the literature on household poverty among the displaced is largely focused on economic drivers. This might be partly due to the emphasis on the provision of income as a tool to move people out of poverty. As a result, the role of demographic factors in shaping displaced households' history of poverty remains understudied even though households are dynamic and even more so in situations of displacement. This study adds to the literature by examining how these demographic dynamics combine to produce vulnerability to poverty through a third research question, which estimates **the role of household structures in explaining the likelihood of experiencing poverty in situations of conflict-induced displacement.**

Finally, conflict-induced displacement creates risks and exacerbates vulnerabilities, but it can also provide opportunities to challenge gender norms that limit women's access to opportunities, slow down economic growth, and hinder poverty reduction efforts (Goldin & Katz, 2000; Harper et al., 2020). For example, the conflict and subsequent displacement of a large share of the population in Liberia resulted in major changes in the roles and activities of women and men. A variety of reports portray displaced women as taking on traditionally male tasks such as making bricks and building houses. Some studies even suggest that post-conflict Liberia has undergone a normative change, with women assuming leadership positions in agricultural and political organizations (Fuest, 2008; Petesch, 2017). Similarly, while acknowledging the devastating effects of the Rwandan genocide, various studies suggest that, partly due to the gender imbalance generated by the massacre of men, the government had reconstructed the country's institutions at different levels (Berry, 2017; Hunt, 2014; Powley, 2005). Today, at 61 percent, Rwanda has the highest number of female parliament representatives in the world (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], 2020). Laws enable women to own and inherit property; boys and girls attend compulsory primary and secondary education in equal numbers (World Bank, 2020, 2021).

Gender norms are adopted and endorsed by women and men through their behaviors and attitudes. They are shaped by multiple factors in individual, social, material, and structural domains that can be altered by conflict-induced displacement (Cislaghi & Heise, 2017; Cislaghi & Heise, 2020; Harper et al., 2020). In new settings, displaced women and men might access both factual and overt messaging about gender equality. Moreover, they can be exposed to more (or less) egalitarian attitudes through social interaction. Gender norms can also be influenced by the change in material conditions related to displacement (Agarwal et al., 2004; Connell & Pearse, 2015). Policies, regulations, decision-making processes, and institutions can reinforce or challenge gender norms in the populations whose lives

intersect with them (Cislaghi & Heise, 2020). The evidence in this area, however, is mostly anecdotal given the lack of representative data on displacement and the difficulty to measure gender norms. The study presented in Chapter 5 aims to bridge this knowledge gap by employing an innovative approach to answer the last research question in this dissertation which estimates the **extent to which gender norms become less traditional in situations of conflict-induced displacement**.

This dissertation adds to the existing literature on several levels. First, from a methodological perspective, the research brings together and builds on various academic disciplines. This includes studies on conflict, voluntary migration, and economic shocks, as well as the literature of feminist economics and social norms to analyze the gendered effects of conflict-induced displacement, a subject that remains under-researched in a growing field of study. Second, building on these different strands of the literature, this dissertation adapts existing approaches that go beyond the traditional headship comparison to shed light on the gender dimensions of displacement. Overall, it presents the first series of studies that exploit the longitudinal nature and hierarchical structure of existing household survey data to analyze differences in the way that women and men experience and respond to displacement.

Each chapter also makes a specific contribution to the literature. Chapter 2 presents the first study to empirically estimate the impact of conflict-induced displacement on household structures using longitudinal data. The approach and findings are not only relevant to migration and conflict studies, but also to the economic shocks literature. Conflict-induced displacement resembles an economic shock in many ways but tends to be more severe; it involves forced migration, and it has long-term consequences that are not necessarily observed with financial crises. Similarly, the few studies that refer to the effects of displacement on household structures focus on disruptions emanating from deaths or migration. This chapter presents exploratory analysis on the role of divorces or marital separations as a potential mechanism of transmission for the changes in household structures due to displacement.

While acknowledging the numerous accounts of women taking up new economic roles in conflict and post-conflict settings, Chapter 3 highlights the lack of rigorous evidence about the magnitude of these changes for both women and men. Only few of the studies referenced in this chapter (see for instance, De La Puente, 2011; Petesch, 2017) examine female participation in civic activities in post-conflict settings or in situations of displacement. None of them, however, examine changes in men's activities. The research in this chapter thus contributes to the literature by expanding the level of analysis on the effects of displacement from a unitary approach to the

household to consider intra-household dynamics. It details the differences in household- and community-level activities between IDP and non-IDP women and men and explores variations in gender roles among displaced couples. Second, this study is among the first to adapt a composite index of gender roles at the micro level in situations of displacement taking advantage of limited survey data.

The research presented in Chapter 4 brings together elements from the studies in previous chapters to analyze poverty dynamics among the IDPs and how they intersect with changes in household structures. It adds to the literature by exploiting the nature of longitudinal data to examine changes in the likelihood of escaping poverty over time and to better understand the risk of experiencing transient and permanent poverty in situations of displacement. It is also the first study with IDPs in Colombia that applies a gender lens to the data to capture the intersection between changes in household structures and poverty dynamics.

Finally, the study in Chapter 5 contributes to the literature in two main areas. First, it provides exploratory empirical evidence regarding the relationship between conflict-induced displacement and changes in gender norms, an area where most of the evidence comes from qualitative research. Second, it is the first study that attempts to operationalize a definition that recognizes the dual nature of gender norms using a nationally representative household survey in the context of conflict-induced displacement.

1.3 Key concepts

This subsection defines key terms that are used throughout the dissertation. In defining these concepts, special attention is paid to the Colombian context.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (UNHCR, 1998) define IDPs as:

“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”³ (p.1)

³ While this is a broad definition for IDP, there is no consensus on the distance an individual must flee in order to be considered IDP or on the moment internal displacement ends (Sarzin, 2017).

Overall, the integration of IDPs in international refugee regimes is limited. Unlike the 1951 Refugee Convention, these guiding principles are not legally binding international law, but they are based on human rights and serve as a guide for national laws and policies targeting IDPs (Koser, 2007; Koser & Martin, 2011).

The definition of IDP in this dissertation is consistent with the guiding principles, but it focuses exclusively on conflict-induced displacement. While many people in Colombia have experienced different types of displacement and, in some cases, a proportion of disaster-displaced persons had been previously displaced due to conflict, they are affected by fundamentally different phenomena. Most populations affected by disaster can return to their homes within months, whereas conflict-displaced persons usually cannot go back because of occupation by the actors that forced them to flee. Hence, their characteristics and ability to find durable solutions are substantially different (Koser & Martin, 2011; Shultz et al., 2014).

In many countries there are controversies around the treatment of IDPs and Colombia is not an exception. As articulated by Koser (2007), IDPs are often the most vulnerable groups of the population as they have not been able to leave the country where they are not safe. Because of this, some argue that more formal responses are required. For example, in the case of Colombia, the IDP status is assigned to a household (not to an individual), and it is transmitted across generations for the purposes of reparations. However, displaced persons often choose not to register because of fear of being targeted by armed actors (Sarzin, 2017). Others consider that IDPs are citizens of their countries that should not be treated differently from poor individuals who have not migrated.

Household structure

Following the definition adopted in the household surveys employed in this dissertation, a household refers to a person or a group of persons (either related or not by blood)⁴ who co-reside and share resources, including eating meals. Members of a household are individuals who live permanently in the household, and those who usually live there but who are absent for less than three months for reasons related to work, health, or vacation. People who migrated (including those displaced) permanently to other places—even if they contribute to the household's income—are not considered members.⁵

⁴ Evidence has shown that intra-household relations are not necessarily based on blood ties or marriage. For instance, in female-headed households, women are not necessarily the mothers of the children with whom they live (Chant, 2008).

⁵ For example, a spouse who works in another municipality and only lives in his or her household during the weekend will be considered a member. A person who has been kidnapped is not included as a member of the household.

The term *household structure*, on the other hand, describes the number, characteristics and relationships of people who co-reside and share resources (Burch & Matthews, 1987). In this dissertation, the measurement of household structures revolves around the idea of deviations from what is assumed to be a traditional form of living arrangement over the lifecycle of a household. Demographic factors that have a direct effect on household composition, such as nuptiality or birth are not the only events that bring new members into a household just as mortality is not the only route for leaving it (Bongaarts, 2001). In Colombia, a traditional structure is a nuclear household comprised of an adult couple of opposite sex and their children. Non-traditional structures are more complex configurations that might result from conflict-induced displacement, including single parents and one-person households.

Gender roles

Gender roles refer to appropriate behaviors, occupations and functions in which each sex is expected to engage (Anselmi & Law, 1998; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). For example, women are considered nurturing and affectionate, therefore they are expected to be the primary caregivers in the household. Men are seen as assertive and dominant, and they should be the main breadwinners for the household (Fischer & Anderson, 2012). Indeed, in many societies, paid and unpaid work is divided along gender lines. Compared to men, women tend to dedicate more time to domestic chores and fewer hours to the labor market. In rural areas, activities are also sex segregated. Men are primarily responsible for hard labor such as ploughing and construction, whereas women are in charge of children, cooking, and planting. Married women in developing countries often do not consider wage labor because of beliefs that their “place” is at home and because of gender norms that give men power over their labor decisions (Brydon & Chant, 1989).

Gender norms

Gender norms are conceptualized in different ways. In general, norms specify rules, conventions and institutions that dictate what should or should not be done (Harper et al., 2020). This dissertation is guided by Cislighi and Heise (2020), who define gender norms as:

Social norms⁶ defining acceptable and appropriate actions for women and men in a given group or society. They are embedded in formal and informal institutions, nested in the mind, and produced and reproduced through social interaction. They play a role in shaping women's and men's (often unequal) access to resources and freedoms, thus affecting their voice, power and sense of self."⁷(p. 415)

Gender norms are adopted and endorsed by men and women through their behaviors and attitudes and they relate to multiple spheres of life, including access to economic opportunities, education, health, violence against women, among others. According to Marcus et al. (2014) "norms bend, relax, evolve and change. Norms relax where people (men and women) challenge or cross boundaries of traditional gender roles or conduct, but their actions are not recognized as a legitimate and acceptable norm." (p.9).

1.4 Data and Methodology

This dissertation takes a quantitative approach to address eight research questions. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the four empirical chapters, the research questions, data used, and empirical strategy. Each chapter employs a quasi-experimental research design to explore the gender dimensions of displacement in a context of protracted conflict. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 use three waves of the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (ELCA for its Spanish acronym), collected between 2010 and 2016. This survey follows a sample of nearly 10,000 households located in urban and rural and it is representative of households residing in the five macro regions of Colombia, namely Bogotá, Central, Eastern, Atlantic, and Pacific. The rural sample is representative of small farmers in four rural regions, namely the Mid-Atlantic, the Coffee, Cundiboyacense and Center-East regions. The empirical strategy in these three chapters aims to partially address the potential issues of self-selection and endogeneity by employing a kernel-based propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of displacement on household structures (Chapter 2), gender roles (Chapter 3), and poverty (Chapter 4).

⁶ A rule of behavior related to the differences in societal expectations for women and men. Individuals prefer to follow such rule if they believe that most people in their reference network conform to it and believe they should follow it (Bicchieri, 2005; Mackie et al., 2015).

⁷ There are multiple definitions of gender norms. For instance, Connell and Pearce (2014) define them as the beliefs and rules, in a given community or institution, about the proper behavior of men and women. See Cislighi and Heise (2020) for a detailed review of concepts.

Table 1.1. Overview of empirical chapters

| Theme | Chapter 2 | | Chapter 3 | | Chapter 4 | | Chapter 5 |
|---------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| | Household structures | | Gender roles | | Poverty | | Gender norms |
| Research questions | What is the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures? | | To what extent does conflict-induced displacement change gender roles within the household? | | To what extent does conflict-induced displacement reduce the likelihood of escaping poverty? | | To what extent do gender norms become less traditional in situations of conflict-induced displacement? |
| | To what extent do divorces explain the change in household structures stemming from conflict-induced displacement? | | To what extent does conflict-induced displacement change gender roles at the community level? | | To what extent do poverty dynamics differ between IDP and non-IDP households? | | |
| | | | | | What is the role of household structures in explaining the likelihood of experiencing poverty in situations of displacement? | | |
| Focus | Size, headship, demographic composition | | Female breadwinners, hours of work for pay, index of gender roles in the labor market; participation in social and political organizations | | Monetary poverty (transient and chronic), wealth index | | Behaviors and attitudes around women's opportunities, contraception, mobility, violence against women, and patriarchy |
| Unit of analysis | Household | | Individuals | | Households | | Individuals |
| Data | Colombian Longitudinal Survey | | Colombian Longitudinal Survey | | Colombian Longitudinal Survey | | Demographic and Health Surveys |
| Number of rounds | Three | | Three | | Three | | Three |
| Period | 2010-2016 | | 2010-2016 | | 2010-2016 | | 2005-2015 |
| Empirical approach | Kernel-based propensity score matching adjusted difference-in-differences | | Kernel-based propensity score matching adjusted difference-in-differences | | Kernel-based propensity score matching adjusted difference-in-differences | | Kernel-based propensity score matching and multilevel modeling |

The analysis in Chapter 2 employs various proxies to illustrate the complexity of the 'household structure' concept, including the household size and the prevalence of female-headed households, which differentiates between *de facto* female heads (i.e., women with an absent partner) and *de jure* female heads (i.e., households led by widows, never married or separated women). Building on previous studies, it proposes a classification of households based on their demographic characteristics and dependency relations. Resulting structures comprise various mutually exclusive categories, namely, male and female single caregivers, one-person households, adult couples, and households consisting of multiple generations with and without children. To explore the role of divorces or separations in explaining the changes in household structures stemming from displacement, this study conducts exploratory mediation analysis. It employs a Structural Equations Models (SEM) to distinguish the direct impact of displacement on household structures from the indirect effect that passes through divorces.

The study presented in Chapter 3 looks at various proxies for gender roles within the household, such as the prevalence of female breadwinners, the number of hours that women and men work for pay, and an index of gender roles in the labor market. The index consists of three components, namely, the number of hours that women allocate to paid work relative to their male partners; women's occupational segregation; and women's level of education relative to their male partners. Recognizing that micro-level decisions ultimately affect women's and men's involvement in higher-level activities, this study also analyzes the effect of displacement on the participation of women and men in social and political organizations.

The methodology in Chapter 4 is informed by traditional poverty measurement theory, including monetary (Foster et al., 1984), chronic (Addison et al., 2009; Foster & Santos, 2012; Jalan & Ravallion, 2003) and structural poverty (Carter & Barrett, 2006; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). It also builds on the feminist economics literature that analyzes the gender dimensions of household income poverty (Chant, 2003, 2008; Chant & Campling, 1997; Kabeer, 1997). The analysis employs multiple proxies for poverty, including monetary measurements that track income and expenditure, and a wealth index based on the household's assets and access to basic services. In addition, this study employs the household typologies proposed in Chapter 2 to analyze the extent to which disruptions in household structures stemming from displacement intersect with household poverty dynamics.

Finally, the study presented in Chapter 5 empirically estimates the impact of conflict-induced displacement on gender norms by building on the work by Heise and Cislaghi (2017, 2020), who propose a definition of gender norms that brings

together two streams of theory and practice around gender equality. First, the work on social norms that evolved with behavioral economics (Bicchieri, 2005; Mackie et al., 2015) and second, the study of gender norms advanced by feminist scholars (Badgett & Folbre, 1999; Connell & Pearce, 2014; Connell & Pearce, 2015). The analysis in this chapter operationalizes the main aspects of the definition of gender norms by measuring behaviors and attitudes using household survey data (Alesina et al., 2013; Harper et al., 2020). The data come from three rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) collected between 2005 and 2015 and a municipal panel with indicators on conflict, violence, and public finances. With the aim to mitigate the potential issues of self-selection and endogeneity, the empirical strategy in this study also employs a two-stage approach involving kernel-based propensity score matching and multilevel models to examine the extent to which gender norms become less traditional in situations of displacement.

1.5 Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is divided into six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 provides new empirical evidence about the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures and the role of divorces or marital separations in explaining the change in household structures stemming from displacement. Chapter 3 builds on existing (limited) knowledge to empirically estimate changes in gender roles within the household and at the community level in situations of conflict-induced displacement. Chapter 4 considers the extent to which displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty and the role of household structures in explaining poverty dynamics among IDPs. Chapter 5 presents evidence about the effect of conflict-induced displacement on gender norms around reproductive health, economic opportunities, and mobility, as well as norms that condone violence against women, and endorse patriarchy. The final chapter of the dissertation concludes by summarizing the main findings of the research and its limitations. It also discusses outlines avenues for future research and policy implications.

2 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Changing Household Structures

2.1 Introduction

Conflict-induced displacement disrupts social networks and breaks households apart, drastically changing their size, composition, and living arrangements. For example, the size of nearly 47 percent of displaced households living in Bogotá, reduced, on average, from 6.2 members prior to displacement to 5.2 members afterwards. Some household members, particularly men, were killed or ‘disappeared,’ while others were forcibly recruited to fight (Vélez & Bello, 2010).

The empirical literature has recognized that household size and composition play a key role in the wellbeing of individuals. People living in larger households or with higher dependency ratios tend to be poorer (Lanjouw & Ravallion, 1995; Schultz, 2005). Thus, the relationship between conflict-induced displacement and household structures constitutes a promising field of research, relevant for policymaking. An improved understanding of such a link can gauge the design of interventions that account for patterns of distribution within households. These range from cash transfers and efforts to reach individuals in certain age groups, such as supplementary feeding to pre-school children or the elderly, to skills training programs targeting young women (Alderman et al., 1995). There is, however, a lack of empirical evidence quantifying the effects of displacement on the household size and composition, partly because of the lack of population-representative data.

The study presented in this chapter aims to bridge this knowledge gap by answering two research questions focused on the case of internal displacement in Colombia. First, it **estimates the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures**, a concept that describes the number, characteristics and relationships of people who co-reside and share resources. It employs multiple complementary proxies to illustrate the complexity of this concept, including the household size and the prevalence of female-headed households, which differentiates between *de facto* female heads (i.e., women with an absent male partner) and *de jure* female heads (i.e., households led by widows, divorced or single women). Further, based on existing literature, it proposes a classification of households based on their demographic characteristics and dependency relations. Resulting structures comprise various mutually exclusive categories, namely, male and female single caregivers, one-person households, adult couples of opposite sex with and without children, and households consisting of multiple generations with and without children. This study considers a second question for which there is very limited

evidence in the literature, namely **the extent to which divorces (or marital separations) explain the change in household structures stemming from conflict-induced displacement.**

The contributions of this study to the literature are summarized in three points. Firstly, most studies examining the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures and living arrangements are descriptive or assume the disruption of households as given. This chapter presents the first empirical study looking at these effects in a context of large-scale conflict using longitudinal data. The econometric approach attempts to mitigate potential issues of endogeneity and self-selection usually present in the analysis of migration by estimating a kernel-based propensity score matching difference-in-differences model using longitudinal data from nearly 10,000 households in Colombia. Secondly, this study contributes to the growing body of evidence on the effect of economic shocks on household structures. Conflict-induced displacement resembles these shocks in many ways but tends to be more severe and has long-term consequences that are not necessarily observed with other shocks, such as those associated with natural disasters or financial crises. Thirdly, it contributes to the literature by examining divorces or separations as a potential mechanism through which conflict-induced displacement affects household structures.

Empirical findings point to a number of patterns. First, conflict-induced displacement causes a reduction in the average household size. In a typical household comprised of four members, conflict-induced displacement reduced the average household size by at least one member between 2010 and 2016. This effect size is equivalent to the change in the average number of household members that took place over a period of three decades in Colombia due to multiple factors. Second, in a 6-year period, conflict-induced displacement caused a 5-6 percentage point increase in the prevalence of female-headed households, particularly those with a widow or a divorced head (*de jure* female-headed households). Relative to the change in headship patterns observed at the national level, an effect size of this magnitude in the prevalence of female headship is equivalent to a change that took almost twice as long (10 years) to take place in Colombia. Third, non-traditional structures consisting of female single caregivers and one-person households surged in response to conflict-induced displacement. These results, coupled with the reduction in the average household size indicate that, unlike *de jure* female heads in other countries with large-scale conflicts (i.e. Rwanda), women heads and their dependents in Colombia do not join other household units. Fourth, exploratory analysis suggests that the reduction in household size, the increase in the prevalence of female-headed households, and the surge of non-traditional structures consisting of female single caregivers and one-person households is partially mediated by a

growing count of divorces or separations. The increase in *de jure* female heads, on the other hand, is fully mediated by marital dissolutions among the displaced.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the empirical evidence on how household structures respond to events that alter what is presumed to be the “natural” course of the household lifecycle. Section 2.3 briefly describes demographic trends in Colombia. Section 2.4 presents a theoretical framework to analyze changes in household structures in the context of displacement, followed by Section 2.5 that describes the empirical approach and the data. Section 2.6 discusses the results, before concluding in Section 2.7.

2.2 Literature Review

The study of the link between conflict-induced displacement and household structures is closely related to three interconnected strands in the economics literature. The first strand is centered on conflict studies, which are mostly focused on the effect of ethnic or short-lived conflicts on household formation. The second strand has analyzed the relationship between voluntary migration and changes in living arrangements. The third strand refers to a number of recent studies exploring the effect of economic shocks on living arrangements. This section summarizes some of the evidence on how household formation changes in response to events that alter the “natural” course of the household lifecycle.⁸ The review looks at different stages of the displacement or migration process and refers to the effects that can be seen both in places of origin and destination. Further, it summarizes studies that analyze the impact on migrants, those who stay behind, and returnees.

2.2.1 Violent conflict, displacement, and household structures

Armed conflict has a profound effect on household demographics. In most cases, men experience high mortality rates, but they might also disappear or join armed groups. This absence implies that female-headed households without adult male presence and other vulnerable structures tend to increase in post-conflict situations. For example, Ruwanpura and Humphries (2004) indicate that in the aftermath of the civil conflict in Sri Lanka, women headed 20 percent of households, an outlier for the South Asia region where female headship is relatively low. Similarly, Ramnarain (2016) suggests that female-headed households in Nepal, a traditionally patriarchal society, constituted at least 20 percent of all households during the civil Maoist

⁸ According to Glick (1977), the lifecycle of the family refers to a series of stages through which an average family passes during its life span. For nuclear families, the concept refers to stages such as marriage, birth of children, children leaving home, the “empty nest” period, and the dissolution of marriage through death of one of the partners.

conflict (1996-2006). In Eritrea, the conflict that ended in independence from Ethiopia (1998-2000) generated a surge in households headed by single women—many of them ex-combatants—who had to settle in cities where job opportunities were scarce (Greenberg & Zuckerman, 2009).

Income and asset losses related to shocks—including armed conflict—often alter household formation decisions. In another study of the effects of the conflict in Eritrea, Blanc (2004) finds a drop in fertility rates, partly due to delayed age at marriage, but also because after the war, married women were less likely to be living with their husbands. However, in other cases, households might respond to conflict and related shocks by increasing fertility to replace children lost due to violence. For example, Verwimp and Van Bavel (2005) argue that Rwandan refugees living in Eastern Congo had higher fertility rates than non-displaced populations after the genocide, even though children had a lower probability of surviving.

Notwithstanding, the structures created by conflict, regardless of their size, are particularly vulnerable to poverty. In South Sudan, for instance, Grabska (2013) finds that the lack of networks, education, and assets of displaced Nuer, has reinforced vulnerabilities among female heads of households, particularly widows, who struggle to negotiate their position at the community level. In the abovementioned example of Sri Lanka, poverty rates experienced by this group were higher than those faced by the rest of the population due to the lack of access to productive resources preceding the crisis (Ruwanpura & Humphries, 2004).

Household structures also respond to the composition, proximity, and size of social networks. In general, social networks provide access to productive resources, such as land, finance, and labor, as well as social support. Yet, conflict-induced displacement removes women and men from their networks and environments, forcing them to alter their living arrangements and, sometimes, deeply rooted beliefs and norms to accommodate to their new situation. In Uganda, Obaa and Mazur (2017) find that kin networks were the most important source for IDP access to productive resources. However, only those living in proximity to displaced relatives received financial and care-related support in moments of crisis.

2.2.2 Voluntary migration and household structures

The characteristics of migration, including the reasons for moving, its duration, and ties to those left behind vary widely across countries (Desai & Banerji, 2008). This variation alongside contextual factors makes it difficult to generalize about the impact of migration on household structures. Regardless of who makes the decision about individual or group migration, evidence has shown that it affects household

configurations and living arrangements for dependents. In Ethiopia, Martin and Zulaika's (2016) findings reveal that parents migrated to urban centers in search of opportunities, leaving the children behind with their grandparents. As a result, structures consisting of children who lived with neither biological parent were three times more likely to be found in rural areas compared to urban areas. In Mexico, Kanaiaupuni (2000) reveals that migration of working age individuals to the United States has disrupted traditional living arrangements of parent-child co-residence and increased the likelihood of the elderly living alone.

These dynamics affect household structures in the place of origin and in the destination. For instance, Glick et al. (1997) show that, for most of the twentieth century and up until the 1980s, the United States registered a downward trend in the share of extended family households. Although this household configuration only showed a small increase at the national level, analysis of census data revealed that the growing share among the foreign population was influenced by the origin of immigrants. In particular, this differential was explained by increments in the proportion of young, single adults living with relatives among immigrants from Central America.

Another strand of the migration literature suggests that household structures affect the decision to migrate. Poor households, in particular, rely heavily on nonworking family members and their networks in the decision to migrate. For example, de Haan (2006) and Yang (2000) argue that members of extended households in parts of India and rural China, respectively, were more inclined to migrate to urban areas in search of work than their counterparts living in nuclear households. In both cases, these dynamics were explained by the fact that extended structures—compared to smaller nuclear households—usually had additional nonworking adults to help with farming, childcare and domestic chores while key members, including the main breadwinner, were away.

2.2.3 Economic shocks and household structures

Until recently, the adaptation of household structures in response to changing economic conditions has been a coping strategy that has received little attention in the empirical literature on economic shocks (Abanokova & Lokshin, 2015). While there is great variation in the effects of economic shocks on wellbeing, most of the evidence in this area focuses on co-residence as a form of insurance that allows household members to smooth consumption over time. Other strategies include changes in the location of residence of some household members.

Overall, the shocks literature suggests that the household size displays a cyclical behavior. For instance, multiple studies about the United States find an increase in the proportion of doubled-up structures (living with relatives or non-kin) in the wake of the recession of 2007. A permanent increase in unemployment reduced the number of households that were formed in the short term, particularly by young adults. In the long run, the number of households returned to its original level (Choi & Painter, 2015; Dyrda et al., 2012; Lee & Painter, 2013; Matsudaira, 2016). In another study, Gatskova and Kozlov (2019) show that families in Tajikistan tend to grow in size during migrants' absence to smooth consumption, but once the migrants return, members of the youngest generations are inclined to move out with a time lag of one or two years. In Indonesia, Frankenberg et al. (2003) find that the average household size increased during the 1998 crisis, as dependents moved to lower cost locations and working age members joined other households that could absorb them. This was also the case of household that experienced an income reduction after the 2008 crisis in Russia. Abanokova and Lokshin (2015) report that they were more likely to increase their size, compared to those whose income did not change after the crisis.

Notwithstanding this cyclical behavior, effects are also context specific. The 1994 Peso Crisis in Mexico had differential impacts on income and consumption across groups, but the average household size did not change compared to the pre-crisis period (McKenzie, 2003). Similarly, Winters et al. (2009) indicate that the economic crisis of the 2000s in Nicaragua forced households to incorporate extended families, particularly young adults, increasing the average household size. However, poor households that were beneficiaries of a large-scale conditional cash transfer during the same period were less likely to agglomerate during the crisis; hence their average household size remained unaltered.

2.3 Household Structures in Colombia

In the last decades, Colombia—and more generally an average Latin American country—has exhibited a substantial demographic change, mainly driven by fertility reductions. Figure 2.1 shows that between 1960 and 2017, the number of children born to a woman declined from 6.7 to 1.8, below the replacement rate, and below the average for both the region (2.0) and for middle-income countries (2.3). Before the 1980s, this downward trend was largely attributed to the improved availability of contraception. More recently, the decline in fertility has been linked to a shift in the timing of family formation (Batyra, 2016).




Figure 2.1. Fertility rates

Note: MIC stands for Middle-Income Countries; LAC stands for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Source: Author based on World Development Indicators (WDI) <http://databank.worldbank.org> (accessed January 2020).

Consistent with a substantial reduction in fertility rates, the number of members in the average Colombian household has seen a downward trend. Between 1990 and 2015, the household size diminished from 4.6 to 3.5 at the national level (and in urban areas) and from 5 to 3.6 members in rural areas. This is lower than the average household size for any other Latin American country with data, as it is the case of regional peers such as Peru (3.7) and Guatemala (4.8). Similarly, Figure 2.2 shows that the share of households with 6 or more members decreased from 30 percent to 12 percent since 1990 (61 percent), while those with 3 or fewer members gained relevance over time, now representing more than a half of all households. Although the decline in large units is common to all countries in the region, the reduction experienced in Colombia is by far, the largest, when the countries' data registered in 1990s and 2010s are compared.




Figure 2.2. Percentage of households by size, 1990-2015

Source: Author based on Demographic Health Surveys (DHS).

One of the most notable changes in household composition is the higher number of two-person households. This type of structure represents 19 percent of households in 2015, a 70 percent increase from its share in 1990. Compared to other Latin American countries with data, two-person households are not only more common in Colombia, but they have also seen the largest increase since the 1990s.

Another important point to highlight is the substantial increase in female-headed households over the last three decades. While this increase is consistent with regional trends, the long-lasting conflict in Colombia seems to have affected such patterns as well (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social & Profamilia, 2017). The prevalence of female headship in Colombia (36.4 percent) is one of the highest in the world⁹ and higher than that observed by the regional peers, such as Peru (26 percent) or Bolivia (21 percent).¹⁰

2.4 Theoretical Framework

This section borrows from the literature on conflict studies, migration, and economic shocks to develop a theoretical framework that describes the main effects of conflict-induced displacement discussed in the literature. It expands the framework on

⁹ Most recent data point between 2010 and 2018 using DHS data extracted from the World Bank Gender Data Portal on October 14, 2019. Colombia ranks 6th after Namibia, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Dominican Republic and Comoros.

¹⁰ The data for Peru correspond to 2012 and the data for Bolivia refers to 2008.

conflict and gender proposed by Buvinić et al. (2013) to describe *some* of the factors and processes that might affect the household size and composition in situations of conflict-induced displacement. Arguments from demography are also considered throughout the framework. The description of mechanisms is limited by the lack of rigorous evidence about intra-household dynamics in the context of conflict-induced displacement.

Following the definition adopted in the household survey used in this study, a *household* refers to a person or a group of persons (related or not by blood)¹¹ who are co-resident and share resources, including meals. Members are individuals who live permanently in the household, and those who usually live there but who are absent for less than three months for reasons related to work, health or vacation. People who migrated (including those displaced) permanently to other places—even if they contribute to the household’s income—are not considered members.¹²

The term *household structure*, on the other hand, describes the number, characteristics and relationships of people who co-reside and share resources (Burch & Matthews, 1987). The measurement of household structures revolves around the idea of deviations from what is assumed to be a traditional form of living arrangement over the lifecycle of a household. Demographic factors that have a direct effect on household composition, such as nuptiality or birth are not the only events that bring new members into a household just as mortality is not the only route for leaving it (Bongaarts, 2001). As explained in Section 2.3, a traditional structure in Colombia is a nuclear household comprised of an adult couple and their children. Non-traditional structures are more complex configurations that might result from conflict-induced displacement, including single-parent and one-person households.

Figure 2.3 presents the main mechanisms through which displacement can impact household structures by differentiating between the first- and second-round effects of displacement and coping strategies. The first-round effects of displacement operate through: (1) mortality due to violence, disappearances, and forced separations; (2) gender-based violence experienced by specific household members in the process of migrating; (3) psychological trauma; (4) income and asset loss; and (5) lack of food, livelihoods and basic services. Second-round impacts resulting from mortality include unbalanced sex ratios, for instance, due to excess male mortality. Another set of second-round effects emerge from psychological trauma, which can

¹¹ Evidence has shown that intra-household relations are not necessarily based on blood ties or marriage. For instance, in female-headed households, women are not necessarily the mothers of the children with whom they live (Chant, 2008).

¹² For example, a spouse who works in another municipality and only lives in his or her household during the weekend will be considered a member. A person who has been kidnapped is not included as a member of the household.

cause intra-household tensions and lead to marital separations, as well as poor mental and physical health due to food insecurity. The empirical analysis in this chapter, however, is only focused on shifts highlighted in Figure 2.3.

Conflict-induced displacement might fuel a temporary or permanent separation of household members. Members might die for reasons other than natural causes: either in the process of being displaced, due to the lack of food, livelihoods, and poor health, or due to the direct effects of violence. Women and children bear most of the indirect consequences of conflict-induced displacement, while more men die or disappear as a result of violence (Buvinić et al., 2013). The excess of male deaths increases the prevalence of widowhood, which is accompanied by a surge in female-headed and female single caregiver households (Box 1). The effect of these dynamics on the household size is not entirely clear. Depending on the context, gender norms, among other factors, *de jure* female heads might join relatives or support networks, increasing an average number of members per unit (Brück & Schindler, 2009). This behavior could be a strategy to seek protection or simply to cope with the shock in the absence of able-bodied men that can contribute to the household income. For example, during the financial crisis that hit Russia in 1998, single female heads and their dependents moved in with relatives to cope with economic hardship and the average number of members increased substantially (Lokshin & Yemtsov, 2004). In other contexts, and as a result of other shocks—notably conflict-induced displacement—smaller but more vulnerable structures remained independent units. The examples of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Eritrea described in the literature review illustrate this point (Greenberg & Zuckerman, 2009; Ramnarain, 2016; Ruwanpura & Humphries, 2004).

Individual members, such as orphaned children, might also join other households because of the disruption to their own household (Box 1) or because of increased labor demand from relatives (e.g. elderly members to help with childcare activities in the absence of one or both parents) (Brück & Schindler, 2009). As in the case of entire units joining other (male- or female-headed) households, the ability of individual members to join other families is partly determined by social norms that emphasize responsibility for kin in need of help (Burch & Matthews, 1987). This pattern might create living arrangements and structures that do not fit the “norm” of a traditional household consisting of parents and their offspring. For example, the disruption of structures is one of the legacies of South Africa’s apartheid. The marginalization of entire communities in areas where there were few income-generating opportunities implied that men were forced to migrate to urban areas to find a job, because restrictions prevented family migration or a permanent settlement. In the first decade after apartheid, many women also migrated in search of economic opportunities and were forced to choose between household

responsibilities and income generation. A longitudinal study suggests that less than 50 percent of all migration events post-apartheid (child, mother, or joint migration) ended in the co-residence of children and their mother. With most parents absent, grandmothers and extended family members played a crucial role in providing childcare (Hall & Posel, 2019).

The effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures can pass through the exposure of specific members to gender-based violence in the process of migrating, psychological trauma, stress, and high unemployment rates, which can create tensions among displaced couples and lead to divorces and separations (Boxes 2 and 3). For example, in societies where the ‘ideal’ man is linked to an idea of a breadwinner, unemployed men are likely to experience stress when they can no longer provide for their family and women assume economic responsibilities (Culcasi, 2019; Suerbaum, 2018). Qualitative evidence from Georgia and from northern Uganda reveals that both IDP women and men blamed high levels of intimate partner violence on the perceived lack of control experienced by men, complex economic conditions, as well as the disruption of their social networks (Kabachnik et al., 2013; Okello & Hovil, 2007). Norms around the distribution of tasks and responsibilities within the household often impose a double burden for IDP women who assume economic responsibilities, which might also exacerbate tensions within the household and lead to separations (Winters et al., 2009).

As underlined in the shocks literature, in the face of economic barriers, households struggle to find ways to maintain their standard of living. Rural India provides an example of how migration is used as a key livelihood strategy. Men often spend extended periods of time working in urban areas while maintaining close links with their places of origin. These dynamics have produced unusual household structures consisting of young men living in shared dwellings in urban peripheries (de Haan, 1997). However, in situations of displacement—and particularly in the case of Colombia, where this phenomenon is directly linked to land seizing by armed groups—households affected by this extreme form of shock have little decision-making power over their assets and resources (Box 4). While little economic rationality can be applied in this case, the migration literature suggests that some households often adopt split-household strategies, as in the case of China, where married couples living in rural areas reduced living costs by dividing into smaller units with lower dependency ratios (Tang, 2019). In situations of conflict-induced displacement, this type of strategy could be the result of individual members remaining in the place of origin to protect their assets. In Colombia, women and children often flee conflict in search of security, but men stay behind to protect the land (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007; Ibáñez, 2009). Qualitative evidence suggests that, in this process, conflict situations produced non-traditional arrangements such as

households of siblings and households with children living with non-relatives (Restrepo-Vélez & Hernandez-Bello, 2010).

Over time, household structures respond to demographic factors insofar as they advance through the lifecycle. However, changes in economic conditions, human capital losses, the trauma and stress attached to conflict-induced displacement might also affect variables associated with the household lifecycle, such as the decision to marry and have children (Box 5). For example, Rwandan women living in areas with the highest proportions of sibling deaths in the year of the genocide were more prone to marry and have children later compared with those living in areas with a lower proportion of sibling deaths (Jayaraman et al., 2009). Regardless of the channel through which displacement affects household structures, resulting configurations will be determined by myriad factors, including initial conditions, context, and prevailing gender norms, among others.




Figure 2.3. Mechanisms of transmission for the impacts of displacement on household structures
Source: Author based on Buvinić et al. (2013).

2.4.1 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework, the literature review, and the analysis of household structures in Colombia presented in Section 2.3, this study formulates and tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Conflict-induced displacement reduces the average household size and increases the prevalence of non-traditional household structures.

Conflict-induced displacement breaks households apart and reduces the average number of members among IDP households. This change is accompanied by an increase in the prevalence of female-headed households and non-traditional structures consisting of female single caregivers. Such a finding would be consistent with the empirical findings in post-conflict Eritrea, Nepal and Sri Lanka, but would be less aligned with the literature on shocks, in which most evidence points to an increase in the average household size, as entire units merge as a strategy to cope with economic hindrances. If this hypothesis is confirmed, the next step is to explore the factors that might explain the disruption of traditional household structures, as described by hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2: Reductions in household size and increases in the prevalence of non-traditional household structures resulting from conflict-induced displacement are partly explained by increases in divorces or separations.

Divorces and marital separations significantly increase as a result of displacement, breaking displaced households apart. The rise in separations might be explained by income losses and a series of factors including stress and trauma, as in the example of IDP women and men in Georgia and Uganda. As a result, the prevalence of smaller structures consisting of female-headed units and single caregivers increases. These newly created units do not join other relatives or support networks.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are consistent with the demographic patterns observed in recent decades in Colombia, namely, a reduction in the average household size, an increase in the prevalence of female-headed households, and delays in family formation. Therefore, it is possible that both displaced and non-displaced populations have experienced similar changes. The analysis in the following sections aims to disentangle the role of conflict-induced displacement in explaining these trends and to determine whether changes have been more marked among IDP households.

2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics

2.5.1 Data

This chapter uses data from the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (ELCA for its Spanish acronym) collected by the Center for Studies on Economic Development (CEDE) at Universidad de los Andes. The ELCA follows a sample of nearly 10,000 households located in urban and rural areas every three years. The urban sample is representative of households that belong to strata¹³ one to four at the national level and in five regions, namely Bogotá, Central, Eastern, Atlantic, and Pacific. The rural sample is representative of small farmers in four rural regions, namely the Mid-Atlantic, Coffee region, Cundiboyacense, and Center-East.

The main objective of the survey is to understand the socioeconomic changes that households and their members experience over time. The ELCA collects information on employment, social capital, land tenure and use, production, households' vulnerability and strategies to cope with shocks, as well as social and political attitudes and behaviors. It follows the same households and their members over time. To date, it has followed them for 3 rounds: 2010, 2013 and 2016. The sample amounted to 9,850 households in 2010, 9,254 in 2013 and 8,925 in 2016.

Internally Displaced Households

The *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 1998) define IDPs as:

“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”¹⁴ (p.1)

In this chapter, the definition of IDP is consistent with the guiding principles, except that it focuses exclusively on conflict-induced displacement.¹⁵ Importantly, for the

¹³ Colombia uses strata (estratos) to categorize areas based on housing infrastructure and conditions. Housing units and buildings are assigned a number on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 being the lowest on the socio-economic scale and 6 being the highest.

¹⁴ While this is a broad definition for IDP, there is no consensus on the distance the individual must flee in order to be considered IDP or when internal displacement ends (Sarzin, 2017).

¹⁵ Conflict-induced and disaster-induced displacement are fundamentally different phenomena. Natural disasters are non-intentional “acts of nature”, whereas armed conflicts involve intentional harm perpetrated by humans. Most populations affected by disaster-induced displacement can return to their

purposes of reparations, the IDP status in Colombia is assigned to a household (rather than to an individual), and it is transmitted across generations (Sarzin, 2017). Although the ELCA does not focus on (or oversample) displaced households, the questionnaire allows for direct identification of IDP households in comparison to those that have not moved in between rounds through various questions. To be consistent with the assignment of displacement status in Colombia, the analysis identifies IDP households by using three different sets of questions included in the survey. Restricting the sample to those who fled because of armed conflict reinforces the argument that displacement is influenced by an exogenous factor, reducing the potential for selection bias (Loschmann et al., 2017):

- i. Whether the respondent has lived in a different municipality for at least 6 months during the last 3 years due to armed conflict. In this case, it is assumed that the answer provided by the principal respondent represents the status of the household (displaced or non-displaced)¹⁶; **or**
- ii. Whether the household was forced to abandon the usual place of residence during the last three years prior to the survey due to violence; **or**
- iii. Whether the household benefits from social assistance programs targeting IDPs.¹⁷

Each forms of identification has advantages and disadvantages. The first question on the list is a standard way of asking about displacement in other nationally representative household surveys with a migration module, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys for Colombia and the High Frequency Surveys collected by the World Bank in conflict-affected countries in Africa. Assigning the status of one member to the entire household, however, can be problematic. While individual displacement is not common in Colombia, it is possible that specific members are forced to abandon their place of residence and join relatives in other municipalities due to death threats or to avoid recruitment by armed actors, among other reasons. Hence, depending on the outcome of interest, assigning the status of displaced to a household that did not move, but welcomed a new member (due to displacement), could bias the estimates of the effects of displacement at the

homes within days or months. Conflict-displaced individuals usually cannot go back because of territorial occupation by armed actors that forced them to flee. Colombia experiences both types of displacement and in some cases, a proportion of disaster-displaced persons, had been previously displaced due to conflict (Schultz et al, 2014).

¹⁶ The module also includes information about the number of times the respondent has migrated and if they have moved into urban or rural areas. The precise terminology used in Colombia is “cabecera municipal”, which according to the National Statistics Institute (DANE) is the geographic area defined by an urban perimeter whose limits are established by municipal authorities. It corresponds to the place where the administrative government is located.

¹⁷ This is a broad question that asks if the household benefits from different social assistance programs, including programs for the elderly, assistance for natural disasters, and so on.

household level. When it comes to the second question, it is not common for nationally representative household surveys in Colombia to include a shocks module. While this question overcomes the issues posed by the first one, as it is asked at the household level, it refers to violence –and not to armed conflict in particular—as the reason for abandoning the place of residence. Therefore, the households identified with this question could be victims of gangs or other criminal groups different from the traditional actors involved in the armed conflict in Colombia. Finally, the last question allows for the identification of households that have lived in protracted displacement, but could be problematic when studying the impact of displacement on poverty or welfare – as by definition, a household will receive cash and other forms of aid for being internally displaced.

The empirical analysis assumes that households that report having experienced displacement in any of the three waves, retain their status over time. This is a reasonable assumption because of three reasons. First, as previously mentioned, there is no consensus on when internal displacement ends. In the case of Colombia, displaced households are no longer eligible for displacement-related assistance once they have overcome a set of vulnerabilities, but they still have access to reparations (European Union & United Nations, 2018). In addition, overcoming the vulnerability does not imply exclusion from the Victims' Registry.¹⁸ Second, evidence has shown that IDP households in Colombia face long-lasting vulnerabilities and even those settled for several years are often unable to guarantee a minimum consumption level (Ibáñez & Moya, 2010). Third, once they have fled, most households are likely to remain displaced for multiple years. Children are born into displacement and that is partly why, for the purposes of reparations, the status is transmitted across generations (Shultz et al., 2014).

Based on the definition above (which assumes that the IDP status is retained over time), displaced households account for 2.5, 13.9 and 20.1 percent of the sample in each wave, respectively. Table 2.1 shows that, in the 2010 wave, most IDPs are identified with the migration and aid question, but the main source of identification in the 2013 and 2016 waves is the shocks module.

¹⁸ In Decree 2569 of 2014, the Colombian Government established criteria to determine when an IDP has overcome the vulnerabilities linked to displacement. Some of the indicators include access to health services, access to education for children and youth, adequate standard of living, and family reunification.

Table 2.1. Identification of IDPs by type of question

| Year | Migration | Shocks | Aid | Migration & shocks | Shocks & aid | Migration & aid |
|------|-----------|--------|-----|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| 2010 | 141 | 15 | 138 | 6 | 5 | 43 |
| 2013 | 140 | 935 | 367 | 45 | 64 | 59 |
| 2016 | 148 | 1,376 | 516 | 57 | 138 | 72 |

In terms of attrition, 80 percent of the households that joined the panel in 2010 were also interviewed in 2013 (7,878 households) with the corresponding figure of 70.5 percent in 2016 (6,940 households). Displaced households that joined the panel in 2010 represent 3.3 percent of those that attrit and 2.3 percent of the households that remain in the study in 2013. The households that were displaced between 2010 and 2013 represent 9.5 percent of those that attrit the panel in 2016 and 14.2 percent of the households that remain in the study. These figures thus indicate that displaced households are no more likely than the average household to attrit the panel.

