

Strategy-proof location of public bads

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STELLINGEN

TO ACCOMPANY THE DISSERTATION

OF

ABHINABA LAHIRI

1. Under myopic preferences, without non-corruptibility or the far-away condition, inner solutions are possible in a two country model.
(Chapter 2)
2. Indifferences in lexicographic preferences makes the description of the class of rules technically complex.
(Chapter 3)
3. Unanimous and strategy-proof rules may select inner points while locating two public bads on a line. This is not the case for locating one public bad on a line.
(Chapter 4)
4. In the model with one public facility; good for some agents and bad for the remaining agents, we have almost dictatorial results. These results are true for two agents. Extending these rules to n agents results into more possibilities.
(Chapter 5)
5. A social choice theorist tries to figure out how to aggregate individual preferences to come up with a social order while imposing some properties on the aggregation procedure.
6. For dealing with a complex domain of preference profiles, creating specific examples helps to characterise the class of rules.
7. A language is a tool to communicate. Mathematics is also a language that enables to communicate in a precise, abstract and elegant way.
8. For implementing the rules described in this thesis, especially the ones in chapter 2, in a real world scenario, the implementing authority, first, must be convinced that the properties assumed here are essential.