2.5.2 Measurement of household structures

Building on the poverty and feminist literatures, this chapter proposes three complementary approaches proposed to measure the concept of household structure. First, the household size or average number of members of all ages in the household is measured. Second, the prevalence of female headship,¹⁹ that distinguishes between *de jure* (i.e. women who are widowed, divorced or separated) and *de facto* female heads (i.e. married women with a non-resident husband) –to account for the heterogeneity of female-headed households (Chant, 1997, 2008; Klasen et al., 2015). Third, households are classified into five major groups based on the sex and dependency relations of household members. These groups include structures with only one adult female member and her dependents (female single caregiver); households with only one adult male member and his dependents (male single caregiver); one-person households; households with a principal couple of opposite sex (nuclear households); and multigenerational households. Nuclear and multigenerational households are further divided into subgroups according to the presence of children as well as the number and sex of adult members, that is, households with majority male or female members (Budlender, 2003; Buvinic & Gupta, 1997; Fuwa, 2000; Milazzo & van de Walle, 2017; Rogan, 2013). In all these

¹⁹ Using the head of household (as reported in household surveys) as the main approach to classify households has proved to be of limited use. This is mainly because of two reasons. First, female-headed households are a heterogeneous group and the headship concept. Second, the concept of household headship reflects social norms about who is understood as the head of the household (e.g. main decision-maker, breadwinner, oldest man, etc.). These norms vary across countries, within countries, and might privilege one sex over the other. See Buvinic & Gupta (1997); Chant (2008); Lampietti & Stalker (2000) for a detailed discussion on the issue.

cases, dependent variables are operationalized as a dichotomous measure (see detailed description in Table A.1).

2.5.3 Descriptive statistics

Conflict-induced displacement in Colombia is largely a process of rural to urban migration. Table 2.2 shows that in 2016, 63 percent of the displaced and 51 percent of non-displaced households resided in urban areas. Between 2010 and 2016, the percentage of displaced households that lived in urban areas rose by 14 percentage points, compared to a reduction of 2.2 percentage points for non-displaced households.

The size of the displaced and non-displaced households is the same, but there are differences in their composition. On average, IDP and non-IDP households had 4 members in 2016. Displaced households had more children (younger than 18) and fewer elderly members compared to non-displaced households. When it comes to adult composition, there were no differences in the number of members. In both cases, households had on average, more than one adult female and one adult male. In fact, the size and composition of displaced and non-displaced households converged over time. In 2010, IDP households were bigger than non-IDP households, mainly because they included more children. Although the average size and the number of children declined for both groups between 2010 and 2016, the reduction for IDPs was twice as large as that for non-IDPs (Table A.2).

Income per capita (in Colombian pesos) is lower among IDP households. However, the difference appears to shrink over time. Whereas in 2010 the average per capita income for displaced households was nearly half that of non-displaced households, the difference diminished to 20 percent in 2016. IDP and non-IDP households differ in terms of household head characteristics. In 2016, IDP households were 3.2 percentage points more likely than non-IDPs to have a female head (33 percent compared to 30 percent, respectively). This increase is partly due to the higher prevalence of *de jure* female heads among the IDPs (24.5 percent compared to 21.3 percent). Indeed, the share of *de jure* women heads among IDPs rose by 7.5 percentage points over the period of analysis. In contrast, the prevalence of *de facto* female heads did not change for IDPs, but there was a slight increase for non-IDPs between 2010 and 2016 Table A.3.

Most household heads are married, but a non-negligible share—particularly among IDPs—is either divorced or separated. Two-thirds of the IDP household heads and 71.3 percent of their non-IDP counterparts reported being married in 2016. Nevertheless, consistent with the increase in *de jure* female heads, the share of heads

who reported being married or in cohabitation decreased more rapidly among the displaced (14 percentage points) than non-displaced household heads (3 percentage points) over the period of analysis. This pattern was accompanied by large increases in the share of divorced or separated heads for IDPs. By 2016, displaced household heads were 1.5 times as likely as their non-displaced counterparts to be divorced or separated (20.5 percent vs. 13.6 percent). Displaced heads of household were also younger than non-displaced heads and the age difference increased over the period of analysis.

On average, educational attainment is low and gaps between IDP and non-IDP heads are statistically significant but small. In 2016, more than half of IDP heads (51.1 percent) had completed primary, but only 3.2 percent had earned a higher education (non-technical) degree. The figures for non-IDPs were 47.1 and 3.9 percent, respectively. At the same time, educational attainment converged over time. In 2010, the share of IDP heads with secondary or postsecondary education was 17.4 percentage points lower than that of non-IDP heads. By 2016, differences were only significant for those with post-secondary education and the share of heads who acquired technical education increased more rapidly for IDPs than non-IDPs over the period of analysis (5 percentage points vs. 2.2 percentage points, respectively).

The intersection between displacement and gender provides more insights masked by average figures. Table 2.3 shows that in 2016 IDP households were more likely than their non-IDP counterparts to live in urban areas and even more so if headed by a woman. Three out of four IDP female-headed households (76 percent) lived in urban areas, compared to slightly more than half (56 percent) of the households with a male head. The figures for non-displaced households were 66 and 45 percent, respectively. Looking at time patterns, the data reveal that the presence of IDP female- and male-headed households in urban areas increased rapidly between 2010 and 2016, but slightly decreased for non-displaced households.

Female- and male-headed households also differ in their composition. Regardless of their status, male-headed households are larger than female-headed households. In 2016, IDP and non-IDP households with a male head consisted of more than 4 members, compared to 3.8 members in those with a female head. On average, male-headed households had more male adults and fewer female adults than those with a woman head. However, differences according to displacement were not statistically significant. IDP female-headed households included more elderly members than their male counterparts, but the difference was not significant for non-IDPs.

Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics

| | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | Total | | | (IDP-Non-IDP) | | |
|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|-----------|----------|
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| Urban (%) | 49 | 54.6 | 63 | 53.4 | 52.6 | 51.2 | 53.3 | 52.9 | 53.5 | -4.37 | 1.99 | 11.83*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -4.22 | -2.17 | -1.57 |
| <i>Composition (number)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Size | 4.9 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4 | 0.53*** | 0.03 | 0.1 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.19 | -0.08 | -0.06 |
| Children (0-5) | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.15** | 0.08*** | 0.06*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
| Children (6-18) | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1 | 0.34*** | 0.16*** | 0.18*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.1 | -0.05 | -0.04 |
| Adult males | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.05 | -0.08*** | -0.03 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| Adult females | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.04 | -0.07** | 0.01 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| Elderly 65+ | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | -0.05 | -0.06*** | -0.13*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| <i>Income (CO pesos, thousands)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Income p/capita | 166 | 339 | 464 | 313 | 457 | 521 | 310 | 443 | 510 | -147*** | -118.2*** | -56.9** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -16.7 | -35.1 | -24.7 |
| Household head | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Female head (%) | 27.4 | 29.3 | 33.2 | 26.5 | 27.6 | 30 | 26.6 | 27.8 | 30.5 | 0.82 | 1.8 | 3.18* |
| | | | | | | | | | | -3.9 | -2.1 | -1.93 |
| De facto | 10.3 | 7.2 | 8.7 | 7.1 | 6.7 | 8.7 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 8.7 | 3.18 | 0.53 | -0.04 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -2.58 | -0.98 | -1.06 |
| De jure | 17.1 | 22.1 | 24.5 | 19.4 | 20.8 | 21.3 | 19.4 | 21 | 21.8 | -2.36 | 1.27 | 3.22* |
| | | | | | | | | | | -3.27 | -2.01 | -1.78 |
| <i>Marital status (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married/cohabiting | 79.7 | 69.2 | 65.9 | 73.8 | 72.4 | 71.3 | 74 | 72 | 70.3 | 5.91* | -3.24 | -5.37*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -3.41 | -2.15 | -2.06 |
| Widow/er | 5.4 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 6.5 | 4.2 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 1.24 | 0.43 | 0.73 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -2.19 | -0.87 | -0.93 |
| Single | 5 | 5.3 | 6.4 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 8.7 | 9.4 | 9 | 8.3 | -4.55*** | -4.25*** | -2.29** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -1.43 | -1.15 | -1.09 |
| Divorced/separated | 9.9 | 19.7 | 20.5 | 12.5 | 12.7 | 13.6 | 12.5 | 13.6 | 14.8 | -2.6 | 7.06*** | 6.93*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -2.49 | -1.92 | -1.89 |
| Age (years) | 42 | 45 | 48 | 45 | 48 | 51.5 | 44 | 48 | 51 | -2.26** | -3.05*** | -3.99*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -1.07 | -0.61 | -0.48 |
| <i>Education (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than primary | 16.1 | 9 | 9.1 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.4 | 8.6 | 7.70* | 0.73 | 0.62 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -4.18 | -1.39 | -1.17 |
| Primary | 56.6 | 53 | 51.1 | 46.9 | 44.7 | 46.6 | 47.1 | 45.8 | 47.4 | 9.70** | 8.24*** | 4.44** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -4.65 | -2.24 | -2.13 |
| Secondary | 26.3 | 31.2 | 31.8 | 34.5 | 33.1 | 32.2 | 34.3 | 32.9 | 32.2 | -8.24** | -1.92 | -0.41 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -3.81 | -1.98 | -1.91 |
| Technical | 0.3 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 6.4 | 6.6 | -4.38*** | -2.35** | -1.57 |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.48 | -0.98 | -1.05 |
| Undergraduate | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 3.2 | -3.16*** | -3.16*** | -2.10*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.74 | -0.8 | -0.78 |
| Graduate | 0.1 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 2 | -1.63*** | -1.69** | -1.08* |
| | | | | | | | | | | -0.45 | -0.7 | -0.59 |
| Observations | 243 | 1,290 | 1,573 | 9,607 | 9,314 | 7,968 | 9,850 | 9,258 | 8,219 | | | |

Note: Adults include ages 18-64. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

It is important to note that the average household size decreased for all subgroups between 2010 and 2016. IDP male-headed households saw the largest reductions (equivalent to 1 person) in the number of members, children in particular. Although smaller, there were also significant reductions in the number of members, children, and female adults in non-IDP female and male-headed households. Changes in composition were not statistically significant for IDP households with a woman head.

Income per capita is lower among IDP households and even more so if headed by a woman. In 2016, the average per capita income for IDP households with a female head was almost 20 percent lower than that of IDP male-headed households and that of non-IDP households with a woman head. Moreover, the convergence in per capita income between IDP and non-IDP was largely driven by increases experienced by male-headed households in situations of displacement, which is consistent with the rapid decrease in the average household size over the period of analysis.

The majority of IDP and non-IDP male heads of household were married in 2016 (86 and 89 percent, respectively), compared to less than 30 percent of IDP and non-IDP female heads. Women heads were often divorced/separated or widows, particularly if displaced. Indeed, more than half of female heads but less than 12 percent of men heads fell into these two categories. The data also reveal gender differences in educational attainment. In 2016, IDP and non-IDP female heads were 7 and 5.5 percentage points less likely than their male counterparts to have primary education, but 5.6 and 3 percentage points more likely to have a technical degree. These patterns, particularly among IDP populations, appear to be explained by the rapid increase in the proportion of IDP women heads who acquired technical or vocational education between 2010 and 2016. Even though the percentage of IDP men heads with technical education also increased over the same period, the change was smaller than that observed for women heads.

Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics by displacement and gender

| | IDP | | | | | | Non-IDP | | | | | | Total | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 2010 | | 2013 | | 2016 | | 2010 | | 2013 | | 2016 | | 2010 | | 2013 | | 2016 | |
| | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH | FH | MH |
| Urban (%) | 61.2 | 43.8 | 69.8 | 48.1 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 68.0 | 47.4 |
| <i>Composition (number)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Size | 4.3 | 5.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.2 |
| Children (0-5) | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Children (6-17) | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Adult males (18-64) | 0.8 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| Adult females (18-64) | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 |
| Elderly (65+) | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| <i>Income (CO pesos, thousands)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Income p/capita | 492 | 534 | 758 | 810 | 737 | 899 | 806 | 963 | 931 | 1,116 | 884 | 1,054 | 798 | 953 | 910 | 1,080 | 852 | 1,025 |
| Household head | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Marital status (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married/cohabiting | 37.7 | 95.6 | 24.7 | 87.6 | 26.1 | 85.6 | 26.9 | 90.8 | 24.4 | 90.7 | 29.0 | 89.3 | 27.1 | 90.9 | 24.4 | 90.3 | 28.4 | 88.7 |
| Widow/er | 19.6 | 0.0 | 16.3 | 1.5 | 17.7 | 2.1 | 13.9 | 0.6 | 16.9 | 1.0 | 17.8 | 1.7 | 14.0 | 0.6 | 16.8 | 1.1 | 17.8 | 1.7 |
| Single | 11.7 | 2.5 | 11.5 | 2.7 | 14.1 | 2.6 | 21.7 | 5.2 | 22.2 | 4.7 | 19.0 | 4.3 | 21.4 | 5.1 | 20.9 | 4.4 | 18.1 | 4.0 |
| Divorced/separated | 31.0 | 2.0 | 47.5 | 8.2 | 42.2 | 9.8 | 37.6 | 3.5 | 36.5 | 3.6 | 34.3 | 4.7 | 37.5 | 3.4 | 37.9 | 4.2 | 35.7 | 5.5 |
| Age (years) | 43 | 42 | 46 | 45 | 47 | 48 | 44 | 45 | 49 | 48 | 51 | 52 | 44 | 44 | 48 | 48 | 50 | 51 |
| <i>Education (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than primary | 11.5 | 17.7 | 5.3 | 10.6 | 7.2 | 10.1 | 7.4 | 8.7 | 7.4 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 7.5 | 8.9 | 7.2 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 9.0 |
| Primary | 49.2 | 59.3 | 50.5 | 54.0 | 46.5 | 53.3 | 43.2 | 48.2 | 40.5 | 46.4 | 42.7 | 48.2 | 43.4 | 48.4 | 41.8 | 47.3 | 43.4 | 49.1 |
| Secondary | 37.3 | 22.3 | 34.9 | 29.7 | 33.6 | 31.0 | 38.0 | 33.3 | 36.3 | 31.9 | 34.1 | 31.5 | 37.9 | 33.0 | 36.1 | 31.7 | 34.0 | 31.4 |
| Technical | 0.7 | 0.1 | 6.1 | 3.6 | 9.0 | 3.4 | 6.7 | 3.9 | 9.3 | 5.7 | 8.9 | 5.9 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 8.9 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 5.5 |
| Undergraduate | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.0 |
| Graduate | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| Observations | 75 | 168 | 414 | 876 | 564 | 1,009 | 2,615 | 6,992 | 2,300 | 5,668 | 2,046 | 4,600 | 2,690 | 7,160 | 2,714 | 6,544 | 2,610 | 5,609 |

Note: FH and MH stand for female- and male-headed household, respectively. Adults include ages 18-64.

Table 2.4 shows the distribution of households based on their demographic composition. Traditional structures make up the majority of households in Colombia. Together, nuclear and multigenerational structures accounted for 83 and 86 percent of IDP and non-IDP households in 2016, respectively. Non-traditional structures, that is, male and female single caregivers and one-person households comprise 17 and 14 percent of IDP and non-IDP households.

Differences in household structures between IDP and non-IDP households are small. In 2016, female single caregivers comprised 9.2 percent of all IDP households, compared to 5.7 percent of non-IDPs. Adult couples with children were slightly more common among the displaced (32 percent vs. 30 percent), but the opposite was true for couples without children (12 percent vs. 17.6 percent). Similarly, IDPs were less likely than non-IDPs to live in units comprised of majority male adults without children (2.2 percent vs. 3.6 percent). When it comes to the evolution of household structures over time, few changes were statistically significant. Multigenerational IDP households consisting of majority female adults without children increased by 3.4 percentage points since 2010, while households with majority male adults with children declined by 5.3 percentage points. In contrast, the share of female single caregivers and nuclear households declined for non-IDPs by 1.6 and 4 percentage points, respectively. There was a small increase in the share of majority female adults with children, accompanied by a reduction of majority male adults with children (1 percentage point).

In sum, Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 show that there are differences between displaced and non-displaced households in terms of demographic characteristics, composition, and structures. For the most part, changes in those characteristics over time have been more marked among IDP households and even more so if headed by a woman. Patterns can be summarized in four points. First, conflict-induced displacement is largely a process of rural-to-urban migration and female-headed households are more prone to live inner-city than male-headed households. Second, IDP and non-IDP households have an average size of four members, but there are small differences in terms of their demographic composition. IDP households have slightly more children and fewer elderly members than non-IDPs. This difference is mainly explained by the composition of male-headed households, who are significantly larger than those with a female head. Third, IDP heads of household are less likely than non-IDPs to be married or in cohabitation, and more likely to be divorced or separated. Male heads—regardless of their displacement status—have a higher likelihood of being married than female heads, but considerably less likely to be divorced or separated. Fourth, the average per capita income of IDP households is significantly lower than that of non-IDP households, and even more so if headed by a woman.

Table 2.4. Distribution of households, demographic composition

| | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | Total | | | IDP - Non-IDP | | | Time diff. (IDP) | | | Time diff. (Non-IDP) | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|----------|----------|------------------|---------|---------|----------------------|----------|----------|
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| Female single caregiver | 9.0 | 8.2 | 9.2 | 7.4 | 6.3 | 5.7 | 7.4 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 1.68 | 1.93 | 3.51*** | -0.84 | 1.04 | 0.20 | -1.09* | -0.54 | -1.62*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | (2.14) | (1.21) | (0.84) | (2.39) | (1.36) | (2.24) | (0.56) | (0.57) | (0.50) |
| Male single caregiver | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | -0.43 | 0.17 | -0.23 | 0.34 | -0.46 | -0.13 | -0.25 | -0.07 | -0.33 |
| | | | | | | | | | | (0.89) | (0.73) | (0.43) | (1.11) | (0.78) | (0.94) | (0.30) | (0.32) | (0.31) |
| One-person | 0.0 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 0.0 | 2.3 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 5.2 | . | 2.26*** | 1.15 | 4.56 | 1.58 | 6.14 | 2.30 | 2.69*** | 4.99 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | (0.81) | (0.81) | (0.00) | (1.04) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.47) | (0.00) |
| Non-traditional | 11.0 | 15.1 | 17.3 | 9.8 | 10.7 | 12.8 | 9.8 | 11.3 | 13.7 | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Nuclear household</i> | 48.4 | 44.9 | 44.5 | 51.3 | 47.9 | 47.4 | 51.2 | 47.5 | 46.8 | -2.87 | -2.93 | -2.94* | -3.45 | -0.49 | -3.94 | -3.39*** | -0.48 | -3.87*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | (4.23) | (2.17) | (1.60) | (4.59) | (2.37) | (4.42) | (1.24) | (1.29) | (0.96) |
| Adult couple w/ children | 38.0 | 36.9 | 32.3 | 38.9 | 33.5 | 29.8 | 38.9 | 33.9 | 30.2 | -0.85 | 3.44* | 2.52* | -1.12 | -4.64** | -5.76 | -5.40*** | -3.73*** | -9.13*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | (3.96) | (2.08) | (1.49) | (4.32) | (2.27) | (4.13) | (1.15) | (1.18) | (0.90) |
| Adult couple w/o children | 10.4 | 8.0 | 12.2 | 12.4 | 14.4 | 17.6 | 12.3 | 13.6 | 16.6 | -2.03 | -6.36*** | -5.46*** | -2.33 | 4.15*** | 1.82 | 2.01* | 3.25*** | 5.26*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | (2.58) | (1.33) | (1.11) | (2.71) | (1.33) | (2.73) | (1.05) | (1.11) | (0.68) |
| <i>Multigenerational</i> | 40.6 | 40.0 | 38.3 | 39.0 | 41.4 | 39.8 | 39.0 | 41.2 | 39.5 | 1.62 | -1.43 | -1.48 | -0.61 | -1.66 | -2.27 | 2.43** | -1.61 | 0.83 |
| | | | | | | | | | | (4.35) | (2.15) | (1.59) | (4.71) | (2.36) | (4.54) | (1.19) | (1.24) | (0.93) |
| Majority female adults w/ children | 23.9 | 26.1 | 22.9 | 22.1 | 23.4 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 23.8 | 23.4 | 1.86 | 2.68 | -0.59 | 2.20 | -3.22 | -1.02 | 1.39 | 0.05 | 1.44* |
| | | | | | | | | | | (4.19) | (1.87) | (1.36) | (4.49) | (2.09) | (4.33) | (0.95) | (1.01) | (0.80) |
| Majority female adults w/o children | 1.9 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 5.9 | -3.61*** | -1.39 | -0.67 | 2.96** | 0.46 | 3.42*** | 0.74 | -0.26 | 0.48 |
| | | | | | | | | | | (1.04) | (1.21) | (0.80) | (1.45) | (1.28) | (1.24) | (0.68) | (0.69) | (0.44) |
| Majority male adults w/ children | 13.2 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 8.6 | 6.8 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 7.0 | 5.37* | -1.23 | 1.13 | -5.81* | 0.54 | -5.27* | 0.80 | -1.83*** | -1.03** |
| | | | | | | | | | | (2.95) | (1.05) | (0.90) | (3.06) | (1.22) | (3.04) | (0.63) | (0.66) | (0.50) |
| Majority male adults w/o children | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 2.9 | 3.3 | -2.03*** | -1.48*** | -1.40*** | 0.04 | 0.56 | 0.60 | -0.51 | 0.48 | -0.03 |
| | | | | | | | | | | (0.75) | (0.51) | (0.46) | (0.80) | (0.55) | (0.81) | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.35) |
| Traditional | 89.0 | 84.9 | 82.8 | 90.2 | 89.3 | 87.2 | 90.2 | 88.7 | 86.3 | | | | | | | | | |
| Observations | 243 | 1,290 | 1,573 | 9,607 | 7,968 | 6,646 | 9,850 | 9,258 | 8,853 | | | | | | | | | |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

2.6 Empirical Framework

This chapter employs a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to estimate the effect of displacement on household structures. The estimation uses panel data from treatment (displaced due to conflict) and control (non-displaced) groups to construct a counterfactual that allows for causal effects to be estimated. This approach reduces biases from two sources. First, it reduces biases in post-displacement comparisons between treatment and control households that could be the result of permanent differences between these groups. Second, it reduces the bias from aggregate shocks that might affect IDP and non-IDP households over time.

The analysis here exploits the fact that a number of households included in the panel were forced to flee between 2010 and 2016 to measure the effect of displacement D_i on the size and composition of households. To evaluate the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, the analysis examines household structures (Y_{it}) through various complementary proxies for household structure. These proxies include the household size, the prevalence of female headship (distinguishing between *de jure* and *de facto* female heads), and nine mutually exclusive groups of households that include female single caregivers; male single caregivers; one-person households; nuclear households with and without children; and multigenerational households with and without children. Equation (2.1) presents the regression model to estimate the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures, where the unit of observation is the i -th household:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta D_i + \gamma t + \delta(D_i \cdot t) + \mu S_i + \theta X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2.1)$$

Two groups are indexed by displacement status $D_i=0, 1$, where 0 indicates households that were not displaced by conflict (control), and 1 indicates households that were displaced (treatment). As described in detail in the data section, a household is in the displaced group in each wave if: (i) at least one of the household members was displaced during the three years prior to the survey, (ii) the household is a beneficiary of a program for displaced households, or (iii) it reported having been forced to abandon its place of residence. In addition, households that report having experienced displacement due to conflict in any of the three waves, retain their IDP status over time. In other words, once households have been exposed to the treatment (displacement), they remain in the treated group across waves.

Households are observed in at least two time periods, $t=0, 1$, where 0 indicates the period before they were displaced (pre-treatment) and 1 indicates a period after they were displaced (post-treatment). In other words, the estimation includes two periods, 2010 (before) and 2016 (after) and the latter includes all observations that

were displaced between rounds. Every observation is indexed by the letter $i=1, 2, \dots, N$. The coefficient α represents the constant term; β is the displacement specific effect; γ is the time trend common to both displaced and non-displaced groups, and δ is the coefficient of interest. The vector S_i is a dummy variable, where 0 indicates households that were displaced in the first wave, $t=0$, or before (2010 or before). This variable serves as an additional control, but observations are not considered in the estimation of the double difference, as there is no information about their characteristics before they were displaced. The matrix X_{it} includes the pre-treatment socio-economic characteristics of the household, including area of residence, share of women of reproductive age (15-49), share of children aged 0-18; share of elderly aged 65+; and exposure to violence in the three years previous to the survey. It includes education, marital status, employment status and age of the household head. The estimation includes department fixed effects to control for specific effects at that level.

Three control groups are employed in the analysis. The first group includes all households that were not displaced in any of the waves, regardless of their place of residence. The second group corresponds to households that reside in rural areas, but that were not displaced by conflict in any of the survey rounds. Given the nature of the conflict in Colombia, these households and their members have characteristics similar to those of the displaced population. Importantly, in these areas patriarchal traditions and household structures are the predominant model (Restrepo-Vélez & Hernandez-Bello, 2010). Even though households living in urban areas are often forced to flee, most of the displacement in Colombia entails moving from rural areas. Hence, the second control group is used for robustness checks. The third group is constructed using kernel-based propensity score matching. As described in the next section, this is the preferred specification since (among other things) it also accounts for intra-urban displacement, a relatively recent phenomenon in Colombia.

The main characteristic of the treatment under evaluation in this dissertation is exogeneity, that is, the treatment is not controllable for individuals. The assumption is that armed groups attack civilians, seize the property and force them to flee, hence conflict-induced displacement is not a voluntary decision to improve economic conditions (Ceriani & Verme, 2018; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). Evidence for Colombia indicates that in most cases (86 percent), displacement is mainly a reaction to being a victim of violent attacks (Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). Although the violence triggers displacement, some argue that it is not the only factor that affects the decision to flee. In some cases, people experience a substantially high risk of dying from violence, yet a non-negligible share decide to stay. Regardless of the reason, it is unlikely that the decision to flee is made under assumptions of economic rationality. Evaluating the costs and benefits of displacement is almost impossible,

especially in the presence of death threats by armed groups (Ceriani & Verme, 2018). To address potential issues of self-selection and endogeneity, the third control group is constructed using a kernel-based PSM using the observable characteristics included as covariates in model (2.1), such as the age and sex of the household head, marital status, educational level, geographic area, the number of children in the household, the number of the elderly, share of women of reproductive age, employment status, exposure to violence and department dummies.

2.7 Results

Using the ELCA, this section presents the DID estimates of the impact of conflict-induced displacement on various proxies for household structures for the 2010-2016 period. These variables include household size, female headed households (*de jure* and *de facto*), female and male single caregivers, one-person households, nuclear households (adult couples with and without children), multigenerational households (majority female and male adults with and without children), and the aggregation of individual categories (traditional and non-traditional). Except for household size, all dependent variables are dichotomous and mutually exclusive categories. All households in the sample are classified in one of the categories and information on the number of members is also available for all of them.

2.7.1 Difference-in-differences estimates

Table 2.5 shows the unconditional DID estimates of the effect of conflict-induced displacement on various proxies for household structures using the first control group, that is, households that were not displaced between 2010 and 2016 (hereafter control group 1). The analysis that follows focuses on the estimates that were statistically significant.

Looking at the most basic proxy for household structure, results in column (1) show that displacement that occurred between 2010 and 2016 caused a significant reduction in the average household size. Specifically, in a typical household of four people, conflict-induced displacement reduced the average household size by one person over a six-year period. To put it into perspective, based on DHS data, for Colombia it took 25 years and a combination of multiple factors to see a reduction of this magnitude in the average household size at the national level (section 2.3).

Moving to the headship proxies, columns (2-2b) indicate that conflict-induced displacement increased the prevalence of female-headed households by 6 percentage points between 2010 and 2016, and this change was largely explained by the surge of *de jure* female heads. Again, relative to the change observed at the

national level using DHS data, an effect size of this magnitude is equivalent to the change that took almost twice as long (10 years) to take place in Colombia.

The analysis based on demographic composition reveals that displacement increases the prevalence of non-traditional structures. Column (4) shows that the likelihood of being a female single caregiver—one of the most vulnerable groups in terms of poverty risk—increased by 3 percentage points due to conflict-induced displacement over the period of analysis. Similarly, displacement increased the prevalence of one-person households by 2 percentage points between 2010 and 2016 as shown in column (5). Overall, displacement caused an increment of 6 percentage points in the prevalence of non-traditional structures over the six-year period.

The results in column (9) suggest that the prevalence of traditional structures overall (nuclear and multigenerational households combined) decreased by 6 percentage points between 2010 and 2016 as an outcome of conflict-induced displacement. This reduction was largely driven by the reduction in the number of households consisting of majority male adults with children (3 percentage points). This finding is somehow consistent with the results in Castiblanco-Moreno's (2016) qualitative study, whereby the displaced population in Bogota is composed mostly of women because male members of their families often stayed behind to avoid the dispossession of their lands. Finally, estimates of the effect of conflict-induced displacement on other household structures, mainly those grouped under the 'traditional' label, were not statistically significant.

These dynamics are partly explained by the large share of the displaced in Colombia who migrate from rural to urban areas escaping from conflict. Therefore, it stands to reason that IDPs share similar observable and unobservable characteristics with non-IDPs residing in rural areas. Table 2.6 presents the unconditional DID estimates of the impact of conflict-induced displacement on household structures restricting the sample to households displaced from rural areas and their counterparts who were not displaced by conflict as control group (hereafter control group 2). The sample in this case is less than half the size of that used in the first estimation, as the focus is only rural areas. The effect of conflict-induced displacement on the prevalence of female-headed households (including *de jure* female heads), female single caregivers, and non-traditional structures overall is found to be positive and significant. Consistent with the estimates using control group 1, the prevalence of traditional structures decreases with conflict-induced displacement. However, using this control group in all cases results in smaller size effects and lower significance levels. This is not necessarily surprising, as, over the last decades, Colombia has seen an increase in urban-to-urban displacement, which was not captured with the estimation using the restricted sample.

Table 2.5. DID (unconditional) estimates of displacement on household structures, control group 1

| Variable | Size | Female head | | Female head | | Single caregiver | | One person | Non-traditional |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | | (1) | (2) | De jure (2a) | De facto (2b) | Male (3) | Female (4) | | |
| Time | -0.20*** (0.03) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.04*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) |
| Displaced | 0.19*** (0.06) | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.02* (0.01) | -0.02* (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01* (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.23*** (0.07) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.5. (continued)

| Variable | Nuclear (7) | Adult couple | | Multi generation (8) | Majority male adults | | Majority female adults | | Traditional (9) |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | | With children (7a) | Without children (7b) | | With children (8a) | Without children (8b) | With children (8c) | Without children (8d) | |
| Time | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.07*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.00) | 0.01** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.01** (0.01) | -0.02*** (0.00) |
| Displaced | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.03** (0.02) | -0.03** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.06*** (0.01) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Obs | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 | 28,042 |
| R-squared | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.6. DID (unconditional) estimates of displacement on household structures, control group 2

| Variable | Size | Female head | | | | | Single caregiver | | |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|
| | | Female head | De jure | De facto | Male | Female | One person | Non traditional | |
| | (1) | (2) | (2a) | (2b) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Time | -0.32*** (0.04) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.04*** (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.01) | |
| Displaced | 0.08 (0.10) | -0.05** (0.02) | -0.04** (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | |
| DID | -0.12 (0.12) | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.04** (0.02) | |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | |
| Observations | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.6. (continued)

| Variable | Nuclear (7) | Adult couple | | Multi generation (8) | Majority male adults | | Majority female adults | | Traditional (9) |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | | With children (7a) | Without children (7b) | | With children (8a) | Without children (8b) | With children (8c) | Without children (8d) | |
| Time | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01* (0.01) | 0.01* (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.03*** (0.01) |
| Displaced | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.07*** (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| DID | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.04** (0.02) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 | 12,967 |
| R-squared | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.7 shows the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures using control group 1 and including pre-treatment covariates. The sample in this case is substantially smaller than the one used in the unconditional estimation because observations missing any of the covariates are dropped from the estimation. Estimates show that, in an average household of four members, displacement is associated with a reduction of one member, but contrary to the unconditional model, displacement is also associated with a reduction in the prevalence of female-headed households by 4 percentage points between 2010 and 2016. The increase in the prevalence of one-person households (2 percentage points) remains consistent with DID unconditional estimates. The effects on traditional and non-traditional structures as groups are no longer significant.

Similar patterns emerge in Table 2.8 when using control group 2 and conditional on the set of covariates in equation (2.1), except that significance levels diminish and the effect of displacement on one-person households is no longer significant. As previously explained, the sample size is substantially reduced because it is restricted to households living in rural areas and once covariates are included, observations with missing information are dropped from the estimation. It is important to note that the vast majority of covariates, on the other hand, are statistically significant and effect sizes in some cases are very large (as it is also the case in Table 2.8). These results might be an indication that the model estimates are likely to be biased because of systematic differences in observable characteristics between treatment (displaced) and control groups (non-displaced). To account for this potential problem, the following section presents the estimations using a kernel-based PSM-DID model to construct a more comparable control group in terms of observable characteristics.

Table 2.7. DID estimates of displacement on household structures, control group 1

| Variable | Size | Female-headed | Female head | | Single caregiver | | One person | Non traditional |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | | De jure | De facto | Male | Female | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (2a) | (2b) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Time | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.04*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Displaced | 0.08 (0.05) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.27*** (0.08) | -0.04*** (0.02) | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) |
| Household | | | | | | | | |
| Victims of violence | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Displaced before 2010 | 0.21** (0.09) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | -0.01* (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) |
| Size | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.04*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.06*** (0.00) |
| Urban | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.07*** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Share children | 0.04*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share elderly | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share women rep. age | -0.03*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Household head | | | | | | | | |
| Female head | -0.01 (0.04) | | | | -0.13*** (0.00) | 0.16*** (0.00) | -0.03*** (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Age (years) | 0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| <i>Marital status (base: married)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Divorced | -1.31*** (0.05) | 0.62*** (0.01) | 0.77*** (0.01) | -0.15*** (0.01) | 0.14*** (0.00) | 0.09*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.00) | 0.30*** (0.01) |
| Widowed | -0.87*** (0.06) | 0.71*** (0.01) | 0.85*** (0.01) | -0.14*** (0.01) | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.00) | 0.19*** (0.01) |
| Single | -0.92*** (0.05) | 0.50*** (0.01) | 0.67*** (0.01) | -0.17*** (0.01) | 0.13*** (0.00) | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.27*** (0.01) |
| <i>Education (base: primary or less)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Secondary | -0.19*** (0.03) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00* (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Tertiary or more | -0.31*** (0.05) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01** (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Employed | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.15*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.00) | -0.11*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Observations | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 |
| R-squared | 0.29 | 0.47 | 0.72 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.11 | 0.43 |

Table 2.7. (continued)

| Variable | Nuclear (7) | Adult couple | | Multi generation (8) | Majority male adults | | Majority female adults | | Traditional (9) |
|--|--------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | | w/ children (7a) | w/o children (7b) | | w/ children (8a) | w/o children (8b) | w/ children (8c) | w/o children (8d) | |
| Time | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01* (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01*** (0.00) |
| Displaced | -0.03*** (0.01) | -0.03*** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| DID | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.01) |
| Household | | | | | | | | | |
| Victims of violence | -0.02*** (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Displaced before 2010 | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.04** (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.02* (0.01) |
| Size | -0.08*** (0.00) | -0.05*** (0.00) | -0.06*** (0.00) | 0.14*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.05*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.08*** (0.00) | 0.06*** (0.00) |
| Urban | -0.01* (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01** (0.01) | 0.01* (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Share children | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | | -0.01*** (0.00) | | -0.00*** (0.00) | | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share elderly | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share women rep. age | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Household head | | | | | | | | | |
| Female head | -0.07*** (0.01) | -0.13*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.00) | -0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.00) | 0.13*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Age (years) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| <i>Marital status (base: married)</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Divorced | -0.60*** (0.01) | -0.35*** (0.01) | -0.26*** (0.01) | 0.30*** (0.01) | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.12*** (0.01) | -0.30*** (0.01) |
| Widowed | -0.54*** (0.01) | -0.24*** (0.01) | -0.31*** (0.01) | 0.36*** (0.01) | 0.09*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.12*** (0.01) | 0.11*** (0.01) | -0.19*** (0.01) |
| Single | -0.60*** (0.01) | -0.27*** (0.01) | -0.26*** (0.01) | 0.33*** (0.01) | 0.14*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.14*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.01) | -0.27*** (0.01) |
| <i>Education (base: primary or less)</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Secondary | -0.01** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Tertiary or more | -0.02* (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Employed | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.01* (0.00) | -0.01 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01*** (0.00) |
| Observations | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 | 18,709 |
| R-squared | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.26 | 0.41 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.22 | 0.43 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model estimated using non-displaced households as a control group. Estimation includes department dummies (not shown).

Table 2.8. DID estimates of displacement on household structures, control group 2

| Variable | Size | Female-headed | Female head | | Single caregiver | | One person | Non traditional |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | | De jure | De facto | Male | Female | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (2a) | (2b) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Time | 0.04 (0.05) | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.02** (0.01) |
| Displaced | 0.01 (0.09) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.22* (0.12) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Household | | | | | | | | |
| Victim of violence | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.00) | -0.01* (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Displaced before 2010 | 0.08 (0.14) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Size | | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00* (0.00) | 0.00** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.03*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.05*** (0.00) |
| Urban | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Share children | 0.05*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share elderly | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share women rep. age | -0.03*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Household head | | | | | | | | |
| Female head | 0.03 (0.06) | | | | -0.17*** (0.01) | 0.20*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Age (years) | 0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| <i>Marital status (base: married)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Divorced | -1.38*** (0.08) | 0.55*** (0.01) | 0.66*** (0.01) | -0.11*** (0.01) | 0.22*** (0.01) | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.00) | 0.41*** (0.01) |
| Widowed | -0.86*** (0.09) | 0.72*** (0.02) | 0.82*** (0.01) | -0.10*** (0.01) | 0.15*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.21*** (0.01) |
| Single | -0.67*** (0.08) | 0.36*** (0.01) | 0.51*** (0.01) | -0.15*** (0.01) | 0.17*** (0.01) | 0.10*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.29*** (0.01) |
| <i>Education (base: primary or less)</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Secondary | -0.13*** (0.05) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Tertiary or more | -0.05 (0.14) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.01) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Employed | -0.09* (0.04) | -0.13*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.00) | 0.01** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Observations | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 |
| R-squared | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.63 | 0.07 | 0.28 | 0.35 | 0.11 | 0.44 |

Table 2.8. (continued)

| Variable | Nuclear (7) | Adult couple | | Multi generation (8) | Majority male adults | | Majority female adults | | Traditional (9) |
|--|--------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | | w/ children (7a) | w/o children (7b) | | w/ children (8a) | w/o children (8b) | w/ children (8c) | w/o children (8d) | |
| Time | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) |
| Displaced | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| Household | | | | | | | | | |
| Victim of violence | -0.02* (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.01 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Displaced before 2010 | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.02) |
| Size | -0.09*** (0.00) | -0.06*** (0.00) | -0.07*** (0.00) | 0.14*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.06*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.07*** (0.00) | 0.05*** (0.00) |
| Urban | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Share children | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | | -0.01*** (0.00) | | -0.00*** (0.00) | | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share elderly | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) |
| Share women rep. age | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Household head | | | | | | | | | |
| Female head | -0.07*** (0.01) | -0.16*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.16*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Age (years) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| <i>Marital status (base: married)</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Divorced | -0.63*** (0.02) | -0.37*** (0.02) | -0.29*** (0.01) | 0.22*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.03* (0.02) | -0.41*** (0.01) |
| Widowed | -0.55*** (0.02) | -0.23*** (0.02) | -0.33*** (0.02) | 0.34*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.09*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.02) | -0.21*** (0.01) |
| Single | -0.61*** (0.02) | -0.25*** (0.02) | -0.27*** (0.01) | 0.32*** (0.02) | 0.17*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.12*** (0.01) | 0.04** (0.02) | -0.29*** (0.01) |
| <i>Education (base: primary or less)</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Secondary | -0.02** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.01** (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Tertiary or more | -0.06* (0.03) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| Employed | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02* (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01* (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.00) | 0.02* (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Observations | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 | 8,845 |
| R-squared | 0.47 | 0.51 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.44 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model estimated using households residing in rural areas who were displaced (treatment) and not displaced (control group 2). Estimation includes department dummies (not shown).

2.7.2 Kernel-based PSM-DID

This section employs a kernel-based PSM-DID approach to construct an alternative control group. Some of the advantages of this approach is that it does not assume a linear relationship among variables, and it can reduce selection bias (Heckman et al., 1998). This approach consists of two stages. In the first stage, it estimates the propensity of displacement based on the set of household and individual pre-treatment variables included in the conditional DID models, such as geographic area, share of children, elderly and women of reproductive age, and exposure to violence, as well as the sex, age, marital status and education level of the household head. In the second stage, propensity scores are used to match IDP and non-IDP households along various dimensions. This approach produces a control group that does not differ systematically from the treated in terms of the pre-treatment variables. By comparing the change in household structures between IDP and non-IDP households, PSM-DID estimates the average treatment on the treated (ATT). Furthermore, PSM-DID reduces biases from two sources. First, it controls for unobserved time-invariant effects, which could be correlated with displacement and the outcome of interest. Second, it reduces the bias from aggregate shocks that affect both displaced and non-displaced households over time. The results in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 suggest that the characteristics of both IDP and non-IDP households are systematically different. Table A.5 shows the balance tests, indicating that after matching, observable characteristics of both groups are similar. Most of the sample (97 percent of the observations) is in the common support area.

Kernel has some advantages over other matching algorithms. First, it is a non-parametric estimator that uses weighted averages of all observations in the control group to construct the counterfactual. Thus, kernel achieves the lower variance by using more information. Another advantage of using kernel in this case is the structure of the data at hand. Most of the sample consists of non-displaced households ('untreated'), so it makes sense to use more than one nearest neighbor (by kernel matching in this case) to gain precision in estimates (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Finally, because displaced households are matched with the non-displaced over a common region of the matching variables, any remaining bias in the matching estimator can thus be attributed to unobserved characteristics (Jalan & Ravallion, 2003). A potential limitation is that observations used are bad matches. The common support condition is imposed to minimize this issue (Heckman et al., 1998).

ATT estimates are presented in Table 2.9. The results are robust, and the effect sizes are, in most cases, larger compared to the conditional and unconditional estimates in the previous section. Column (1) indicates that in a typical household of four members, conflict-induced displacement reduces the average household size by

slightly more than one member. Results in columns (2-2b) show that displacement also increases the prevalence of female-headed households by 5 percentage points, mainly due to the increase in *de jure* female heads (4 percentage points). In both cases, estimates confirm that conflict-induced displacement accelerates the reduction in the average household size and accelerates the pace of change in the prevalence of non-traditional living arrangements. The sample size in these estimations is similar to that in the full sample because the vast majority of observations are in the common support area. By design, kernel-based PSM uses all observations in the control group, but assigns different weights based on the probability of being treated to ensure that each observation in the treatment group has the best possible counterfactual.

Consistent with the estimates in the previous section, the prevalence of female single caregivers and one-person household structures increases by 3 and 2 percentage points (columns 4 and 5), respectively. Estimates on the variables in traditional and non-traditional structures also confirm the described patterns: conflict induced displacement increases the prevalence of non-traditional arrangements by 6 percentage points while reducing the prevalence of traditional arrangements by the same magnitude.

As in previous estimates, the results in column (9) suggest that the prevalence of traditional structures overall (nuclear and multigenerational households combined) decreased by 6 percentage points between 2010 and 2016. This seems to be driven by the reduction in the prevalence of multigenerational households (5 percentage points). In particular, units comprised of multiple (female and male) adults without children tend to decrease with conflict-induced displacement. Again, this finding might reflect the fact that adult members stay behind to protect their property, or they decide to split as a strategy to cope with a lack of opportunities. Finally, estimates of the effect of conflict-induced displacement on nuclear household structures with and without children were not statistically significant.

Table 2.9. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on household structures

| Variable | Size | Female head | | | | | Single caregiver | | | One person | Non traditional | Nuclear |
|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------|-----------------|---------|
| | | Female head | De jure | De facto | Male | Female | De jure | De facto | Male | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (2a) | (2b) | (3) | (4) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | | |
| Time | -0.17*** (0.04) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.01) | | | |
| Displaced | 0.08* (0.05) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.02** (0.01) | | | | |
| DID | -0.26*** (0.05) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.06*** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | | | |
| Obs | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

Table 2.9. (continued)

| Variable | Adult couple | | Multi generation | Majority male adults | | Majority female adults | |
|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| | W/ children | W/o children | | W/ children | W/o children | W/ children | W/o children |
| | (7a) | (7b) | (8) | (8a) | (8b) | (8c) | (8d) |
| Time | -0.08*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.01* (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.01) |
| Displaced | -0.02* (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.03** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.02*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.06*** (0.01) |
| Obs | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 | 27,308 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are reported in the common support area.

2.7.3 Validity of the “parallel trends” assumption

The validity of the underlying assumption of equal trends cannot be proved, but it can be assessed. One way to check is to compare changes in outcomes for the treatment and control groups before the treatment. This requires at least two serial observations on the treatment and control groups before the start of the treatment. Since displacement occurs at different points in time, this exercise is only possible for the sample of households that were displaced between the second and third waves. Figure 2.4 presents the evolution of the average household size for IDP and non-IDPs. Although there is no statistical test for this assumption, visual inspection suggests that in the absence of displacement, the difference between the “treatment” and “control” group is constant over time. This is also the case for the share of female-headed households, as depicted in Figure 2.5. This is an indication that the parallel trends assumption is valid.




Figure 2.4. Parallel trends assumption, household size

Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.




Figure 2.5. Parallel trends assumption, share of female-headed households
Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.

A second way to test the assumption of equal trends is to perform a “placebo” test. In this case, the test is performed using a “fake” outcome, that is, the dependent variable is replaced by an outcome that is not affected by displacement, in this case, the self-reported ethnic group of the head of household. Table 2.10 shows the kernel-based PSM-DID estimation using the “fake” outcome, indicating that the impact of conflict-induced displacement is not statistically significant. Since the placebo test reveals zero impact, there is support for the parallel trends assumption.

Table 2.10. Placebo test, parallel trends assumption

| Variable | 2010-2016 | 2010-2013 | 2013-2016 |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (2) |
| Time | 0.39*** (0.01) | 0.39*** (0.01) | 0.03** (0.02) |
| Displaced | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| DID | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Observations | 21,378 | 18,574 | 11,857 |
| R-squared | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.00 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

2.7.4 Mechanisms of transmission between conflict-induced displacement and household structures

There is no consensus in the literature about the effect of conflict, shocks or migration on household structures. In some cases, households are disrupted, and new, bigger units are formed to cope with poor living conditions. In other cases, smaller, but also vulnerable structures emerge in response to the hardships of conflict or to smooth consumption. In Colombia, the phenomenon of conflict-induced displacement reduces the average household size and increases the prevalence of non-traditional structures, particularly those consisting of *de jure* female heads, female single caregivers, and one-person households.

To offer more insights into potential mechanisms through which conflict-induced displacement might affect household structures, this section uses mediation analysis to explore the extent to which the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures is explained by divorces or separations (hypothesis 2). It is possible that other factors mediate (or not) the relationship between displacement and household structures. This *exploratory* analysis only focuses on the effect of divorces or separations as it is a mechanism that has not received a lot of attention in the conflict literature but has substantial implications on poverty and inequality, particularly for women (Hogendoorn et al., 2019; Holden & Smock, 1991).

Mediation analysis allows associations to be decomposed into components that reveal potential causal mechanisms (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This section uses a structural equation model (SEM) to examine whether divorces mediate the effect of conflict-induced displacement on the subset of proxies of household structures affected by displacement according to the results in the previous section. SEM is often a preferred method for mediation analysis for two reasons. First, this technique separates the mediator and the dependent variable from their measurement errors. Second, SEM is more flexible than multiple regression as it allows estimating and testing the entire causal model (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Danner et al., 2015).

Figure 2.6 illustrates the elements of the mediation analysis and the relationships between conflict-induced displacement (Di), divorces or separations (Zi), and household structures (Yi). Divorces and household structures are endogenous, while conflict-induced displacement is an exogenous variable. The model assumes that divorces or separations precede changes in household structures in time and that they are a potential cause for changes in those structures. As explained in the theoretical framework, conflict-induced displacement triggers divorces or separations due to increasing stress, trauma, and intrahousehold tensions. The

model also assumes that divorces or separations are associated with changes in household structures, beyond the direct effect of conflict-induced displacement on those structures. As a result, conflict-induced displacement is expected to have an indirect effect on household structures through divorces.




Figure 2.6. Effect of displacement on household structures mediated by divorces
Source: Prepared by author.

The SEM for this mediation model for the i -th household is given by:

$$Z_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{DZ}D_i + \beta_{XZ}X_i + \varepsilon_{Zi} \quad (2.2)$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_{ZY} Z_i + \alpha_{DY} D_i + \beta_{XY}X_i + \varepsilon_{Yi} \quad (2.3)$$

SEM assumes that the error terms in equations (2.2) and (2.3) are uncorrelated and that they follow a normal distribution. The two structural equations are linked to one another and inference is simultaneous, unlike two independent regression equations. In this exploratory analysis, the data are pooled, as it is not possible to fully exploit the dynamic nature of the panel to conduct the mediation analysis due to the small number of observations. The direct effect (α_{DY}) is the impact of conflict-induced displacement on household structures while controlling for divorces and the same set of covariates included in model (1). The indirect effect is the impact of conflict-induced displacement on household structures that pass through divorces, which is represented through the product of β_{DZ} and α_{ZY} . The total effect for conflict-induced displacement is the impact that would be found if there was no mediator in

the model. The estimation controls for the same set of observable characteristics X_i included in model (2.1) and used in the matching.

For simplicity, the analysis is conducted on the proxies for household structures found to be (statistically) impacted by conflict-induced displacement in the DID model including control variables (). Results of this exploratory analysis are presented in Table 2.11. Divorces partially mediate the effect of conflict-induced displacement on all proxies for household structures, except for *de jure* female-headed households and multi-generation households with multiple male members but no children. The estimated change in both household structures is fully mediated by divorces or separations.

The proportion of the total effect of displacement that is mediated through divorces or separations ranges from 15 percent for the increase in one-person households to 30 percent for the increase in the prevalence of non-traditional structures and the accompanying decline in the prevalence of traditional structures. Divorces or separations mediate 16 percent of the effect of conflict-induced displacement on the household size. The ratio of indirect to direct effect for the household size is 0.2 or one-fifth of the size of the direct effect of conflict-induced displacement. The ratio is similar for one-person households (0.18), but half of the size of the direct effect for the 3-percentage point increase in non-traditional structures and accompanying reduction of traditional living arrangements.

In this case, estimates indicate that the hypothesis of divorces mediating the impact of conflict-induced displacement on changes in household structures is valid. On the one hand, divorces or separations explain part of the change in the household size and in the prevalence of non-traditional structures stemming from conflict-induced displacement. On the other hand, divorces appear to fully mediate the effect of conflict-induced displacement on the increase in *de jure* female heads.

Table 2.11. Mediating effect of divorces or separations

| Variable | Coefficient | Proportion of effect mediated | Ratio of indirect to direct effect | Ratio of total to direct effect | Obs. |
|--|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|
| <i>Size</i> | | | | | |
| Indirect effect | -0.04 (0.01)** | 0.16 | 0.20 | 1.20 | 26,977 |
| Direct effect | -0.19** (0.06) | | | | |
| Total | -0.23*** (0.06) | | | | |
| <i>De jure</i> | | | | | |
| Indirect effect | 0.02** (0.01) | 2.62 | -1.61 | -0.62 | 26,977 |
| Direct effect | -0.01 (0.01) | | | | |
| Total | 0.01 (0.01) | | | | |
| <i>One-person</i> | | | | | |
| Indirect effect | 0.00* (0.00) | 0.15 | 0.18 | 1.18 | 26,977 |
| Direct effect | 0.01* (0.01) | | | | |
| Total | 0.02** (0.01) | | | | |
| <i>Multi-generation majority male without children</i> | | | | | |
| Indirect effect | 0.00* (0.00) | -0.94 | -0.48 | 0.52 | 26,977 |
| Direct effect | 0.00 (0.01) | | | | |
| Total | 0.00 (0.01) | | | | |
| <i>Non-traditional</i> | | | | | |
| Indirect effect | 0.01* (0.00) | 0.29 | 0.40 | 1.40 | 26,977 |
| Direct effect | 0.02* (0.01) | | | | |
| Total | 0.03** (0.01) | | | | |
| <i>Traditional</i> | | | | | |
| Indirect effect | -0.01* (0.00) | 0.30 | 0.40 | 1.34 | 26,977 |
| Direct effect | -0.02* (0.01) | | | | |
| Total | -0.03** (0.01) | | | | |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model estimated using structural equation modeling.

2.8 Concluding Remarks

Household structures play a key role in the wellbeing of individuals. Their size and composition are even more relevant in situations of conflict-induced displacement, where trauma, loss of human and physical capital, and limited access to opportunities can lead to a vicious cycle of poverty. However, an empirically rigorous analysis of how displacement affects household size and composition is scarce, partly due to the lack of representative data. The study presented in this chapter used a kernel-based PSM-DID model and a nationally representative longitudinal survey to estimate the causal effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures in Colombia between 2010 and 2016. This study adds to the growing body of research on conflict studies and economic shocks by quantifying the effect of conflict-induced displacement—an extreme form of shock that carries long-term consequences—on household structures.

Results point to a number of patterns. First, conflict-induced displacement in Colombia causes a reduction in the average household size. In a typical household of four members, conflict-induced displacement represents losing (either temporary or permanently) at least one member. Putting this effect size into perspective, based on DHS data, it took 25 years for Colombia to see a reduction of this magnitude in the average household size at the national level. This chapter presented the first study to quantify the effect of displacement on household size; hence, there is no direct comparison with other studies in this area. Most of the literature on shocks, on the other hand, point to the exact opposite pattern, that is, an increase in the average number of household members in response to economic hindrances.

Second, conflict-induced displacement is associated with a higher probability of female headship, which is largely explained by a growing share of *de jure* women heads, that is, structures where there is no permanent male presence, such as households headed by divorced women or widows. Depending on the specification, the increase in the prevalence of these structures between 2010 and 2016 ranged between 5-6 percentage points. Again, relative to the change observed at the national level using DHS data, an effect size of this magnitude in the prevalence of female headship is equivalent to a change that took almost twice as long (10 years) to take place in Colombia. This finding is consistent with studies analyzing the effects of the conflict in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Eritrea and it has implications for poverty and vulnerability. While reductions in the household size might be associated with lower poverty rates, the structures created by conflict-induced displacement might be particularly vulnerable, especially if the lost member is the main breadwinner for the household. Following displacement, *de jure* heads assume the role of provider—in this case, either due to changes of context, absence of spouse or other

circumstances associated with displacement. This new role implies that women heads might have to take a job while being responsible for childcare and domestic chores. In contexts where gender norms restrict women's participation in the labor market or dictate the types of work they can do; displacement can increase female breadwinners' vulnerability to poverty. On the other hand, these dynamics can provide opportunities for women to challenge gender norms around their role in society and, in some cases, engage in traditionally male-dominated sectors. These aspects are examined in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5 of this dissertation.

Third, conflict-induced displacement increases the prevalence of non-traditional structures, including female single caregiver households and one-person households. These results, coupled with the reduction in household size indicate that unlike *de jure* female heads in other countries with large-scale conflicts (e.g. Rwanda), in Colombia, women heads and their dependents do not join other units with a male (or female) head. The finding that displacement increases the likelihood of becoming a one-person household is noteworthy as this is a structure that typically receives less attention in the literature. Demographic trends at the national level are consistent with this finding, but the use of longitudinal data and a DID technique reinforce the idea that displacement in Colombia propels the creation of this household configuration, which depending on the socioeconomic characteristics of the one member, might also be vulnerable to poverty.

Fourth, the analysis using structural equations suggests that these effects are partly mediated by the increase in divorces resulting from conflict-induced displacement. Stress, trauma, and dire economic conditions might create intra-household leading to separations. This finding is consistent with evidence from displacement situations in Georgia and Uganda that points to growing levels of intimate partner violence leading to divorces, due to difficult economic conditions, shifting gender roles around paid work and the perceived lack of control experienced by men.

Why do the results for Colombia differ from those for other countries in the shocks literature and in other post-conflict situations? While the comparison is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible to formulate a few hypotheses. Overall, displacement represents a severe form of shock that carries long-lasting economic and psychological consequences, which cannot be equated with the impact of a financial crisis. At the same time, the context, geography, gender norms, and the role of social networks vary across countries and over time; hence, comparing these findings to other countries might not be adequate. Joining other structures might be a strategy to cope with displacement in Rwanda, but it might not be feasible in Colombia. Finally, it is possible that the panel nature of the data captures dynamics that cannot be observed or disentangled in cross-sectional studies.

3 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Changes in Gender Roles

3.1 Introduction

Conflict-induced displacement is a phenomenon with long term consequences, including catastrophic losses of human and physical capital and psychological trauma. Although women and men experience and respond differently to conflict-induced displacement, the impact of this phenomenon on traditional gender roles is relatively understudied (Gulesci, 2018; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2018). This gap is largely explained by the lack of population representative data disaggregated by sex in the contexts where displacement takes place (Brück & Schindler, 2009; Buvinic et al., 2013).

The study presented in this chapter aims to bridge this research gap by analyzing the impact of conflict-induced displacement on gender roles, that is, appropriate behaviors, occupations and functions in which each sex is expected to engage at the household and community levels (Anselmi & Law, 1998; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Studying gender roles in the context of displacement is important to understand how individuals and their households experience and respond to an extreme form of shock. Further, gender roles might help to explain the interaction between displacement and poverty and the channels through which displacement can perpetuate household poverty (Buvinic et al., 2013). As in many countries around the world, traditional gender roles play an important part in the Colombian society. Women are expected to take on the bulk of domestic and care responsibilities, whereas men are seen as the main breadwinners for their families (Chant, 2002).

The empirical analysis employs three rounds the Colombian Longitudinal Survey and a kernel-based PSM-DID approach to answer two research questions for which there is limited evidence in the academic literature. The **first question considered here is the extent to which conflict-induced displacement changes gender roles within the household**. Proxies for gender roles include the prevalence of female breadwinners, the number of hours that women and men work for pay, and an index of gender roles in the labor market.

Recognizing that micro-level decisions ultimately feed into women's and men's involvement in higher-level activities, this study poses a second research question, which examines **the extent to which conflict-induced displacement changes gender roles at the community level**. The analysis here focuses on the effects of displacement on women's and men's participation in social and political organizations; the number of social and political organizations they are affiliated to; and their participation in political organizations.

The findings reveal that conflict-induced displacement increases the prevalence of female breadwinners and significantly reduces the number of hours that men allocate to paid work, compared to their non-IDP counterparts with similar characteristics. Overall, displacement causes gender roles in the labor market, as measured by an index of gender roles focused on partnered women and single caregivers, to become less traditional. However, it only triggers a small shift in roles at the community level, as revealed by a slight increase in the probability that women participate in political organizations and a reduction in men's overall engagement in civic organizations over the period of analysis.

This study contributes to the economics of conflict and shocks literature in two ways. First, as articulated by Brück and Schindler (2009), the household is often considered a black box in the literature in peacetime and even more so in situations of conflict and post-conflict. The analysis presented in this chapter thus expands the level of analysis from a unitary approach to the household to consider intra-household dynamics. Second, it provides new empirical evidence, building on (limited) knowledge, about the impact of large-scale conflict-induced displacement on the roles and activities of both women and men at the household and community levels.

The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes three strands of the empirical literature that explain the effects of conflict, migration, and economic shocks on gender roles. Section 3.3 describes gender roles in the Colombian context. Section 3.4 presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses. Section 3.5 describes the data and the construction of proxies for gender roles, followed by Section 3.6 which outlines the empirical approach. Results are discussed in Section 3.7 before concluding in Section 3.8.

3.2 Literature Review

Given the limited evidence on conflict-induced displacement and gender roles, this section looks at three interconnected strands in the economic literature, namely, conflict studies, migration and economic shocks. Violent conflict is associated with significant asset and income losses and households restore to different strategies to cope with these and other negative impacts (Buvinic et al., 2013). For example, some of them rely on financial credit or support from social networks to cope with the economic shock (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989). The combination of these events and/or coping strategies by themselves are likely to alter the behaviors and activities of women and men. The review looks at different stages of the displacement or migration process and refers to effects that can be seen both in places of origin and

destination. Further, it summarizes studies that analyze the impact on migrants, those who stay behind, and returnees.

3.2.1 Conflict-induced displacement and gender roles

Households reallocate labor and resources to cope with the loss of assets and the lack of income-generating opportunities in conflict settings (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Buvinic et al., 2013). In the absence of able-bodied working-age men or as a result of labor market dynamics, whereby men's job insertion at the place of destination is slow, women often become heads of household or primary breadwinners even in traditionally patriarchal societies (Justino, 2017). Indeed, many displaced women become income providers for the first time in their lives, but also maintain their roles as primary caregivers, creating a double burden compounded by the lack of infrastructure and gender norms (Culcasi, 2019; Petesch, 2017; Pirtskhalava, 2015). For example, Culcasi (2019) and Hagen-Zanker et al. (2017) find that Syrian refugee women in Jordan often engage in the informal economy, mainly carrying activities such as cooking and cleaning homes, but they continue to bear the responsibility for childcare and domestic chores. Similar dynamics have been reported for IDP widows in Nepal (Ramnarain, 2016); Chechen refugees in the Czech Republic (Szczepanikova, 2005); and IDP women in Darfur (De La Puente, 2011). Furthermore, according to Pirtskhalava (2015), displaced Muslim Meskhetian women in Georgia were encouraged by their husbands to seek employment outside the home, but they were also expected to fulfill domestic duties, as it was perceived to be their "job."

Displaced women's increasing participation in the labor market does not necessarily translate into increased decision-making power. In a study about IDPs in Colombia, Calderón et al., (2011) find that displaced women worked 8 more hours per week than non-IDP women in rural areas and their contribution to household income rose by 14 percent after displacement. However, their bargaining power was not improved. Further, IDP women often reported increased domestic violence when they pursued employment or education while their husbands were unemployed (Wirtz et al., 2014). A qualitative study with refugee communities from Somalia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sudan resettled in Australia described similar findings and confirmed the interrelationship between dire labor market conditions, changing roles, and experiences of domestic violence (Fisher, 2013).

The relationship between changing gender roles and domestic violence might be explained by the underlying norms or rules of behavior related to women's and

men's societal expectations.²⁰ In a study on IDPs in Darfur, De La Puente (2011) shows that women were involved in health-related activities at the community level, but they did not participate in decisions related to IDP camps infrastructure or management, which were perceived as male fields. Similarly, drawing on a large qualitative dataset, Petesch (2017) finds that a large share of displaced women became the main breadwinners for their households in Gaza and in post-conflict Liberia. However, gender roles at the community level only changed in Liberia, where women adopted leadership positions. Importantly, traditional gender norms also appear to have shifted in this context (but not in Gaza), where women could own productive assets and enjoyed greater agency.²¹

The case of Liberia shows that when gender norms become less traditional women are often allowed to perform activities previously deemed unsuitable for them at the community level. In a study for Nepal, Ramnarain (2016) reports that in the aftermath of conflict, widows engaged in employment outside the home and some of them even crossed over into male-dominated fields, such as construction labor or transport. Similarly, Grabska (2013) finds that Nuer displaced women in South Sudan not only adopted the role of breadwinner for their households but also assumed traditionally male responsibilities, such as negotiating bride wealth payments.

Finally, conflict-induced displacement might also affect the distribution of paid and unpaid labor within households in hosting communities. Using panel data from Kagera, Tanzania, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) find that the inflow of refugees reduced local women's likelihood of being engaged in employment outside the home and increased the share of time devoted to wood collection and water fetching relative to men. The authors hypothesize that this might be the result of the environmental degradation associated with the arrival of refugees and the competition for natural resources used in household production, rather than a change in roles or underlying norms.

3.2.2 Voluntary migration and gender roles

Voluntary migration can also alter intra-household dynamics among those who stay behind. Using a panel of rural households in El Salvador, Acosta (2019) finds that male migration caused a minor redistribution of work within households. Women's growing engagement in agricultural activities was accompanied by a reduction in the amount of time dedicated to paid work outside the home and on domestic

²⁰ See details on the definition of gender norms in Bicchieri (2005) and Mackie, Moneti, Shakya, and Denny (2015).

²¹ According to Kabeer (1999) agency is defined the "ability to define one's goals and act upon them."

chores. In other words, male migration was not associated with more domestic responsibilities for women. Ghimire et al. (2019) report similar findings in a study for Nepal whereby husband's international migration increased wives' work in farming and participation in activities outside the home largely due to the loss of male labor. In neither case did remittances ameliorate the change in traditional dynamics.

Notwithstanding, even if male migration provides opportunities for women to assume new responsibilities, the changes can be only temporary in nature. As articulated by de Haas and van Rooij (2010), as soon as male migrants return, they tend to assume their traditional roles. Further, migrants often adopt ideas that prevail in host countries, which might weaken the status of women at places of origin with more traditional gender norms. For instance, Samari (2019) shows that return migration from Arab countries with large gender disparities was associated with increased household responsibilities for Egyptian women and worsened attitudes towards gender equality. Tuccio and Wahba (2018) report similar findings for Jordan. The authors find that having a return migrant from countries with more regressive gender norms had a negative impact on the self-perceived role of women. Women with a returnee family member also had a lower probability of participating in the labor market and higher fertility compared to women in non-migrant households.

Some of these changes in women's roles, or the lack thereof, can be explained by household structures. Desai and Banerji's study (2010) reveals that husbands' migration in India was associated with greater responsibilities and autonomy for women living in nuclear families, but women living in extended households did not experience these benefits. In particular, wives had less freedom with the presence of an older woman in the household. In another study from India, de Haan (2006) shows that households and communities at the origin reorganize and alter their living arrangements to respond to male migration and maintain traditional gender norms. Further, migrants in his study often delayed their departure until male relatives were available to join their households and care for the members left behind.

3.2.3 Economic shocks and gender roles

A growing body of literature shows that economic shocks can lead to changes in roles at the household level. For instance, Beck et al. (2019) examine the effects of a temporary income shock on the intra-household allocation of labor among coffee growers in Vietnam. Their results show that in addition to selling assets and taking up of credit for consumption, households coped with lower coffee prices by

increasing wage labor of adults. Children replaced adults on the farm and were more prone to engage in household chores than before the shock. These patterns, however, did not affect school enrollment or grade repetition for boys or girls. By contrast, Duryea et al. (2007) show that an unemployment shock affecting male household heads in Brazil increased the likelihood that 16-year old girls will enter employment and drop out of school by as much as 50 percent.

Economic crises can also lead to the gradual convergence of men's and women's roles in developed countries. In Italy, the 2009 economic crisis increased the prevalence of no-earner households and female breadwinners. One of the strategies to cope with the husband's job loss was the activation and search for employment of the wife. Interestingly, the segregated nature of the labor market in the country protected women from unemployment, by maintaining jobs in non-tradable sectors characterized by large shares of female employment such as care services and public sector work (De Rosa, 2019).

Notwithstanding, the dynamics that challenge the traditional male breadwinner model also pose risks for women (Hynes et al., 2016; Wirtz et al., 2014). Apart from increasing the likelihood of experiencing domestic violence, women might be forced to accept low quality and poorly remunerated jobs, which tend to reinforce occupational segregation. Further, this vicious cycle of poor labor market outcomes might increase women's and their dependents' vulnerability to poverty (Mayra Buvinic & Gupta, 1997; Munoz-Boudet et al., 2018).

3.3 Gender Roles in Colombia

Gender roles in Colombia tend to be traditional, particularly in rural areas. Men are considered the heads and the main breadwinners for the household. Women, on the other hand, bear most of the responsibility for household chores (Chant, 2002; Franco-Orozco & Franco-Orozco, 2018). In rural areas, the lack of publicly provided water, electricity, and sanitation, make domestic work even more time consuming. On average, women devote 3.1 more hours per day than men to these activities (4.2 hours compared to 1.1 hours), which is higher than the gap observed in other countries with similar levels of female labor force participation, including Paraguay (2.5 hours), Bhutan (2.2 hours), and Thailand (1.9 hours).²²

In over two decades, the situation of Colombian women in the labor market has shown a slight improvement. Between 1990 and 2018, female labor force

²² Own calculations based on National statistical offices or national database and publications compiled by United Nations Statistics Division. Data extracted from the World Bank Gender Data Portal on March 17, 2020.

participation rose from 52 percent to 59 percent. However, small improvements in female engagement in paid work have not been accompanied by a redistribution of unpaid work, creating a double burden for women (Rubiano-Matulevich & Viollaz, 2019). In fact, women are 23 percentage points less likely than men to participate in the labor market and when they do work, women are more likely than men to engage in informal or temporary jobs, and even more so if they are Indigenous or Afro descendants (Benería, 2001; Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (OCDE), 2015).

When it comes to women's participation in decision making structures, Colombia presents a mixed picture. At 18.7 percent, the country has the third lowest share of women in parliamentary seats in the Latin America region, only after Paraguay and Brazil. Female representation in these bodies is also low when compared to other middle-income countries.²³

In Colombia, slow progress in economic opportunities for women is matched with rigid attitudes or beliefs around gender equality, particularly in rural areas. Data from the 2015 Colombian DHS show that 57 percent of men and 52 percent of women between the ages of 13 and 49 in rural areas consider that women's most important role is cooking and taking care of household chores. The percentages for urban areas are 31 percent and 27 percent, respectively.

Low levels of female labor force participation and gender norms around housework and caregiving responsibilities in Colombia and similar societies might have an origin in traditional agricultural practices. Alesina et al. (2013), for example, empirically test Boserup's (1970) hypothesis according to which such practices, particularly plough agriculture, influenced the gender division of labor and the evolution of gender norms. Their findings show a strong negative relationship between historical plough use and unequal gender roles today; that is, traditional plough agriculture is positively correlated with attitudes around gender inequality and inversely correlated with female participation in the labor market and in politics.

3.4 Theoretical Framework

This section borrows from the literature on conflict studies, migration, and economic shocks to describe the main effects of conflict-induced displacement. It expands the framework presented in Chapter 2 and uses arguments from the feminist literature to outline *some* of the mechanisms through which conflict-induced displacement

²³ Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Data extracted from the World Bank Gender Data Portal. Accessed on March 16, 2020.

might affect gender roles. The description of transmission mechanisms in this section is limited by the lack of rigorous evidence about the impacts of displacement gender roles in the literature.

Gender roles refer to appropriate behaviors, occupations and functions in which each sex is expected to engage (Anselmi & Law, 1998; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). For example, women are seen as nurturing and affectionate, therefore they are expected to be the primary caregivers in the household. Men are considered assertive and dominant, and therefore should be the main breadwinners for the household (Fischer & Anderson, 2012). Indeed, in many societies, paid and unpaid work is divided along the gender lines. Compared to men, women dedicate more time to domestic chores and less hours to the labor market. In rural areas, activities are also sex segregated. Men are primarily responsible for ploughing and construction, whereas women are responsible for childcare, cooking, and planting. Married women in developing countries often do not consider wage labor because of beliefs that their “place” is at home and because of gender norms that give men power over their labor decisions (Brydon & Chant, 1989).

Theoretically, the effects of conflict-induced displacement on gender roles can pass through various mechanisms. Figure 3.1 illustrates *some* of these mechanisms by differentiating between the first- and second-round effects of displacement. The first-round impacts include: (1) mortality due to violence, disappearances; (2) GBV experienced by specific household members in the process of migrating; (3) psychological trauma; (4) income, assets and networks loss; (5) lack of food, livelihoods, and basic services; and (6) exposure to a different context and norms. The diagram also illustrates a series of second-round effects (derived from first-round impacts) that range from unbalanced sex ratios to intra-household tensions, marital separations, and poor health. The empirical analysis in this chapter is only focused on shifts highlighted in Figure 3.1.

Changes in gender roles among the displaced might be driven by the disruption in household structures that results from conflict and its legacy. Adult men typically suffer the highest mortality in conflicts, creating a shortage of working-age males and a high share of widow-headed households (Box 1). The Rwandan genocide provides an example whereby the excess male mortality caused highly unbalanced sex ratios and a substantial increase in widow-headed households. In many cases, widows also adopted a large number of orphans, creating household structures with high dependency ratios and poverty risk (Brück & Schindler, 2009). Importantly, these households showed a less biased division of housework along the gender lines, suggesting a change in traditional roles (Schindler, 2010).

The absence of men might also provide opportunities for gender roles to change at the community level. When referring to opportunities, the analysis in this study does not moderate the hardships that both women and men experience in situations of conflict-induced displacement. However, it aims to offer a perspective that goes beyond victimization to provide a more accurate picture of changes in gender roles. For instance, the conflict of Liberia and subsequent displacement of a large share of the population resulted in major changes in the roles and activities of women. They assumed leadership positions in agricultural organizations and cooperatives. A variety of reports also portray women as taking on traditionally male tasks such as making bricks and building houses (Fuest, 2008; Petesch, 2017).

The effects of conflict-induced displacement on gender roles can pass through the disruption of household structures resulting from tensions and (subsequent) marital separations associated with psychological trauma, stress, and episodes of GBV experienced by specific members in the process of fleeing (Boxes 2 and 3). In societies where the 'ideal' man is linked to a breadwinner, displaced men are likely to experience stress when they can no longer provide for their family and women take over economic responsibilities (Culcasi, 2019; Suerbaum, 2018). These dynamics create tensions within the household that can lead to marital separations and changes in household structures that assign new roles for women, for instance, as the main breadwinners and decision-makers in a 'new' household. Hence, although not depicted in Figure 3.1, the relationship between marital dissolutions and gender roles might work in both directions. Reports by the Centro de Memoria Histórica in Colombia also give various account of marital separations (and emergence of new roles) resulting from the trauma experienced by male spouses who witnessed the sexual assault of their wives perpetrated by armed actors (Centro de Memoria Histórica [Colombia], 2011, 2012).

Conflict-induced displacement is associated with substantial losses of income, assets, and social networks (Box 4). Further, IDPs might lack the connections and skills to get a job at their place of destination and those dynamics have a gender dimension. In Colombia, most displaced men—who come from rural areas, where they usually worked in agriculture—have skills less relevant to the urban context where they resettle with their families. In contrast, women—who were responsible for household chores in rural areas—can use the same skills to find a job as domestic workers in urban areas (Ibáñez et al., 2011; Meertens & Stoller, 2001). Hence, a situation that might represent lack of opportunities for men might turn into a higher likelihood of employment for women. Importantly, collective models of household bargaining predict that a change in women's access to economic opportunities might affect the distribution of roles and responsibilities within the household (Baland & Ziparo, 2018; Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017).

In many societies, some household chores and childcare are performed within networks of neighbors or extended family and the support of those networks is essential in leveraging labor, food and money (Chant & Campling, 1997; Kebede & Butterfield, 2009). To the extent that gender norms assign caring responsibilities to women, the destruction of community networks associated with displacement is thus likely to alter gender roles at the household and community levels. Indeed, evidence from IDPs in Uganda, reveals that households receive more support from within their locality or village than from distant places (Obaa & Mazur, 2017).

Health aspects are also relevant in the process of changing gender roles. People who have lost their homes and livelihoods due to conflict-induced displacement are highly vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity (Box 5). Many of them also suffer from poor health and injuries caused by the conflict, all of which have a gender dimension. While poor health stemming from malnutrition and the lack of proper sanitation is more common among women and children, the disability burden from conflict in many contexts is skewed towards men (Buvinić et al., 2013; Krug et al., 2002). In the absence of able-bodied men, women are likely to adopt the role of primary providers for their households as well as caregivers for children, elderly, and the disabled.

Finally, a large body of literature suggests that differences in gender roles might be explained by norms about the appropriate role of women and men in society (Borck, 2014; Fernández, 2007, 2013; Fernández & Fogli, 2009). Thus, it is possible that gender roles change because conflict-induced displacement exposes IDP women and men to different gender norms (Gulesci, 2018) (Box 6). Behaviors and functions traditionally assigned to women and men in rural communities of Colombia might conflict with the norms at the urban destination, forcing people to adapt to the new context. However, it is also possible that gender roles remain unaltered because norms prevailing at the origin do not become less rigid in a new environment. Given that cultural transmission is largely determined by parents and social networks, behaviors related to the expected role of women and men in society will be embodied in beliefs that might span over generations (Fernández & Fogli, 2009; Jayachandran, 2015). Similarly, in cases when (most of) the community migrates together to a new location, crucial reference networks remain intact; hence, the likelihood of changing attitudes or behaviors is low.




Figure 3.1. Mechanisms of transmission for the impacts of displacement on gender roles
Source: Author based on Buvinić et al. (2013).

3.4.1 Hypotheses

This study formulates and tests the following hypotheses based on the literature, the theoretical framework, and the analysis on gender roles in Colombia presented in Section 3.3.

Hypothesis 1: Conflict-induced displacement increases the prevalence of female breadwinner households.

It is expected that displacement will have a positive and significant impact on the probability of becoming a female breadwinner household. The negative effects of displacement force households to adopt strategies such as changes in customary divisions of labor along the gender lines. Women will take on earning roles within the household during displacement to replace male workers. This finding would be consistent with qualitative evidence for other contexts, including displaced women in South Sudan and in Palestine (Grabska, 2013; Petesch, 2017).

Hypothesis 2: Displacement increases the participation of women in paid work, while reducing that of men.

Women's greater engagement in the labor market might be a general trend in Colombia. However, it is possible that conflict-induced displacement boosts the presence of women in the labor force, as measured by the number of hours dedicated to income-generating activities. Based on the conflict and shocks literature, it is expected that the amount of time that women allocate to paid work will increase with displacement to cope with the absence of working-age men or with the fact that displaced men have higher unemployment rates because their agricultural skills are of little use in the areas where they resettle (Giugale et al., 2003; Calderón et al., 2011). In line with higher unemployment rates for displaced men (compared to non-displaced men), it is expected that the number of hours that they dedicate to paid work will decrease with displacement.

Hypothesis 3: Displacement is associated with less traditional gender roles at the household level.

Based on the shocks literature, it is expected that conflict-induced displacement, an extreme form of shock, will lead to the gradual convergence of men's and women's roles in the labor market. The demand for women's skills in urban areas will lead to increased employment opportunities for them. In contrast, the fact that men's agricultural skills are of little use in urban areas will lead to lower engagement in

paid work. These dynamics change gender roles around paid work within the household.

Hypothesis 4: Displacement increases female participation in civic and/or political organizations while decreasing that of men.

Rigorous empirical evidence on the impact of displacement (or even conflict alone) is extremely limited and studies of gender differentials are virtually non-existent. Based on the case studies in the literature on displacement (Justino et al., 2012; Petesch, 2017), it is expected that female participation in social and political organizations will increase with displacement. One of the potential mechanisms underlying this change might be associated with women's increasing engagement in the labor market, which promotes social interactions and increasing engagement in social and political activities. Then, it follows that reductions in men's engagement in paid work (postulated in hypotheses 2 and 3) and the stress and trauma stemming from changing gender roles in the household will lead to fewer social interactions and a lower likelihood of participating in social and political activities.

3.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data employed in this study come from the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (ELCA) collected by the Center for Studies on Economic Development (CEDE) at Universidad de los Andes. Details about the sample and characteristics of the survey are included in the Data section of Chapter 2. The identification and definition of IDPs are also consistent with the description in that chapter.

3.5.1 Measurement of gender roles

This study uses various proxies for gender roles. At the household level, they include the prevalence of female breadwinner households, working hours for women and men, and an index of gender roles focused on labor market opportunities. Proxies for gender roles at the community level include female and male participation in social and political organizations, the number of organizations in which women and men engage, and female and male participation in political organizations. Below a detailed description of each variable.

3.5.1.1 Gender Roles at the household level

- *Female breadwinner household:* A main breadwinner is the primary or sole income earner in a household. By contributing the largest share of household income, this person is often responsible for most expenses and

for supporting dependents. This variable is constructed with data on gross earnings at the time of the survey for the heads of household and their spouses (or for the head if they do not have a spouse). Households are divided into two groups, namely, male breadwinners and female breadwinners. The latter are defined as households where one or more women contributes with 50 percent or more of the household's income.²⁴

- *Number of working hours:* This variable is based on self-reported data on the total number of hours per week that women and men spend on income-generating activities. It includes female and male heads who have a partner of opposite sex and single caregivers.
- *Gender roles index:* This chapter follows the approach proposed by Smith and Koehoorn (2016) to construct a gender roles index (GRI) in the labor market when direct measures are not collected. The GRI focuses on two dimensions: (i) the behavioral norms applied to men and women and (ii) the distribution of power among them. As in the case of the variables described above, the analysis focuses on women with a male partner (principal couple) and single caregivers. Given the limited data available for couples across waves, the GRI consists of three components: number of hours that the woman allocates to paid work relative to her male partner; women's occupational segregation; and the woman's level of education relative to her male partner.

To create the GRI the values for the three components (occupational segregation, hours of work, and educational level) are summed for every woman. Each component is given the same weight, providing a score ranging from 0 to 9, with higher scores indicating more traditional gender roles in the labor market. By contrast, lower scores indicate less traditional gender roles. Components and the treatment of single caregivers are described in detail below.

- *Hours of paid work relative to partner:* Respondents report the usual number of hours they work for pay each week. Using the hours of work reported by women and their male spouse in the principal couple (if partnered), each partnered woman is grouped into one of the following four categories: 0 = woman works but partner does not (or she does not have a partner); 1 = respondent works more hour than her partner; 2 = respondent works the same hours as her partner; 3 = respondent works less hours than her partner.

²⁴ Households consisting of female single caregivers and one woman (one person households) are also included in this variable.

If a woman does not have a male partner (e.g. single caregiver) she is grouped with women who work but their partners do not.

- *Occupational segregation:* Using the distribution of self-reported sector of employment in the survey (21 major groups), each sector is classified into one of four groups: 0 = sectors where less than 26 percent of workers are women; 1 = sectors where 26 to 50 percent of workers are women; 2 = sectors where 50 to 74 percent of workers are women; 3 = sectors where 75 percent or more of workers are women. Sectors with the lowest participation of women (25 percent or less) are considered as male-dominated, while those with the highest participation (75 percent or more) of women are conceived as female-concentrated. This definition is then applied to the sample of women with a partner and single caregivers in the survey.
- *Education level relative to partner:* The level of education is reported in six categories, namely, less than primary; primary; secondary; technical; undergraduate; and graduate degree. Using this information, each woman with a partner is classified into one of the following three categories: 0 = woman with a higher level of education than her partner (or female single caregivers); 1 = woman with the same level of education as her partner; and 2 = woman with a lower level of education than her partner. Similar to working hours, women without a spouse are grouped with women who have a higher level of education than their spouse. Importantly, descriptive statistics in the previous section showed that, except for the share of household heads with technical training, educational attainment is constant over time. The implication is that as far as this component is concerned, the index is not expected to show major changes associated to education.

In order to look at the effect of conflict-induced displacement on the individual dimensions, each component is transformed into a binary variable as follows:

- *Woman works more hours than male partner:* Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the woman in the principal couple works the same number or more hours than her male partner or if the woman is a single working caregiver; 0 otherwise.
- *Woman works in a male-dominated sector:* Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the woman works in a sector where 25 percent or less of workers (as reported in the ELCA) were women; 0 otherwise.

- *Woman has the same or a higher level of education than her male partner:* Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the woman has the same or more education than her male partner or if the woman is a single caregiver; 0 otherwise.

Robustness checks are conducted by changing the cutoff points for the hours of work and the level of education to exclude the equality condition in both variables. In other words, the variables only take the value of 1 if the woman works more hours and has more education than her partner.

3.5.1.2 *Gender roles at the community level*

The ELCA includes a multiple-choice question on civic and political participation in all three waves. Specifically, the survey asks about individual participation in Community Action Boards,²⁵ community organizations, bodies for citizens' participation and action, ethnic organizations, worker cooperatives, political movements, among others. Based on this information, three proxies for gender roles at the community level are constructed: (i) a dichotomous variable for female/male participation in any of the organizations listed in the question; (ii) a continuous variable measuring the number of activities in which women and men participate; and (iii) a dichotomous variable for female/male participation in a political movement. Below a description of each variable.

- *Female/male participation in civic or political organizations:* Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a woman/man participates in any of the organizations listed in the question; 0 otherwise.
- *Number of political or civic organizations in which women and men participate:* Continuous variable measuring the number of organizations listed in the question in which a woman/man participates.
- *Female/male participation in political organizations:* Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a woman/man participates in a political movement; 0 otherwise.

²⁵ Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs) have a long tradition in Colombia as a basic unit of social organization at the community level. Their mission is to promote development and collective well-being for the communities they represent (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2001).

3.5.2 Descriptive statistics

Table 3.1 presents the distribution of female breadwinners in the three survey rounds. Female breadwinners represent one-third of all households in the 2016 wave, with the corresponding share of two-thirds of households consisting of male breadwinners. Differences in the prevalence of female and male breadwinners are not statistically significant between IDP and non-IDP households.

Displaced and non-displaced women and men dedicate on average the same number of hours to income-generating activities. In 2016, women in the sample work an average of 17 hours per week, while men spend an average of 28.4 hours per week. Differences between displaced and non-displaced individuals are not statistically significant in 2016, but the data reveal a positive trend in labor market engagement for women in both groups. Between 2010 and 2016, the number of hours that IDP and non-IDP women dedicated to paid work increased by 4 and 2 hours per week, respectively. Labor market engagement also increased for non-IDP men during the same period (4 hours per week), but the change was not significant for IDP men Table B.1.

Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the GRI components in the three survey waves. Slightly more than one-fourth of women (25.2 percent) work more hours than their spouse in 2016, but there are no differences according to displacement. In most households, male partners work longer hours in the labor market compared to their female spouses. Similarly, only 15 percent of IDP women and 20 percent of non-IDP women work in male-dominated sectors. The share of IDP women in these sectors did not change between 2010 and 2016, but it increased by 15.5 percentage points among non-IDPs (Table B.2). Finally, differences in education are noticeable for men and women in the principal couple, although these are smaller in magnitude than the gaps observed for other measures. The proportion of women who have higher levels of education than their spouse (conceptualized as the less traditional category) is only 15.3 percent of the sample and IDPs are 8 percentage points more likely than non-IDPs to be in this category. Changes in the distribution over time were not statistically significant for either group.

Table 3.2. Distribution of GRI components

| | Observations | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|------|------|------|------|-------|---------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | IDP | | | | | | Non-IDP | | | | | | Total | | | IDP | | |
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| <i>Hours of work</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Respondent work and spouse does not (or no spouse) | 14.0 | 9.5 | 11.3 | 11.4 | 7.1 | 7.15 | 11.5 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 178 | 1,140 | 1,470 | 6,257 | 7,063 | 5,688 | 2.53 | 2.39* | 4.17*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3.16) | (1.38) | (1.03) |
| Respondent works more hours than spouse | 23.1 | 18.4 | 24.7 | 23.2 | 25.2 | 25.34 | 23.2 | 24.4 | 25.2 | 178 | 1,140 | 1,470 | 6,257 | 7,063 | 5,688 | -0.09 | -6.82*** | -0.65 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (4.14) | (1.93) | (1.53) |
| Respondent works the same amount as spouse | 6.2 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 5.1 | 3.8 | 3.31 | 5.2 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 178 | 1,140 | 1,470 | 6,257 | 7,063 | 5,688 | 1.11 | -0.31 | -0.74 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2.65) | (1.04) | (0.54) |
| Respondent works less hours than spouse | 56.7 | 68.7 | 61.4 | 60.2 | 64.0 | 64.20 | 60.2 | 64.5 | 63.7 | 178 | 1,140 | 1,470 | 6,257 | 7,063 | 5,688 | -3.55 | 4.75** | -2.77 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (4.63) | (2.26) | (1.71) |
| <i>Occupation</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 26% women | 8.9 | 16.3 | 14.8 | 5.7 | 23.8 | 20.3 | 5.8 | 23.0 | 19.2 | 101 | 411 | 524 | 3,374 | 2,607 | 2,001 | 3.19 | -7.49*** | -5.57*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3.27) | (2.67) | (2.08) |
| 26 to 50% women | 8.9 | 2.1 | 4.7 | 11.7 | 7.5 | 6.4 | 11.7 | 6.9 | 6.1 | 101 | 411 | 524 | 3,374 | 2,607 | 2,001 | -2.88 | -5.41*** | -1.70 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2.92) | (1.89) | (1.31) |
| 51 to 74% women | 32.3 | 57.3 | 46.9 | 51.3 | 51.3 | 45.4 | 50.8 | 52.0 | 45.7 | 101 | 411 | 524 | 3,374 | 2,607 | 2,001 | -18.97*** | 6.00 | 1.57 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (5.65) | (3.91) | (3.01) |
| More than 74% women | 49.9 | 24.3 | 33.6 | 31.3 | 17.4 | 27.9 | 31.7 | 18.1 | 29.0 | 101 | 411 | 524 | 3,374 | 2,607 | 2,001 | 18.66*** | 6.90** | 5.70** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (6.03) | (2.95) | (2.85) |
| <i>Education</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Respondent higher level of education than spouse | 20.7 | 18.3 | 22.2 | 15.2 | 14.0 | 13.7 | 15.3 | 14.5 | 15.3 | 144 | 715 | 932 | 5,673 | 4,697 | 3,776 | 5.52 | 4.27* | 8.51*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (4.19) | (2.20) | (1.69) |
| Respondent same education as spouse | 59.1 | 65.2 | 62.2 | 66.1 | 67.8 | 67.7 | 66.0 | 67.5 | 66.7 | 144 | 715 | 932 | 5,673 | 4,697 | 3,776 | -7.04 | -2.55 | -5.58*** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (5.15) | (2.66) | (2.09) |
| Respondent lower education than spouse | 20.2 | 16.5 | 15.6 | 18.7 | 18.3 | 18.6 | 18.7 | 18.1 | 18.0 | 144 | 715 | 932 | 5,673 | 4,697 | 3,776 | 1.52 | -1.72 | -2.93* |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (4.24) | (2.06) | (1.63) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01,

Table 3.3 shows the polychoric correlations between the GRI and its three components. The GRI was most strongly correlated with occupational segregation, followed by hours of work. Focusing on the measures included in the LFGI the highest correlation was observed between education and hours of work.

Table 3.3. Polychoric correlations between the GRI and its components

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|-----------------------|------|-------|-------|------|
| 1. Gender roles index | 1.00 | | | |
| 2. Hours of work | 0.49 | 1.00 | | |
| 3. Occupation | 0.65 | -0.15 | 1.00 | |
| 4. Education | 0.41 | 0.76 | -0.05 | 1.00 |

Note: Correlations are estimated for the 2010-2016 period.

Table 3.4 presents the results of a linear regression examining the interaction between displacement and survey year on GRI scores after adjusting for age of the household heads and their spouses' (if applicable), as well as area of residence. Compared with 2010, scores were higher (or gender roles more traditional) in 2013 and 2016. Although displaced women had a higher GRI than non-IDP women, gender roles in IDP households became less traditional between 2010 and 2016.

Table 3.4 Linear regression estimates for gender roles index

| Variables | GRI |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|
| <i>Survey year</i> | |
| 2016 | 0.21*** (0.03) |
| 2013 | 0.39*** (0.03) |
| <i>Displacement (ref: non-IDP)</i> | |
| IDP | 0.26* (0.15) |
| Survey 2016*IDP | -0.52*** (0.16) |
| Survey 2013*IDP | -0.37** (0.16) |
| Observations | 18,854 |
| R-squared | 0.17 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates adjusted for age, age squared, and area of residence. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Turning to gender roles at the community level, overall participation in civic organizations is low. Table 3.5 shows that in 2016, 14 percent of women and men in the sample report participating in one or more of the social and/or political organizations listed above. While IDP men are 2.3 percentage points less likely than non-IDP men to participate in any of these organizations, differences between IDP and non-IDP women are not statistically significant. The data also reveal a small increase in female and male participation in social and/or political organizations between 2010 and 2016. The percentage of IDP men engaged in these groups increased by 4.5 percentage points over the period of analysis, compared to 5.3 percentage points for non-IDP men. The figures for IDP and non-IDP women were 6.5 and 3.6 percentage points, respectively (Table B.2).

Regardless of their displacement status, few people in the sample participate in any social or political organization. While displaced and non-displaced women's social and political participation increased between 2010 and 2016, differences in the number of organizations they are affiliated to, are not statistically significant. Displaced men, on the other hand, on average participated in fewer civic organizations compared to non-displaced men.

Female and male participation in political organizations is also low in the sample. On average, 0.3 percent of women are affiliated to a political movement in 2016, compared to 1.1 percent of men. However, IDP women are 0.32 percentage points more likely than non-IDP women to participate in political organizations. Differences between IDPs and non-IDP men, on the other hand, are not statistically significant in 2016.

Table 3.5. Female and male participation in civic and political organizations

| | | Observations | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|--------------|------|------|---------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|---------------|---------|--------|
| | | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | Total | | | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | IDP - Non-IDP | | |
| | | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| Participation in civic organizations (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Women | 8.4 | 22.5 | 14.9 | 10.2 | 19.6 | 13.8 | 10.1 | 19.9 | 14.0 | 242 | 1,237 | 1,710 | 9,499 | 7,768 | 6,784 | -1.80 | 2.93 | 1.08 | (1.21) |
| Men | 7.2 | 16.0 | 11.7 | 8.7 | 17.8 | 14.0 | 8.6 | 17.6 | 13.6 | 236 | 1,211 | 1,659 | 9,174 | 7,548 | 6,574 | -1.51 | -1.83 | -2.34* | (1.84) |
| Number of civic organizations | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Women | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 242 | 1,237 | 1,710 | 9,499 | 7,768 | 6,784 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 0.02 | (0.02) |
| Men | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 236 | 1,211 | 1,659 | 9,174 | 7,548 | 6,574 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.04** | (0.02) |
| Participation in political movements (%) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Women | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 242 | 1,237 | 1,710 | 9,499 | 7,768 | 6,784 | 0.29 | 0.18 | 0.32* | (0.19) |
| Men | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 236 | 1,211 | 1,659 | 9,174 | 7,548 | 6,574 | -0.24 | 0.09 | -0.24 | (0.37) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01,

3.6 Empirical Framework

This objective of this section is to address the hypotheses presented in Section 3.4 around the two research questions that frame this study. First, the extent to which conflict-induced displacement changes gender roles within the household. And second, the extent to which displacement changes gender roles at the community level.

The analysis exploits the fact that a number of households included in the panel were forced to flee their homes between 2010 and 2016 to measure the effect of displacement D_i on traditional gender roles (Y_{it}) at the household and community level. Proxies for the analysis at the household level include the prevalence of female breadwinners, the number of hours that women and their male partners work for pay, and an index of gender roles in the labor market (as well as its components). Proxies for gender roles at the community level include women's and their male partners' participation in civic organizations, the number of organizations to which they are affiliated, and their participation in political organizations.

Equation (3.1) presents the regression model to estimate the effect of conflict-induced on various proxies for gender roles, where the unit of observation is the i -th household/individual:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta D_i + \gamma t + \delta(D_i \cdot t) + \theta X_{it} + \mu S_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3.1)$$

Two groups are indexed by displacement status $D_i=0, 1$ where 0 indicates couples or single caregivers in households that were not displaced by conflict (control), and 1 indicates couples or single caregivers from households that were displaced by conflict (treatment). As described in Chapter 2, a household is in the displaced group in each wave if: (i) it has at least one member who was displaced during the three years prior to the survey and they have lived in another municipality for at least 6 months, or (ii) it is beneficiary of a program for displaced households, or (iii) it had to abandon its place of residence in the three years prior to the survey. In addition, households retain their IDP status over time.

Individuals are observed in at least two time periods, $t=0, 1$, where 0 indicates the period before they were displaced (pre-treatment), and 1 indicates the period after they were displaced (post-treatment). This means that the treatment includes households that were displaced between 2010 and 2013 or between 2013 and 2016 and were interviewed in the last round. Every observation is indexed by the letter $i=1, 2, \dots, N$. The coefficient α represents the constant term; β is the displacement specific effect; γ is the time trend common to both displaced and non-displaced

groups, and δ is the coefficient of interest. The matrix X_{it} includes the pre-treatment socio-economic characteristics of the household, including its size, area of residence, the share of women of reproductive age (15-49), the share of children aged 0-18; the share of elderly aged 65+; and exposure to violence during the three years prior to the survey. Individual-level characteristics include the level of education of the household head, their employment status, age group, and marital status. These characteristics are also included for their spouses (if they have one). The vector S_i is a dummy variable, where 0 indicates households or individuals that were displaced in $t=0$ or before. This variable serves as additional control, but observations are not included in the estimation of the double difference, as there is no information about their characteristics before they were displaced. Department fixed effects are included to control for effects at that level.

The main characteristic of the treatment under evaluation is exogeneity, that is, the treatment is not controllable for individuals. The assumption is that armed groups attack civilians, seize the property and force them to flee, hence conflict-induced displacement is not a voluntary decision to improve economic conditions (Ceriani & Verme, 2018; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). Evidence for Colombia indicates that in most cases (86 percent), displacement is mainly a reaction to being a victim of violent attacks (Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). Although the violence triggers displacement, some argue that it is not the only factor that affects the decision to flee. In many regions, people experience a substantially high risk of dying from violence, yet a non-negligible share decide to stay (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007). Regardless of the reason, it is unlikely that the decision to flee is made under assumptions of economic rationality. Evaluating the costs and benefits of displacement is almost impossible, especially in the presence of death threats by armed groups (Ceriani & Verme, 2018).

To address potential issues of self-selection and endogeneity, the estimation is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, it estimates the propensity of displacement based on the set of pre-treatment covariates at the household and individual level, which include all the variables listed as covariates above (see Table B.3 and Table B.4 for balance tests). In the second stage, propensity scores are used to match IDP and non-IDP households along various dimensions. This approach produces a control group that does not differ systematically from the treated in terms of the pre-treatment variables. By comparing the change in gender roles in among the displaced and non-displaced with similar characteristics, PSM-DID estimates the ATT.

PSM-DID reduces biases from two sources. First, it controls for unobserved time-invariant effects, which could be correlated with displacement and the outcome of interest. Second, it reduces the bias from aggregate shocks that affect both displaced

and non-displaced households over time. To verify the robustness of results and explore changing dynamics over shorter periods of time, the model is estimated for two subperiods: 2010-2013 and 2013-2016. Additional sensitivity analyses are conducted by changing the cutoff points for gender roles index and excluding single caregivers from the sample.

3.7 Results

This section presents the kernel-based PSM-DID estimates of the impact of displacement on gender roles at the household and community level for the 2010-2016 period. This means that the estimation only compares the outcomes of interest in two periods, but the treatment group includes all households (and their members) that were displaced between 2010 and 2013, and 2013 and 2016.

Results are reported on the area of common support for the balanced sample, which includes most observations in the sample. However, because the number of observations in the treatment group is limited for some of the dependent variables, the matched sample can vary across estimations. As mentioned, consistent with the transmission of the displaced status across generations, households that were displaced between 2010 and 2016, retain their status over time.

3.7.1 Kernel-based PSM-DID

In terms of the impact on the gender roles index, estimates in Table 3.7 show support for the hypothesis that conflict-induced displacement in Colombia causes less traditional gender roles in the labor market (hypothesis 3). In particular, displacement reduces the overall GRI score by 0.47 points between 2010 and 2016, a change that appears to be explained by women's increased involvement in paid work compared to their male partners (or single caregivers' engagement in paid work), but not for the sector in which they work or differences in their educational levels. Compared to non-displaced women with similar observable characteristics, the percentage of IDP women who work more hours than their partners increase by 15 percentage points between 2010 and 2016. These estimates, however, should be interpreted with caution as the number of observations is considerably smaller than those included in the estimations for other proxies (e.g., Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 shows the PSM-DID estimates of the effect of displacement on the proxies for gender roles at the household level. The overall results suggest that conflict-induced displacement increases the likelihood that women become the main breadwinners for their households by 4 percentage points. This responsibility often takes the form of greater engagement in paid work, particularly when men face dire

labor market conditions. Moreover, estimates in column (3) show that displaced men participate less actively in the labor market in relation to non-displaced men with similar characteristics (-4.2 hours per week), while the amount of time that IDP women dedicate to the labor market increases by 1.5 hours per week, but the difference with other non-IDP women is not statistically significant.

In terms of the impact on the gender roles index, estimates in Table 3.7 show support for the hypothesis that conflict-induced displacement in Colombia causes less traditional gender roles in the labor market (hypothesis 3). In particular, displacement reduces the overall GRI score by 0.47 points between 2010 and 2016, a change that appears to be explained by women's increased involvement in paid work compared to their male partners (or single caregivers' engagement in paid work), but not for the sector in which they work or differences in their educational levels. Compared to non-displaced women with similar observable characteristics, the percentage of IDP women who work more hours than their partners increase by 15 percentage points between 2010 and 2016. These estimates, however, should be interpreted with caution as the number of observations is considerably smaller than those included in the estimations for other proxies (e.g., Table 3.6).

Table 3.6. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles, household level

| Variable | Female breadwinners (1) | Hours worked (female) (2) | Hours worked (male) (3) |
|--------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Time | 0.06*** (0.01) | 3.34*** (0.50) | 6.01*** (0.62) |
| Displaced | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.42 (0.89) | 0.74 (1.18) |
| DID | 0.04* (0.02) | 1.48 (1.04) | -4.24*** (1.33) |
| Controls | No | No | No |
| Observations | 11,934 | 19,857 | 19,857 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.7. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles index

| Variable | Works the same or more than partner (1) | Male-dom. sector (2) | Same or more education than partner (3) | GRI (4) |
|--------------|--|----------------------------|--|--------------------|
| Time | 0.08*** (0.02) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.26*** (0.07) |
| Displaced | -0.05 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.33*** (0.10) |
| DID | 0.15*** (0.04) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.05) | -0.47*** (0.13) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 5,142 | 4,944 | 3,175 | 5,142 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.04 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.8 shows that the magnitude of the effect on the variables comparing the number of hours of work and the level of education with respect to the partner changes when changing the cutoff points to exclude the equality condition. Compared to non-IDP women with similar observable characteristics, the percentage of IDP women who work more hours than their partners increase by 9 percentage points between 2010 and 2016. Similarly, displacement is associated with an increase in the proportion of women who have more education than their partners by 8 percentage points. These findings imply that the index is highly sensitive to the choice of cutoff point.

When it comes to gender roles at the community level, almost no support is found for the hypothesis that conflict-induced displacement causes greater participation of women in civic and political organizations (hypothesis 4). Columns (1) and (3) in Table 3.9 show that the effect of displacement on women's overall engagement in these organizations is not statistically significant. In contrast, results support the hypothesis of decreased male participation in civic organizations in situations of displacement, by revealing a decline of 3 percentage points between 2010 and 2016.

Table 3.8. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles index

| Variable | Works more than partner (1) | Male-dom. sector (2) | More education than partner (3) | GRI (4) |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Time | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | -0.26*** (0.07) |
| Displaced | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.33*** (0.10) |
| DID | 0.09 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.02) | -0.47*** (0.13) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 5,142 | 4,944 | 3,175 | 5,142 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.04 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The number of organizations that men are affiliated to, also decreased because of conflict-induced displacement (columns [2] and [4]). In contrast, conflict-induced displacement only triggered a small increase (1 percentage point between 2010 and 2016) in the likelihood that women participate in political organizations (column [5]). This could be explained by the fact that the engagement in productive activities fosters social connections that alter women's behavior in relation to political activism. However, in the context of the labor market dynamics for displaced people in Colombia, an effect size as small as 1 percentage point, could also hint at the fact that the changes in gender roles within households and women's increased engagement in paid work (in relation to men) restrict their ability to participate in other non-work related activities, as evidenced in the results in Table 3.9. The data on the intra-household distribution of tasks in the ELCA are limited; hence, a detailed analysis in this area was not feasible.

Table 3.9. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles, community level

| Variable | Social or political participation | | Number of organizations | | Political participation | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Time | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.09*** (0.01) | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Displaced | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| DID | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.03** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.04** (0.02) | 0.01* (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 19,525 | 19,541 | 19,525 | 19,541 | 19,525 | 19,541 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summing up, these results partially confirm hypotheses 1 and 2. IDP women are more prone to become the main or sole income earner for the households than non-IDP women. And the number of hours that men dedicate to paid work decreases with conflict-induced displacement. Changes in the indicator of gender roles (GRI) also confirm these results by showing that, compared to non-IDP couples, gender roles in the labor market among IDP couples have become less traditional. This change seems to be driven by labor market engagement, even though women still appear to be concentrated in traditionally female sectors of work and there are no significant differences associated with education. The results around women's working hours relative to their partners are also valid when changing the cutoff point to exclude the equality, and in the case of education, the effect of displacement also becomes significant.

Findings show evidence of a slight increase in the levels of female engagement in political organizations as a result of displacement but no significant differences in civic participation compared to non-IDP women. Male engagement in civic activities, on the other hand, decreases with displacement but the effect on their participation in political organizations is not statistically significant. These findings show support in favor of hypothesis 4.

3.7.2 Validity of the “parallel trends” assumption

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the validity of the underlying assumption of equal trends cannot be proved, but it can be assessed. Since displacement occurs at different points in time, this exercise is restricted to the sample of households that were displaced between the second and third waves. Figure 3.2 presents the evolution of the gender roles index for IDP and non-IDPs. Although there is no statistical test for this assumption, visual inspection suggests that in the absence of displacement, the difference between the “treatment” and “control” group is constant over time. This is also the case for the share of female breadwinner households, as depicted in Figure 3.3.




Figure 3.2. Parallel trends assumption, gender roles index

Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.




Figure 3.3. Parallel trends assumption, share of female breadwinners
 Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.

3.7.3 Sensitivity analysis

This section presents sensitivity analysis estimating model (3.1) with (i) a restricted sample, that is, only women with a partner of opposite sex for 2010-2016 (excluding single caregivers) and (ii) with the full sample for two subperiods, 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 using the same empirical approach. The full set of covariates for the matching is the same as in the previous section.

Restricted sample

Table 3.10 presents the estimates of the effect of displacement on gender roles at the household level after removing single caregivers from the sample. The results indicate that the effect of displacement is no longer significant on the share of female breadwinners or the number of hours worked by men. This could be an indication that some of the changes in gender roles observed at the household level are likely to be driven by an increased engagement of female single caregivers in paid work or other income-generating opportunities.

Table 3.10. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles, household level

| Variable | Female breadwinners | Hours worked (female) | Hours worked (male) |
|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Time | 0.01 (0.01) | 2.54*** (0.47) | 8.92*** (0.57) |
| Displaced | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.67 (0.87) | 0.54 (1.16) |
| DID | 0.00 (0.02) | 1.02 (1.05) | -1.63 (1.32) |
| Controls | No | No | No |
| Obs. | 11,207 | 18,367 | 18,367 |
| R-squared | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

When it comes to the gender roles index and its components, Table 3.11 indicates that effects are consistent with those for the full sample, albeit smaller. Conflict-induced displacement causes a 10-percentage points increase in the share of married or partnered women who work more than their male partners. Gender roles also become less traditional, as evidenced by the 0.29-point reduction in the gender roles index.

Table 3.11. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles index

| Variable | Works more than partner | Male-dom. sector | More education than partner | GRI |
|--------------|-------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Time | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.03* (0.01) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.18*** (0.07) |
| Displaced | -0.05 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.32*** (0.10) |
| DID | 0.10** (0.04) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.05) | -0.29** (0.13) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 4,791 | 5,043 | 3,128 | 5,043 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In terms of the effects on gender roles at the community level, Table 3.12 indicates that effect sizes are consistent with those for the full sample, except for female political participation. Displacement no longer appears to have a positive and statistically significant effect on women's engagement in political activities. This could be an indication that, the small effect observed for the full sample was mainly driven by female single caregivers.

Table 3.12. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles, community level

| Variable | Social or political participation | | Number of organizations | | Political participation | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|----------------|
| | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Time | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.09*** (0.01) | 0.10*** (0.01) | 0.12*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Displaced | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| DID | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.04* (0.02) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 18,315 | 18,324 | 18,315 | 18,324 | 18,315 | 18,324 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Subperiod analysis

Estimates for the 2010-2013 period in Annex B confirm that, compared to their non-IDP counterparts with similar characteristics, the number of hours that IDP men dedicate to paid work diminished by approximately 3 hours (Table B.5). The effect of displacement on the number of hours that women dedicate to paid work is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the results reveal a reduction of 0.3 points in the GRI score (less traditional gender roles in the labor market), compared to non-IDP women with similar characteristics (Table B.6).

When it comes to changes in gender roles at the community level, estimates show no significant effect on men's involvement in any civic or political activity, while it triggers a 8-percentage point reduction in the participation of women in this sphere. Because of their caregiving responsibilities, it is not surprising that women's engagement in social activities declines in the aftermath of displacement. These findings show partial support in favor of hypotheses 2, but do not provide support

for hypothesis 3 over the 2010-2013 period. Similarly, there is no evidence to confirm hypothesis 1. Estimates for the 2013-2016 are not statistically significant.

A few potential explanations emerge from the patterns observed in this exploratory analysis. Broad economic changes can alter gender roles, but they might only be temporary or in response to dire conditions. Permanent change takes time and requires shifts in the underlying norms. For example, changing norms around women working outside the home in India has been a decades-long process and it has been driven by the recognition of the broader economic benefits attached to these activities (Jensen, 2012). In the case of Colombia, it is possible that displaced families maintain traditional roles early in the resettlement process (e.g. men are the main breadwinners for the household).

Notwithstanding, men in particular face difficult labor market conditions and a higher likelihood of being unemployed than women, since their agricultural skills are of no use in urban areas. Thus, the number of hours that they work for pay diminishes. Households use strategies to cope with unemployment such as the activation and search for employment of the woman, as explained in the shocks literature.

As time goes by, during the second subperiod of the analysis, households adapt to the new environment and labor market conditions for men do not worsen further. These dynamics increase in the prevalence of households where women are the primary breadwinners early in the displacement process, which is consistent with a rise in the number of hours that women work for pay (and in the shame of women who work more than their partners) during the 2013-2016 subperiod. An alternative, more straightforward interpretation (not empirically tested in this chapter) is that there is a slight shift in the composition of the displaced population between periods. That is, people who were displaced between the first and second rounds are driving the changes in gender roles observed for the entire period.

3.8 Concluding Remarks

The main objective of this study was to provide new empirical evidence on the impact of conflict-induced displacement on gender roles at the household and community levels. To do so, it studies the case of internal displacement in Colombia using longitudinal data for 2010-2016. The results obtained estimating a kernel-based PSM-DID approach point to a number of patterns.

First, the results have overall provided evidence for changes in gender roles at the household level triggered by conflict-induced displacement. Estimates show an

increase in the prevalence of female breadwinners and greater engagement of women in the labor market (relative to their male partners or as single caregivers). These patterns appear to be directly linked to the impact of displacement in reducing the amount of time that men allocate to paid work over the period of analysis.

Second, gender roles in the labor market become less traditional with displacement. This change appears to be driven by one of the three components of the index, that is, the share of displaced women that work more hours for pay than their partners. On the other hand, estimates of the effect of displacement on sectoral sex segregation or education are not statistically significant, unless cutoff points are more stringent – at least in the case of the latter.

Third, rigorous empirical evidence on the impact of displacement on social and political engagement is extremely limited and even more so, if looking at differences in gendered roles. This is partly due to the lack of survey data not only on displaced populations, but more generally, on political engagement, particularly of data disaggregated by sex. Only few of the studies referenced in this chapter (see for instance, De La Puente, 2011; Petesch, 2017) have shown evidence of increased levels of female participation in civic activities in post-conflict settings and in situations of displacement. On the other hand, none of them examines changes in men's activities. However, the analysis of the gender dimensions of displacement (and in general any gender analysis) is no more about women than it is about men: it is the analysis of how gender shapes people's lives in situations of displacement (Levine et al., 2019). Estimates presented here suggest that conflict-induced displacement in Colombia only triggered a small increase in women's participation in political organizations over a 6-year period, while that of men remains unaltered. Male civic participation, on the other hand, significantly decreases in response to displacement.

Gender roles can shift as a result of conflict-induced displacement. Separation of household members or men's inability to find a job in the new setting will often compel (or force) women to take on the role of main breadwinners for their households. Overall, despite the traumatic circumstances facing displaced populations, this could be a step towards the transformation of gender relations and eventually, the change of norms around the appropriate role of women and men in society (Levine et al., 2019). However, the labor market is only one dimension of the gendered experiences of conflict-induced displacement.

The distribution of domestic chores and childcare activities, as well as the norms that tolerance towards violence against women are even more relevant for understanding gender relations more broadly in a society. Moreover, changing gender roles, activities, and opportunities in situations of conflict-induced

displacement, as well as disruption of social networks have important implications on poverty, not only for women and men but also for their dependents.

4 Poverty Dynamics and Changes in Household Structures in Situations of Displacement*

4.1 Introduction

Conflict-induced displacement represents a severe form of shock that cannot be equated with the impact of a financial crisis or with events of voluntary migration. Hence, it deserves special attention both from a humanitarian and development perspective. Many of the vulnerabilities acquired with conflict-induced displacement set victims apart from other non-displaced populations. Such vulnerabilities affect their ability to seize opportunities and can trap them in chronic poverty (World Bank, 2017). In Azerbaijan, for example, poverty rates among IDPs are 25 percent, compared with 20 percent among non-IDPs (Bussolo & Lopez-Calva, 2014). Similarly, in Colombia, displaced populations belong to the poorest segments in urban areas and often become poorer after having been displaced from rural areas (Ibáñez, 2008).

While some studies have researched income poverty rates among displaced populations at one point in time—as a snapshot of poverty—little is known about the dynamics or evolution of poverty for those who experience it over time, largely due to the lack of survey data (Bussolo & Lopez-Calva, 2014; Hanmer et al., 2020; Ibáñez, 2008; Pape et al., 2019; Verme et al., 2016). Longitudinal analyses offer opportunities for understanding the nature of transient and persistent poverty and for determining the risk of experiencing one or the other. At the same time, the literature on household poverty among the displaced is largely focused on economic drivers. This might be partially an outcome of the overwhelming focus on provision of income as a tool to eradicate poverty. As a result, the role of demographic factors in shaping displaced households' history of poverty remains neglected to a large extent. Households, however, are dynamic and even more so in situations of displacement. Structures are often disrupted due to the separation of household members or due to death. Children are born, new individuals join, and others leave; couples separate and form new households. Chapter 2 revealed that these disruptions are often reflected in a higher number of female-headed households and single caregivers after displacement. Thus, understanding these dynamics and how they might combine to produce vulnerability to poverty is essential when formulating policies targeting displaced persons.

* This chapter has been adapted from Rubiano-Matulevich, E. & Sandoval, C. (2020). "Poverty Dynamics and Changes in Household Structures in Situations of Conflict-Induced Displacement: Evidence from Colombia."

The study presented in this chapter aims to bridge the knowledge gap about poverty dynamics and changing household structures in situations of conflict-induced displacement in Colombia. Similar to Chapters 2 and 3, the analysis uses three rounds of the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (2010, 2013, and 2016), including a subsample that was displaced within this period, to answer three research questions. First, the study examines **the extent to which conflict-induced displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty**. The analysis uses multiple proxies for poverty including monetary measurements based on income per capita, income per adult equivalent, consumption expenditure, and a wealth index based on the household's assets and access to basic services. The analysis estimates a kernel-based PSM-DID model and exploits the nature of the data to study poverty dynamics within households in the panel. Second, to better understand the role of demographic factors in the dynamics of poverty, this study explores **the extent to which poverty dynamics (or the evolution of poverty for those who experience it) differ between IDP and non-IDP households**. Third, it considers **the role that household structures play on the likelihood of experiencing poverty in situations of displacement**. This analysis builds on results in Chapter 2, which show that displacement accelerates reductions in household size and increases in the prevalence of non-traditional household structures such as *de jure* female-headed households (i.e. divorced, separated or never married woman head), female single caregivers, and one-person households.

The findings of this study reveal four key patterns. First, consistent with previous studies (Ibáñez, 2008; Ibáñez & Moya, 2010; Shultz et al., 2014), IDP households in Colombia experience higher poverty rates and lower levels of wealth compared to non-displaced households in every survey round, regardless of the period of displacement. However, estimates suggest that poverty rates between 2010 and 2016 decreased more rapidly among displaced households, compared to non-displaced households with similar characteristics. Wealth also increased more rapidly among the displaced over the same period of analysis. Hence, estimates do not provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that conflict-induced displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty. While the reasons behind these dynamics go beyond the scope of this study, we hypothesize that they could be the result of a 'catch-up' effect, as many of the households that were displaced between rounds were already poor when they joined the panel. Changing household structures, gender roles, and improved access to social assistance over time could also help explaining these patterns. Third, despite this progress, a non-negligible share of displaced households remains chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty, particularly those with a *de jure* female head. Fourth, households that have experienced changes in structure during displacement, particularly those that have

become single caregivers and households consisting of multiple generations with children tend to be chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty.

This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it presents empirical evidence to understand the variation in poverty dynamics for displaced and non-displaced households and the extent to which specific household structures, particularly among the displaced, are more prone to chronic poverty than others. Little is known in this area partly because of the lack of longitudinal data, particularly for IDPs. Second, this study provides evidence on the extent to which disruptions in household structures stemming from displacement intersect with household poverty dynamics. This is the first study that analyzes poverty among the displaced in Colombia using a longitudinal survey and applies a lens to the data that capture the intersection between changes in household structures and poverty dynamics.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of the literature on the determinants of poverty. Section 4.3 is devoted to explaining the Colombian context. Section 4.4 presents the theoretical framework and discusses the core hypotheses. Section 4.5 describes the data and the approach to measure poverty. Section 4.6 presents the empirical framework. Section 4.7 describes the results before concluding in Section 4.8 with a discussion of the findings.

4.2 Literature Review

This section briefly reviews two streams of the economics literature dealing with poverty at the household level. First, the studies on poverty traps and determinants of poverty with a focus on household size and composition. Second, the feminist economics literature that highlights the importance of household structures in the analysis of gendered poverty. Where there is evidence, the review refers to displaced populations.

4.2.1 Determinants of poverty

The literature on poverty can be divided into two main streams. First, the studies concerned with poverty measurement and its evolution in a descriptive manner. Second, the stream of research that provides the theoretical foundations for understanding the determinants of poverty. This second stream is usually embedded in the theory of poverty traps, which is the focus of this subsection.

The notion of poverty trap is directly derived from macroeconomic growth theory and it is defined as a self-reinforcing mechanism that causes poverty to persist

(Azariadis & Stachurski, 2005). According to Arunachalam and Shenoy (2017), the literature on poverty traps at the macroeconomic level can be classified according to the cause underlying such poverty traps into theories of geography (Krugman, 1991), imperfect credit (Matsuyama, 2004; Quah, 1996), and coordination failure (Murphy et al., 1989). When it comes to the literature at the microeconomic level, most theories try to explain why a household is poorer than other. These theories refer to occupational choice and lack of physical capital (Banerjee & Newman, 1993), human capital (Galor & Zeira, 1993), nutrition (Dasgupta & Ray, 1986), and contractual distortions resulting from moral hazard (Mookherjee & Ray, 2002). Given that inequality within countries explains a large part of the global distribution of income (Bourguignon & Morrisson, 2002), the household poverty trap is no less important than the economy-wide poverty trap.

The research on poverty traps at the microeconomic level often classifies households into three groups, namely, the chronically poor, the transient poor, and non-poor poor. This classification is frequently linked to the duration and severity of poverty (Hulme et al., 2001). Others describe ways to distinguish between chronic and transient poverty by focusing on the characteristics of individuals or the households in which they live. For example, Lawson and McKay (2011) note that the most common characteristics of chronic poverty include being disadvantaged in the following aspects, namely, human capital, demographic composition, location, physical assets, and occupational category. Similarly, using panel data for rural China, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) find that a household's wealth is an important determinant of both chronic and transient poverty. Their results suggest that although household demographics, level of education, and health status of members are important for chronic poverty, they do not determine transient poverty. Woolard and Klasen (2005) report similar findings for South Africa, where poverty traps are associated with large initial household size, poor initial education, poor initial asset endowments and poor initial employment access. However, the mobility observed for a large share of households is related to rapid demographic and employment changes in a context of a volatile labor market.

Within the literature on the determinants of poverty at the microeconomic level, several empirical studies have focused on how socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of households, particularly their size and composition, impact their poverty status. In general, these studies suggest that people living in larger households are usually poorer (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995). Similarly, the presence of children is associated with an increase in the risk of poverty, which can be explained by higher dependency ratios and lower resources on a per capita basis (Lanjouw & Ravallion, 1995; Schultz, 2005). But the relationship also holds in the other direction. Poor couples often marry earlier and have higher fertility than non-poor couples. In

contrast, the presence of adults of productive age reduces the risk of poverty (Meyer & Nishimwe-Niyimbanira, 2016). However, the relationship between household size and the incidence of poverty is sensitive to measurement assumptions, notably the properties of equivalence and economies of scale used to compare households of different size and demographic composition.²⁶

Using a per capita measure of individual expenditure to define poverty assumes that there are no economies of scale in household consumption, that is, the per capita cost of reaching a specific measure of welfare, does not fall as household size increases (Lanjouw et al., 2004). Research in various countries has shown that poverty measurement is sensitive to this assumption. For example, Brown and Van de Walle (2020) indicate that in Sub-Saharan Africa, a small adjustment for economies of scale can reverse the conclusions about poverty comparisons. Judged by traditional poverty measures, female-headed households have on average lower poverty rates than male-headed households. However, once consumption is adjusted for economies of scale female-headed households fare significantly worse in most of the region, except when the female head is married.

The structure of households also affects poverty through a heavy burden on women's time, given their role as main caregivers (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995). Specifically, evidence suggests that the presence of dependents significantly reduces women's labor supply, their investment in human capital, as well as their earnings. In contrast, the effects on men's supply of labor are negligible (Angrist & Evans, 1998). This strand of empirical studies suggests that there is a gender dimension to poverty, which goes beyond the classification of women and their dependents as a vulnerable group of the population.

4.2.2 Household structures and gender dimensions of poverty

According to the feminist economics literature, two interrelated phenomena can help explain women's and their dependents' higher vulnerability to poverty. First, barriers to labor market participation and lack of access to economic opportunities. Compared to men, women are less likely to participate in the labor market (Klasen, 2019) and when they do work, women are more likely to be in the informal sector, earn less, and they are less likely to receive work-related benefits (Bosch & Maloney, 2010; Ñopo et al., 2011; World Bank, 2011). Second, gender norms that assign caring

²⁶ According to Nelson (1988), economies of scale in consumption is the notion that "the cost per person of maintaining a given material standard of living might fall as household size increases." Household equivalence scales, on the other hand, measure the relative income needs of households of different sizes and composition; that is, how much income different households would need to attain the same welfare level.

and household responsibilities to women also lead to a gendered division of work where women undertake most unpaid tasks. This unequal division restricts their ability to participate in the labor market and increases their vulnerability to poverty (Floro, 1995; Folbre, 2006; Folbre et al., 2005).²⁷

In the absence of individual-level data, the standard approach to analyze the gender dimensions of poverty is to examine differences between male- and female-headed households. Some studies have found that female-headed households are poorer than those with a male head, but the evidence is inconclusive (Buvinic & Gupta, 1997; Chant, 2003; Chant & Campling, 1997). In general, analyses based on headship have been criticized because of two reasons. First, the concept of household headship reflects patriarchal social norms about who is the head of the household, which tend to privilege one sex over the other (Bennett, 2013; Horrell & Krishnan, 2007; Kabeer, 1997; Quisumbing et al., 1995). Second, the headship concept masks the heterogeneity of households in which individuals live and the reasons why a household is headed by a particular individual (Chant, 2003; Hanmer et al., 2020; Lampietti & Stalker, 2000; Quisumbing et al., 1995; Rosenhouse, 1989).

To respond to these issues, scholars have focused on subgroups of households based on the presence of male spouses to analyze the gender dimensions of poverty. For example, Klasen et al. (2015) distinguish between *de facto* and *de jure* female-headed households in their analysis of poverty in Thailand and Vietnam. The former are households headed by widows and unmarried, separated or divorced women. The latter have either a self-reported female head whose husband is present or, a self-reported male head who is absent for most of the time (Quisumbing et al., 2001). Their analysis reveals that *de facto* female-headed households in Thailand are less vulnerable to poverty than households with a male head, whereas those with *de jure* female heads, particularly single women are highly vulnerable to poverty in Vietnam.

Another strand of the literature explores alternative classifications that encompass demographics or ability to generate income. Milazzo and van de Walle (2017) group female-headed households according to their demographic characteristics to estimate changes in poverty across African countries. Their results reveal that households with a married female head and a male adult experienced the largest reduction in poverty in the past decade, whereas households with an unmarried female head and no male presence barely experienced reductions in poverty. Hanmer et al. (2020) is the first study that has looked at the gender dimensions of poverty in displacement by classifying households according to their demographic

²⁷ See Hanmer et al. (2020) and Muñoz-Boudet et al. (2018) for a detailed review of the literature in this area.

characteristics. Their analysis of administrative records and household visits of Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates that households that have formed because of the unpredictable dynamics of displacement, such as unaccompanied children and single caregivers, particularly those headed by widows and widowers are extremely vulnerable to poverty. In the case of Colombia, the study presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation is the first one to apply a similar approach using a longitudinal household survey to examine the effects of internal displacement on household structures.

4.3 Poverty in Colombia

Judged by standard poverty measures, around 36 percent of Colombians lived below the national poverty line in 2019, previous to the coronavirus-induced economic crisis.²⁸ Differences in female and male poverty rates are not statistically significant, partly because poverty is measured at the household level and the ratio of women to men there is roughly a 50/50 percent in both poor and non-poor households (Muñoz-Boudet et al., 2018; World Bank, 2019). However, there are gender differences in the incidence of poverty across age groups. Girls and boys are consistently more likely than adults and seniors to live in poor households. Furthermore, between the ages of 20-39 years old, the peak productive and reproductive ages, women are more likely than men to live in poverty. Children and other dependents are an important factor in the risk of experiencing poverty for women. Among the households composed solely of adult women, those with children have an average poverty rate that is five times higher than those without dependents (World Bank, 2019).

Evidence based on one-time snapshots of poverty suggests that displaced populations in Colombia belong to the poorest segments of the population. Declines in labor income and consumption, as well as asset losses after displacement are substantial. According to Ibáñez and Moya (2010), because formal and informal mechanisms to share risk are disrupted by displacement, a considerable proportion of the income shock is translated into reductions in household consumption. This implies that displaced households might experience high welfare losses, and their vulnerability to future shocks might push them into a poverty trap (Ibáñez, 2008; Ibáñez & Moya, 2010).

²⁸ Estimates by Colombia's National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE, for its acronym in Spanish). <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/pobreza-y-desigualdad/pobreza-monetaria-y-multidimensional-en-colombia-2019>. Accessed on November 1, 2020.

4.4 Theoretical Framework

This section borrows from the poverty and feminist literatures to describe the main mechanisms of transmission of displacement on the risk of poverty, some of which pass through the disruption of household structures.²⁹ In doing so, it expands the theoretical frameworks in Chapters 2 and 3. The displaced households often acquire vulnerabilities that are specific to them, such as psychological trauma or catastrophic losses of physical and human capital. These vulnerabilities set them apart from other non-displaced poor populations, affect their ability to seize opportunities, and can trap them into chronic poverty (World Bank, 2017).

Theoretically, conflict-induced displacement might affect household structures, gender roles, and ultimately, the risk of poverty through various mechanisms. Figure 4.1 illustrates *some* of the mechanisms of transmission by differentiating between first- and second-round effects of conflict-induced displacement, coping strategies and the outcome of interest—poverty in this case. The first-round effects of displacement include: (1) mortality due to violence, disappearances, and family separation; (2) episodes of GBV experienced by specific household members in the process of fleeing; (3) psychological trauma; (4) income, assets and networks loss; (5) lack of food, livelihoods, and basic services; and (6) exposure to a different context and gender norms. The diagram also illustrates a series of second-round impacts (derived from first-round effects) of displacement that range from unbalanced sex ratios to intra-household tensions, and poor health. The description of the various mechanisms through which displacement can impact poverty is limited by the lack of rigorous studies in this area. Moreover, the empirical analysis in this chapter is only focused on shifts highlighted in Figure 4.1.

Poverty can be driven by the disruption of household structures that results from conflict and its legacy. As in the case of the Rwandan genocide, adult men typically suffer the highest mortality in conflicts, creating a shortage of working-age males and a high share of widow-headed households with poverty risk (Brück & Schindler, 2009) (Box 1). In Colombia, the most common and culturally expected household type is one with a married male head, but conflict-induced displacement rapidly increased the prevalence of female single caregivers as well as single-person households in the last years (see Chapter 2). As articulated by Brown and Van de Walle (2020), the effect of mortality on poverty depends on who the lost member is. If prior to a shock, the husband was the main breadwinner or the means to acquire livelihoods and assets, the newly formed female-headed household will experience a high poverty risk, particularly when it has dependents (Holden & Smock, 1991). If

²⁹ See Chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed analysis of transmission mechanisms for the effect of displacement on household structures and gender roles.

the lost member is a child and desired household size is to be maintained, then child deaths will have to be replaced. The evidence suggests that child deaths stimulate excess replacement births—especially in rural areas—which are correlated with poverty, and with the associated “need” to insure against high risk of further child death (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995).³⁰

Changes in household structures and gender roles due to separations derived from psychological trauma, stress, and GBV experienced by specific household members can also increase the risk of poverty (Boxes 2 and 3). In Colombia, most displaced men—who come from rural areas, where they usually work in agriculture—have skills less relevant to the urban context where they resettle with their families. In contrast, women—who are responsible for household chores—can use the same skills to find a job as domestic workers in urban areas (Calderón et al., 2011; Meertens & Stoller, 2001). Hence, the lack of opportunities for IDP men might represent a higher likelihood of employment for IDP women. These dynamics can challenge patriarchal social norms, create tensions, increase domestic violence, and lead to marital dissolutions (Calderón et al., 2011; Culcasi, 2019; Suerbaum, 2018). Marital dissolutions have negative and long-term consequences for women’s and their dependents’ economic well-being. As articulated by Holden and Smock (1991), economic hardship is explained by interconnected factors such as the division of labor during marriage, differences in earning power, and the lack of post-dissolution transfers to women—unless changes in women’s roles are reflected in social policies and men’s involvement in childcare. In general, marital dissolutions can increase poverty when one household becomes two because of the loss in economies of scale. Specifically, the nature of fixed costs such as housing and transportation implies that it is cheaper to live in one household than in two as the same resources must now cover greater fixed costs (Teachman & Paasch, 1994).

Displacement is also associated with substantial losses of income, assets, and social networks, which have a direct effect on poverty (Box 4). And this effect has a gender dimension. Pre-displacement factors that favor men’s over women’s access to productive economic opportunities and control over assets positions women in a weak bargaining position and makes them more vulnerable to poverty (Sen, 1990). But the effect can also pass through the changes in household structures and roles stemming from marital dissolutions, as described above. Overall, household structures play a critical role in the risk of experiencing poverty, particularly for female-headed households. A single woman with a young child is more likely to drop out of the labor force (and has lower labor force attachment) than is an identical

³⁰ In some cultures, the response also depends on the sex of the dead child. For instance, see Bhat (1998) for a detailed analysis of the Indian case.

woman with no children. The effect is especially large for women with young children (Netz & Haveman, 1999).

The loss of physical assets that accompanies displacement not only pushes people into poverty, but it also has profound psychological consequences that can further damage their beliefs about economic recovery (Boxes 3 and 4). In their study of displacement in Colombia, Moya and Carter (2019) explain that the trauma can create a behavioral poverty trap driven by lower aspirations about what is possible to achieve similar to that resulting from assets loss. The authors estimate that the expected long-run extreme poverty rate is almost three times higher for victims at the top of the distribution of perceived severity of violence compared to those at the bottom of the distribution. Evidence on the 1998-99 conflict in Kosovo also suggests that extreme trauma and psychosocial disturbance contributed to increased vulnerability among the displaced, particularly for those where the breadwinner was missing or no longer alive (Ogden, 2000).

Poverty can increase with the destruction of community networks, which also triggers changes in gender roles (Obaa & Mazur, 2017). In many societies, some household chores and childcare are performed within networks of neighbors or extended family and the support of those networks is essential in leveraging labor, food and money (Chant & Campling, 1997; Kebede & Butterfield, 2009). To the extent that gender norms assign caring responsibilities to women, the lack of support networks might prevent women under pressure of poverty from engaging in wage work and/or increase the double burden of work if domestic labor is not redistributed between household members (Choithani, 2019; Lipton & Ravallion, 1995; Ruwanpura & Humphries, 2004).

People who have lost their livelihoods due to conflict-induced displacement are highly vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity (Box 5). Many of them also suffer from poor health and injuries caused by the conflict, all of which have a gender dimension. While poor health due to malnutrition and the lack of proper sanitation is more common among women and children, the disability burden from conflict tends to be skewed towards men (Buvinić et al., 2013; Krug et al., 2002). In the absence of able-bodied men, women are likely to adopt the role of primary providers for their households as well as caregivers for children, elderly, and the disabled. Nevertheless, women and their dependents might face lower chances of escaping from poverty, not only because of the domestic burden, but also because gender norms about the appropriate role of women and men in society can restrict women's access to economic opportunities (Badgett & Folbre, 1999; Floro, 1995; Folbre et al., 2005) (Box 6).³¹ For example, widow-headed households in many societies are by far

³¹ See Hanmer et al. (*forthcoming*) for a detailed review of the feminist literature in this area.

the poorest as they face effective barriers to access employment and basic services, which can also affect food security (Chen & Dreze, 1995; van de Walle, 2013). Gender norms also justify occupational sex-segregation that consigns women to lower paying and lower quality jobs, which makes them more vulnerable to poverty (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995).




Figure 4.1. Mechanisms of transmission for the impacts of displacement on poverty
Source: Author based on Buvinić et al. (2013).

4.4.1 Hypotheses

This study formulates and tests three hypotheses based on the literature, the Colombian context and the theoretical framework presented in the previous section.

Hypothesis 1: Conflict-induced displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty.

Previous evidence for Colombia suggests that displaced populations belong to the poorest in urban areas and often become poorer after having been displaced from rural areas (Ibáñez, 2008). Similar dynamics are observed among Somali IDPs (Pape et al., 2019). Consistent with these findings based on specialized household surveys, it is expected that conflict-induced displacement will reduce the likelihood of escaping poverty, that is, poverty rates for displaced households either increase or remain unaltered compared to poverty rates for non-displaced households.

Hypothesis 2: IDP households are significantly more likely than non-IDP households to be chronically poor and vulnerable to poverty.

Many of the vulnerabilities acquired with conflict-induced displacement set victims apart from other non-displaced populations. Such vulnerabilities affect their ability to seize opportunities and can trap them in chronic poverty (World Bank, 2017). Therefore, when comparing poverty dynamics (or the evolution of poverty for those who experience it), it is expected that IDP households will be significantly more likely than non-IDPs to remain in poverty or experience one or more episodes of poverty in the three-year panel.

Hypothesis 3: Among the displaced, single caregiver households have a higher likelihood than other structures to be chronically poor and vulnerable to poverty.

Consistent with evidence for Syrian refugees in Syria and for Somali IDPs, households that have formed because of the unpredictable dynamics of conflict-induced displacement, such as single caregivers are extremely vulnerable groups. Household composition, individual attributes of male and female heads of households and gender-specific barriers that prevent women from accessing labor markets are some of the factors driving increased poverty risk (Hanmer et al., forthcoming, 2020).

4.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics

4.5.1 Data

This chapter uses data from the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (ELCA) collected by the Center for Studies on Economic Development (CEDE) at Universidad de los Andes. Details about the sample and characteristics of the survey are included in the Data section of Chapter 2. The identification and definition of IDPs are also consistent with the description in that chapter.

Poverty Measurement

According to Carter and Barrett (2006), the taxonomy of poverty measurements can be divided into four generations. The *first* generation relies on the comparison of household income (or expenditure) with a monetary poverty line. This method relies on cross-sectional data to divide the population into poor and non-poor, while its repeated application to cross sectional surveys over time provides a description of the evolution of poverty. The *second* generation is based on panel data, which provides information to divide the population into always poor, transitory poor and never poor. The *third* generation suggests that monetary metrics ignore whether a household's transitions in and out of poverty might be due to structural or stochastic conditions. Scholars thus use an asset-based poverty line to distinguish whether a household is poor due to structural conditions (portion of the income that is explained by productive assets) or stochastic shocks (transitory income). Finally, the *fourth* generation allows for the identification of the structural foundations of poverty and analyzes the long-term persistence of structural poverty.³²

A report by the World Bank (2018) indicates that each approach, including the most used monetary measure, has both advantages and disadvantages. For example, measures based on self-reported income are problematic because of various reasons. First, respondents often do not reveal their true income due to fear of taxation or a desire to conceal illegal earnings. Second, income measures are prone to seasonable variations. Consumption expenditure is an alternative to income, but it is subject to similar shortcomings. At the same time, measuring the monetary poverty of individuals requires information on how household resources are allocated among its members, as well as the differences in needs across household members, such as

³² As articulated by Carter and Barrett (2006), "the analysis based on the asset poverty line cannot [...] identify whether the currently structurally poor are likely to remain poor over the longer term, caught in a poverty trap, or whether some of the structurally non-poor may remain non-poor over the longer term." This kind of decomposition requires not only to be able to model the dynamics of income, but also to include an analysis of the dynamic evolution of the assets, which in this theoretical framework determine the evolution of the structural income.

sex and age, and across households of different sizes and compositions. Both ideas are intuitive, but also have theoretical and practical challenges. On the one hand, individual food consumption is difficult to collect, and other goods, such as housing or durable items, cannot be allocated to individual members. Because of these and other challenges, poverty analysis thus remains focused on the household (World Bank, 2018).

Another challenge with poverty analysis is to define which measure to use and how to model it for different groups of the population. Displaced populations in particular, not only suffer reductions in income and consumption, but lose assets. It is in this context that a wealth index is proposed as a complementary measure of poverty. Most of the studies on poverty among the displaced population in Colombia depend upon monetary measures, using the poverty line as a threshold level. This study complements the analysis based on income and expenditure with a wealth index to examine the likelihood of experiencing poverty in displacement in Colombia. The use of a wealth index as a proxy for poverty is an ongoing and inconclusive debate. However, there is evidence suggesting that wealth indices and consumption expenditures exhibit a strong association and provide a good alternative for expenditure, particularly in low-income settings (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). This study uses multiple proxies for poverty with the aim to provide an overall picture of the vulnerability of IDPs in Colombia, rather than arguing in favor of one approach over the other. These proxies include the most widely used measure of monetary poverty, a wealth index, and the analysis of chronic versus transient poverty.

Following seminal work by Foster et al. (1984), the measurement of monetary poverty is based on the headcount of population below a certain income level, determined by the caloric intake required to reach a minimum nutrition level. Household income includes labor (agriculture and non-agriculture), pensions or retirement income, rents, interest, dividends, educational assistance, public assistance, and other miscellaneous sources. It is important to note that the question about labor income changed between 2010 and 2013. The first survey wave asked about the monthly value of labor income as a single category for both urban and rural areas. In the second and third waves, labor income was divided between agricultural and non-agricultural sources for rural areas (but no changes were made in the urban questionnaire). It is hard to predict whether the methodological change overestimates or underestimates household income. More important is to understand if such change systematically affected specific groups of the population included in the analysis. Figure C.1 in the Annex shows that while the share of labor in total household income declined between 2010 and 2013 (from 86 to 78 percent), the change does not appear to have systematically affected households in rural

areas. Indeed, the declining trend in the share of labor income between 2010 and 2016 is common for households in both rural and urban areas. This is also the case when comparing displaced and non-displaced households (Figure C.2). For the purposes of the analysis that follows, the changes in the way questions around income are asked might affect poverty levels for both IDP and non-IDP households, but not the difference or trends in poverty rates when comparing both groups. All income sources of related members that live together are added up and then divided by the household size. Households considered poor are those with a per capita income below the official poverty lines.³³ To account for differences in demographic composition, the analysis also adjusts the household income using adult equivalence scales (see Section 4.5). In addition, the analysis examines reported household consumption-expenditure and expenditure on food in per capita terms as complementary measures of poverty.

The second measure uses principal component analysis (PCA) to construct a wealth index for the household. The index includes durable assets, land ownership, and variables related to the dwelling such as sanitation facilities, water supply, type of flooring and walls. A single wealth index is developed, irrespective of rural or urban areas or displacement status and it does not consider household composition. Because of these limitations, the analysis using this index is only used as a robustness check. The list of indicators is included in Table C.1.

4.5.2 Descriptive Statistics

Consistent with previous studies for Colombia (Ibáñez, 2008; Ibáñez & Moya, 2010; Shultz et al., 2014), displaced households in the ELCA are significantly poorer than their non-IDP counterparts, regardless of the year of displacement or survey wave. Table 4.1 shows that in 2010, poverty rates were high for both, households that were displaced between the first and second round and for households that were not displaced (70 vs. 59 percent, respectively). While the difference in poverty rates between IDP and non-IDP households diminished over time, IDPs were 4 and 7 percentage points more likely than non-IDP households with similar characteristics to live below the poverty line in 2013 and 2016, respectively. Similar patterns are observed for households that were displaced between 2013 and 2016. The figures reveal some convergence over time, with the gap in poverty diminishing from 8 percentage points in 2010 to 4 percentage points in 2016. Two patterns are worth highlighting. First, both groups—displaced and non-displaced households—experience high poverty rates in all three survey rounds; but IDPs are significantly more likely to be poor. Second, poverty rates for both displaced and non-displaced

³³ The official poverty lines for urban and rural areas were CO\$207,082 and CO\$123,502 in 2010; CO\$227,118 and CO\$136,192 in 2013 and CO\$265,559 and CO\$159,543, respectively.

households decrease rapidly between 2010 and 2016. These patterns are consistent with national-level figures reported by the Department of National Statistics (DANE) for the period of analysis. Poverty rates using adult equivalence scales are lower but reveal similar patterns to those observed with per capita income, particularly for households that were displaced between 2013 and 2016.

Displaced households also appear to be poorer than non-displaced households according to the consumption-expenditure and wealth measures. Table 4.2 shows that expenditure patterns are consistently lower for IDP households—regardless of the period in which they were displaced—across survey waves. Similar patterns are observed using the wealth index as depicted in Table 4.3. IDPs have lower levels of wealth in all survey waves, but the difference is not significant in 2016. This might be an indication of catching up with non-IDP counterparts.

Table 4.1. Poverty rates

| Period of displacement | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | IDP - Non-IDP | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| <i>2010-2013</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Poverty (per capita income) | 0.70 (0.01) | 0.52 (0.01) | 0.49 (0.02) | 0.59 (0.01) | 0.48 (0.01) | 0.42 (0.01) | 0.11*** (0.02) | 0.04* (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) |
| Poverty (adult equivalent) | 0.57 (0.02) | 0.38 (0.01) | 0.31 (0.02) | 0.47 (0.01) | 0.36 (0.01) | 0.30 (0.01) | 0.10*** (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| <i>2013-2016</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Poverty (per capita income) | 0.67 (0.02) | 0.54 (0.02) | 0.46 (0.02) | 0.59 (0.01) | 0.48 (0.01) | 0.42 (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.06* (0.03) | 0.04* (0.02) |
| Poverty (adult equivalent) | 0.55 (0.02) | 0.38 (0.02) | 0.33 (0.02) | 0.47 (0.01) | 0.36 (0.01) | 0.30 (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.04* (0.02) |
| Observations | | | | | | | | | |
| 2010-2013 | 939 | 1,199 | 956 | 8,351 | 7,512 | 7,164 | 9,290 | 8,711 | 8,120 |
| 2013-2016 | 585 | 671 | 873 | 8,351 | 7,512 | 7,164 | 8,936 | 8,183 | 8,037 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4.2. Household expenditure per capita and expenditure on food per capita

| Period of displacement | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | IDP - Non-IDP | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| <i>2010-2013</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Expenditure | 148,123.87 (5,750.61) | 199,943.84 (6,097.71) | 247,479.66 (8,066.71) | 194,514.39 (2,427.14) | 253,206.22 (3,446.87) | 273,099.27 (3,195.04) | -46,390.51*** (8,710.60) | -53,262.38*** (16,994.81) | -25,619.61*** (9,913.83) |
| Expenditure on food | 72,098.26 (1,689.04) | 85,526.90 (1,620.33) | 115,110.42 (2,833.81) | 87,085.14 (775.30) | 107,650.56 (1,216.11) | 124,202.64 (1,281.96) | -14,986.88*** (2,389.23) | -22,123.66*** (6,914.16) | -9,092.22** (3,822.16) |
| <i>2013-2016</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Expenditure | 161,733.81 (8,140.52) | 194,543.41 (7,439.11) | 252,332.22 (8,049.21) | 194,514.39 (2,427.14) | 253,206.22 (3,446.87) | 273,099.27 (3,195.04) | -32,780.57*** (11,854.55) | -58,662.80*** (18,584.09) | -20,767.04* (11,137.91) |
| Expenditure on food | 77,497.46 (2,436.88) | 86,132.28 (1,965.08) | 115,156.74 (2,926.79) | 87,085.14 (775.30) | 107,650.56 (1,216.11) | 124,202.64 (1,281.96) | -9,587.68*** (3,541.81) | -21,518.28*** (7,139.83) | -9,045.90** (4,350.99) |
| Observations | | | | | | | | | |
| 2010-2013 | 939 | 1,199 | 956 | 8,351 | 7,512 | 7,164 | 9,290 | 8,711 | 8,120 |
| 2013-2016 | 585 | 671 | 873 | 8,351 | 7,512 | 7,164 | 8,936 | 8,183 | 8,037 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4.3. Household wealth index

| Period of displacement | IDP | | | Non-IDP | | | IDP - Non-IDP | | |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| 2010-2013 | 1.93 (0.03) | 2.05 (0.03) | 2.21 (0.03) | 2.18 (0.01) | 2.21 (0.01) | 2.20 (0.01) | -0.25*** (0.05) | -0.16*** (0.05) | 0.01 (0.04) |
| 2013-2016 | 2.02 (0.04) | 2.04 (0.04) | 2.21 (0.03) | 2.18 (0.01) | 2.21 (0.01) | 2.20 (0.01) | -0.16*** (0.06) | -0.17** (0.07) | 0.00 (0.05) |
| Observations | | | | | | | | | |
| 2010-2013 | 935 | 1,199 | 956 | 8,328 | 7,512 | 7,164 | 9,263 | 8,711 | 8,120 |
| 2013-2016 | 582 | 671 | 873 | 8,328 | 7,512 | 7,164 | 8,910 | 8,183 | 8,037 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.6 Empirical Framework

The empirical approach in this chapter is informed by traditional poverty measurement theory, including monetary (Foster et al., 1984), chronic (Addison et al., 2009; Foster & Santos, 2012; Jalan & Ravallion, 2003) and structural poverty (Carter & Barrett, 2006; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). The methodology also builds on the feminist economics literature that analyzes the gender dimensions of household income poverty (Chant, 2003, 2008; Chant & Campling, 1997; Kabeer, 1997).

Poverty dynamics

To examine hypothesis 1, which states that the likelihood of being poor increases in situations of displacement, equation (4.1) presents a discrete dependent variable to estimate the effect of conflict-induced on the probability of falling into poverty, where the unit of observation is the i -th household:

$$\Pr(y_{it} \leq z_t | D_i, t, X_{it}) = \phi(\alpha + \beta D_i + \gamma t + \delta(D_i \cdot t) + \theta X_{it}) \quad (4.1)$$

$\Pr(y_{it} \leq z_t | D_i, t, X_{it}, S_i)$ indicates the probability of household i 's income in period t (y_{it}) to be lower than the poverty line in period t z_t , and $\phi(\cdot)$ represents the normal distribution. Two groups are indexed by displacement status $D_i=0, 1$ where 0 indicates households that were not displaced by conflict (control group), and 1 indicates households that were displaced by conflict (treatment group).

Households are observed in at least two time periods, $t=0, 1$, where 0 indicates the period before they were displaced (pre-treatment), and 1 indicates the period after they were displaced (post-treatment). Every observation is indexed by the letter $i=1, 2, \dots, N$. Unlike the studies in the previous two chapters, the analysis here includes estimations using two different periods, that is, 2010-2013 (includes households that were displaced between these two periods) and 2010-2016 (which includes all households that were displaced between the baseline and the most recent wave). The coefficient α represents the constant term; β is the displacement specific effect; γ is the time trend common to both displaced and non-displaced groups, and δ is the coefficient of interest. The matrix X_{it} includes the pre-treatment socio-economic characteristics of the household, including its size, area of residence, the share of women of reproductive age (15-49), the share of children aged 0-18; the share of elderly aged 65+; and a dummy variable indicating if the household was exposed to violence. Individual-level characteristics include the level of education of the household head, their employment status, age group, and marital status. Households that were displaced before 2010 (the first survey round) are excluded from the analysis because there is no information about their characteristics before

they were displaced. Department fixed effects are included to control for the intensity of conflict.

The main characteristic of the treatment under evaluation is exogeneity, that is, the treatment is not controllable for individuals. Here, the assumption is that armed groups attack civilians, seize the property and force them to flee, hence conflict-induced displacement is not a voluntary decision to improve economic conditions (Ceriani & Verme, 2018; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). Evidence for Colombia indicates that in most cases (86 percent), displacement is mainly a reaction to being a victim of violent attacks (Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). Although the violence triggers displacement, some argue that it is not the only factor that affects the decision to flee. In many regions, people experience a substantially high risk of dying from violence, yet a non-negligible share decide to stay (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007). Regardless of the reason, it is unlikely that the decision to flee is made under assumptions of economic rationality. Evaluating the costs and benefits of displacement is almost impossible, especially in the presence of death threats by armed groups (Ceriani & Verme, 2018).

To address the potential issues of self-selection and endogeneity, the sample is restricted to those who fled due to violence and to reinforce the argument that displacement is influenced by an exogenous factor (Loschmann et al., 2017). In addition, the estimation is performed in two stages using a kernel-based PSM-DID approach and panel data from treatment (displaced due to conflict) and control (non-displaced) groups.

Chronic vs. transient poverty

To explore hypothesis 2, which states that IDP households are more likely than non-IDP households to be chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty (experience transient poverty), the analysis follows the ‘counting’ or ‘spells’ approach proposed by Foster (2009). The chronically poor are identified based on the number of periods they are observed to be in poverty. This approach assumes that resources observed in a time period are consumed and cannot be transferred across periods (Foster & Santos, 2012). The concept of chronic poverty adds the time dimension to the measurement of poverty. From this perspective, chronic poverty can be thought of in terms of long-term structural constraints that persist over time. A household is chronically poor if its per capita income remained below the poverty line in two or three of the survey rounds using only the households in the panel. A household is identified as vulnerable to poverty if its per capita income remained below the poverty line in one of the three survey rounds. A potential concern with the panel data is that households that fall into or escape out of poverty might be the most likely to move, and therefore attrit from the panel. In order to ensure that the panel does not suffer

from this problem, the analysis of poverty dynamics and household structures uses only the households in all three survey rounds.

Poverty dynamics and household structures

The difference in the demographics of the household, notably in terms of composition, is another important factor to consider in poverty analysis. Standard poverty measures assume that all household members benefit equally from household resources, which ignores individual differences in control or decision making. These differences are important to assess whether differences in resources translate into differences in poverty (Haddad & Kanbur, 1992). The disruption caused by displacement typically does not favor female-headed households, which tend to have fewer working age adults and higher dependency ratios. As a result, they can be expected to face a disproportionate work burden and pronounced time poverty (Brown & Van de Walle, 2020). The different demographic composition of displaced households might also affect consumption patterns stemming from different needs of adults and children. How this is treated might thus affect assessments of poverty of different household types.

To account for differences in demographic composition and examine hypothesis 3, the analysis employs three different approaches. First, it follows the methodology proposed by Muñoz-Conde (2004) for Colombia to adjust the household income (y_{it}) using adult equivalence scales:

$$y_{it} = \frac{HH\ income_{it}}{1 + 0.7089 * (adults_{it} - 1) + 0.6822 * children_{it} + 0.6628 * teen_{it}} \quad (4.2)$$

where $HH\ income_{it}$ is the sum all eligible income sources from all adult members of household i in period t ; $adults_{it}$ represents the number of members ages 18 and above; $children_{it}$ is the number of household members between 0 and 7 years of age; and $teenagers_{it}$ is the number of household members ages 8 and 17 years old. Second, it classifies households according to the sex of the household head, distinguishing between *female-* and *male-headed* households. Third, to account for differences in the demographics of the household as a key factor to take into consideration in poverty analysis—not captured by the headship concept—the analysis uses the classification of households proposed in Chapter 2 and divides them into five major groups based on dependency relations of household members. These groups include structures with only one adult member and their dependents (single caregiver); households with one member or a principal couple of opposite sex without children (adults without children); households with a principal couple of opposite sex and children (adults with children); multigenerational households with children; and multigenerational households without children (Budlender, 2003;

Buvinic & Gupta, 1997; Fuwa, 2000b; Milazzo & van de Walle, 2017; Rogan, 2013) (see Table A3 for details).

4.7 Results

To what extent does conflict-induced displacement reduce the likelihood of escaping poverty?

Table 4.4 shows the kernel-based PSM-DID estimates of the effect of displacement between 2010 and 2013 on various measures of poverty reported on the common support area, which includes most of the observations in the sample. Balance tests for the matching are presented in Table C.3. Three key findings emerge from this analysis. First, consistent with national level data for Colombia, poverty levels show a downward trend between 2010 and 2013. Expenditure per capita and expenditure on food per capita increased over the period of analysis. The difference in wealth levels, on the other hand, is not statistically significant. Second, regardless of the indicator of poverty employed, IDP households fare worse compared to non-IDP households with similar characteristics. Levels of expenditure are lower, poverty rates are higher, and wealth levels are significantly lower. Results are consistent with the descriptive analyses presented in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Third, PSM-DID estimates show that between 2010-2013 poverty rates decreased and welfare levels improved more rapidly among displaced households compared to non-displaced households with similar pre-treatment characteristics.

These estimates suggest that the average household that was displaced during this period (and was captured by the ELCA panel) appears to catch up with non-displaced households with similar observable characteristics. On average, IDP households' expenditure per capita and expenditure on food per capita increases by 15 percent and 7 percent more compared to non-IDP households, respectively. Similarly, poverty rates among the displaced, based on per capita and adult equivalent income, decreases 7 percentage points more rapidly compared to non-IDPs between 2010 and 2013. Wealth also increased more rapidly among the displaced.

Table 4.4. PSM-DID estimates of the effect of displacement on poverty, 2010-2013

| Variable | (1) Expenditure per capita | (2) Expenditure on food per capita | (3) Poverty (per capita income) | (4) Poverty (adult equivalent) | (5) Wealth index |
|--------------|----------------------------------|---|---|---|------------------------|
| Time | 0.20*** (0.02) | 0.16*** (0.01) | -0.07*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Displaced | -0.10*** (0.04) | -0.07* (0.04) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | -0.11*** (0.04) |
| DID | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.07* (0.04) | -0.07*** (0.02) | -0.07*** (0.02) | 0.14*** (0.05) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 17,215 | 17,215 | 17,215 | 17,215 | 17,165 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

Note: Model estimated for households that were displaced between 2010 and 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Results remain consistent when expanding the period of analysis to capture households in the panel that were displaced between 2013 and 2016. Similar to the previous estimation, results are reported on the common support area, which includes most observations in the balanced sample. Balance tests are shown in Table C.4 in the Annex. Table 4.5 shows that overall expenditure per capita for the average household increases over time; poverty rates based on per capita and adult equivalent income decrease by 12 percentage points, and there is a slight but significant increase in the level of wealth. Despite this progress, estimates reveal that IDP households remain poorer, have lower levels of expenditure and wealth, compared to their non-IDP counterparts. On the other hand, DID estimates indicate that displaced households catch up with similar non-IDP households over time, with expenditure and wealth levels increasing, and poverty decreasing more rapidly compared to non-displaced households. Hence, these results indicate that there is evidence to reject hypothesis 1, which states that displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty.

Poverty rates appear to diminish more rapidly for households that were forced to flee (and that were captured by the ELCA) compared to non-IDP households with similar characteristics between 2010 and 2016. These patterns could be the result of a 'catch-up' effect associated with improved access to economic opportunities over

time, particularly for women as documented in previous studies (Calderón et al., 2011; Meertens & Stoller, 2001). Similarly, poverty rates could decrease more rapidly for the displaced if they are more likely than eligible non-IDPs to access and benefit from social assistance programs. As stipulated in the policy and legislative framework, the state has the responsibility to assist and protect IDPs in Colombia, while regional and national entities must address their basic needs and any violations of their human rights. Specific social assistance programs such as *Familias en Acción*—the largest Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program in Colombia—have been adapted to serve particularly vulnerable populations such as the displaced, indigenous peoples, or extremely poor populations. It was estimated that in 2013, 19 percent of all beneficiaries of *Familias en Acción* were victims of displacement (Medellín & Sánchez, 2015). Indeed, IDP households in the ELCA were 12 percentage points more likely than non-IDP households to benefit from social assistance programs in 2013 (54 versus 42 percent, respectively), while the difference was 11 percentage points in 2016 (53 vs. 42 percent). Moreover, in both years, the value of social assistance received by IDP households was nearly 1.5 times higher for IDP households compared to non-IDP households.

Table 4.5. PSM-DID estimates of the effect of displacement on poverty, 2010-2016

| Variable | (1) Expenditure per capita | (2) Expenditure on food per capita | (3) Poverty (per capita) | (4) Poverty (adult equivalent) | (5) Wealth index |
|--------------|----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|------------------------|
| Time | 0.35*** (0.01) | 0.29*** (0.01) | -0.12*** (0.01) | -0.12*** (0.01) | 0.03** (0.01) |
| Displaced | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.04 (0.03) | 0.04** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.02) | -0.09*** (0.03) |
| DID | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.06* (0.03) | -0.04** (0.02) | -0.05*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.04) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 26,383 | 26,383 | 26,454 | 26,454 | 26,302 |
| R-squared | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Do poverty dynamics differ between displaced and non-displaced households? What is the effect of changes in household structures on these dynamics?

The analysis in this section only includes IDP and non-IDP households that were surveyed in all three rounds. In addition, it focuses on households that were displaced between 2010-2013, as their poverty dynamics are observed for a longer period of time after displacement. It uses the poverty measure based on household per capita income.³⁴ Chronically poor households are those that fall below the poverty line in at least two of the three survey rounds. Households are classified as vulnerable to poverty if they are poor in one of the three survey rounds. Never poor are households that do not fall below the poverty line in any round.

Table 4.6 shows that IDP households in the panel are 3 percentage points more likely than non-IDPs to be chronically poor (56 vs. 53 percent, respectively). Further, nearly one-third of all households are poor in all rounds. The likelihood of being vulnerable to poverty is 4 percentage points higher among IDP households, compared to their non-IDP counterparts (23 vs. 20 percent, respectively). In contrast, IDP households are 7 percentage points less likely than non-IDPs to be classified as non-poor. Overall, these results reveal three key patterns. First, a large share of IDP and non-IDP households was below the poverty line when they entered the panel. Second, on average, IDP households are significantly more likely than non-IDPs to be chronically poor and vulnerable to poverty (and less likely to be non-poor). Third, despite poverty reduction efforts, many IDP and non-IDP households are still left behind, either staying or becoming poor. These results confirm hypothesis 2.

³⁴ Results are robust for the households that were displaced between 2013 and 2016 and using adult equivalence scales.

Table 4.6. Poverty dynamics of households in the panel

| Variable | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | IDP 2013 | Non-IDP | IDP- Non-IDP |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Chronically poor | | | | 0.56 (0.01) | 0.53 (0.00) | 0.03** (0.01) |
| Always poor | Poor | Poor | Poor | 0.29 (0.01) | 0.30 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| | Poor | Poor | Not poor | 0.14 (0.01) | 0.15 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) |
| Twice poor | Poor | Not poor | Poor | 0.09 (0.01) | 0.05 (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.01) |
| | Not poor | Poor | Poor | 0.04 (0.00) | 0.03 (0.00) | 0.01* (0.01) |
| Vulnerable to poverty | | | | 0.23 (0.01) | 0.20 (0.00) | 0.04*** (0.01) |
| Once poor | Poor | Not poor | Not poor | 0.15 (0.01) | 0.13 (0.00) | 0.02** (0.01) |
| | Not poor | Poor | Not poor | 0.05 (0.00) | 0.04 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| | Not poor | Not poor | Poor | 0.04 (0.00) | 0.03 (0.00) | 0.01** (0.01) |
| Never poor | Not poor | Not poor | Not poor | 0.20 (0.01) | 0.27 (0.00) | -0.07*** (0.01) |
| Obs. | | | | 2,070 | 16,293 | 18,363 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Because the size and composition of households are key determinants of wellbeing, it is important to establish whether certain household structures are associated with a higher probability of becoming chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty. These characteristics are even more important in situations of conflict-induced displacement, where limited access to opportunities can lead to a vicious cycle of

poverty. To examine this, Table 4.7 shows the distribution of households in the panel by poverty group across household structures at the initial period in 2010. Overall, there is a wide array of household types. Most households, however, consist of couples with children and multigenerational households with children. When looking at the distribution of households according to the headship concept, the results indicate that chronically poor IDP households are more likely than chronically poor non-IDP households to have a female head at the start of the panel. The difference is more marked for *de jure* female heads (widows, divorced, and never married women who are heads of household). However, there are no clear patterns in terms of headship among the vulnerable, except for a slightly higher likelihood of having a male head and being poor when comparing IDP households with their non-IDP counterparts. At the same time, households that were initially classified as single caregivers and households with multiple adults and children are more frequently found to be chronically poor (and less likely to be non-poor) compared to those without children. Adults without children in particular, are substantially more likely to be classified as non-poor. Differences according to displacement are not statistically significant though.

To study the relationship between a change in household structure and the dynamics of poverty, Table 4.8 shows the distribution of IDP and non-IDP households in the panel into the three poverty categories—the chronically poor, the vulnerable to poverty, and the non-poor—based on changes in their household structure. A small number of the households that remain in the panel experienced a change in headship during the 2010-2016 period. Among the IDP households that did not experience changes in household structure, 56 percent were chronically poor, 23 percent were vulnerable to poverty, and 21 percent were non-poor. Albeit small, differences with the non-displaced were statistically significant. Similarly, among the households that experienced changes in headship (female to male or male to female), around 66 percent were chronically poor, 22 percent are vulnerable to poverty, and 12 percent are non-poor households.

Table 4.7. Households by poverty status and initial household structure

| Initial household structure | Chronic poor | | | | Vulnerable | | | | Non-poor | | | | Obs |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------|--|--|-----|
| | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff | | | | |
| <i>Headship</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Female headed | 65.90 (3.50) | 54.40 (1.29) | 11.50*** (4.26) | 19.61 (2.93) | 19.07 (1.02) | 0.54 (3.56) | 14.49 (2.60) | 26.53 (1.14) | -12.04*** (3.15) | 1,673 | | | |
| <i>De jure</i> | 67.57 (4.14) | 53.12 (1.52) | 14.46*** (5.03) | 19.33 (3.49) | 19.12 (1.20) | 0.21 (4.16) | 13.10 (2.98) | 27.76 (1.36) | -14.66*** (3.72) | 1,212 | | | |
| <i>De facto</i> | 61.60 (6.62) | 57.75 (2.45) | 3.84 (7.91) | 20.33 (5.48) | 18.92 (1.95) | 1.41 (6.85) | 18.08 (5.24) | 23.33 (2.10) | -5.25 (5.89) | 461 | | | |
| Male headed | 52.98 (2.22) | 54.81 (0.79) | -1.83 (2.86) | 25.09 (1.93) | 20.30 (0.64) | 4.80* (2.50) | 21.93 (1.84) | 24.89 (0.69) | -2.96 (2.37) | 4,448 | | | |
| <i>Household type</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Single caregiver | 61.86 (6.49) | 55.40 (2.25) | 6.46 (8.95) | 18.39 (5.18) | 20.37 (1.82) | -1.98 (6.84) | 19.75 (5.32) | 24.23 (1.94) | -4.48 (7.59) | 548 | | | |
| Adults with children | 61.49 (2.86) | 58.85 (1.07) | 2.64 (3.60) | 20.84 (2.39) | 19.89 (0.87) | 0.95 (2.90) | 17.67 (2.24) | 21.26 (0.89) | -3.59 (2.95) | 2,400 | | | |
| Adults without children | 25.62 (5.26) | 31.89 (1.86) | -6.27 (6.40) | 31.05 (5.57) | 21.84 (1.65) | 9.22 (7.34) | 43.32 (5.97) | 46.27 (1.99) | -2.95 (7.31) | 696 | | | |
| Multigenerational with children | 59.57 (3.29) | 62.60 (1.17) | -3.03 (4.14) | 25.26 (2.91) | 19.29 (0.95) | 5.97 (3.83) | 15.17 (2.40) | 18.11 (0.93) | -2.94 (2.95) | 1,935 | | | |
| Multigenerational without children | 48.51 (7.29) | 38.78 (2.19) | 9.74 (9.23) | 28.18 (6.56) | 19.82 (1.80) | 8.36 (7.48) | 23.31 (6.17) | 41.40 (2.22) | -18.09** (7.02) | 542 | | | |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4.8. Households by poverty status and household structure change

| Household composition change | Chronic poor | | | Vulnerable | | | Non-poor | | | Obs. |
|------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|--------|
| | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff | |
| <i>Headship</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| No change in head | 55.82 (1.11) | 53.17 (0.40) | 2.65* (1.50) | 23.43 (0.95) | 19.73 (0.32) | 3.70*** (1.26) | 20.76 (0.91) | 27.10 (0.35) | -6.35*** (1.31) | 15,771 |
| Changed head | 66.36 (6.05) | 53.69 (2.18) | 12.67 (8.05) | 22.06 (5.31) | 20.47 (1.77) | 1.58 (7.51) | 11.58 (4.10) | 25.84 (1.92) | -14.26*** (4.75) | 522 |
| <i>Household structure</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| No change in structure | 57.21 (1.27) | 53.96 (0.44) | 3.24* (1.70) | 22.67 (1.07) | 19.09 (0.35) | 3.59** (1.42) | 20.12 (1.03) | 26.95 (0.39) | -6.83*** (1.46) | 12,944 |
| Changed structure | 53.25 (2.13) | 50.13 (0.86) | 3.12 (2.96) | 25.36 (1.86) | 22.36 (0.72) | 3.00 (2.56) | 21.39 (1.75) | 27.51 (0.77) | -6.12** (2.60) | 3,349 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

If a change in household structure is a source of vulnerability among poor households (losing productive members as a result of displacement for instance), it can be expected that those households that experienced a change in household structure will have a higher probability of being chronically poor compared to those that did not experience any change. Hence, it stands to think that the classification by poverty group will differ significantly, that is, those that experienced changes in structures will have a higher proportion of the chronically poor. The results in Table 4.8 indicate that it is not the case—at least for the average IDP and non-IDP household. However, the relationship between poverty dynamics and changes in household structures might be masked by the fact that the latter is a broad category which includes groups of households with different vulnerabilities. For instance, per capita income might be lower (and the likelihood of being poor higher) for a household that became a single caregiver, which by definition includes only one earner with dependents, compared to a household that became a couple without children, which might have two potential earners and no dependents. Hence, when combined into one category of households that changed structure, the effect of such change on poverty risk might be zeroed out.

To look at this issue further, in particular to examine whether specific changes in household structure may induce a higher probability of IDP households to be chronically poor, Table 4.9 shows the distributions by poverty categories of the households which experienced changes in household structure according to the type of change that occurred. Households that changed from female to male head are considerably more likely to be chronically poor, compared to those that changed from male to female head. The sample size, however, is small so caution should be used when generalizing results for displaced populations even with similar characteristics. One key point to note is that IDP households consisting of single caregivers and multiple generations with children are more likely to be chronically poor than any other household structure. This might be partly explained by high dependency ratios, which are associated with lower per capita income and household poverty (Birdsall et al., 2001). Households consisting of couples without children, on the other hand, are less likely to be classified as chronically poor. Overall, these results provide evidence in support of hypothesis 4, which states that IDP single caregiver households are more likely to be chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty than other household structures in situations of conflict-induced displacement.

Table 4.9. IDP households by poverty status and household structure change

| Household composition change | Chronic poor | Vulnerable | Non-poor | Obs. |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------|
| <i>Headship change</i> | | | | |
| Female to male head | 80.95 (7.17) | 12.03 (5.94) | 7.02 (4.66) | 29 |
| Male to female head | 47.84 (9.61) | 33.81 (9.10) | 18.35 (7.45) | 33 |
| <i>Changed household structure</i> | | | | |
| To single caregiver | 64.86 (6.69) | 22.00 (5.80) | 13.14 (4.73) | 52 |
| To adults with children | 55.37 (4.25) | 20.63 (3.46) | 24.00 (3.65) | 138 |
| To adults without children | 36.72 (4.16) | 33.50 (4.08) | 29.77 (3.95) | 135 |
| To multigenerational with children | 63.63 (3.79) | 23.65 (3.35) | 12.71 (2.63) | 162 |
| To multigenerational without children | 43.68 (6.30) | 27.09 (5.64) | 29.23 (5.78) | 63 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

4.7.1 Validity of the “parallel trends” assumption

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the validity of the underlying assumption of equal trends cannot be proved, but it can be assessed. Since the displacement occurs at different points in time, this exercise is conducted for the sample of households that were displaced between the second and third waves. Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of the poverty rates using adult equivalence scales. Although there is no statistical test for this assumption, visual inspection suggests that in the absence of displacement, the difference between the “treatment” and “control” group is constant over time. This is also the case for the level of monthly expenditure in per capita terms, as depicted in Figure 4.3. However, there appear to be a slight difference in trends for the wealth index as shown in Figure 4.4. Except for the latter, there is an indication that the parallel trends assumption holds in this case.




Figure 4.2. Parallel trends assumption, poverty rates (adult equivalent)
 Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.




Figure 4.3. Parallel trends assumption, monthly expenditure per capita
 Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.




Figure 4.4. Parallel trends assumption, wealth index
 Note: Dotted line denotes the pre- and post-treatment comparison.

4.8 Concluding Remarks

Many of the challenges facing displaced people affect their ability to escape poverty and set them apart from other non-displaced poor populations. While some studies have researched income poverty rates among displaced populations at one point in time, little is known about the dynamics of poverty in situations of displacement. This is largely explained by the lack of longitudinal data that captures displaced populations. At the same time, the literature on poverty and displacement is mainly limited to economic drivers. As a result, the role of demographic factors in shaping displaced households' history of poverty remains neglected to a large extent. This study aimed to bridge these knowledge gaps about the dynamics of poverty in situations of conflict-induced displacement by using longitudinal data for Colombia, a country with a long history of conflict and home to the second largest IDP population in the world.

Consistent with previous studies, findings in this study reveal that IDP households experience higher poverty rates and lower levels of wealth compared to non-IDP households. The study hypothesized that displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty. However, using a kernel-based PSM-DID, the analysis of poverty dynamics indicates that, over the period of analysis and based on the sample captured by the ELCA, poverty rates decreased more rapidly among displaced households, compared to non-displaced households with similar characteristics.

Results are robust to alternative measures of poverty, including household expenditure-consumption per capita and wealth.

The results shed light on a number of important policy debates. While previous studies using cross-sectional data demonstrate that IDP populations are significantly poorer than their non-IDP counterparts, they do not address the question of whether the incidence of poverty changes over time for displaced populations. In some cases, displaced households do experience reductions in poverty. The reasons behind these patterns are beyond the scope of this study but suggest the need for more specialized studies that follow IDP populations over time. These patterns might be explained by a combination of factors, including a ‘catch-up’ effect, better access to economic opportunities for women in living in displacement, and/or access to social assistance programs targeting displaced households. The latter is consistent with evidence for Syrian refugees in Jordan (Hanmer et al., 2020), where humanitarian assistance received between 2013 and 2014 lifted around three-quarters of poor households out of poverty. But, even after assistance, households formed because of the unpredictable dynamics of displacement, such as sibling households, unaccompanied children, and single caregivers, are extremely vulnerable.

It is important to acknowledge that results for the average household mask differences in the experience of poverty among the displaced. In particular, despite the substantive reduction in poverty rates, a non-negligible share of displaced households remains chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty, particularly those with a *de jure* female head (i.e. divorced, separated or never married women). Moreover, households that experienced changes in structure, a key feature of conflict-induced displacement, particularly those that became single caregivers and households consisting of multiple generations with children are more likely to be chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty.

5 Do Gender Norms Become Less Traditional in Situations of Displacement?

5.1 Introduction

Women can be disproportionately affected by the negative effects of conflict-induced displacement. Access to essential services such as sexual and reproductive health can be disrupted. Displacement can also result in higher levels of GBV and sexual abuse (Annan & Brier, 2010; Callaway & Martin, 2011; Cohen et al., 2013; Vu et al., 2014; Wirtz et al., 2014). However, it can also provide opportunities to break with stereotypes and challenge gender norms that limit women's access to opportunities and decision-making processes. Gender norms can slow down economic growth and pose obstacles to poverty reduction efforts (Goldin & Katz, 2000; Harper et al., 2020).

Chapter 3 documented that, following displacement, women might adopt new roles that would not have been possible before (Justino et al., 2012; Meertens & Stoller, 2001; Pirtskhalava, 2015). For example, in the absence of men, displaced Nuer women in South Sudan not only took on male responsibilities as income providers but also assumed roles perceived as male, including negotiating bride wealth payments with male relatives. In the case of Colombia, Chapter 3 revealed that displaced women often become the main breadwinners for their households. To date, however, few studies take account of the changes in gender relations among women and men in situations of conflict-induced displacement.

This study presented in this chapter aims to bridge this knowledge gap by building on the work by Heise and Cislighi (2020), who propose a definition of gender norms that brings together two streams of theory and practice around gender equality. The first stream is the work on social norms, which emerged from studies in social psychology and evolved with behavioral economics (Bicchieri, 2005; Mackie et al., 2015). The second stream is the study of gender norms advanced by feminist scholars (Badgett & Folbre, 1999; Connell & Pearce, 2014; Connell & Pearce, 2015). The analysis operationalizes the main aspects of the definition of gender norms proposed by measuring two components using household survey data: (i) behaviors or actions, and (ii) attitudes or empirical expectations (Alesina et al., 2013; Harper et al., 2020). Following previous studies on gender norms around contraception and intimate partner violence, survey clusters are used as a proxy for reference networks (Blakely, 2000; Kelly et al., 2018; Storey & Kaggwa, 2009; Uthman et al., 2011; Vyas & Heise, 2016).

The empirical analysis employs three rounds of the Colombian DHS for 2005-2015—a period with sharp increases in displacement flows in Colombia—to **examine the extent to which gender norms become less traditional in situations of conflict-induced displacement**. The focus is on gender norms that limit women’s access to reproductive health, economic opportunities, and mobility, and norms that tolerate violence against women, and endorse patriarchy. The empirical approach involves a two-step estimation. In the first stage, the analysis employs kernel-based PSM to preprocess the data and construct a comparable control group for the displaced (treatment). In the second stage, the analysis uses a multilevel linear regression model to estimate the effect of conflict induced displacement on behaviors and attitudes (the two main components of the definition of gender norms) on the matched sample.

Based on the proposed approach to detect a change in gender norms (simultaneous change in traditional behaviors and attitudes), the findings show mixed evidence regarding norm change. Specifically, gender norms that tolerate violence against women become less traditional with displacement, while those that limit women’s economic opportunities become more rigid. Findings also reveal a misalignment between attitudes and behaviors in specific domains of gender norms that deserve further investigation. In particular, conflict-induced displacement reduces the likelihood of agreeing with patriarchal statements such as “families with men have less problems” or “a good wife obeys her husband”, but women’s ability to decide about contraception and their own earnings, two proxies for behaviors within the household, decrease with displacement. As documented by Wirtz et al. (2014) and Hynes et al. (2016), men’s controlling behaviors could be an outcome of the psychological trauma, stress and loss of financial stability associated with conflict-induced displacement. Displaced women have also reported increased controlling behaviors when their husbands faced unemployment in urban settings, and they pursued employment to support their families.

This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides exploratory empirical evidence regarding the relationship between conflict-induced displacement and gender norms. Most of the evidence in this area comes from qualitative research with small samples, partly due to the lack of household survey data that captures displaced populations. Second, this is the first study that operationalizes a definition that recognizes the dual nature of gender norms using a nationally representative household survey in the context of conflict-induced displacement.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the literature on gender norms and displacement. Section 5.3 is devoted to

explaining the Colombian context. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework and core hypotheses. Section 5.4 describes the data, followed by Section 5.6 that presents the methodology and empirical approach. Finally, Section 5.7 discusses the results before concluding in Section 5.8.

5.2 Literature Review

Displacement disrupts social and community relations, alters the structure and size of households and is associated with changes in gender roles (Gururaja, 2000; Ibáñez & Velásquez, 2009; Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008; Levine et al., 2019; Vélez & Bello, 2010). In some cases, displacement provides an opportunity to renegotiate gender roles (Aysa-Lastra, 2011). Women often take on the role of providers and protectors of families when working-age male separate from households because of security reasons, in search of economic opportunities or because of their recruitment into armed groups (Ayssa & Massey, 2004; El-Bushra, 2000). For example, Meertens and Stoller (2001) and Meertens and Segura-Escobar (1996) document changes in gender roles among IDPs in Colombia. The authors argue that the majority of displaced peasant women were raised in a context of patriarchal traditions characterized by a rigid feminine role around domestic chores and participation in agricultural activities close to the home. When fleeing to urban settings, displaced women often become the main breadwinners for the first time in their lives.

Gender norms that assign women to the domestic sphere have significant economic consequences in the context of displacement. As women enter paid employment, these gender norms are reproduced by occupational segregation (Badgett & Folbre, 1999). Displaced women tend to be employed as domestic workers or they are often engaged in petty trade (Bouta et al., 2005). They also maintain their roles as primary caregivers, creating a double burden compounded by poor security, limited transport and public services, lack of time-saving domestic technologies, and gender norms (Culcasi, 2019; Petesch, 2017; Pirtskhalava, 2015). For example, Culcasi (2019) finds that Syrian refugee women in Jordan have become breadwinners for their households, but traditional gendered responsibility as the caretakers for their families is not diminished. Similar dynamics have been reported for IDP widows in Nepal (Ramnarain, 2016); Chechen refugees in the Czech Republic (Szczepanikova, 2005); and IDP women in Darfur (De La Puente, 2011).

Notwithstanding IDP women's increasing participation in the labor market, the evidence on the effect of displacement on intra-household bargaining power is mixed. In a study on the impact of violent conflict on women's activities, Justino et al. (2012) find that women in Colombia participate more actively in labor markets during and immediately after conflict. Moreover, greater engagement in paid work

is accompanied by improvements in women's economic empowerment within households. In another study for Colombia, Calderón et al. (2011) confirm that IDP women work more hours per week than non-IDP women in rural areas. However, despite improvements in labor market engagement, their ability to participate in important household decisions remains unaltered. Furthermore, IDP women often report increased domestic violence when they pursued employment or education while their husbands are unemployed (Wirtz et al., 2014). In Turkey, Gulesci (2018) finds that displaced men were more likely than their non-displaced counterparts to display controlling behaviors, either by limiting their wives' movements or social interactions. At the same time, displaced women were 16 percentage points more inclined to believe that domestic violence is acceptable, compared to women who were not displaced.

Women's ability to perform activities deemed unsuitable pre-displacement often depends on the contestation of gender norms at the community level. In the above mentioned study in Darfur, De La Puente (2011) shows that IDP women were involved in health-related activities at the community level, but they did not participate in decisions related to camps infrastructure or management, which were perceived as male fields. In contrast, a study by Ramnarain (2016) finds that in the aftermath of the conflict in Nepal, widows engaged in employment outside the home and some of them even crossed over into male-dominated fields, such as construction labor or transport. Similarly, Grabska (2013) finds that in the absence of men, displaced Nuer women in South Sudan not only adopted the role of breadwinner for their households but also assumed traditionally male responsibilities, such as negotiating bride wealth payments.

5.3 Legislative Framework, Displacement, and Gender Norms

Overall, the Colombian State has established a solid normative framework for gender equality.³⁵ On paper, the legislation recognizes women's rights, penalizes GBV, and requires that women candidates comprise at least 30 percent of party electoral lists. In 2010, Colombia became the first country to formally acknowledge the economic contribution of unpaid care work with the passage of Law 1413 of 2010, which mandates time-use surveys to account for the care economy and women's invisible contribution to national accounts (OECD, 2017, 2020). Furthermore, the peace process that led to the 2016 accord is often referred to as a model for gender inclusion. Gradually, women's movements managed to be included in the negotiations, discuss gender issues and challenge gender biases in the initial strategies for transitional justice and peacebuilding (Céspedes-Báez & Jaramillo Ruiz, 2018). In the process of developing the peace agreement, the Colombian

³⁵ See for instance, the National Policy for Comprehensive Gender Equality (2012).

government recognized the importance of resolving gender inequities; guaranteeing the rights of women in rural areas; improving political participation of women; and addressing the rights of the victims at the end of the conflict. Inclusive language is also used throughout the accord (PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security, 2016; Ruiz-Navarro, 2019). Furthermore, the Victims and Land Restitution Law (2011) established preferential treatment for displaced women seeking restitution and provides specific reparations for survivors of sexual violence (Bouvier, 2016).

Notwithstanding, this legislative framework has not yet translated into real conditions of gender equality. Gender discrimination appears to prevent applicants from receiving property rights after their husbands have died or disappeared, a situation that is common with other post-conflict settings in which most of the combatants or fatal victims were men (Garcia-Godos & Wiig, 2014; Meertens, 2010). Access to justice also remains a challenge for victims of conflict-related sexual violence, despite an increase in the number of formal complaints (United Nations Security Council, 2020). Nearly 16 percent of the women displaced because of the armed conflict have stated that they were also victims of sexual violence, most of them women from Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2019).

In general, one of the key challenges to achieve gender equality in Colombia lies in deeply rooted patriarchal norms. Women are expected to take on the bulk of domestic and care responsibilities, whereas men are seen as the head and main breadwinners for their families (Chant, 2002). Moreover, women do nearly four times as much unpaid domestic and care work as men.³⁶ Affordable, good-quality childcare services are lacking, and no legal provision exists for paid parental leave to be shared between both mother and father. Nor are payments for childcare currently tax deductible, discouraging participation in pre-school education (World Bank, 2019, 2020). According to van der Gaag et al. (2019), alongside outliers such as Bangladesh and Algeria, Colombia is one of the countries, comparatively speaking, where both the laws and gender norms around caregiving are relatively resistant to gender equality. These structural barriers are reflected in women's lack of access to economic opportunities. With only 56 percent of women in the workforce, compared to 80 percent of men, Colombia still trails some countries of the region regarding gender equality in the labor market.³⁷

³⁶ World Bank Gender Data Portal (national estimates). <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/>. Accessed on February 4, 2021.

³⁷ Female labor force participation decreased from 57.1 percent in 2000 to 56 percent in 2019. In contrast, male labor force participation increased from 74 percent to 80 percent over the same period.

When it comes to women's participation in the 2016 Peace Accord, Colombia is increasingly referred to as a model for gender inclusion, at least on paper (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security [GIWPS], 2017).³⁸ According to Alvarado Cobar et al. (2018), the final agreement mainstreamed a gender perspective throughout the six points covering the main disputes between both parties, namely, a comprehensive rural reform, political participation, an end to the armed conflict, a solution to the problem of illicit drugs, an agreement regarding the victims of the conflict, and the implementation of verification mechanisms. The large number of references to gender equality in the peace agreement were a result of the participation of diverse groups of women as delegates or in supporting mechanisms for the negotiation process (Chaparro González & Martínez Osorio, 2016). The effectiveness of 'engendering' the peace accord, however, has not been evaluated. According to the Kroc Institute (2020), 130 of the 579 stipulations in the accord have a gender perspective.³⁹ In the fourth year of implementation, 42 of the gender stipulations have not yet initiated implementation and only 12 have been completed.

5.4 Theoretical Framework

Gender norms are conceptualized in different ways. In general, norms specify rules, conventions and institutions that dictate what should or should not be done (Harper et al., 2020). Gender norms are adopted and endorsed by both women and men through their behaviors and attitudes relating to multiple spheres of life, such as access to economic opportunities, education, health, violence against women, among others (Cislaghi & Heise, 2020; Harper et al., 2020; Lundgren et al., 2019). Gender norms, in particular, are defined by Cislaghi and Heise (2020) as:

"Social norms⁴⁰ defining acceptable and appropriate actions for women and men in a given group or society. They are embedded in formal and informal institutions, nested in the mind, and produced and reproduced through social interaction. They play a role in shaping women and men's (often unequal) access to resources and freedoms, thus affecting their voice, power and sense of self."⁴¹ (p. 415)

³⁸ Colombia has experienced numerous peace processes in the last three decades. In past peace processes, women rarely participated in negotiating teams.

³⁹ These include specific affirmative actions to prioritize women in programs related to the implementation of the accord and encourage leadership and participation of women, among others.

⁴⁰ Rule of behavior related to the differences in societal expectations for women and men. Individuals prefer to follow such rule if they believe that most people in their reference network conform to it and believe they should follow it (Bicchieri, 2005; Mackie et al., 2015).

⁴¹ There are multiple definitions of gender norms. For instance, Connell and Pearce (2014) define them as the beliefs and rules, in a given community or institution, about the proper behavior of men and women. See Cislaghi and Heise (2020) for a detailed review of concepts.

Following Cislighi and Heise (2017) and using elements outlined in Marcus and Harper (2015) in relation to how gender norms can change, this section describes the main factors that *could* drive change in gender norms in the context of conflict-induced displacement.⁴² These factors are organized into four overlapping domains: individual, social, material, and structural. Depending on the context, they can either promote a positive change, that is, gender norms become less traditional and new practices emerge, or a negative change, which entails more discriminatory or rigid practices.

Gender norms live at the intersection of the individual, family, and social domains. They are learned early in life, in the family, and through socialization (Tenenbaum & Leaper, 2002). Then, they are reinforced or contested in school, at the workplace, by the media, and other social institutions. Individuals hold their own attitudes, but they also observe others' behaviors and attitudes and react to them. Individual characteristics such as agency, aspirations, and the level of skills that people learn and acquire over time, contribute to the reproduction, or change of gender norms. One way in which gender norms become manifest in education is in the materials used to teach children. Several studies find that, in curricula and educational materials in many countries, characters are portrayed in stereotypical roles in the household and at the workplace (Blumberg, 2008; Islam & Asadullah, 2018; Mahmood & Kausar, 2019; Miroiu, 2004). It is difficult to quantify the impact of such bias, but there is a concern that children internalize gender stereotypes and that this influences their attitudes, aspirations, and behaviors. Providing people with access to unbiased education materials and curriculum can thus contribute to norm change. For instance, a study in Turkey assessed the impact of a semester-long course on gender equity in education on preservice teachers towards gender roles. The results reveal that the course has a substantial impact on the attitudes of the preservice teachers. Indeed, the attitudes of the teacher candidates taking the course change considerably at the end of the semester, developing more favorable attitudes toward gender equality (Erden, 2009).

More generally, slow-moving changes in education levels can also shift gender norms. For instance, Barker et al. (2011) argue that the growth of formal education and literacy is associated with a widespread pattern of less traditional opinions regarding gender equality, particularly among people with more years of formal education. In the case of displaced populations, improved access to education can also foster more liberal attitudes and gender-equal behaviors to break with the intergenerational transmission of gender norms (Marcus & Harper, 2015).

⁴² The evidence presented here is limited by the lack of research focused on changes in gender norms in the context of conflict-induced displacement.

Gender norms are enforced, learned and internalized through socialization, the media, and engagement with institutions (Hyde, 2014). Mass media, for example, can reflect and sustain gender norms over time, but can also foster positive change around gender equality. By moving from remote to more densely populated areas, with more access to information, displaced women and men might access both factual and overt messaging about gender equality. These messages can also be transmitted through popular entertainment programs that present an alternative vision of gender relations. For example, soap operas played an important role in the reduction of fertility rates in Brazil and in reducing gender norms around domestic violence in Nigeria (Banerjee et al., 2019; Ferrara et al., 2012).

Research also indicates that urbanization often triggers shifts in gender norms. Displacement from rural to urban areas can offer opportunities for women and girls to access education and paid work, as well as reduced exposure to the structures that tend to reinforce gender norms, such as traditional and religious leaders, among others (Muñoz Boudet et al., 2013). Migration, whether internal or overseas, can have similar effects, offering people the opportunity to do things that go beyond what is accepted in their communities of origin. At the same time, migration can reinforce conservative gender norms if the communities of reception have more discriminatory attitudes and behaviors towards gender equality (Gulesci, 2018; Tuccio & Wahba, 2018).

More generally, displacement can expose people to more (or less) gender egalitarian cultures through interactions generated among individuals, households, and other structures. These interactions tend to be nested within cities, villages, states, etc. (Choe et al., 2014). Studies of behavioral change suggest that what other people do has a greater influence than what they say, particularly for behaviors that are visible, such as child marriage (Palluck & Ball, 2010). For behaviors that are less visible, such as those related to the distribution of domestic chores between women and men, new norms are more likely to be spread by people talking about endorsing them (Bursztyn et al., 2020).

At the same time, gender norms are influenced by material conditions and the environment in which individuals are born and live. Gender norms underpin (and the other way around) inheritance laws, ownership and control over land, dynamics in the household, and practices in agrarian societies (Agarwal, 1997; Connell & Pearce, 2014). For example, land privatization via government redistribution programs has often disadvantaged women by placing land in the hands of a relatively small number of male household members (Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). In the process of fleeing conflict, displaced families in Colombia lose assets, particularly land. While this is traumatic and represents an overall loss of wealth for

the household, it might also 'level the playing field' for women and men. This might lead to changes around decision making, how resources are allocated, and even the patriarchal notions that men are the breadwinners for the household.

Policies and regulations, decision-making processes and biases in institutions reinforce gender norms in the population whose lives intersect with those institutions (Cislaghi & Heise, 2020). For instance, gender norms are salient in labor markets. They influence the recruitment of workers, the type of jobs that women and men can (or cannot) do, the work environment, wage differentials, and career progression. In Colombia, where most of the displacement entails movements from rural to urban areas, IDP men often face large spells of unemployment as their agricultural skills are less relevant in urban settings. Displaced women, on the other hand, participate actively in the labor market, whereas before fleeing their work in rural areas was confined to the domestic sphere (Meertens & Stoller, 2001). However, they are frequently employed as domestic workers who tend to be poorly remunerated. These dynamics can increase tensions within the household and challenge patriarchal gender norms whereby men are no longer the heads and main breadwinners of the household (Calderón et al., 2011; Meertens & Segura-Escobar, 1996).

Gender norms can also change in contexts of economic restructuring. As articulated by Connell and Harper (2014), in countries where male-dominated heavy industry has been demolished or public sector employment for men restructured, households rely more on women's earnings, recognize women's contribution, and patriarchal norms are called into question (Gutmann & Viveros, 2005). Similarly, changing norms around girls' education and young women working outside the home in India have been largely driven by the recognition of the economic benefits of these activities (Jensen, 2012). Displacement could have similar effects. Women who enter the labor market following displacement often become the main breadwinners for their families, helping relieve the pressure emanating from the lack of opportunities for men and the loss of assets associated with displacement. The recognition of such contribution to the household welfare could shift patriarchal attitudes that represent a barrier in women's access to opportunities.

Periods of conflict, or other significant political change or disruption, can lead to change or reinforce existing gender norms. Armed actors can disrupt traditional practices and beliefs, or force people to do things that do not fit with their traditional beliefs, in order to survive. For example, in regions where the Colombian State had been historically absent, the control exerted by armed groups also extended to the establishment of rules and the regulation of gender norms (Bouvier, 2016). In southern Colombia, guerilla groups occupying towns in the lower Putumayo

established behavioral norms and strict schedules for inhabitants arguing safety concerns, particularly for women, who were not allowed outside their homes in the afternoon. Although they regulated domestic violence, the FARC also demanded a specific type of behavior from women that reproduced patriarchal gender norms, reflected in norms around fidelity to husbands and the prohibition of divorces and separations (Centro de Memoria Histórica [Colombia], 2012).

5.4.1 Hypotheses

This study formulates and tests five hypotheses based on previous evidence for various countries, the theoretical framework, and the analysis of the Colombian context.

Hypothesis 1: Conflict-induced displacement is not associated with less traditional gender norms around reproductive health.

Norms related to reproductive health do not become less traditional in the new setting. They are embodied in beliefs that tend to span over generations; largely determined by parents and social networks, and often reinforced by religion (Fernández & Fogli, 2009). Furthermore, qualitative evidence for Colombia reveals that displaced women's partners controlled their reproductive decisions and they had to find ways to discretely access contraceptive methods (Wirtz et al., 2014).

Hypothesis 2: Conflict-induced displacement is associated with less traditional gender norms around women's access to economic opportunities.

Consistent with previous evidence for Colombia, it is anticipated that IDP women (regardless of their marital status) will participate more actively in paid work than their non-displaced counterparts. This might be partly driven by labor market dynamics for displaced people. In Colombia, most displaced men—who come from rural areas and worked in agriculture—have skills less relevant to the urban context where they resettle with their families. In contrast, women—who were responsible for household chores in rural areas—can use the same skills to find a job as domestic workers in urban areas (Calderón et al., 2011; Justino et al., 2012; Meertens & Stoller, 2001). Hence, a situation that might represent lack of opportunities for men might turn into a higher likelihood of employment for women. Attitudes around women's role in the domestic sphere are expected to adjust with observed behaviors.

Hypothesis 3: Conflict-induced displacement is associated with less traditional gender norms around women's mobility.

Consistent with hypothesis 2, in the new setting, displaced women actively participate in the labor market and restrictions around mobility become less rigid.

Hypothesis 4: Conflict-induced displacement is not associated with less traditional norms that condone violence against women.

Gender norms around violence against women are ‘sticky’ and change slowly because they are intertwined with other norms that reflect patriarchy. Gender norms about masculinity, gender roles and marriage, for example, lead some men to resort to violence as a way to exert power and control over women (Harper et al., 2020; Heilman & Barker, 2018). Women themselves sometimes also believe that men are justified in their use of violence (Schuler et al., 2012).

Hypothesis 5: Conflict-induced displacement is not associated with less traditional patriarchal norms.

It is anticipated that displaced women’s increasing participation in paid work (hypothesis 2) will not translate into less traditional attitudes around men’s superior standing in the household or increased decision-making power. The empirical evidence in this area, however, is mixed. Previous studies for Colombia (Calderón et al., 2011) and IDPs in contexts including Darfur (De La Puente, 2011) and Gaza (Petesch, 2017) support this hypothesis. Justino et al. (2012), on the other hand, find a significant association between greater engagement of women in the labor market and female empowerment within households.

5.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics

5.5.1 Data

This chapter uses data from the Colombian DHS for 2005, 2010, and 2015.⁴³ All survey waves are representative of the female population ages 13-49 at the national, urban, and rural levels in all departments. The surveys collect information on health outcomes and basic socio-economic characteristics. In addition, the most recent waves include questions about attitudes towards gender equality, women’s role within the household, and violence against women as well as intra-household decision-making, and individual’s migration histories.

The DHS surveys employ two-stage sampling designs. Primary sampling units (PSUs) or clusters are sampled in the first stage, and households in the second stage.

⁴³ Earlier surveys are excluded from the study either because they do not sample IDPs or do not include the set of questions required to conduct the analysis of gender norms.

A household respondent is interviewed first to obtain information about the household as a unit and a household roster. Eligible women are then interviewed. This design results in a multilevel dataset, with households and individuals at level-1 and PSUs at level-2. The hierarchically nested nature of the DHS data involving individual respondents nested within clusters are suitable for this study that explores relationships between individual-level and contextual-level factors for behavior and attitudes. The DHS sample consists of 37,211 households (41,344 women) in 2005, 51,447 households (53,521 women) in 2010, and 44,614 households (38,718 women) in 2015. These three waves of the DHS oversampled IDPs, representing between 6-7 percent of the individuals who migrated internally in each wave. Men were only interviewed in the 2015 round, but they are not included in the analysis because of the limited set of questions on attitudes and behaviors that were included in the questionnaire.

Internally Displaced Households

The Colombian DHS allows for the direct identification of household members who were forced to flee due to conflict through the migration questions included in the household roster. First, two questions asking (i) whether the respondent lived in one of more places in the last 5 years and (ii) the date of migration; and second, the reason for migrating, which includes violence caused by armed conflict as a choice.⁴⁴ It is important to note that the limited time span covered by the question might pose a challenge in terms of identifying changes in gender norms, as they can be slow. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 4, the argument behind this study is that conflict-induced displacement can accelerate change by, for instance, opening up economic opportunities for women in urban areas and reducing exposure to traditional structures that reinforce gender norms (Cislaghi & Heise, 2020; Harper et al., 2020; Marcus & Harper, 2015; Muñoz Boudet et al., 2013).

Displaced households in this study are defined as those that had at least one member who was forced to flee due to armed conflict. This is a reasonable assumption as in the case of Colombia, nearly 91 percent of IDPs migrate with all household members (Ibáñez, 2008). Furthermore, to facilitate the provision of reparations and other entitlements, IDP status in Colombia is not attached to an individual but to a household, and it is transmitted across generations (Sarzin, 2017; Shultz et al., 2014). However, as explained in Chapter 2, assigning the status of displaced to a household that did not move, but welcomed a new member (due to displacement), could bias the estimations on the effects of displacement at the household level. In the case of gender norms, this is perhaps less of a concern, as they are produced and reproduced

⁴⁴ The module also asks people if they moved to another municipality in the same department, to another department, or within the same municipality.

within the household. Hence the presence of displaced members or the actual displacement of all members is likely to alter intra-household dynamics with regards to gender.

5.5.2 Measurement of Gender Norms

The methodology in this study brings together two streams of theory and practice on gender equality. First, the work on social norms, particularly the theory that emerges from psychology and behavioral economics. Second, the work on gender norms put forward by feminist economics. To do so, it adopts the definition of gender norms proposed by Cislighi and Heise (2020) and presented in the previous section.

Gender norms relate to multiple spheres of life, including access to economic opportunities, education, health, violence against women, among others. This chapter focuses on gender norms that limit women's access to reproductive health, economic opportunities, and mobility; norms that tolerate violence against women, and patriarchal gender norms.⁴⁵ The analysis of gender norms in other spheres, although important, remains beyond the scope of this paper because of the lack of data required to identify and measure a norm (see Cislighi & Heise [2017]).

For the purposes of operationalization, the analysis combines this definition with elements of the social norms theory (Bicchieri, 2005, 2017).⁴⁶ Specifically, it pays attention to the role of a reference network, which refers to the group of people whose actions and beliefs individuals care about when they act. Depending on the context and the sphere of life that gender norms refer to, this group can be given by neighborhoods, villages, people on the street. Hence, as people move from one place to another, they move across reference groups and may knowingly change their behavior to comply with the norms in place in the new setting (Choe et al., 2014). By drawing on two complementary streams of the literature, this approach acknowledges the different dimensions of gender norms and how they shape differential access and opportunities for women and men.

The definition of gender norms is operationalized by measuring two components using the Colombian DHS: (i) behaviors or actions, and (ii) attitudes or empirical

⁴⁵ Norms that disproportionately favour men and masculinity (hooks, 2004). Patriarchy more generally is defined as a structure of power relations that favours the male grip on political leadership, moral authority, social privilege and control of property and assets. Not all men uphold these power relations, support them or benefit from them. At the same time, there are some women who do (Harper et al., 2020).

⁴⁶ As articulated by Cislighi and Heise (2020), operationalizing this definition using only quantitative measures also requires recognizing that they may fall short in capturing institutional aspects.

expectations (Alesina et al., 2013).⁴⁷ These two components are measured and analyzed separately, rather than combined in an index or composite measure. Following previous studies on gender norms around contraception and intimate partner violence, survey clusters are used as a proxy for reference networks (Storey & Kaggwa, 2009; Uthman et al., 2011; Vyas & Heise, 2016). The prevalence of behaviors and attitudes at the reference network level is thus inferred by aggregating (non-self) reported values across individuals in the same cluster, as it is reasonable to think that people residing in the same cluster might have direct contact with each other. This approach is consistent with the feminist literature which has theorized gender norms as having blurry boundaries, rather than focusing on a particular group with similar demographic characteristics (Oakley, 2015). Also, following gender norms theory, which focuses on the alignment between the norm and personal attitudes, the analysis in this paper assumes that gender norms become less (more) traditional when both, attitudes and behaviors become less (more) rigid.

In the Colombian DHS, individuals are asked whether they agree or disagree with various statements about behaviors and gender roles. They are also asked about their own behaviors and standing in terms of decision making within the household. This study examines 17 items (10 attitudes and 7 behaviors) classified into five domains of gender norms. The first domain, *reproductive health*, is measured using one indicator for attitudes and one indicator for behaviors shown in the top panel of Table 5.1, which lists the item and indicates the response considered nontraditional, the surveys in which the item was included, and the abbreviation used in subsequent tables and figures. The question on attitudes refers to women's approval of contraception to prevent pregnancy. The proxy for behavior aims to measure the ability of women to decide upon the use of contraception.

The second group, norms that limit *women's access to economic opportunities*, is measured by one indicator for attitudes and two indicators for behaviors. These three items deal with the intersection of family and work that involves aspects of paid and unpaid work as well as the ability of women to decide on the money that they earn. In Colombia, gender norms assign women to the domestic sphere, which limits their ability to participate in paid work. This is reflected in low rates of participation in the labor market. The third group, norms that limit *women's mobility*, is measured with one indicator for attitudes and one indicator for behaviors, which aim to capture women's ability to make decisions around their own mobility. The fourth group includes four indicators, two of which aim to measure tolerance (or the lack thereof) towards *violence against women* and two proxies for violent behaviors of

⁴⁷ According to Harper et al. (2020), although gender norms are invisible, they are reflected in behaviors and attitudes.

friends. The fifth group, *patriarchal gender norms*, includes six indicators measuring the disagreement with statements around traditional gender roles of male dominance within the household. Four of the indicators on attitudes are combined into a single measure that differentiates women who disagree with all statements around patriarchy compared to those who agree with at least one of them. The number of indicators included in each dimension is mostly driven by the availability of data in the Colombian DHS.

Table 5.1. Attitudes and behaviors indicators

| Sphere | Component | Attitude or behavior question | Nontraditional if response is | Surveys | Abbreviation |
|------------------------|-----------|---|--|------------|-------------------|
| Reproductive health | Attitude | Do you approve or disapprove that couples use a method to prevent pregnancy? | Approve | All | App contra |
| | Behavior | Main decision maker for the use of contraception | Sole decision maker for contraception | 2010, 2015 | Use dec contra |
| Economic opportunities | Attitude | Women's most important role is to care for the household and to cook | Disagree | 2015 | D Wcare hh |
| | Behavior | Main or shared decision on how to spend money | Respondent works & decides how to spend money | All | Decide money |
| | | Who cleans the house, prepare food, clean bathroom, wash clothes, buy food/supermarket, pay bills, take care of sick (chores x=1-8) | Respondent & partner, partner more, partner alone, neither | 2015 | Share chores |
| | | | | | |
| Mobility | Attitude | It is normal that men do not allow their wives to go out | Disagree | 2015 | D rest mobility |
| | Behavior | Who has final say on visits to family or relatives | No one, decision not made, respondent, or respondent & partner | 2010, 2015 | Say visits |
| Violence against women | Attitude | When men are mad it is better not to tempt them | Disagree | 2015 | D tempt men |
| | | Women that stay in a relation after being beaten is because they like it | Disagree | 2015 | D Wbeat & stay |
| | | Has friends who abuse their wives | No | 2015 | No abu friend |
| | Behavior | Would call the attention (or has done it) of a friend who abuses a woman | Yes | 2015 | Call abu friend |
| | | | | | |
| Patriarchal norms | Attitude | Men always have the last word on household decisions | Disagree | 2015 | M last word |
| | | Families with a man have less problems | Disagree | 2015 | M less prob |
| | | Men are head of households | Disagree | 2015 | M heads |
| | | A good wife always obeys her husband | Disagree | 2015 | Wife obeys |
| | | Disagreement with all patriarchal statements | Disagree with all | 2015 | No patriarchy |
| | Behavior | Who has final say on making large household purchases and own health care | Respondent alone or respondent & husband | 2010, 2015 | Say imp decisions |

In the analyses that follow, items were coded so that for all indicators a 1 is assigned to a less traditional attitude and behavior and 0 otherwise. In general, only the more recent DHS surveys include questions about attitudes towards gender equality, whereas some of the behaviors are also covered in earlier rounds.

5.5.3 Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics comparing the full sample of IDP and non-IDP women interviewed in the three rounds of DHS (pre-matching) are shown in Table 5.2. Overall, differences in the age, level of education, and household composition are statistically significant. On average, displaced women are younger and less educated than their non-displaced counterparts. They are less likely to be married but more they likely to be widowed, or not be in union. IDP households have one more member than non-IDP households; they have slightly more children and adult members, but fewer elderly. The average time a household has been displaced is 2.5 years.

Turning to the indicators to measure gender norms, Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of IDP and non-IDP women (pre-matching) giving a nontraditional response for each of the 17 indicators used as proxies for attitudes and behaviors, with separate panels for the five clusters of gender norms, starting from reproductive health at the top all the way down to patriarchal gender norms. The majority of IDP and non-IDP women in the sample approve the use of contraceptives to avoid pregnancy, but only less than 1 in 5 women use any modern method and are the sole decision makers regarding contraceptive use.

When it comes to economic opportunities, the proportion of interviewees disapproving women's relegation to the domestic sphere is substantially lower than the share of those disagreeing with traditional attitudes in the other four dimensions. Similarly, a low share of women reports being the sole decision makers for the use of the money earned at work. These patterns are consistent with rigid gender norms that limit women's economic opportunities and with time use statistics showing that Colombian women do nearly four times as much unpaid domestic and care work as men.⁴⁸ Further, women's engagement in paid work is low for both groups, which is consistent with overall figures for the country. The chart also shows the concordance between the proportions of IDP and non-IDP women endorsing non-traditional attitudes and behaviors regarding mobility, that is disagreeing with statements about restricting wives' movements outside the home and participating in the final say about visits to relatives and friends.

⁴⁸ National Statistics Office (DANE). <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/encuesta-nacional-del-uso-del-tiempo-enut>. Data accessed on January 6, 2021.

Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics

| | Observations | IDP | Non-IDP | Diff |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Individual characteristics | | | | |
| Age | 110,992 | 28.26 (0.23) | 29.86 (0.03) | -1.61*** (0.26) |
| Years of education | 110,772 | 7.46 (0.08) | 9.02 (0.01) | -1.57*** (0.09) |
| <i>Marital status</i> | | | | |
| Never married | 110,977 | 0.33 (0.01) | 0.39 (0.00) | -0.06*** (0.01) |
| Married | 110,977 | 0.14 (0.01) | 0.19 (0.00) | -0.05*** (0.01) |
| Cohabiting | 110,977 | 0.36 (0.01) | 0.29 (0.00) | 0.07*** (0.01) |
| Widowed | 110,977 | 0.03 (0.00) | 0.02 (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Not in union | 110,977 | 0.14 (0.01) | 0.11 (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.01) |
| Employed | 110,992 | 0.46 (0.01) | 0.51 (0.00) | -0.04*** (0.01) |
| Household characteristics | | | | |
| Size | 110,992 | 5.91 (0.06) | 4.88 (0.01) | 1.03*** (0.05) |
| Children (0-5) | 110,992 | 0.81 (0.02) | 0.54 (0.00) | 0.27*** (0.02) |
| Children (6-14) | 110,992 | 1.43 (0.03) | 0.96 (0.00) | 0.47*** (0.02) |
| Adults (15-64) | 110,992 | 3.54 (0.04) | 3.18 (0.00) | 0.36*** (0.04) |
| Elderly (65+) | 110,992 | 0.13 (0.01) | 0.20 (0.00) | -0.07*** (0.01) |
| Female-headed | 110,990 | 0.41 (0.01) | 0.34 (0.00) | 0.07*** (0.01) |
| Years in displacement | 1,874 | 2.50 (0.04) | | |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In terms of norms around violence against women, a small share of women disagrees with the statements such as “when men are mad it is better not to tempt them” or “women stay in abusive relations because they like it.” In contrast, most women would call out a friend who abuses a woman. The final set of items relate to

patriarchal gender norms. The highest proportion of IDP and non-IDP women showing a nontraditional attitude is in response to “men have the last word in household decisions.” The level of disagreement is much lower for other items, including statements such as “men are the heads of the household” and “good wives obey their husbands.” Not surprisingly, only a small share of women disagrees with all four statements around men’s superior standing in the household. The behavior, measured by the share of respondents who participate in important decisions such as household large purchases shows marked differences between IDP and non-IDP women, with substantially lower proportions among the former. Overall, few differences in attitudes and behaviors between IDP and non-IDP women are statistically significant and patterns in terms of nontraditional attitudes or behaviors differ by dimension of gender norms. For instance, IDP women at 3 percentage points less likely than their non-IDP counterparts to decide over their own money, but 5 percentage points more likely to call out a friend who abuses a woman. The remainder of this section turns to the link between shifts in behavior and attitudes to explore whether displacement is associated with less traditional gender norms.




Figure 5.1. Differences in attitudes and behaviors questions

Source: Author based on DHS 2005/2010/2015. Note: The bars show the percentage of women with non-traditional responses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

5.6 Empirical Strategy

This section describes the empirical strategy to answer the research question, which examines the effect of conflict-induced displacement on gender norms. The main characteristic of the treatment under evaluation is exogeneity, that is, the treatment is not controllable for individuals. Here, the assumption is that armed groups attack civilians, seize the property and force them to flee; hence conflict-induced displacement is not a voluntary decision to improve economic conditions (Ceriani & Verme, 2018; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). Evidence for Colombia indicates that in most cases (86 percent), displacement is mainly a reaction to being a victim of violent

attacks (Ibáñez & Vélez, 2008). Although the violence triggers displacement, some argue that it is not the only factor that affects the decision to flee. In many regions, people experience a substantially high risk of dying from violence, yet a non-negligible share decide to stay (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007). Regardless of the reason, it is unlikely that the decision to flee is made under assumptions of economic rationality. Evaluating the costs and benefits of displacement is almost impossible, especially in the presence of death threats by armed groups (Ceriani & Verme, 2018).

Following Ho et al. (2007), the approach involves a two-step estimation. In the first stage, the analysis employs kernel-based PSM to pre-process the data and construct a comparable control group for the displaced (treatment) before applying the parametric analysis in the second stage. PSM has been traditionally used to evaluate employment and education programs (Dehejia & Wahba, 1998; Heckman et al., 1997; Jalan & Ravallion, 2003; Lechner, 2001; Smith & Todd, 2005) and it is a potentially useful tool in cases when an experimental design is not feasible. The approach allows the matching of individuals in the treatment group to others who did not participate but have comparable characteristics (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).

PSM develops a single (propensity) score that condenses multiple characteristics, reducing the multidimensionality problem. It employs a predicted probability of group membership (e.g. treatment versus control), based on observed predictors obtained from a logistic regression to create a counterfactual group. In this paper, the treatment group includes all women living in a household where at least one member reported being displaced due to violence, while the control group is defined as those who have not been displaced and did not migrate for any other reason. Voluntary migrants (other than IDPs) are excluded from the analysis. The approach estimates the propensity to be displaced or not based on the observable characteristics of interviewed women and their households $p(X_i) = \Pr(i \in \text{displaced} \mid X = x)$. It employs a logistic regression of the binary indicator that takes value 1 for observations in the displaced sample, and 0 for observations in the non-displaced sample, over the set of common variables. Observed predictors include age group, years of education, marital status, geographic area, and exposure to massacres at the municipality or department level with a two-year lag.⁴⁹ The matching is done for each survey wave separately. In the estimation of the

⁴⁹ Because the surveys do not include detailed information on the municipality of origin, the analysis follows Calderón et al. (2011) and constructs a dummy variable equivalent to 1 if: the household migrated within the same municipality and there were massacres in the two years prior to the date of migration; if the household migrated within the same department and there were any massacres in that department in the two years prior to the survey; or if it moved to another department where there were massacres in any other department two years prior to their migration; or 0 otherwise. For non-displaced households, the variable assigns a 1 to households that live in a municipality where there were massacres in the two years prior to the survey.

propensity score, the balancing property is fulfilled, that is, the mean propensity score is the same individuals in the treatment and control in each block. There is also a high degree of overlap between the two distributions, indicating that the common support assumption is satisfied (see balance tests in Annex D).

In the second stage, the analysis employs a multilevel linear regression model to estimate the effect of conflict induced displacement on behaviors and attitudes (the two main components of the definition of gender norms) on the matched pooled sample. Multilevel models have been applied extensively to DHS data to study the effects of cluster-level variables on individual-level outcomes and to explore the effects of community characteristics on contraceptive use, the nutritional status for under-5 children, intimate partner violence, among other topics (Heise & Kotsadam, 2015; Kelly et al., 2018; Ogbo et al., 2018; Paek et al., 2008). The model is given by equation (5.1):

$$Y_{ijklky} = \alpha + \beta_y + \beta_k + \rho Z_{lky} + \theta X_{ilky} + \delta D_{ilky} + \gamma C_{ilky} + U_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ilky} \quad (5.1)$$

Where Y_{ijklky} denotes behaviors or attitudes (measured separately) related to reproductive health, women's economic opportunities, women's mobility, violence against women, and patriarchy for individual i in cluster j municipality l in department k at time y . As described in the previous section, proxies to measure behaviors as a dependent variable (Y_{ijklky}) include female decision-making status within the household (e.g. resource allocation, livelihood choices, reproductive health), the decision to participate in paid work, and the use of modern contraceptive methods, among others. Proxies for attitudes include attitudes towards contraception, women's perceived role in the family, men's status in the family, and women's mobility, among others (see Table 5.1 for details). The effect of displacement on behaviors and attitudes is estimated with separate models.

Explanatory variables include year (β_y) and department fixed effects (β_k) to control for potential shocks at this level and unobservable effects. Z_{lky} represents the municipality characteristics, including the share of public expenditure allocated to the social sector, and the value of royalties in logarithm; and X_{ilky} denotes individual characteristics that influence behaviors and attitudes, not included in the matching process such as household size, number of children under 5, sex of the head of household, employment status, and a wealth index. These variables are important controls in the analysis model for the outcome but were not included in the matching because they could have been affected by the treatment (Frangakis & Rubin, 2002; Greenland, 2003; Stuart, 2010). D_{ilky} is a dummy variable equivalent to 1 if the woman is displaced and 0 for non-IDP women with similar characteristics (control); δ is the coefficient of interest. C_{ilky} is the (non-self) average of behaviors or attitudes

aggregated at the cluster level, which serves as a proxy for the reference network. The multilevel model contains two components where ‘i’ indicates individual and ‘j’ at the cluster level, (1) a fixed effects component, which consists of level-1 slope coefficients and (2) a random effects component denoted as U_{ij} that indicates variability across clusters. Although effects and variability at the aggregate level are present, individual-level predictors can still be interpreted in the same way as in OLS regression (Hox, 1995).

To examine whether a multilevel model is appropriate (i.e., whether any variance is detected at the multilevel structure), intraclass correlations are computed from the empty model, which has no predictors with only random error. The intraclass correlation captures the proportion of variance that lies between level-2 units, which ranges from 0.15 for attitudes and behaviors around contraception to 0.9 for variables around violence against women. These findings indicate that, depending on the outcome of interest, between 15 – 90 percent of the variation is accounted for at group level. These variations are moderate to high, as Snijders and Bosker (2012) note that intraclass correlations with values between 0.05 and 0.2 are common.

The estimation sequentially adds blocks of potential confounding variables (not included in the first stage) to adjust for the characteristics of women that comprise the cluster (reference network). The first block of variables consists of demographic information. The second block includes the proxy for the reference network. The third block includes department fixed effects and municipality characteristics.

5.7 Results

5.7.1 Gender norms around contraception

Table 5.3 shows the effect of conflict-induced displacement on attitudes and behaviors around reproductive health. Estimates in columns (1)-(5) indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in the share of IDP and non-IDP women who approve the use of contraception. This is mainly explained by the fact that most women in the sample—regardless of their displacement status—agree with the use of contraception. When it comes to behaviors, estimates in columns (6)-(10) indicate that displacement is associated with a reduction in women’s ability to use and decide on contraceptive use. Some of the factors explaining such pattern include the lack of access to quality sexual and reproductive health information and services and different attitudes around the ideal family size (Harper et al., 2020). Similarly, women’s ability to decide on contraception might also be influenced by norms that hold men in a dominant position and thus they might still control the types of contraception used by their partners or female relatives, and whether contraception

is used at all. In Ethiopia, for example, male disapproval of contraception is more common in poorer households (Solomon et al., 2019).

Gender norms around sexual and reproductive health tend to be transmitted through the family and passed down to the next generation (Fernández & Fogli, 2009). Hence women's lack of decision-making power could also be explained by less 'gender-equitable' practices within the household, which might become more marked with displacement. Given these patterns and the approach to determine whether gender norms become less traditional (or not) adopted in this paper, there is evidence in support of hypothesis 1, that is, displacement is not associated with less traditional gender norms around sexual and reproductive health. Moreover, estimates indicate that women's decision-making power around contraception diminishes with displacement.

Table 5.3. Effect of displacement on gender norms around reproductive health

| | Attitudes | | | | | Behaviors | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Approve contrac | | | | | Use & decide contra | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Displaced | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.05** (0.03) |
| Household characteristics | | | | | | | | | | |
| Children under 5 | | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | | -0.04** (0.02) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.04** (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Female headed | | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.03) |
| Wealth quintile | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poor | | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) |
| Middle | | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.03) |
| Rich | | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.04) |
| Richest | | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.07* (0.04) |
| Context | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reference network | | | 0.16** (0.07) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.13* (0.07) | | | -0.00 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.04) |
| Royalties (ln) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Social investment (% exp) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.98*** (0.00) | 0.96*** (0.01) | 0.80*** (0.06) | 0.88*** (0.06) | 0.91*** (0.07) | 0.23*** (0.01) | 0.21*** (0.02) | 0.21*** (0.02) | 0.21*** (0.04) | 0.50** (0.22) |
| Observations | 18,850 | 18,875 | 18,840 | 18,840 | 11,866 | 18,850 | 18,875 | 18,271 | 18,271 | 11,516 |
| Number of groups | 4,749 | 4,749 | 4,741 | 4,741 | 3,665 | 4,749 | 4,749 | 4,621 | 4,621 | 3,508 |
| Department FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Reference group for wealth quintile is poorest.

5.7.2 Gender norms that limit women's economic opportunities

Household survey data show limited change in labor market indicators for women in Colombia over the last 20 years. Female labor force participation increased from 54 percent in 2000 to 57 percent in 2020. Time use data indicates that women allocate 3.5 as much time as men per day on unpaid and domestic work.⁵⁰ This limited progress might indicate that gender norms around paid and unpaid work in Colombia are relatively rigid and stable.

Table 5.4 shows the effect of displacement on gender norms that limit women's access to economic opportunities. Estimates in columns (2)-(5) indicate that displacement is associated with more traditional attitudes around women in the domestic sphere, that is, a lower likelihood of disagreeing the statement that women's main role is family caregiving and cooking. Depending on the specification, displacement is associated with a 6-8 percentage points lower probability of disagreeing with such statement after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and contextual variables. Societal expectations that assign women to the domestic sphere can make them "protective" of the unpaid care space, attaching value to their leadership and resisting to the increased involvement of others (van der Gaag et al., 2019). Higher socioeconomic status is also associated with a lower probability of disagreeing with traditional attitudes towards women's role in the domestic sphere. In contrast, knowing someone who does not concur with such statement is strongly correlated with the likelihood of disagreeing with the view that women should be at home and cooking.

In terms of behaviors, columns (6)-(10) show that IDP women who work for pay are significantly less likely than non-IDP women to be the sole decision makers on the money they earn. In terms of the distribution of household chores, there are no significant differences between IDP and non-IDP women, except when including the full set of controls. In this specification, women tend to experience a slight redistribution of unpaid domestic work following displacement [Column (10)]. Reference networks, on the other hand, are strongly correlated with less traditional behaviors around domestic chores but do not influence women's decision making.

Based on these findings, there is no evidence in support of hypothesis 2. Instead, estimates indicate that displacement is associated with more rigid gender norms that limit women's economic opportunities. These findings are not necessarily surprising, as the evidence in this area is mixed. For example, Culcasi's study (2019)

⁵⁰ World Bank's Gender Data Portal. Available at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/gender>. Data extracted on January 8, 2021.

of Syrian refugees in Jordan reveals that women can work for pay outside the home, but they continue to be the main caregivers in the household. Similar experiences have also been reported in qualitative studies of IDP widows in Nepal, Chechen refugees in the Czech Republic and IDP women in Darfur (De La Puente, 2011; Ramnarain, 2016; Szczepanikova, 2005). In the case of Colombia, Calderon et al. (2011) find that IDP women work more hours than non-IDP women in rural areas, but greater engagement in the labor market does not translate into improved bargaining power within the household. Overall, gender norms about paid and unpaid work are intertwined, but they can also move in different directions. According to Harper et al. (2020), this is the case when norms stretch to encompass women doing paid work, without any corresponding shifts in male responsibilities.

Table 5.4. Effect of displacement on gender norms around economic opportunities

| | Attitudes | | | | | Behaviors | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | D Wcare hh | | | | | Works & dec money | | | | | Share chores | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) |
| Displaced | -0.04 (0.03) | -0.08*** (0.02) | -0.07*** (0.02) | -0.06** (0.02) | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.09*** (0.03) | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.07* (0.04) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.06** (0.03) |
| Household characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Children under 5 | | 0.04* (0.03) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.07** (0.03) | | 0.04* (0.03) | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.09*** (0.03) | -0.08** (0.04) | | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.06** (0.03) |
| Female headed | | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) | | -0.03 (0.02) | 0.11*** (0.04) | 0.11*** (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) |
| Wealth quintile | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poor | | -0.20*** (0.04) | -0.16*** (0.04) | -0.15*** (0.04) | -0.12** (0.05) | | -0.20*** (0.04) | 0.07 (0.05) | 0.08* (0.05) | 0.12** (0.05) | | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.02 (0.03) |
| Middle | | -0.29*** (0.04) | -0.22*** (0.04) | -0.24*** (0.04) | -0.22*** (0.05) | | -0.29*** (0.04) | 0.15*** (0.06) | 0.18*** (0.06) | 0.30*** (0.06) | | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.06* (0.03) |
| Rich | | -0.38*** (0.04) | -0.30*** (0.04) | -0.33*** (0.04) | -0.26*** (0.06) | | -0.38*** (0.04) | 0.17*** (0.06) | 0.20*** (0.06) | 0.26*** (0.07) | | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.08** (0.03) | 0.07* (0.04) | 0.03 (0.03) |
| Richest | | -0.44*** (0.04) | -0.34*** (0.04) | -0.35*** (0.05) | -0.29*** (0.07) | | -0.44*** (0.04) | 0.12** (0.06) | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.22*** (0.08) | | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.08** (0.04) | 0.02 (0.04) |
| Context | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reference network | | | 0.33*** (0.06) | 0.25*** (0.06) | 0.28*** (0.07) | | | -0.03 (0.08) | -0.06 (0.08) | -0.00 (0.11) | | | 0.15* (0.08) | 0.17** (0.07) | 0.23** (0.10) |
| Royalties (ln) | | | | | -0.01* (0.00) | | | | | | | | | | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Social investment (% exp) | | | | | 0.01 (0.00) | | | | | | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.43*** (0.00) | 0.72*** (0.03) | 0.53*** (0.05) | 0.50*** (0.06) | 0.01 (0.38) | 0.38*** (0.01) | 0.72*** (0.03) | 0.30*** (0.05) | 0.34*** (0.07) | -0.13 (0.58) | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.04* (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.04) | -0.36 (0.25) |
| Observations | 15,799 | 15,798 | 15,755 | 15,755 | 9,170 | 15,799 | 15,790 | 15,790 | 15,790 | 9,170 | 9,090 | 9,089 | 8,852 | 8,852 | 5,017 |
| Number of groups | 4,213 | 4,213 | 4,170 | 4,170 | 2,363 | 4,213 | 4,205 | 4,205 | 4,205 | 2,363 | 3,783 | 3,783 | 3,546 | 3,546 | 2,017 |
| Department FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category for wealth quintile is poorest.

5.7.3 Gender norms that limit women's mobility

Turning to gender norms around women's mobility, estimates in Table 5.5 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the attitudes of IDP and non-IDP women towards wives' ability to go out without telling their husbands. However, across most specifications (columns [5]-[7]), displacement is associated with a higher likelihood of women participating in the final say about visits to relatives and friends. Knowing someone who has greater decision-making power around mobility is also associated with less traditional behaviors. These results, however, do not provide enough evidence in support of hypothesis 4, or to say that conflict-induced displacement is associated with less traditional gender norms around women's mobility.

Table 5.5. Effect of displacement on gender norms around women's mobility

| | Attitudes | | | | | Behaviors | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | D rest mobility | | | | | Say visits | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Displaced | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.04* (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.04 (0.03) |
| Household characteristics | | | | | | | | | |
| Children under 5 | | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.05* (0.03) | | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) |
| Female headed | | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) | | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.06** (0.03) |
| Wealth quintile | | | | | | | | | |
| Poor | | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.04) | | 0.06* (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.08** (0.04) |
| Middle | | 0.06* (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.06* (0.04) | 0.05 (0.05) |
| Rich | | 0.11*** (0.04) | 0.09*** (0.04) | 0.09** (0.04) | 0.07 (0.05) | | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.08** (0.04) | 0.06 (0.05) |
| Richest | | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.09** (0.04) | | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.05) |
| Context | | | | | | | | | |
| Reference network | | | 0.20*** (0.07) | 0.14** (0.07) | 0.06 (0.09) | | | 0.27*** (0.08) | 0.38*** (0.10) |
| Royalties (ln) | | | | | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Social investment (% exp) | | | | | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.72*** (0.01) | 0.67*** (0.03) | 0.54*** (0.06) | 0.62*** (0.06) | 1.21*** (0.36) | 0.68*** (0.01) | 0.63*** (0.03) | 0.42*** (0.06) | 0.32 (0.41) |
| Observations | 15,509 | 15,508 | 15,464 | 15,464 | 9,008 | 15,509 | 15,508 | 15,500 | 9,032 |
| R-squared | 4,196 | 4,196 | 4,152 | 4,152 | 2,358 | 4,196 | 4,196 | 4,188 | 2,382 |
| Department FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category for wealth quintile is poorest.

5.7.4 Gender norms that tolerate violence against women

Reports of domestic violence have fallen slightly in Colombia over the past two decades, but there is still a long way to go. An estimated 37.4 percent of women and girls report physical and/or sexual abuse, most often at the hands of an intimate partner. Evidence has confirmed that gender norms contribute to men's use of violence against women as a way to exert power and in some cases, women themselves believe that men are justified in their use of violence (Heilman & Barker, 2018).

In terms of the effect of displacement on gender norms around violence against women, columns (1) and (5) in Table 5.6 show that IDP women are significantly less likely than non-displaced women to disagree with the statement that it is better not to tempt men when they are mad, but they are more likely to disagree with the statement that women stay in abusive relations because they like it. When it comes to behaviors, on the other hand, the effect of displacement is significant and stable across specifications for one of the two proxies. IDP women are more likely than their non-IDP counterparts to state that they would call out a friend who abuses a woman.

Some of these findings, particularly around attitudes, might be explained by the fact that the acceptability of violence spans a continuum. Some women believe that violence is justified under certain circumstances, but do not accept it completely (Harper et al., 2020). Qualitative evidence from Bangladesh suggests that women's acceptability of domestic violence is driven by community norms and by what is assumed to be 'normal' in their communities (Schuler et al., 2012). In general, attitudes towards violence against women might be slow to change because of sticky norms that reflect patriarchy (Harper et al., 2020), but results in Table 5.6 provide some evidence to reject hypothesis 5, as some attitudes and behaviors around violence against women appear to change with displacement.

Strong legislative frameworks that support the rights of displaced women and condemn different forms of violence against women such as the one established by the Colombian government can also contest traditional gender norms. Some of these laws shape values and norms, which in turn, can influence individual attitudes and behaviors (Klugman, 2017; Nadler, 2017). For example, in a study of 12 Sub-Saharan African countries Maswikwa et al. (2015) found that the prevalence of child marriage was 40 percent lower in countries with consistent laws against this practice than in countries without consistent laws against child marriage.

Table 5.6. Effect of displacement on gender norms around violence against women

| | Attitudes | | | | | | | | | | Behaviors | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) |
| Displaced | -0.03* (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.03* (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) |
| Household characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Size | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Children under 5 | | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.03) | -0.04 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.05 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.06) | -0.03 (0.02) |
| Female headed | | -0.02* (0.01) | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.08*** (0.03) | -0.08*** (0.03) | -0.07*** (0.03) | -0.08*** (0.02) | -0.06* (0.03) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) |
| Wealth quintile | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poor | | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | -0.09** (0.04) | -0.07* (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.06) | -0.00 (0.03) |
| Middle | | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | -0.08** (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.07* (0.04) | -0.07 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.06* (0.03) |
| Rich | | 0.11*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.05) | 0.12** (0.05) | 0.12** (0.05) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.10** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12** (0.06) | 0.07*** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.07** (0.03) |
| Richest | | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.10** (0.04) | 0.10** (0.04) | 0.08* (0.05) | 0.17*** (0.07) | -0.08* (0.04) | -0.08* (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.10** (0.04) | -0.13** (0.06) | 0.05 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.04) |
| Context | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reference network | | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.06) | 0.15* (0.08) | 0.15* (0.08) | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.09) | 0.01 (0.09) | 0.18*** (0.06) | 0.18*** (0.06) | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.08) | 0.07 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.10) | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.06 (0.10) |
| Royalties (ln) | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | | | | | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Social investment (% exp) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | | | | | | | | | 0.00 (0.01) | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.33 (0.27) | 0.28*** (0.01) | 0.28*** (0.03) | 0.26*** (0.04) | 0.29*** (0.05) | 0.11 (0.38) | 0.55*** (0.01) | 0.65*** (0.03) | 0.53*** (0.05) | 0.66*** (0.06) | 0.29 (0.49) | 0.86*** (0.01) | 0.83*** (0.02) | 0.77*** (0.06) | 0.84*** (0.06) | 0.56** (0.28) |
| Observations | 15,509 | 15,508 | 15,464 | 15,464 | 9,008 | 15,509 | 15,508 | 15,464 | 15,464 | 9,008 | 15,494 | 15,493 | 15,449 | 15,449 | 9,001 | 15,413 | 15,412 | 15,368 | 15,368 | 8,945 |
| R-squared | 4,196 | 4,196 | 4,152 | 4,152 | 2,358 | 4,196 | 4,196 | 4,152 | 4,152 | 2,358 | 4,195 | 4,195 | 4,151 | 4,151 | 2,358 | 4,191 | 4,191 | 4,147 | 4,147 | 2,355 |
| Department FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category for wealth quintile is poorest.

5.7.5 Patriarchal gender norms

Table 5.7 shows the effect of conflict-induced displacement on patriarchal gender norms. IDP women are significantly less likely than non-IDP women with similar characteristics to disagree with individual statements such as “families with men have less problems” and “a good wife obeys her husband,” but there is no statistically significant difference when asked about men as heads of household and men’s last word in household decisions. When looking at the effect of displacement on the indicator that combines all four statements (columns [14]-[17]), displaced women are significantly more likely than non-displaced women to disagree with all patriarchal statements at the same time. Both groups, however, are relatively small in the sample. In terms of behaviors, estimates in columns (18)-(22) indicate that there is no statistically significant effect of displacement on women’s ability to have a say in important household decisions (that is, large household purchases). These findings thus provide some evidence in support of hypothesis 6. Based on the proxy indicators included in the analysis, conflict-induced displacement is not associated with the less traditional patriarchal gender norms, but they reveal important changes around women’s attitudes which might be indicative of slow shifts in intra-household dynamics.

Table 5.7. Effect of displacement on patriarchal gender norms

| | Attitudes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | M last word | | | | | M less prob | | | | | M heads | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) |
| Displaced | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.06** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.02) | 0.09*** (0.02) | 0.05* (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.05 (0.03) |
| Household characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Children under 5 | | -0.04 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.05* (0.03) | | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.06** (0.03) | | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.04 (0.03) |
| Female headed | | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.04 (0.03) | | 0.10*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.02) | 0.11*** (0.03) | | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.15*** (0.03) | 0.14*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.03) |
| Wealth quintile | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poor | | 0.15*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.14*** (0.04) | | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.10** (0.04) | | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.11*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.04) | 0.08* (0.05) |
| Middle | | 0.21*** (0.04) | 0.16*** (0.04) | 0.17*** (0.04) | 0.16*** (0.05) | | 0.18*** (0.04) | 0.16*** (0.04) | 0.17*** (0.04) | 0.12** (0.05) | | 0.18*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.15*** (0.04) | 0.12** (0.05) |
| Rich | | 0.30*** (0.03) | 0.23*** (0.04) | 0.24*** (0.04) | 0.26*** (0.05) | | 0.31*** (0.04) | 0.29*** (0.04) | 0.29*** (0.04) | 0.23*** (0.05) | | 0.26*** (0.04) | 0.20*** (0.04) | 0.22*** (0.05) | 0.17*** (0.06) |
| Richest | | 0.34*** (0.03) | 0.26*** (0.04) | 0.27*** (0.04) | 0.30*** (0.05) | | 0.33*** (0.04) | 0.30*** (0.04) | 0.30*** (0.04) | 0.24*** (0.05) | | 0.33*** (0.04) | 0.25*** (0.04) | 0.26*** (0.04) | 0.27*** (0.06) |
| Context | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reference network | | | 0.27*** (0.06) | 0.17*** (0.06) | 0.16** (0.08) | | | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.08 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.08) | | | 0.27*** (0.06) | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.14* (0.08) |
| Royalties (ln) | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | | | 0.01* (0.00) | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Social investment (% exp) | | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | | | | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.13) |
| Constant | 0.71*** (0.01) | 0.52*** (0.03) | 0.36*** (0.05) | 0.43*** (0.06) | 0.11 (0.42) | 0.45*** (0.01) | 0.24*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.04) | 0.21*** (0.05) | 0.53 (0.44) | 0.52*** (0.01) | 0.45*** (0.01) | 0.18*** (0.04) | 0.31*** (0.05) | 0.13 (0.46) |
| Observations | 15,426 | 15,425 | 15,383 | 15,383 | 8,969 | 15,426 | 15,425 | 15,383 | 15,383 | 8,969 | 15,426 | 15,426 | 15,383 | 15,383 | 8,969 |
| R-squared | 4,184 | 4,184 | 4,142 | 4,142 | 2,355 | 4,184 | 4,184 | 4,142 | 4,142 | 2,355 | 4,184 | 4,184 | 4,142 | 4,142 | 2,355 |
| Department FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Table 5.7. (continued)

| | Attitudes | | | | | | | | | | Behaviors | | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| | Wife obeys | | | | | No patriarchy | | | | | Say imp decisions | | | | |
| | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | (23) | (24) | (25) | (26) | (27) | (28) | (29) | (30) |
| Displaced | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.03) |
| Household characteristics | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Children under 5 | | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) |
| Female headed | | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.03) | | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.03) |
| Wealth quintile | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Poor | | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.15*** (0.04) | 0.18*** (0.04) | | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.04** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) | | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.08** (0.04) | 0.09* (0.04) |
| Middle | | 0.28*** (0.04) | 0.24*** (0.04) | 0.27*** (0.04) | 0.28*** (0.05) | | 0.11*** (0.02) | 0.09*** (0.02) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.09** (0.04) | | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.10** (0.04) | 0.09* (0.05) |
| Rich | | 0.37*** (0.04) | 0.33*** (0.04) | 0.36*** (0.05) | 0.35*** (0.06) | | 0.18*** (0.03) | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.17*** (0.04) | 0.10** (0.04) | | 0.09** (0.04) | 0.09** (0.04) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.06) |
| Richest | | 0.45*** (0.03) | 0.39*** (0.04) | 0.42*** (0.05) | 0.45*** (0.06) | | 0.25*** (0.03) | 0.21*** (0.03) | 0.22*** (0.04) | 0.18*** (0.05) | | -0.03 (0.05) | -0.03 (0.05) | -0.07 (0.05) | -0.07 (0.07) |
| Context | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reference network | | | 0.17*** (0.06) | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.08) | | 0.17** (0.07) | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.16 (0.10) | | 0.02 (0.15) | 0.02 (0.15) | -0.05 (0.15) | 0.04 (0.20) |
| Royalties (ln) | | | | | 0.01** (0.00) | | | | | 0.01*** (0.00) | | | | | 0.01 (0.00) |
| Social investment (% exp) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | | | | | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.18*** (0.05) | 0.33 (0.40) | 0.13*** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.30 (0.29) | 0.60*** (0.01) | 0.51*** (0.03) | 0.50*** (0.05) | 0.52*** (0.06) | 0.72* (0.43) |
| Observations | 15,425 | 15,381 | 15,381 | 15,381 | 8,968 | 15,426 | 15,425 | 15,381 | 15,381 | 8,968 | 15,426 | 15,425 | 15,425 | 15,425 | 8,996 |
| R-squared | 4,184 | 4,140 | 4,140 | 4,140 | 2,354 | 4,184 | 4,184 | 4,140 | 4,140 | 2,354 | 4,184 | 4,184 | 4,184 | 4,184 | 2,382 |
| Department FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category for wealth quintile is poorest.

5.8 Concluding Remarks

Displacement affects women and men differently, and this differential can be manifested in the loss of or change in livelihoods. In the case of Colombia, the movement from rural to urban areas often represents lack of opportunities for men (whose skills in agriculture might not be relevant in the new context), but a higher likelihood of employment for women. While these dynamics result from one the most dramatic oppressions of civilians, they might also offer opportunities to shift gender norms.

This chapter studied the case of internal displacement and gender norms in Colombia, by measuring attitudes and behaviors in five domains, namely, reproductive health, women's economic opportunities, women's mobility, violence against women, and patriarchy. Based on the proposed approach to determine whether gender norms change or not (simultaneous change in traditional behaviors and attitudes), the findings show mixed evidence regarding norm change. Specifically, gender norms that tolerate violence against women become less traditional with displacement, while those that limit women's economic opportunities become more rigid. These findings related to the economic sphere are not necessarily surprising, as the evidence in this area is mixed. For example, Culcasi's study (2019) of Syrian refugees in Jordan reveals that women can work for pay outside the home, but they continue to be the main caregivers in the household. Similar experiences have also been reported in qualitative studies of IDP widows in Nepal, Chechen refugees in the Czech Republic and IDP women in Darfur (De La Puente, 2011; Ramnarain, 2016; Szczepanikova, 2005).

Findings also reveal a misalignment between attitudes and behaviors in specific domains of gender norms, which merit further investigation. For example, conflict-induced displacement is associated with less traditional patriarchal attitudes such as "families with men have less problems" or "a good wife obeys her husband", but women's ability to decide about contraception and their own earnings decreases following displacement. Women's ability to decide about contraception might also be influenced by norms that hold men in a dominant position and thus they might still control the types of contraception used by their partners or female relatives, and whether contraception is used at all (Solomon et al., 2019). These results are also consistent with qualitative evidence for Colombia (Wirtz et al., 2014).

Gender norms can limit women's ability to enter the workforce, participate in decision-making processes, or access basic services. Importantly, gender norms can slow down economic growth and hamper poverty reduction efforts. Knowing more about the role of gender norms and whether they change in situations of

displacement is thus fundamental for the design and implementation of policies aimed at providing opportunities for women and men displacement. The findings also shed light on the complexity of gender norms and gender norm change, which does not operate in a vacuum. Gender norms are tied into a web of attitudes and behaviors that are influenced by the socioeconomic and institutional context (Marcus, 2018). It is thus important to look at gender norms in various domains as change can be contradictory and improvements in one area do not imply that all others will automatically follow, as illustrated by the dissonance between violence against women and economic opportunities in this study.

6 Conclusion

Many reports highlight the fact that women's and men's experience of and response to conflict-induced displacement is highly differentiated (El-Bushra, 2000; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014; Gururaja, 2000; Levine et al., 2019). However, the economics literature on the impacts of displacement is a growing field and few studies consider gender-specific effects. Partly due to the lack of sex-disaggregated data in the settings where displacement takes place, most of the evidence in this area is based on qualitative research. The discussion usually centers around increased levels of gender-based violence. However, the phenomenon of conflict-induced displacement is also associated with shifts that would be expected to have differential impacts on the households in which women and men live. These shifts include the risk of experiencing poverty, access to services, as well as health and education outcomes, among others. Rigorous evidence on the gender dimensions of displacement is thus needed to identify and understand patterns and associations between the socio-economic characteristics of displaced persons, poverty, and vulnerability and to inform policy responses that would succeed in creating durable solutions. This study, thus, contributes to the literature by applying a gender lens to the empirical analysis of the impacts of conflict-induced displacement. Specifically, it builds on evidence from various academic disciplines to estimate the effects of displacement on household structures, gender roles, poverty, and gender norms.

The research focused on the case of Colombia, a middle-income country with a protracted conflict and the second largest IDP population in the world, after Syria. Each chapter employed a quasi-experimental research design and large-scale household surveys that capture a sample of displaced households. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 used three waves of the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (2010-2016) and a kernel-based propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of displacement on household structures, gender roles, and poverty. Chapter 5 used three rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) collected between 2005 and 2015, a municipal panel with indicators on conflict, violence, and public finances and a two-stage approach involving kernel-based propensity score matching and multilevel models to examine the extent to which gender norms become less traditional in situations of displacement.

The remainder of this concluding chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.1 reports the main findings of the dissertation. Section 6.2 reflects on the findings and discusses limitations of the research. Section 6.3 presents suggestions for future research, before outlining implications for policy making in Section 6.4.

6.1 Main Findings

Chapters 2-5 presented empirical evidence on the effects of conflict-induced displacement in four areas where there is limited evidence in the literature, namely, household structures, gender roles, poverty, and gender norms. This section summarizes and brings together the main findings of each study, highlighting the contributions of the dissertation to the literature.

What is the effect of conflict-induced displacement on household structures? To what extent do divorces (or marital separations) explain the change in household structures stemming from conflict-induced displacement?

Chapter 2 of this dissertation analyzed the effects of conflict-induced displacement on household structures, a concept that describes the number, characteristics and relationships of people who co-reside and share resources. The empirical literature has recognized that the household size and composition play a key role in the wellbeing of individuals. In particular, people living in larger households are usually poorer (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995). However, in empirical studies about the effects of displacement, the disruption of household structures is often taken as a given or approached through a descriptive analysis at best. This study is the first to estimate the effect of displacement on household structures using a longitudinal survey in a context of protracted conflict. Findings are relevant not only for conflict and migration studies, but also for the shocks literature, considering that displacement is an extreme form of shock with long-term consequences. Improved understanding of the changes in household structures derived from displacement can, thus, inform the design of development interventions that account for intra-household dynamics, including cash transfers and poverty reduction efforts.

The analysis employed three complementary proxies to measure the household structure concept, including the household size and the prevalence of female headship, which also distinguished between *de jure* (i.e. women who are widowed, divorced or separated) and *de facto* female heads (i.e. married women with a non-resident husband). There is also a classification of households into five major groups based on the sex and dependency relations of household members, including female and male single caregivers; one-person households; and nuclear and multigenerational households, both with and without children.

Estimates showed that between 2010 and 2016, conflict-induced displacement in Colombia accelerated reductions in the average household size and increased the prevalence of non-traditional household structures such as *de jure* female-headed households, female single caregivers, and one-person households. Estimated effect

sizes for the six-year panel are equivalent to those that took place in Colombia at the national level over a period of 25 years. This appears to be the first study to quantify the effect of displacement on the household size; hence, there is no direct comparison with other studies in this area. Most of the literature on shocks, however, point to the exact opposite pattern, that is, an increase in the average number of household members in response to economic hindrances.

The finding of increases in non-traditional structures, particularly those with a female head and/or single caregiver, is consistent with qualitative studies analyzing the effects of the conflicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Eritrea (Blanc, 2004; Greenberg & Zuckerman, 2009; Ramnarain, 2016; Ruwanpura & Humphries, 2004). Importantly, while reductions in the household size might be associated with lower poverty rates, the structures created by the disruption stemming from displacement might be particularly vulnerable, especially if the lost member is the main breadwinner of the household. Following displacement, *de jure* heads assume the role of provider—in this case, either due to changes of context, absence of spouse or other displacement-related circumstances. This new role implies that women heads might have to take an outside domestic work while being responsible for childcare and domestic chores. In contexts where gender norms restrict women's participation in the labor market or dictate the types of work they can do, conflict-induced displacement can lead to a poverty trap for female breadwinners. Depending on the socio-demographic characteristics of the one member, this vulnerability also applies to one-person households.

Finally, exploratory analysis using structural equation models revealed that some of the changes in household structures resulting from displacement are driven by marital dissolutions or separations. Divorces partially mediate the effect of conflict-induced displacement on all proxies for household structures, except for *de jure* female-headed households and multi-generation households with multiple male members and no children. This finding implies that the estimated change in both household structures is fully mediated by divorces or separations. Results are consistent with qualitative studies with IDPs in Georgia and Uganda, which indicate that stress, trauma, and dire economic conditions can cause tensions within the household and lead to separations (Kabachnik et al., 2013; Okello & Hovil, 2007). Shifting gender roles around paid work and the perceived lack of control experienced by men in the case of Colombia could also be behind these patterns.

To what extent does conflict-induced displacement change gender roles within the household? To what extent does conflict-induced displacement change gender roles at the community level?

Chapter 3 investigated the linkages between conflict-induced displacement and changes in gender roles at the household and community levels. Qualitative studies with Syrian refugees, IDP widows in Nepal, and displaced Muslim Meskhetians in Georgia indicate that in many cases, due to labor market conditions, women have become the main breadwinners for their households (Culcasi, 2019; Ramnarain, 2016; Szczepanikova, 2005). Furthermore, IDP women in Darfur assumed traditionally male responsibilities, such as negotiating bride wealth payments (De La Puente, 2011) and in Iraq, women of the Yazidis minority group joined military units and took on responsibility jointly with men for keeping their families and communities safe (Černý, 2020).

Although women and men experience displacement and respond to it differently, the impact of this phenomenon on traditional gender roles is relatively under-researched. This study contributes to the literature by expanding the level of analysis in post-conflict situations from a unitary approach to the household to consider intra-household dynamics. It also provides new empirical evidence by quantifying the impact of displacement on the evolution of roles and activities of women and men at the household and community levels. In general, this type of analysis is relevant to understand how individuals and their households experience and respond to an extreme form of shock that is associated with significant losses and trauma. It can also help to explain the interaction between displacement and poverty and the channels through which displaced individuals remain in or can escape poverty.

To examine intra-household dynamics, the analysis employed three proxies, namely, the prevalence of female breadwinner households, the number of hours that women and their spouses work for pay, and an index of gender roles in the labor market. The components of the index were also analyzed separately. At the community level, the focus was on indicators related to female and male participation in civic activities and political organizations.

Findings revealed that compared to their non-displaced counterparts with similar characteristics, displaced men work fewer hours for pay, while differences among women are not statistically significant. These patterns appear to be associated with a higher share of women who work more hours than their male partners and in the prevalence of female breadwinners among the displaced. Overall, conflict-induced displacement causes gender roles in the labor market to be less traditional. When it

comes to roles at the community level, estimates showed a slight increase in the probability that women would participate in political activism, compared to women who were not displaced by conflict. While men's engagement in these activities remains unaltered, their overall participation in civic organizations decreases with displacement.

To what extent does displacement reduce the likelihood of escaping poverty? To what extent do poverty dynamics differ between displaced and non-displaced households? What is the role of household structures in explaining the likelihood of experiencing poverty in situations of displacement?

The study presented in Chapter 4 focused on the dynamics of poverty in situations of conflict-induced displacement. Many of the vulnerabilities brought about by displacement set victims apart from other non-displaced poor populations. Such vulnerabilities affect their ability to seize opportunities and can trap them in chronic poverty (World Bank, 2017). Because of the lack of surveys that capture displaced populations, most poverty-related studies only provide "snapshots" that do not account for people's history of poverty (Bussolo & Lopez-Calva, 2014; Hanmer et al., 2020; Ibáñez, 2008; Pape et al., 2019). At the same time, the literature on household poverty among the displaced is largely focused on economic drivers, partially an outcome of the overwhelming focus on the provision of income as a tool to eradicate poverty. As a result, the role of demographic factors in shaping displaced households' history of poverty remains, to a large extent, under-researched. This chapter contributes to the growing literature on poverty among the displaced by presenting empirical evidence to examine poverty dynamics for IDP and non-IDP household. The analysis also builds on the approach and findings in Chapter 2 to provide evidence on the extent to which disruptions in household structures stemming from displacement intersect with household poverty dynamics.

The research employed multiple proxies for poverty and wealth. Variables included the traditional monetary measurement in per capita terms and adjusted by adult equivalence scales; household expenditure patterns; and an index of wealth, comprised of assets and access to basic services. In addition, it followed a 'counting' or 'spells' approach to identify the chronically poor, the transient poor, and the non-poor among the displaced and non-displaced households.

Consistent with previous studies, the findings indicate that displaced households experience higher poverty rates and lower levels of wealth compared to their non-displaced counterparts (Bussolo & Lopez-Calva, 2014; Ibáñez, 2008; Pape et al., 2019). However, there is no evidence in support of the hypothesis that displacement reduces the likelihood of escaping poverty. On the contrary, over time, the

likelihood of being poor decreases more rapidly among households in the panel that were forced to flee due to conflict. While the chapter does not present an analysis of mechanisms of transmission, some of the potential reasons behind these patterns include a 'catch-up' effect, as many of the households that were displaced between rounds were already poor when they joined the panel; a consequence of changing household structures or an improved access to social assistance. Despite the decrease in overall poverty rates, a large share of the displaced remains chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty; in particular, households that experienced specific changes in structure, either becoming single caregivers or multiple generations with children.

To what extent do gender norms become less traditional in situations of conflict-induced displacement?

The study in Chapter 5 examined the effect of displacement on gender norms in Colombia. Gender norms can limit women's ability to enter the workforce, participate in decision-making processes, or access basic services. Importantly, gender norms can slow down economic growth and hamper poverty reduction efforts. While conflict-induced displacement is one the most dramatic victimizations of civilians, the resulting disruption of household and social structures that produce and reproduce gender norms might provide opportunities to shift gender norms (Levine et al., 2019).

This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides exploratory empirical evidence regarding the relationship between conflict-induced displacement and less traditional gender norms. Second, it provides an alternative view of the analysis of gender norms by employing indicators on attitudes and behaviors included in a nationally representative household survey that oversampled IDP households to operationalize a definition that recognizes the dual nature of gender norms. The analysis examined gender norms around contraception, economic opportunities, women's mobility, violence against women, and patriarchy. The proposed approach also employed survey cluster to exploit the nature of the data and account for the role of social interaction in the production and reproduction of gender norms.

Based on the proposed approach to detect a shift in gender norms (a simultaneous change in traditional behaviors and attitudes), the findings showed mixed evidence regarding the norm change. Specifically, gender norms that tolerate violence against women become less traditional with displacement, while those that limit women's economic opportunities become more rigid. Results also revealed a misalignment between attitudes and behaviors in specific domains of gender norms that deserve further investigation. In particular, conflict-induced displacement reduces the

likelihood of agreeing with patriarchal statements such as “families with men have less problems” or “a good wife obeys her husband”, but women’s ability to decide about contraception and their own earnings, two proxies for behavior, decreases with displacement. These findings are consistent with those reported by Wirtz et al. (2014) and Hynes et al. (2016) in qualitative studies for Colombia, men’s controlling behaviors could be an outcome of the psychological trauma, stress and loss of financial stability associated with conflict-induced displacement. Displaced women have also reported increased controlling behaviors when their husbands faced unemployment in urban settings, and they pursued employment to support their families.

How do the findings in all chapters come together?

Despite all the negative effects associated with conflict-induced displacement, a surprisingly mixed picture—at least from a gender perspective—emerges from the findings in this dissertation. Figure 6.1 shows that several factors worked together to alter gender roles in displacement. For instance, the fact that most IDP men come from rural areas, where they usually work on agriculture, implies that their skills are less relevant to the urban context. Women, on the other hand, who tend to be relegated to the domestic sphere, can use the same skills to find jobs as domestic workers in the cities. Therefore, Chapter 3 showed that the lack of opportunities for men also represents a higher likelihood of employment for women, who often become the main breadwinners for their households. As predicted by collective models of household bargaining, the findings in Chapter 5 indicated that IDP women’s increased access to economic opportunity could be associated with a redistribution of household chores within the household. However, improved labor market outcomes—at least in terms of access—do not necessarily translate into ability to make decisions around their own money or reproductive health.

One of the key findings of the dissertation is the rapid reduction in the average household size derived from conflict-induced displacement. Families are broken apart due to death, forced recruitment by armed actors or in the process of fleeing. Chapter 2 showed that a non-negligible share of the reduction in household size is driven by divorces or marital separations, which can be driven by psychological trauma, stress and dire economic conditions that create tensions within the household. Indeed, in a patriarchal society, unemployed men can perceive a lack of control when they can no longer provide for their family and women become the main breadwinners of the household. Intra-household tensions can increase the risk of domestic violence and lead to divorce, which is consistent with the increase in non-traditional household structures, such as female single caregivers and one-person households. These dynamics are also aligned with the changes in gender

norms found in Chapter 5 whereby IDP women are significantly more prone to rejecting attitudes and behaviors that condone gender-based violence, but less likely to be involved in decision making within the household.

Finally, there is the aspect of quality of life as measured by income and wealth. The findings in Chapter 4 indicated that IDP households are significantly more likely than non-IDPs to be poor. However, there was no evidence to support the hypothesis that displacement reduces the chances of escaping poverty. In fact, estimates revealed that, on average, IDP households experienced more rapid reductions in poverty compared to their non-IDP counterparts over the period of analysis. Despite these improvements, many displaced households remain below the poverty line, particularly those that experienced disruptions (including for instance due to divorces) and became single caregivers or multiple generations with children.

Overall, it is difficult to say whether these findings are positive (or not), from a gender equality perspective. Each study does show, however, that households are dynamic and even more so in situations of conflict-induced displacement. Importantly, despite the trauma and dire conditions faced by the displaced, the changes in household structures, context, and labor market dynamics stemming from displacement can provide opportunities to challenge traditional gender roles and norms that refrain women from accessing opportunities.




Figure 6.1. Mechanisms of transmission for the gender impacts of displacement

6.2 Limitations

As discussed throughout this dissertation, the complex nature of conflict-induced displacement is a growing field of study. The gender dimensions of displacement, in particular, are relatively understudied. Part of the challenge comes from the lack of household surveys that capture displaced populations and/or collect sex-disaggregated data that allows for analysis of gender differentials in the experience of and response to displacement. Specifically, none of the household surveys employed in this study targeted displaced populations, but because of the scale of displacement in Colombia, it is possible to identify a subsample of households that were forced to flee or abandon their homes due to conflict or violence.

The questions (and assumptions) used to identify IDPs in this dissertation have advantages and disadvantages. For example, one of the questions used in the studies presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 asks whether the respondent has lived in a different municipality during the last 3 years due to armed conflict. This is a standard way of identifying the displaced in household surveys. However, the studies assume that the answer provided by the principal respondent represents the status of the household, which can be problematic. While not common in Colombia, it is possible that specific members are forced to abandon their place of residence and join relatives in other municipalities due to death threats or to avoid recruitment by armed actors, among other reasons. Hence, depending on the outcome of interest, assigning the status of displaced to a household that did not move, but welcomed a new member (due to displacement), could bias the estimations on the effects of displacement at the household level. The studies in these chapters also employ a question that asks whether the household receives aid for IDPs, which allows for the identification of households that have lived in protracted displacement (as it is not restricted to a specific time period). Nonetheless, it is problematic when studying the impact of displacement on poverty or welfare (Chapter 4) – as by definition, a household receives cash and other forms of aid for being internally displaced.

Because the household surveys used in this dissertation do not purposely sample or target IDPs, the analyses have limitations in terms of extrapolating results for the overall displaced population in Colombia. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the main characteristics of displaced populations in the sample are similar to those described by previous research based on specialized surveys with IDP households in Colombia. They have low levels of education, most of them migrate from rural to urban areas and have lower levels of income than their non-displaced counterparts. Thus, the insights gained from this study on the effect of displacement are likely to be relevant to a broader sample of households and individuals forced to flee their homes due to conflict in Colombia.

In terms of the methodology, the main assumption in all chapters of this dissertation is the exogeneity of conflict-induced displacement. Conflict forces households to migrate to urban areas, hence it is not a voluntary decision based on the desire to improve economic conditions. Moreover, in nearly 9 out of 10 cases, displacement in Colombia is driven by violent attacks. However, previous studies have argued that the choice of destination might not be random and could be influenced by access to labor markets. Similarly, some people that experience violence decide to remain, suggesting that there could be other factors behind the decision to flee that can challenge the assumption of exogeneity. The studies presented in this dissertation employ a similar approach to reduce the potential for self-selection and endogeneity. First, the analysis restricts the sample to individuals and/or households that migrated because of armed conflict and second, the estimation of the impact of conflict-induced displacement is performed in two stages. The first stage employs a kernel-based PSM to construct a control group that has the same odds of having migrated due to conflict based on observable characteristics at the individual, household, and municipality level. This approach reduces bias in post-displacement comparisons between treatment and control households that could be the result of permanent differences in observable characteristics between these groups. The second stage uses the matched sample to estimate the effect of displacement on the outcomes of interest in the area of common support.

In the case of Chapters 2-4, the second stage exploits the longitudinal nature of the survey and uses a DID to estimate the effect of displacement on the outcomes of interest. This quasi-experimental approach has been widely used when panel data are available for impact evaluation and randomization is not feasible. A key aspect of DID is that it reduces potential bias derived from time-invariant unobserved effects that could be correlated with displacement as well as bias from aggregate shocks that affect for the treatment and control groups over time (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). One of the limitations of the DID approach is that, even if trends are equal before the start of the treatment, bias in the estimation might still appear. The reason is that any differences in trends between the treatment and control are attributed to the intervention after the time it occurs. Therefore, estimates will be biased if any other factors that affect the difference in outcomes between the two groups are not accounted for in the regression analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Gertler et al., 2016).

There are other alternative methods based on observational data for nonexperimental causal inference. Some of these methods could have been employed to estimate the effects of conflict-induced displacement on the outcomes of interest, but they were not feasible due to specific data limitations. For example, there is the instrumental variables (IV) method, which relies on an external source of variation to determine treatment status. In this case, an instrumental variable

should affect the likelihood of being displaced but should not be correlated to the household's or individual's characteristics (Muller et al., 2014). Finding a strong instrument for conflict-induced displacement, however, proved to be a difficult if not impossible task given the multiple proxies that were used to apply a gender lens to the outcomes of interest (e.g., household structures, roles, welfare, and norms).

Besides these limitations that apply to most analyses in the dissertation, each chapter also has its specific limitations. A caveat of the research in Chapter 2 is that it only examines marital dissolutions and separations as a mechanism through which displacement might affect household structures. Moreover, due to the sample size (for the IDP population) and the lack of information about when the separation happened, it is not possible to fully exploit the panel nature of the data in the mediation analysis. The research could have been enriched if the data on intimate partner violence or detailed intra-household dynamics were available in the Colombian Longitudinal Survey.

Even with a large number of IDP household in the panel, sample sizes for some of the outcomes of interest in Chapter 3 were still too small to allow for analyses by cohort or at the subnational level. To control for specific effects at that level, all first stage estimations include department-level variables. Lastly, the construction of the gender roles index in this chapter represents the sum of scores for the relative components. While this approach is simple and can be replicated, it makes strong assumptions about the weight of each component in relation to the overall labor market gender roles, which may not be valid.

When it comes to the analysis of poverty in Chapter 4, one of the limitations has to do with the change in the wording of the income variable for rural areas between the first and second survey rounds. Specifically, the first survey wave asked about the monthly value of labor income as a single category for both urban and rural areas. In the second wave, labor income was divided between agricultural and non-agricultural sources for rural areas (but no changes were made in the urban questionnaire). It is hard to predict whether the methodological change overestimates or underestimates household income. It is more important to understand if such a change systematically affected specific groups of the population included in the analysis. A simple exercise comparing the share of labor in total household income revealed that the change in wording does not appear to have systematically affected households in rural areas. Indeed, the declining trend in the share of labor income between 2010 and 2016 is common for households in both rural and urban areas. This is also the case when comparing displaced and non-displaced households. For the purposes of the analysis in Chapter 4, the changes in the way questions around income are asked might affect poverty levels for both IDP

and non-IDP households, but not the difference or trends in poverty rates when comparing both groups. Finally, two of the three questions to identify internally displaced households refer to the three years prior to the survey. Hence, the immediate effects of displacement on variables such as income and asset loss might not be captured by the data. However, the panel nature of the survey captures dynamics that cannot be observed with snapshots of poverty using cross sections.

The analysis of the effects of conflict-induced displacement on gender norms in Chapter 5 also has limitations. The approach to measuring gender norms is one of them. Large-scale household surveys rarely (if at all) include questions with the level of detail required to identify and measure a norm. In general, measuring a gender norm requires accounting for multiple dimensions and nuances that cannot be properly captured with close-ended or even multiple-choice questions. However, even though the indicators included in DHS are not perfect, the proposed approach, which combines attitudes and behaviors focused on decision-making power, while exploiting the structure of the data, provides a different view on gender norms and can be used for future studies and data collection initiatives.

The analysis of gender norms is also constrained by the lack of data on men's attitudes and behaviors. Gender norms are produced and reproduced by both women and men; hence, the analysis omits an important part of the story. On the other hand, focusing on women's views and their own decision-making power within the household provides an overview of intra-household dynamics that could hint at men's and other household members' attitudes and behaviors around women's and men's appropriate roles in society.

Finally, in terms of measurement, the choice of indicators as proxy variables for attitudes and behaviors is driven by data availability and some of the indicators could arguably be mapped onto multiple spheres or domains of gender norms. Similarly, the analysis assumes that the survey cluster represents an important reference network across gender norms in a number of spheres and among interviewees. However, different norms might have varying reference networks and might extend (or be more limited) beyond the cluster. A more refined analysis that considers this differentiation requires detailed data, which is rarely included in traditional household surveys if at all in surveys that sample displaced populations.

6.3 Agenda for Future Research

This section presents some avenues for future research based on the findings and limitations of this dissertation. They do not represent an exhaustive list of studies, but rather outline some ideas to advance the work on the gender dimensions of

conflict-induced displacement. Existing knowledge gaps severely constrain evidence-based policy for supporting women and men in situations of conflict-induced displacement.

One key limitation of this dissertation is related to the data. As previously mentioned, neither the Colombian Longitudinal Survey nor the Demographic and Health Surveys target displaced populations. Sample sizes tend to be small, constraining the type of analysis that can be done to assess the impacts of displacement. Furthermore, even in cases where displaced populations are included in data collection efforts, questions are limited in depth and scope. It is equally important to consider displaced populations in longitudinal studies. Innovative methods to strengthen data collection and analysis can thus make a significant difference in the analysis of the gender dimensions of conflict-induced displacement.

The economics literature is increasingly studying intra-household dynamics and gender differentials in the allocation of time to paid and unpaid activities, but limited research has been conducted for displaced populations. Future research should examine, data permitting, the relative importance of household responsibilities, such as the number of hours that women and their partners invest in housework and caring for children. Rigorous analyses in these largely unexplored areas could contribute to a better understanding of the type of interventions to encourage female participation in the labor market and in economic recovery in situations of displacement.

As mentioned throughout the dissertation, given that gender norms assign different roles and responsibilities to women and men, their experience of and response to displacement can be systematically different. Risks, vulnerabilities, and impacts should be considered in the short and long term, also for those individuals who decide to return to their places of origin. There is scope for further analysis of the ways in which changes in gender roles affect the risk of poverty and the capacity of households to adapt and recover from the shock of displacement. Little is known about this in the literature. Equally important is not to overlook men and boys in the analysis of the gender dimensions of conflict-induced displacement. The analysis of the gender dimensions of displacement is no more about women than it is about men.

In addition to analyzing outcomes, more sophisticated empirical analysis can also help to identify the complex mechanisms shaping the relationship between conflict-induced displacement, gender roles, and poverty, as illustrated in the theoretical framework that guided this dissertation. This analysis might help to better focus the

interventions on the specific needs of women and men and their dependents in situations of displacement. Data permitting, the analysis of poverty should go beyond monetary measurements and consider different dimensions of wellbeing at the individual level, such as nutrition, access to information and communication, and emotional wellbeing. Few migration studies have looked at the link between migration and the multidimensional wellbeing of household members, particularly among children and elderly persons ‘left behind’ (Gassmann et al., 2013; Waidler et al., 2018).

Another important area of work, greatly unexplored, is how to mobilize displaced women to shape political and legal outcomes. The findings in Chapter 3 revealed only a slight increase in women’s political participation as a result of displacement (in contrast with a decrease in men’s activities in the community). Women’s organizations in Colombia played a key role in rallying support for the peace talks and in the integration of a gender perspective in the 2016 peace accord. However, according to the Kroc Institute (2020), in the fourth year of implementation, many gender stipulations have not yet initiated implementation. Therefore, the challenge now is how to translate commitments that on paper promote gender equality into concrete actions and how to have women rallying behind the implementation of the accord.

More evidence is also needed on the effect of specific policies and programs targeting differences in the needs of women and men, boys, and girls. The protracted nature of the conflict in Colombia and its solid normative framework provide an interesting case study to analyze the effects of ‘gendered’ policies on poverty, wellbeing, and social mobility. There is also limited empirical evidence on the impacts of specific programs around employment or microfinance on the economic wellbeing of women and their families.

When it comes to the analysis of gender norms, more evidence is needed on the mechanisms through which gender norms influence the outcomes for displaced women and men. Gender norms play an important role in women’s ability to access economic opportunities, participate in decision-making processes or access education and health services, and documenting and exploring this relationship can help improve outcomes for the displaced. Mixed methods studies should also be considered given the difficulty in measuring gender norms and the sensitivity of the topic, particularly among populations that have suffered psychological trauma and losses. The institutions are a key component of the definition of a gender norm that deserves more attention.

Finally, GBV is another area where more rigorous evidence is needed. Many reports draw attention to a greater risk of experiencing different forms of violence in situations of displacement. However, questions around the prevalence and severity of intimate partner violence and the main risk factors associated with this phenomenon are yet to be studied. This is also the case of early marriage and sexual exploitation, particularly in contexts where these practices are prevalent. Importantly, this dissertation highlighted various qualitative studies that linked changes in gender roles in situations of displacement with reported increases in domestic violence. These dynamics can affect women's gains in labor market outcomes, which is another area where more rigorous evidence is needed.

6.4 Policy Implications

In general, the findings and the limitations of this dissertation stress the importance of including displaced women and men in national household surveys. This is particularly relevant in the context of protracted conflict and large-scale displacement. Considering that conducting household surveys represents a major investment for countries, particularly where most of the displaced live, expanding the type and quality of socioeconomic indicators gathered by administrative records could also contribute to narrowing data gaps. It is equally important to promote innovations in data collection, for instance, through cell phones. One example is the UNHCR-World Bank Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement, which is leading efforts to improve data availability on displaced populations in developing countries. Specialized surveys can also be conducted as part of efforts to assess the needs of the beneficiaries of humanitarian and development programs fostered by international organizations. While it is more aspirational, longitudinal studies, even based on administrative records, can go a long way to identify obstacles to establishing livelihoods and assessing poverty outcomes but also to ensure that ongoing government programs are adequate. Finally, although household surveys and quantitative studies are the most promising to measure the gendered effects of displacement, qualitative studies are more appropriate for exploring the mechanisms behind the quantitative patterns. Mixed methods studies can thus offer more insights as the economics literature on the gender-differentiated effects of conflict-induced displacement evolves.

The nuances in the analysis of the gender dimensions of conflict-induced displacement are also important. Chapters 2 and 4 underlined how differentiating between types of households can enrich the understanding of poverty and vulnerability in situations of conflict-induced displacement. In the case of Colombia, specific household structures, particularly those that result from disruptions caused by conflict-induced displacement, are more prone to experience chronic and

transient poverty. These structures include households consisting of single caregivers and multiple generations with children. In the short term, cash transfers and other instruments of social protection can reach households that are especially vulnerable such as single caregivers and households consisting of multiple generations with children. Moreover, the regular income received via cash transfers can reduce anxiety and improve the psychological wellbeing of displaced populations thereby decreasing the risk of domestic violence (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017). At the same time, given the Colombian context, it is important for interventions targeting internally displaced persons to not exclude other non-displaced poor or vulnerable populations that could benefit from the same type of support.

Notwithstanding, the displacement situation in Colombia is long-term for many people. As articulated by Koser (2012), the challenges and opportunities faced by the displaced in protracted situations are different from those in the phase of emergency. It is, thus, important to build capacity for both displaced women and men to access economic opportunities, which can eventually replace social assistance. Program interventions should identify occupations and sectors where they could work given their skills and include components providing support services, particularly for women, such as flexible working hours and childcare facilities to address specific constraints related to domestic responsibilities.

The findings in Chapter 3 showed that IDP women work more hours than their male partners, compared to their non-IDP counterparts with similar characteristics. In the same manner, previous studies for Colombia reveal that women are also more likely to find a job than men because their pre-displacement skills are more easily adapted in urban settings (Calderón et al., 2011; Ibáñez, 2008; Meertens & Stoller, 2001). However, the findings in Chapter 5 showed that, in situations of displacement, paid work does not necessarily translate into increased decision-making power. Hence, providing access to economic opportunities is not a guarantee that durable solutions to displacement will be achieved and that gender gaps will be reduced if men have full control of gains, as determined by patriarchal norms. Economic empowerment programs for the displaced, in particular, should have built-in guidelines for the protection of women and should engage men in promoting more gender-equitable relationships (Heilman & Barker, 2018; van der Gaag et al., 2019).

The findings around gender norms have some other important implications for policy making. Greater access to sexual and reproductive health services for displaced women could be ensured through universal health coverage schemes, for example, the ones that include contraception in basic packages. Social assistance programs for displaced populations could also address barriers in accessing

contraception and provide information to increase uptake and men's support for the various kinds of modern methods (Khan et al., 2016). While the expansion of sexual and reproductive health services might not guarantee a shift in gender norms, it might provide opportunities for women to overcome some of the challenges imposed by existing gender norms (Malhotra et al., 2019).

Another point relevant from a policy perspective is women's political voice, their empowerment in relation to the conflict and in the implementation of the peace accord. In Colombia, the Law 1475 of 2011 establishes the participation of women in at least 30 percent of the electoral list of political parties.⁵¹ However, despite this measure, Colombia has one of the lowest rates of female representation in parliament (18 percent) and the share is even lower among mayors (12 percent) (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC], 2021). Some of the obstacles to women's engagement in politics include the lack of enforcement of the quota system and gender norms that dissuade women from participating in politics (World Bank, 2019). In the case of the implementation of the peace accord, as highlighted in Chapter 5, even though women played a central role in ensuring that gender issues were reflected in the final agreement, they are not fully benefitting from the dispositions as yet mainly due to the lack of mechanisms and institutional capacity to implement the commitments established on paper. It is thus important to establish clear targets and results-based programs that assign accountability to specific government institutions for the implementation of previously established commitments. Equally relevant is to build institutional capacity. Government institutions should be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender policies (and quotas) and be accountable for the achievement of targets (World Bank, 2019). When it comes to women's political participation, the enforcement of the legal quota would require sanctions to parties that do not adhere to the Law. The media and women's organizations could also play a crucial role in promoting norm change around the role of women and men in politics.

As described throughout this dissertation, the risk of sexual and gender-based violence in situations of displacement has devastating impacts on the individual and on the household. This is a complex issue and requires a battery of interventions for prevention and response. Approaches need to recognize the effect of post-traumatic psychological issues in triggering and exacerbating domestic violence. Considering the findings of the study presented in Chapter 5, interventions that have worked in non-displaced settings such as strategies for addressing norms that condone violence against women, designing effective facilities and services for survivors, and

⁵¹ See official document (in Spanish) on the organization and functioning of political movements and parties and electoral processes at <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/ley147514072011.pdf>.

engaging men and boys in the prevention and response of domestic violence could be piloted in situations of displacement (see Jewkes et al., [2015] and Ellsberg et al., [2015] for a detailed review of the evidence).

The development literature that studies conflict-induced displacement naturally focuses on economic factors and implications. Because there is an urgent need to prioritize basic needs and living conditions, this focus is not necessarily surprising (or inappropriate). However, the narrative that emerges often misses important aspects of the story, including disruptions in households and social structures. Issues around GBV and mental health, widely discussed in qualitative studies, have important implications on individual and household wellbeing and thus should not be ignored. Equally important is the analysis of gender differentials in the experience of and response to conflict-induced displacement. Among the few studies that analyze this dimension of displacement, the exclusive focus on women is also problematic, as it often overlooks men's own needs and experiences. Gender norms that limit women's access to opportunities and expose them to violence are produced and reproduced by both men and women; hence, any opportunity to change should take into consideration both genders.

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Appendix A. Additional Data - Chapter 2

Table A.1. Proxies for household structures

| Variable | Definition |
|--|---|
| <i>Size</i> | Average number of household members |
| <i>Female-headed</i> | Household with a woman head |
| <i>De jure</i> female head | Female head of household who is widowed, separated, divorced or single |
| <i>De facto</i> female head | Female head whose husband is away for a long time (do not live permanently in the household) |
| <i>Single female caregiver household</i> | Household comprised of a single female adult and dependents |
| <i>Single male caregiver household</i> | Household comprised of a single male adult and dependents |
| <i>One-person household</i> | Household with a single adult member |
| <i>Non-traditional household</i> | Category that combines single female and male caregiver households with one-person households |
| <i>Nuclear household</i> | Household consisting of an adult couple with or without children and no additional members |
| Adult couple with children | Adult couple (ages 18 or older) with children and no additional members |
| Adult couple without children | Adult couple without children and no additional members |
| <i>Multigenerational household</i> | Household comprised of multiple generations excluding nuclear arrangements. |
| Majority female adults with children | Multiple generations with children. 50% or more of the adult members are women |
| Majority female adults without children | Multiple generations without children. 50% or more of the adult members are women |
| Majority male adults with children | Multiple generations with children. 50% or more of the adult members are men |
| Majority male adults without children | Multiple generations without children. 50% or more of the adult members are men |
| <i>Traditional household</i> | Category combining nuclear and multigenerational households |

Note: Adult is defined as an individual age 18 and older. Dependents are individuals under the age of 18 or above 64. Children are defined as individuals of age 5 and below.

Table A.2. Differences in household characteristics by displacement status

| | Time difference (IDP) | | | Time difference (Non-IDP) | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | 2010-13 | 2013-16 | 2010-16 | 2010-13 | 2013-16 | 2010-16 |
| Urban (%) | 5.60 (4.59) | 8.37*** (2.37) | 13.97*** (4.40) | -0.76 (1.20) | -1.46 (1.25) | -2.22** (0.95) |
| <i>Composition (number)</i> | | | | | | |
| Size | -0.59*** (0.20) | -0.19** (0.09) | -0.78*** (0.20) | -0.09** (0.04) | -0.26*** (0.05) | -0.35*** (0.04) |
| Children (0-5) | -0.15** (0.07) | -0.14*** (0.03) | -0.29*** (0.07) | -0.09*** (0.02) | -0.12*** (0.02) | -0.21*** (0.01) |
| Children (6-18) | -0.24** (0.10) | -0.04 (0.05) | -0.28*** (0.10) | -0.06** (0.03) | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.12*** (0.02) |
| Adult males | -0.14** (0.07) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.15** (0.07) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.07*** (0.02) | -0.07*** (0.02) |
| Adult females | -0.09 (0.07) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.09 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.08*** (0.02) | -0.06*** (0.01) |
| Elderly (65+) | 0.03 (0.04) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.12*** (0.01) |
| Income p/capita | 272.9*** (55.1) | 48.2 (50.9) | 321.2*** (48.6) | 141.1*** (49.7) | -62.3 (51.6) | 78.8*** (30.1) |
| Household head | | | | | | |
| Female head (%) | 1.98 (4.27) | 3.81 (2.52) | 5.79 (4.15) | 1.01 (1.16) | 2.42* (1.33) | 3.43*** (1.32) |
| De facto | -3.07 (2.70) | 1.40 (1.24) | -1.66 (2.68) | -0.42 (0.58) | 1.97*** (0.74) | 1.56** (0.77) |
| De jure | 5.05 (3.69) | 2.41 (2.40) | 7.46** (3.53) | 1.43 (1.08) | 0.45 (1.22) | 1.88 (1.19) |
| <i>Marital status (%)</i> | | | | | | |
| Married/cohabiting | -10.57*** (3.85) | -3.28 (2.65) | -13.85*** (3.76) | -1.42 (1.20) | -1.15 (1.35) | -2.57* (1.31) |
| Widow/er | 0.46 (2.31) | 1.40 (1.16) | -1.29 (1.05) | 1.27*** (0.44) | 1.10** (0.52) | 2.37*** (0.49) |
| Single | 0.27 (1.65) | 1.13 (1.24) | 1.41 (1.59) | -0.03 (0.81) | -0.82 (0.98) | -0.86 (0.85) |
| Divorced/separated | 9.83*** (2.99) | 0.76 (2.49) | 10.59*** (2.93) | 0.18 (0.96) | 0.88 (1.03) | 1.05 (1.09) |
| Age (years) | 3.14*** (1.20) | 2.16*** (0.71) | 5.30*** (1.13) | 3.93*** (0.30) | 3.10*** (0.33) | 7.03*** (0.32) |
| <i>Education (%)</i> | | | | | | |
| Less than primary | -7.04 (4.37) | 0.12 (1.68) | -6.92 (4.29) | -0.07 (0.59) | 0.23 (0.68) | 0.16 (0.67) |
| Primary | -3.58 (4.99) | -1.92 (2.71) | -5.5 (4.90) | -2.12 (1.30) | 1.87 (1.49) | -0.24 (1.46) |
| Secondary | 4.95 (4.12) | 0.62 (2.39) | 5.56 (4.05) | -1.38 (1.23) | -0.89 (1.38) | -2.27* (1.36) |
| Technical | 4.07*** (0.76) | 0.91 (1.02) | 4.98*** (0.75) | 2.05*** (0.78) | 0.14 (1.01) | 2.18** (0.88) |
| Undergraduate | 0.62 (0.74) | 0.09 (0.59) | 0.71 (0.69) | 0.62 (0.81) | -0.97 (0.96) | -0.35 (0.82) |
| Graduate | 0.80* (0.45) | 0.24 (0.57) | 1.04*** (0.37) | 0.86 (0.70) | -0.37 (0.71) | 0.50 (0.64) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.3. Changes in demographic characteristics by displacement and headship

| | Female IDP | | | Male IDP | | | Female Non-IDP | | | Male Non-IDP | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 |
| Urban (%) | 8.60 (8.55) | 5.94 (3.85) | 14.54* (8.24) | 4.24 (5.38) | 8.32*** (2.91) | 12.56** (5.17) | -1.67 (1.83) | -1.24 (1.92) | -2.91* (1.61) | -0.99 (1.51) | -1.36 (1.58) | -2.35** (1.14) |
| <i>Composition (numbers)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Size | -0.24 (0.27) | -0.27* (0.16) | -0.51** (0.26) | -0.74*** (0.26) | -0.12 (0.11) | -0.86*** (0.26) | -0.17** (0.08) | -0.26*** (0.08) | -0.43*** (0.07) | -0.05 (0.05) | -0.22*** (0.06) | -0.27*** (0.04) |
| Children (0-5) | -0.01 (0.12) | -0.17*** (0.06) | -0.17 (0.11) | -0.22** (0.09) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.34*** (0.09) | -0.09*** (0.03) | -0.09*** (0.02) | -0.19*** (0.02) | -0.08*** (0.02) | -0.14*** (0.02) | -0.22*** (0.02) |
| Children (6-18) | -0.11 (0.15) | -0.07 (0.09) | -0.17 (0.14) | -0.29** (0.13) | -0.03 (0.07) | -0.32** (0.13) | -0.13*** (0.05) | -0.04 (0.05) | -0.17*** (0.04) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.10*** (0.03) |
| Adult males | -0.11 (0.12) | -0.04 (0.07) | -0.14 (0.11) | -0.15* (0.08) | 0.04 (0.04) | -0.11 (0.08) | 0.08** (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) | 0.02 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.06*** (0.02) | -0.07*** (0.02) |
| Adult females | 0.02 (0.12) | -0.03 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.11) | -0.14 (0.09) | 0.01 (0.04) | -0.14 (0.09) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.10*** (0.03) | -0.12*** (0.03) | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.06*** (0.02) | -0.04*** (0.02) |
| Elderly 65+ | -0.03 (0.09) | 0.02 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.08) | 0.06 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.11*** (0.02) | 0.16*** (0.01) |
| Income p/capita | 265.7*** (95.1) | -20.9 (74.3) | 244.8*** (82.1) | 276.2*** (68.5) | 89.2 (66.5) | 365.5*** (61.2) | 124.4** (51.3) | -46.5 (50.2) | 77.9** (38.2) | 152.5** (66.2) | -61.8 (69.5) | 90.7** (39.6) |
| Household head | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Marital status (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married/cohabiting | -13.00 (8.27) | 1.40 (3.82) | -11.60 (8.06) | -7.93*** (2.06) | -2.02 (2.54) | -9.95*** (2.51) | -2.49 (1.99) | 4.61** (2.30) | 2.12 (2.41) | -0.12 (0.95) | -1.32 (1.11) | -1.44 (1.05) |
| Widow/er | -3.38 (7.51) | 1.41 (3.26) | -1.97 (7.43) | 1.51*** (0.50) | 0.55 (0.75) | 2.05 (0.00) | 3.03** (1.50) | 0.90 (1.65) | 3.92** (1.60) | 0.42** (0.18) | 0.63** (0.27) | 1.06*** (0.24) |
| Single | -0.14 (4.63) | 2.56 (3.07) | 2.42 (4.52) | 0.19 (1.40) | -0.08 (1.11) | 0.11 (1.23) | 0.56 (2.10) | -3.26 (2.36) | -2.70 (2.20) | -0.49 (0.73) | -0.39 (0.93) | -0.88 (0.76) |
| Divorced/separated | 16.52** (8.36) | -5.37 (5.07) | 11.15 (7.89) | 6.24*** (1.48) | 1.55 (2.29) | 7.79*** (2.21) | -1.09 (2.55) | -2.25 (2.71) | -3.34 (2.79) | 0.18 (0.62) | 1.08* (0.62) | 1.26* (0.73) |
| Age (years) | 2.78 (2.15) | 1.73 (1.54) | 4.51** (1.84) | 3.26** (1.42) | 2.35*** (0.76) | 5.61*** (1.39) | 4.21*** (0.54) | 1.88*** (0.57) | 6.09*** (0.58) | 3.82*** (0.36) | 3.61*** (0.41) | 7.43*** (0.38) |
| <i>Education (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than primary | -6.22 (5.57) | 1.95 (1.79) | -4.27 (5.60) | -7.06 (5.56) | -1.99 (3.80) | -9.05 (6.25) | 0.06 (1.39) | 0.47 (1.59) | 0.53 (1.64) | -0.09 (0.63) | 0.16 (0.71) | 0.07 (0.69) |
| Primary | 1.32 (9.00) | -4.00 (5.08) | -2.68 (8.61) | -5.18 (6.00) | 5.98 (5.97) | 0.80 (7.78) | -2.69 (2.49) | 2.20 (2.70) | -0.49 (2.80) | -1.81 (1.54) | 1.89 (1.78) | 0.08 (1.72) |
| Secondary | -2.43 (8.45) | -1.29 (4.38) | -3.72 (8.13) | 7.31 (4.61) | -7.61 (5.02) | -0.30 (6.15) | -1.69 (2.40) | -2.21 (2.49) | -3.90 (2.60) | -1.35 (1.43) | -0.46 (1.65) | -1.80 (1.60) |
| Technical | 5.36*** (1.62) | 2.94 (2.19) | 8.30*** (1.81) | 3.48*** (0.85) | 2.03 (2.64) | 5.51** (2.50) | 2.61* (1.48) | -0.35 (1.71) | 2.27 (1.54) | 1.78* (0.92) | 0.25 (1.24) | 2.03* (1.07) |
| Undergraduate | 0.24 (1.20) | 0.59 (0.93) | 0.83 (1.23) | 0.78 (0.91) | -1.10 (0.70) | -0.33 (0.80) | 1.60 (1.31) | -0.52 (1.88) | 1.08 (1.51) | 0.26 (0.99) | -1.16 (1.11) | -0.89 (0.96) |
| Graduate | 1.54 (1.21) | -0.01 (1.50) | 1.54 (0.98) | 0.49 (0.40) | 2.87 (2.11) | 3.36 (0.00) | 0.06 (0.72) | 0.42 (0.71) | 0.47 (0.76) | 1.17 (0.92) | -0.66 (0.95) | 0.51 (0.84) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Income per capita is in thousand Colombian pesos. Adults are defined as individuals of ages 18-64.

Table A.4. Differences in household characteristics by headship and displacement

| | Female - Male (IDP) | | | Female - Male (Non-IDP) | | | IDP - Non-IDP (Female) | | | IDP - Non-IDP (Male) | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 | 2010 | 2013 | 2016 |
| Urban (%) | 17.39* | 21.75*** | 19.53*** | 21.02*** | 20.34*** | 20.85*** | -7.50 | 2.77 | 9.95*** | -3.87 | 1.36 | 11.04*** |
| | (9.32) | (3.91) | (2.82) | (1.30) | (1.99) | (1.48) | (8.01) | (3.49) | (2.50) | (4.91) | (2.66) | (1.97) |
| <i>Composition (number)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Size | -0.81** | -0.31** | -0.45*** | -0.25*** | -0.36*** | -0.38*** | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.71*** | 0.02 | 0.12 |
| | (0.34) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.24) | (0.14) | (0.10) | (0.25) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Children (0-5) | -0.22 | -0.01 | -0.05 | -0.06*** | -0.08*** | -0.03** | 0.14 | 0.12** | 0.05* | 0.20** | 0.06* | 0.07*** |
| | (0.14) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.24) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.02) |
| Children (6-18) | -0.22 | -0.04 | -0.08 | -0.01 | -0.11** | -0.07** | 0.19 | 0.21*** | 0.18*** | 0.40*** | 0.14** | 0.18*** |
| | (0.14) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.14) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Adult males | -0.57*** | -0.53*** | -0.60*** | -0.60*** | -0.51*** | -0.49*** | 0.09 | -0.10 | -0.08 | 0.06 | -0.07** | 0.03 |
| | (0.13) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Adult females | 0.09 | 0.25*** | 0.22*** | 0.31*** | 0.27*** | 0.24*** | -0.13 | -0.09* | -0.01 | 0.10 | -0.06* | 0.00 |
| | (0.14) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Elderly 65+ | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.06** | 0.11*** | 0.06*** | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.08* | -0.08*** | -0.05 | -0.05* | -0.17*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Income p/capita | -41.4 | -51.8 | -161.3*** | -156.7*** | -184.8** | -164.0*** | -314.1*** | -172.8** | -147.2*** | -429.4*** | -305.7*** | -154.6*** |
| | (84.6) | (81.1) | (57.8) | (36.7) | (75.3) | (40.7) | (76.9) | (75.8) | (47.8) | (50.6) | (80.6) | (52.4) |
| Household head | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Marital status (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Married/cohabiting | -57.89*** | -62.96*** | -59.54*** | -63.92*** | -66.30*** | -60.36*** | 10.82 | 0.31 | -2.90 | 4.79*** | -3.03* | -3.72* |
| | (7.85) | (3.34) | (3.15) | (1.62) | (1.50) | (2.06) | (7.85) | (3.27) | (3.03) | (1.55) | (1.65) | (2.23) |
| Widow/er | 19.63*** | 14.75*** | 15.61*** | 13.24*** | 15.84*** | 16.11*** | 5.78 | -0.63 | -0.11 | -0.62*** | 0.47 | 0.38 |
| | (7.11) | (2.49) | (2.23) | (1.03) | (1.11) | (1.25) | (7.17) | (2.68) | (2.49) | (0.10) | (0.52) | (0.60) |
| Single | 9.21** | 8.88*** | 11.52*** | 16.53*** | 17.57*** | 14.71*** | -10.01** | -10.71*** | -4.89* | -2.68** | -2.01* | -1.70* |
| | (4.17) | (2.46) | (2.14) | (1.40) | (1.73) | (1.86) | (4.25) | (2.80) | (2.67) | (1.11) | (1.12) | (0.93) |
| Divorced/separated | 29.05*** | 39.33*** | 32.41*** | 34.15*** | 32.88*** | 29.55*** | -6.59 | 11.02** | 7.90** | -1.49 | 4.57*** | 5.04** |
| | (7.36) | (4.24) | (3.60) | (1.94) | (1.77) | (2.13) | (7.52) | (4.44) | (3.64) | (1.08) | (1.19) | (2.06) |
| Age (years) | 0.82 | 0.34 | -0.28 | -0.04 | 0.35 | -1.38*** | -1.63 | -3.06** | -3.21*** | -2.49* | -3.05*** | -4.31*** |
| | (2.12) | (1.47) | (0.90) | (0.46) | (0.46) | (0.53) | (1.72) | (1.40) | (0.86) | (1.32) | (0.64) | (0.58) |
| <i>Education (%)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than primary | -6.25 | -5.32** | -2.88 | -1.34 | -1.18 | -0.87 | 4.11 | -2.18 | -0.70 | 9.02* | 1.96 | 1.31 |
| | (7.58) | (2.15) | (1.93) | (1.11) | (1.04) | (1.39) | (5.53) | (1.53) | (1.84) | (5.28) | (1.83) | (1.50) |
| Primary | -10.08 | -3.53 | -6.81* | -4.93** | -5.81*** | -5.50** | 5.95 | 9.95** | 3.75 | 11.09** | 7.67*** | 5.06* |
| | (9.76) | (4.67) | (3.80) | (2.10) | (2.03) | (2.52) | (8.24) | (4.37) | (3.74) | (5.61) | (2.62) | (2.61) |
| Secondary | 15.08* | 5.22 | 2.65 | 4.68** | 4.33** | 2.58 | -0.63 | -1.37 | -0.45 | -11.03*** | 7.67*** | -0.52 |
| | (8.73) | (4.06) | (3.32) | (2.03) | (1.93) | (2.28) | (7.89) | (3.85) | (3.26) | (4.22) | (2.62) | (2.37) |
| Technical | 0.65 | 2.49 | 5.65*** | 2.75*** | 3.58** | 2.98* | -5.93*** | -3.18* | 0.11 | -3.83*** | -2.09* | -2.55** |
| | (0.74) | (1.67) | (1.79) | (1.03) | (1.40) | (1.57) | (1.17) | (1.85) | (2.07) | (0.49) | (1.15) | (1.18) |
| Undergraduate | 0.31 | -0.21 | 0.52 | -1.13 | 0.21 | 0.85 | -2.09* | -3.45** | -2.35 | -3.54*** | -3.04*** | -2.02** |
| | (1.24) | (0.86) | (0.82) | (0.77) | (1.45) | (1.62) | (1.13) | (1.37) | (1.59) | (0.91) | (0.98) | (0.89) |
| Graduate | 0.29 | 1.35 | 1.06 | -0.02 | -1.13 | -0.05 | -1.40** | 0.08 | -0.34 | -1.71*** | -2.40*** | -1.45** |
| | (0.29) | (1.24) | (0.97) | (0.78) | (0.87) | (0.81) | (0.62) | (1.27) | (1.07) | (0.57) | (0.82) | (0.68) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Income per capita is in thousand Colombian pesos. Adults are defined as individuals of ages 18-64.

Table A.5. Balance test

| Weighted variable | Control | Treated | Difference | t | Pr(T > t) |
|--------------------|---------|---------|------------|------|-------------|
| Age | 42.19 | 42.16 | -0.03 | 0.07 | 0.94 |
| Female head | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.88 |
| Divorced | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.91 |
| Widow/er | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.98 |
| Single | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.93 | 0.35 |
| Urban | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.01 | 0.53 | 0.60 |
| % children | 37.91 | 38.11 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.79 |
| % elderly | 4.30 | 4.05 | -0.25 | 0.73 | 0.47 |
| % women rep. age | 15.58 | 15.59 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.99 |
| Secondary | 0.32 | 0.31 | -0.01 | 0.87 | 0.39 |
| Tertiary or more | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.94 | 0.34 |
| Employed | 0.59 | 0.60 | 0.01 | 0.40 | 0.69 |
| Victim of violence | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.01 | 0.61 | 0.54 |
| Depto 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 2 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.81 |
| Depto 3 | 0.08 | 0.08 | -0.01 | 0.65 | 0.51 |
| Depto 4 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Depto 5 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.65 | 0.52 |
| Depto 6 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.66 |
| Depto 7 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 0.82 |
| Depto 8 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.36 | 0.72 |
| Depto 9 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.82 |
| Depto 10 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 0.52 |
| Depto 11 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| Depto 12 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.73 |
| Depto 13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.90 |
| Depto 14 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.88 |
| Depto 15 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.79 |
| Depto 16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 0.52 |
| Depto 18 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.73 |
| Depto 19 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 1.48 | 0.14 |
| Depto 20 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.79 |
| Depto 21 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.95 |
| Depto 22 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.72 | 0.47 |
| Depto 23 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.98 |

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Kernel weighs variables in covariate list. Means and t-test are estimated by linear regression.




Figure A.1. Kernel density before and after matching

Appendix B. Additional Data - Chapter 3

Table B.1. Gender roles at the household and community levels

| | Time difference (IDP) | | | Time difference (Non-IDP) | | |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 |
| <i>Household dynamics</i> | | | | | | |
| Female breadwinner household (%) | -8.15 (5.15) | 8.88*** (2.36) | 0.73 (5.08) | -0.18 (1.39) | -0.09 (1.40) | -0.27 (1.09) |
| Male breadwinner household (%) | 8.15 (5.15) | -8.88*** (2.36) | -0.73 (5.08) | 0.18 (1.39) | 0.09 (1.40) | 0.27 (1.09) |
| Number of hours dedicated to paid work (female) | 1.34 (1.99) | 2.62** (1.04) | 3.96** (1.96) | 3.52*** (0.58) | -1.65*** (0.60) | 1.87*** (0.45) |
| Number of hours dedicated to paid work (male) | 8.12*** (2.69) | -4.84*** (1.38) | 3.28 (2.58) | 6.98*** (0.67) | -2.91*** (0.68) | 4.06*** (0.53) |
| <i>Social and political participation</i> | | | | | | |
| Female participation in community activities (%) | 14.14*** (2.42) | -7.65*** (2.01) | 6.49*** (2.08) | 9.41*** (0.87) | -5.79*** (0.92) | 3.62*** (0.62) |
| Male participation in community activities (%) | 8.83*** (2.50) | -4.34** (1.83) | 4.49** (2.27) | 9.15*** (1.10) | -3.82*** (1.17) | 5.33*** (0.67) |
| Female participation in community activities (number) | 0.17*** (0.04) | -0.09*** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.04) | 0.14*** (0.01) | -0.09*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) |
| Male participation in community activities (number) | 0.13*** (0.03) | -0.07*** (0.03) | 0.06** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.01) |
| Female participation in a political movement (%) | 0.20 (0.65) | -0.22 (0.30) | -0.01 (0.63) | 0.31** (0.15) | -0.36** (0.15) | -0.04 (0.08) |
| Male participation in a political movement (%) | 0.37 (0.60) | -0.11 (0.43) | 0.26 (0.55) | 0.04 (0.20) | 0.22 (0.21) | 0.26 (0.23) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.2. Distribution of GRI components

| | Time difference (IDP) | | | Time difference (Non-IDP) | | |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 | 10-13 | 13-16 | 10-16 |
| <i>Hours of work</i> | | | | | | |
| Respondent works and spouse does not (or no spouse) | -4.51 (3.37) | 1.87 (1.58) | -2.64 (3.25) | -4.36*** (0.72) | 0.09 (0.67) | -4.27*** (0.68) |
| Respondent works more hours than spouse | -4.75 (4.33) | 6.32*** (1.97) | 1.56 (4.31) | 1.97 (1.46) | 0.15 (1.48) | 2.13** (0.95) |
| Respondent works the same amount as spouse | -2.79 (2.80) | -0.89 (1.08) | -3.68 (2.66) | -1.37** (0.53) | -0.46 (0.47) | -1.82*** (0.47) |
| Respondent works less hours than spouse | 12.05** (4.94) | -7.30*** (2.42) | 4.75 (4.81) | 3.76** (1.48) | 0.21 (1.47) | 3.97*** (1.09) |
| <i>Occupation</i> | | | | | | |
| Less than 26% women | 7.40* (3.89) | -1.56 (2.82) | 5.84 (3.70) | 18.08*** (1.65) | -3.48* (1.86) | 14.60*** (1.16) |
| 26 to 50% women | -6.73** (2.91) | 2.60** (1.27) | -4.13 (3.02) | -4.20** (1.91) | -1.12 (1.91) | -5.32*** (1.07) |
| 51 to 74% women | 25.01*** (6.42) | -10.38** (4.20) | 14.63** (6.16) | 0.04 (2.47) | -5.95** (2.59) | -5.91*** (1.75) |
| More than 74% women | -25.67*** (6.54) | 9.34** (3.72) | -16.33** (6.48) | -13.91*** (1.52) | 10.54*** (1.74) | -3.37** (1.61) |
| <i>Education</i> | | | | | | |
| Respondent higher level of education than spouse | -2.43 (4.62) | 3.96 (2.56) | 1.53 (4.42) | -1.18 (1.02) | -0.29 (1.08) | -1.47 (0.92) |
| Respondent same education as spouse | 6.12 (5.63) | -3.06 (3.02) | 3.05 (5.43) | 1.62 (1.41) | -0.02 (1.51) | 1.60 (1.22) |
| Respondent lower education than spouse | -3.68 (4.57) | -0.90 (2.31) | -4.58 (4.43) | -0.44 (1.15) | 0.31 (1.24) | -0.13 (1.00) |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.3. Balance test

| Weighted variable | Control | Treated | Difference | t | Pr(T > t) |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|------------|------|-------------|
| Size | 4.69 | 4.75 | 0.05 | 0.69 | 0.49 |
| Male HH | 0.92 | 0.91 | -0.01 | 0.43 | 0.67 |
| Young male | 0.37 | 0.36 | -0.01 | 0.43 | 0.67 |
| Middle age male | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.02 | 0.76 | 0.45 |
| Married head | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.75 |
| Young spouse | 0.49 | 0.48 | -0.01 | 0.38 | 0.70 |
| Middle age spouse | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.01 | 0.37 | 0.71 |
| Urban | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.02 | 0.98 | 0.33 |
| % children | 37.51 | 37.98 | 0.46 | 0.56 | 0.57 |
| % elderly | 3.02 | 2.89 | -0.13 | 0.41 | 0.68 |
| % women rep. age | 38.67 | 38.45 | -0.22 | 0.22 | 0.82 |
| HH has secondary | 0.30 | 0.29 | -0.01 | 0.34 | 0.74 |
| HH has tertiary or more | 0.05 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 1.08 | 0.28 |
| Spouse has secondary | 0.30 | 0.29 | -0.01 | 0.34 | 0.74 |
| Spouse has tertiary or more | 0.05 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 1.08 | 0.28 |
| Employed HH | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.84 |
| Exposed to violence | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.01 | 0.48 | 0.63 |
| Depto 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 2 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.61 |
| Depto 3 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.61 | 0.54 |
| Depto 4 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.28 | 0.78 |
| Depto 5 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.64 | 0.52 |
| Depto 6 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.77 |
| Depto 7 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.01 | 0.81 | 0.42 |
| Depto 8 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.82 | 0.41 |
| Depto 9 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.94 |
| Depto 10 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 1.18 | 0.24 |
| Depto 11 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.72 | 0.47 |
| Depto 12 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.82 |
| Depto 13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.34 | 0.73 |
| Depto 14 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.57 | 0.57 |
| Depto 15 | 0.11 | 0.10 | -0.01 | 0.89 | 0.37 |
| Depto 16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.95 |
| Depto 18 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.43 | 0.67 |
| Depto 19 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.54 | 0.59 |
| Depto 20 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.60 |
| Depto 21 | 0.09 | 0.08 | -0.01 | 0.70 | 0.49 |
| Depto 22 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.46 | 0.64 |
| Depto 23 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.61 |

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Depto stands for Department.




Figure B.1. Kernel density before and after matching

Table B.4. Balance test for Gender Roles Index

| Weighted variable | Control | Treated | Difference | t | Pr(T > t) |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|------------|------|-------------|
| Size | 4.66 | 4.74 | 0.07 | 0.86 | 0.39 |
| Male HH | 0.91 | 0.91 | -0.01 | 0.39 | 0.70 |
| Young male | 0.37 | 0.36 | -0.01 | 0.47 | 0.64 |
| Middle age male | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.02 | 0.75 | 0.45 |
| Married head | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Young spouse | 0.49 | 0.48 | -0.01 | 0.39 | 0.70 |
| Middle age spouse | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.01 | 0.37 | 0.71 |
| Urban | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.02 | 0.96 | 0.34 |
| % children | 37.47 | 38.17 | 0.70 | 0.81 | 0.42 |
| % elderly | 2.78 | 2.65 | -0.13 | 0.42 | 0.68 |
| % women rep. age | 39.63 | 39.15 | -0.48 | 0.44 | 0.66 |
| HH has secondary | 0.33 | 0.32 | -0.01 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| HH has tertiary or more | 0.05 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 1.04 | 0.30 |
| Spouse has secondary | 0.33 | 0.32 | -0.01 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| Spouse has tertiary or more | 0.05 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 1.04 | 0.30 |
| Employed HH | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.96 |
| Exposed to violence | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.01 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| Depto 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 2 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.99 |
| Depto 3 | 0.08 | 0.07 | -0.01 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| Depto 4 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.88 |
| Depto 5 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.43 | 0.67 |
| Depto 6 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.84 |
| Depto 7 | 0.13 | 0.12 | -0.01 | 0.38 | 0.71 |
| Depto 8 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.75 |
| Depto 9 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.89 |
| Depto 10 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.55 |
| Depto 11 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.75 | 0.45 |
| Depto 12 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 0.83 |
| Depto 13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.71 |
| Depto 14 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.89 |
| Depto 15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.80 |
| Depto 16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.34 | 0.74 |
| Depto 18 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 19 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 1.11 | 0.27 |
| Depto 20 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.88 |
| Depto 21 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.95 |
| Depto 22 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.48 | 0.63 |
| Depto 23 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.80 |

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Depto stands for Department.




Figure B.2. Kernel density before and after matching

Table B.5. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles at the household level

| Variable | 2010-2013 | | | 2013-2016 | | |
|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | Female breadwinners | Hours worked (female) | Hours worked (male) | Female breadwinners | Hours worked (female) | Hours worked (male) |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Time | 0.04*** (0.01) | 3.18*** (0.57) | 8.33*** (0.68) | 0.07 (0.05) | 1.34 (2.29) | -9.75*** (2.81) |
| Displaced | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.34 (0.89) | 0.55 (1.19) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.34 (1.69) | -2.05 (2.22) |
| DID | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.14 (1.21) | -3.26** (1.50) | 0.05 (0.06) | 1.33 (2.50) | 0.71 (3.02) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Obs | 13,443 | 13,443 | 13,443 | 12,470 | 12,470 | 12,443 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 |

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimations for 2010-2013. Columns (4)-(6) show the estimations for 2013-2016. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.6. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles index

| Variable | 2010-2013 | | | | 2013-2016 | | | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| | Works more than partner (1) | Male-dom. sector (2) | More education than partner (3) | GRI (4) | Works more than partner (5) | Male-dom. sector (6) | More education than partner (7) | GRI (8) |
| Time | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) | -0.25*** (0.09) | 0.21* (0.12) | -0.01 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.09) | -0.36 (0.27) |
| Displaced | -0.04 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.03) | 0.30*** (0.10) | 0.02 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.06) | -0.09 (0.18) |
| DID | 0.09* (0.05) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.06) | -0.32* (0.17) | -0.04 (0.12) | -0.05 (0.06) | -0.03 (0.10) | 0.04 (0.31) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 3,853 | 4,061 | 2,588 | 4,061 | 3,687 | 3,683 | 3,681 | 3,681 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.01 |

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1)-(4) present the estimations for 2010-2013. Columns (5)-(8) present the estimations for 2013-2016.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.7. PSM-DID estimates of displacement on gender roles, community level

| Variable | 2010-2013 | | | | | | 2013-2016 | | | | | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| | Social or political participation | | Number of organizations | | Political participation | | Social or political participation | | Number of organizations | | Political participation | |
| | Female (1) | Male (2) | Female (3) | Male (4) | Female (5) | Male (6) | Female (7) | Male (8) | Female (9) | Male (10) | Female (11) | Male (12) |
| Time | 0.01 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.08) | 0.02 (0.08) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.06*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.06*** (0.01) | -0.00* (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Displaced | 0.05** (0.02) | -0.02 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| DID | -0.08* (0.05) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.12 (0.08) | -0.10 (0.08) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 12,291 | 12,318 | 12,294 | 12,308 | 13,289 | 13,291 | 12,301 | 12,294 | 12,276 | 12,300 | 12,278 | 12,293 |
| R-squared | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimations for 2010-2013. Columns (4)-(6) present the estimations for 2013-2016. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix C. Additional Data - Chapter 4




Figure C.1. Share of labor in total income, by geographic area




Figure C.2. Share of labor in total income, by displacement status

Table C.1. Components of wealth index

| Assets | Living conditions |
|---|--|
| Household owns more than one of these assets: <i>TV, radio, video equipment, oven, washing machine, microwave, car, motorcycle, bicycle, air conditioning, shower, telephone, blender, refrigerator.</i> | <i>Sanitation:</i> Household has improved sanitation facility. |
| <i>Housing:</i> Household owns a house | <i>Drinking water:</i> Household's source of drinking water is safe. |
| <i>Land:</i> Household owns land | <i>Piped water:</i> Household has access to on-site piped water. <i>Electricity:</i> Household has electricity. <i>Cooking fuel:</i> Household cooks with piped was or electricity. It does not use solid fuel (such as dung, shrubs, wood, charcoal, or coal). <i>Flooring:</i> Household has adequate housing materials in the floor. <i>Walls:</i> Household has adequate materials in the walls. |

Table C.2. Proxies for household structures

| Variable | Definition |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Female-headed | Household with a woman head |
| Male-headed | Household with a man head |
| Single caregiver household | Household comprised of a single male or female adult and dependents |
| Adult couple with children | Adult couple (ages 18 or older) of opposite sex with children and no additional members |
| Adult couple without children | Adult couple without children and no additional members. Includes one-person households or those with a single adult member. |
| Multigeneration with children | Household comprised of multiple generations with children excluding nuclear arrangements. This includes uncles, aunts, grandparents, etc. |
| Multigeneration without children | Household comprised of multiple generations without children |

Note: Adult is defined as an individual age 18 and older. Dependents are individuals under the age of 18 or above 64. Children are defined as individuals of age 5 and below.

Table C.3. Balance test, 2010-2013

| Weighted Variable(s) | Control | Treated | Diff. | t | Pr(T > t) |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|-------|------|-------------|
| Female head | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.95 |
| Size | 4.54 | 4.59 | 0.05 | 0.70 | 0.48 |
| Youth | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.02 | 1.28 | 0.20 |
| Mid-age | 0.52 | 0.51 | -0.01 | 0.49 | 0.62 |
| HH divorced | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.95 |
| HH widowed | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.89 |
| HH single | 0.07 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 1.05 | 0.29 |
| Urban | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.84 |
| Share children | 36.60 | 37.50 | 0.90 | 1.09 | 0.28 |
| Share elderly | 4.45 | 4.07 | -0.38 | 0.94 | 0.35 |
| Share women of rep. age | 0.62 | 0.64 | 0.02 | 1.02 | 0.31 |
| HH secondary | 0.34 | 0.33 | -0.01 | 0.44 | 0.66 |
| HH tertiary or more | 0.07 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.73 | 0.46 |
| HH employed | 0.60 | 0.61 | 0.01 | 0.64 | 0.52 |
| Exposed to violence | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.37 | 0.71 |
| Depto 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 2 | 0.05 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.63 | 0.53 |
| Depto 3 | 0.09 | 0.08 | -0.01 | 0.79 | 0.43 |
| Depto 4 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.86 |
| Depto 5 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.89 | 0.37 |
| Depto 6 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.71 |
| Depto 7 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.85 | 0.39 |
| Depto 8 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.73 | 0.47 |
| Depto 9 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.96 |
| Depto 10 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.55 |
| Depto 11 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.43 | 0.67 |
| Depto 12 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.96 |
| Depto 13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.80 |
| Depto 14 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.36 | 0.72 |
| Depto 15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.89 |
| Depto 16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.81 |
| Depto 18 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.28 | 0.78 |
| Depto 19 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 1.45 | 0.15 |
| Depto 20 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.73 |
| Depto 21 | 0.08 | 0.07 | -0.01 | 0.62 | 0.53 |
| Depto 22 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.46 | 0.65 |
| Depto 23 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.68 |

Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1




Figure C.3. Kernel density before and after matching

Table C.4. Balance test, 2010-2016

| Weighted Variable(s) | Control | Treated | Diff. | t | Pr(T > t) |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|-------|------|-------------|
| Female head | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.84 |
| Size | 4.58 | 4.63 | 0.05 | 0.78 | 0.43 |
| Youth | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.01 | 0.95 | 0.34 |
| Mid-age | 0.52 | 0.52 | -0.01 | 0.36 | 0.72 |
| HH divorced | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.94 |
| HH widowed | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.87 |
| HH single | 0.07 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.67 | 0.50 |
| Urban | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 0.77 |
| Share children | 37.09 | 37.58 | 0.49 | 0.73 | 0.47 |
| Share elderly | 4.74 | 4.56 | -0.18 | 0.48 | 0.63 |
| Share women of rep. age | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.01 | 0.73 | 0.47 |
| HH secondary | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.90 |
| HH tertiary or more | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.43 | 0.67 |
| HH employed | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.01 | 0.60 | 0.55 |
| Exposure to violence | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.01 | 0.41 | 0.68 |
| Depto 1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 2 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.79 |
| Depto 3 | 0.09 | 0.09 | -0.01 | 0.52 | 0.60 |
| Depto 4 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.80 |
| Depto 5 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.54 | 0.59 |
| Depto 6 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.76 |
| Depto 7 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.53 | 0.59 |
| Depto 8 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.76 | 0.45 |
| Depto 9 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.86 |
| Depto 10 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.69 |
| Depto 11 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.81 |
| Depto 12 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.94 |
| Depto 13 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.82 |
| Depto 14 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.49 | 0.63 |
| Depto 15 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.76 |
| Depto 16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | . | . |
| Depto 17 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 1.00 |
| Depto 18 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.80 |
| Depto 19 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.81 | 0.42 |
| Depto 20 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.46 | 0.65 |
| Depto 21 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.45 | 0.65 |
| Depto 22 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.86 |
| Depto 23 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.83 |

Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1

Figure C.4. Kernel density before and after matching

Appendix D. Additional Data - Chapter 5

Table D.1. Balance test, 2005

| Variable | Unmatched | | | | Matched (common support) | | | |
|---|-----------|---------|--------|---------|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|
| | Treated | Control | % bias | P-value | Treated | Control | % bias | P-value |
| Age (<i>base: age 35-49</i>) | | | | | | | | |
| Age: 15-17 | 0.11 | 0.11 | -0.20 | 0.96 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.20 | 0.20 | -0.30 | 0.95 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 7.60 | 0.05 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| Years of education | 6.87 | 8.20 | -34.10 | 0.00 | 6.87 | 6.87 | 0 | 1 |
| Marital status (<i>base: single</i>) | | | | | | | | |
| Married | 0.51 | 0.48 | 6.30 | 0.12 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0 | 1 |
| Widow | 0.04 | 0.02 | 13.70 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0 | 1 |
| Separated or divorced | 0.13 | 0.11 | 3.90 | 0.32 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0 | 1 |
| Geographic area | | | | | | | | |
| Urban | 0.83 | 0.77 | 15.70 | 0.00 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0 | 1 |
| Massacres in t-1 or t-2 (origin) | 0.25 | 0.39 | -29.10 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 |

Note: Figures are in percentages (%) or as indicated. The p-values are for the two-sample t-test with equal variances (H_0 : Difference in means =0 and H_a : Difference in means $\neq 0$). Variables capturing household size and composition are omitted from the matching because they are likely to be affected treatment.




Figure D.1. Kernel density before and after matching, 2005

Table D.2. Balance test, 2010

| Variable | Unmatched | | | | Matched (common support) | | | |
|---|-----------|---------|--------|---------|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|
| | Treated | Control | % bias | P-value | Treated | Control | % bias | P-value |
| Age (<i>base: age 35-49</i>) | | | | | | | | |
| Age: 15-17 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 5.20 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 5.90 | 0.06 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 3.00 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| Years of education | 6.57 | 8.61 | -53.60 | 0.00 | 6.59 | 6.59 | 0 | 1 |
| Marital status (<i>base: single</i>) | | | | | | | | |
| Married | 0.51 | 0.51 | 2.00 | 0.53 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0 | 1 |
| Widow | 0.02 | 0.02 | 4.40 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0 | 1 |
| Separated or divorced | 0.13 | 0.11 | 5.50 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0 | 1 |
| Geographic area | | | | | | | | |
| Urban | 0.75 | 0.73 | 4.10 | 0.20 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0 | 1 |
| Massacres in t-1 or t-2 (origin) | 0.84 | 0.29 | 130.90 | 0.00 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0 | 1 |

Note: Figures are in percentages (%) or as indicated. The p-values are for the two-sample t-test with equal variances (Ho: Difference in means =0 and Ha: Difference in means \neq 0). Variables capturing household size and composition are omitted from the matching because they are likely to be affected treatment.




Figure D.2. Kernel density graph before and after matching, 2010

Table D.3. Balance test, 2015

| Variable | Unmatched | | | | Matched (common support) | | | |
|---|-----------|---------|--------|---------|--------------------------|---------|--------|---------|
| | Treated | Control | % bias | P-value | Treated | Control | % bias | P-value |
| Age (<i>base: age 35-49</i>) | | | | | | | | |
| Age: 15-17 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 3.00 | 0.51 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.22 | 0.20 | 4.70 | 0.30 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 2.10 | 0.64 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | | | | | | | | |
| Years of education | 8.21 | 9.18 | -26.00 | 0.00 | 8.24 | 8.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Marital status (<i>base: single</i>) | | | | | | | | |
| Married | 0.52 | 0.50 | 3.60 | 0.44 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0 | 1 |
| Widow | 0.02 | 0.01 | 2.60 | 0.55 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0 | 1 |
| Separated or divorced | 0.16 | 0.11 | 14.80 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0 | 1 |
| Geographic area | | | | | | | | |
| Urban | 0.82 | 0.75 | 18.00 | 0.00 | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0 | 1 |
| Massacres in t-1 or t-2 (origin) | 0.84 | 0.22 | 159.70 | 0.00 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0 | 1 |

Note: Figures are in percentages (%) or as indicated. The p-values are for the two-sample t-test with equal variances (H_0 : Difference in means = 0 and H_a : Difference in means $\neq 0$). Variables capturing household size and composition are omitted from the matching because they are likely to be affected treatment.




Figure D.3. Kernel density before and after matching, 2015

Appendix E. Summary of the Dissertation

The UNHCR estimates that nearly 80 million people were forced to flee their homes worldwide by the end of 2019 as a result of conflict, violence, persecution and human rights violations. Among them, 26 million were refugees, 4.6 million were asylum seekers, and 45.7 million were displaced within their own countries. The IDP population in Colombia, the setting of this dissertation, is the second largest in the world, with government estimates varying from 5 to 6 million people. The underlying causes of displacement in Colombia include armed conflict, illicit drugs, land disputes, weak institutions, poverty and inequality, but violence is most frequently the main reason for people to flee their homes.

Many reports suggest that, because of the prescribed roles and power relations in society, the experience of and response to displacement is delineated along the gender lines. Displaced women and men, girls and boys often acquire vulnerabilities that are specific to them, such as psychological trauma, exposure to GBV, and catastrophic losses of physical and human capital. These vulnerabilities set them apart from non-displaced populations and affect their ability to seize opportunities. However, partly due to the lack of data, few empirical studies in the growing field of research on the effects of conflict-induced displacement consider gender-specific effects.

This study contributes to the literature by applying a gender lens to the empirical analysis of the impacts of conflict-induced displacement. The analyses presented in each chapter employ a quasi-experimental research design and large-scale household surveys that capture a sample of displaced households. The studies included in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 use three waves of the Colombian Longitudinal Survey (2010-2016) and a kernel-based propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of displacement on household structures, gender roles, and poverty. The research in Chapter 5 employs three rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) collected between 2005 and 2015, a municipal panel on conflict, violence and public finances and a two-stage estimation involving kernel-based propensity score matching and multilevel models to examine the extent to which gender norms become less traditional in situations of displacement.

The dissertation shows that between 2010 and 2016, conflict-induced displacement in Colombia accelerated reductions in the average household size and increased the prevalence of non-traditional structures such as *de jure* female-headed households, households with single female caregivers, and one-person households. Some of these changes appear to be driven by marital dissolutions or separations resulting

from tensions associated with changes in traditional gender roles within the household. Compared with their non-IDP counterparts, displaced women work more hours than their male partners and they are also more likely to be the main breadwinners in their households. When it comes to gender roles at the community level, estimates show a slight increase in the probability that women who were displaced would participate in political activism, compared to women who were not displaced by conflict. In contrast men's engagement in these activities remains unaltered and their overall participation in civic organizations decreases with displacement.

The findings in the dissertation also indicate that displaced households are characterized by higher poverty rates and lower levels of wealth relative to their non-displaced counterparts. However, over time, the likelihood of being poor decreases more rapidly among households in the panel that were forced to flee due to conflict. While the analysis of transmission mechanisms goes beyond the scope of the study, some of the potential reasons behind these patterns include a 'catch-up' effect, as many of the households that were displaced between survey rounds were already poor when they joined the panel; a consequence of changing household structures, or an improved access to social assistance. Despite the decrease in overall poverty rates, a large share of the displaced remains chronically poor or vulnerable to poverty; in particular, households that changed their structure, either becoming households with single caregivers or consisting of multiple generations with children.

These dynamics suggest that, even though displacement is one of the worst victimizations of civilians, it can also offer opportunities to break with traditional stereotypes and challenge gender norms around the appropriate role of women and men in society. Nevertheless, the findings in this dissertation reveal mixed evidence regarding the norm change. Specifically, gender norms that tolerate violence against women become less traditional in the context of displacement, while those that limit women's economic opportunities become more rigid. This is consistent with previous studies suggesting that loss of financial stability, psychological trauma and stress associated with displacement can increase men's controlling behaviors, particularly when they face unemployment while women pursue income-generating activities to support their families—as is the case of Colombia. Furthermore, these findings highlight the importance of looking at gender norms across a number of domains as change can be contradictory and improvements in one area do not imply that all others will automatically follow, as illustrated by the dissonance between violence against women and economic opportunities in this study.

This dissertation adds to the existing literature on several levels. First, from a methodological standpoint, it brings together various academic disciplines, namely studies on conflict, voluntary migration, and economic shocks, as well as the literature of feminist economics and social norms to analyze the gendered effects of conflict-induced displacement, a subject that remains under-researched in the empirical literature. Second, building on these different strands of the literature, the dissertation adapts the existing approaches that go beyond the traditional headship comparison to analyze the gender dimensions of displacement.

The studies presented in each chapter also make specific contributions to the literature. Chapter 2 exhibits the first study to empirically estimate the impact of conflict-induced displacement on household structures using longitudinal data, while exploring the role of marital separations as one of the mechanisms of transmission underlying these changes. The research in Chapter 3 expands the level of analysis from a unitary approach to the household to consider the changes in intra-household dynamics resulting from displacement. It explores gender differences in household- and community-level activities and adapts a composite index of gender roles in the labor market for the displaced taking advantage of limited survey data. The study in Chapter 4 adds to the literature by exploiting the nature of longitudinal data to examine changes in the likelihood of escaping poverty over time and to better understand the risk of experiencing transient and permanent poverty in situations of displacement. Furthermore, it is the first study with IDPs in Colombia that applies a gender lens to the data to capture the intersection between changes in household structures and poverty dynamics. Finally, the research described in Chapter 5 contributes to the literature in two main areas. First, it provides empirical evidence regarding the relationship between conflict-induced displacement and changes in gender norms, an area where most of the evidence comes from qualitative research. Second, it is the first study that operationalizes a definition that recognizes the dual nature of gender norms using a nationally representative household survey in the context of conflict-induced displacement.

From the policy perspective, the dissertation stresses the importance of including displaced women and men in efforts to collect and rigorously analyze data, particularly in the context of protracted conflict and large-scale displacement. When it comes to development programming, in the short term, cash transfers and other instruments of social protection can reach households that are highly vulnerable to poverty such as households with single caregivers and households consisting of multiple generations with children. Moreover, regular income received via cash transfers can reduce anxiety and improve the psychological wellbeing of displaced populations thereby decreasing men's controlling behaviors and the risk of domestic violence. However, given that the displacement situation in Colombia is long term

for many people, it is important to build capacity for both displaced women and men to access economic opportunities, which can eventually replace social assistance. Importantly, the findings of this dissertation show that, in situations of displacement, paid work does not necessarily translate into increased decision-making power for women. Hence, providing access to economic opportunities is not a guarantee that durable solutions to displacement will be found and that gender gaps will be reduced if men have full control of gains, as determined by patriarchal norms. Economic empowerment programs for displaced women should thus have built-in guidelines for the protection of women and should engage men in promoting more gender-equitable relationships.

Appendix F. About the Author

Eliana Rubiano-Matulevich was born on June 13, 1984 in Girardot, Colombia. She obtained a B.Sc. in Economics from Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia. After completing her undergraduate studies, she obtained a M.Sc. in Economics from the same institution in 2009, and a Master of Public Administration (MPA) at Columbia University in the City of New York, United States, in 2012. In November 2018, Eliana joined the Dual Career Ph.D. in Governance and Policy Analysis (GPAC²) at Maastricht University.

As a development professional, Eliana has more than 15 years of experience working on education, poverty reduction, gender equality, and more recently, conflict-induced displacement. She first joined the World Bank in 2006 as a consultant working for the Office of the Chief Economist for the Latin America and the Caribbean Region. Between 2008 and 2010, Eliana was a Junior Professional for the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. She also held positions at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); FEDESARROLLO, the largest think tank in Colombia; and at the Central Bank of Colombia. She has worked in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, South Asia, and in the Middle East. Currently, Eliana is an Economist with the Poverty and Equity Global Practice and serves as the Regional Gender Coordinator for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Eliana lives in Washington D.C., United States, with her husband and two children. Her research focuses on conflict-induced displacement and development, gender equality, and poverty. She speaks Spanish, English, and French.

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