How “black” is the black sheep compared to all others? 
Turkey and the EU

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June 2006
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Abstract

In this paper we question the validity of the arguments against Turkey’s membership of the EU and challenge the political wisdom of excluding Turkey from Europe. First, we argue that fundamental European values are not as uniform as they are made out to be. There are significant differences among the member states and the different European regions on basic values relating to religion and democracy. Second, we argue that many of Turkey’s supposed cultural differences with the rest of Europe are in fact unsubstantiated. We support our arguments by analyzing widely available macroeconomic evidence and the data from the European Values Study, 1999 (EVS99).

Keywords: Turkey, EU, Institutions, Institutional Analysis, Values, EVS

JEL codes: A13, Z12, Z13

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Admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide undeniable proof the
Europe is not a closed ‘Christian Club’. It would confirm the Union’s nature as an
inclusive and tolerant society, drawing strength from its diversity and bound together by
common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights
… Turkish membership would further give evidence of the compatibility of Islam and

1. Introduction

The events following the publication of different caricatures of the prophet
Mohammad, first in Denmark and later in a number of EU and non-EU countries,
prove once again that conscious and conscientious efforts need to be made to heal a
seemingly deep wound felt by many in the Islamic world. The wound, most pundits
would agree, is the product of deeply felt cultural, socio-economic, and political
differences between the industrialized democracies and the less industrialized countries
that are home to the world’s vast majority of Muslims and a most precious resource:
oil. According to Eric Rouleau, France’s ambassador to Turkey from 1988 to 1992,
because Turkey borders the oil fields of the Middle East, the Turkic republics of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, and is linked through its Ottoman past to the Balkans, it has
huge potential to play a stabilizing role in a turbulent region (Rouleau 2000: 101) – and
ensure the steady flow of oil and gas to the industrialized countries of Europe and
beyond.

Based on the available macroeconomic and other evidence we wish to advance the
argument that getting passed the near-stalemate in negotiations over Turkey’s
membership of the EU needs to be more explicitly based on recognition of the key role
played by formal and informal institutions in structuring the modes of governance in
and between Islamic and non-Islamic nation states. This recognition does not imply
acceptance or rejection of certain religion-related core values that for long have
governed and given identity to each and every one of these nation states. We view such
recognition as the first step toward seeking solutions that work through and build on,
rather than dismiss, the institutions through which governance is exercised. Working
through institutions entails embracing some institutions in both camps as legitimate
while recognizing that others need to be counter-balanced in the short term through
economic and other incentives and neutralized in the long term through development
programmes and macroeconomic policy with a potential to pave the way for the
formation of desirable institutions in a (still) emerging market economy such as
Turkey’s. Our premise is that Turkey’s membership of the EU will boost Turkey’s
capacity to strengthen its institutional ties with the EU through increased cooperation
in social and economic policy making. Such cooperation offers an important opportunity to start a process of understanding and healing to thwart a potentially serious cultural divide along religious lines with quite significant global implications.

In this paper we focus on the relations between Turkey, an overwhelmingly Muslim nation state, and the European Union, an overwhelmingly Christian community of nations. We begin with an historical overview of the relations between Turkey and the European Union to highlight some of the pertinent facts that underlie our analysis. The arguments for and against Turkey’s membership into the EU are examined to illustrate the latest mood in the debate on the question and to separate some of the real concerns from rhetoric. The macroeconomics context is examined to highlight the degree of economic integration between Turkey and the EU, followed by two types of analysis. We carry out an institutional analysis by applying Parto’s (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) typology of institutions to the available data from secondary sources followed by an analysis of the primary data from the European Values Study, 1999 (EVS99). We show that the differences between Turkey and the EU are based more on (mis)perception rather than empirical evidence.

We find extensive support for the argument that the social and cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are largely exaggerated and unsupported by empirical evidence. Our analysis clearly shows that basic values related to religion and democracy, two cornerstones in many of the arguments against Turkey’s membership, differ greatly among the EU members and the wider European regions with this heterogeneity increasing in the EU25 as compared to EU15. A striking finding is that introducing Turkey to the analysis of the heterogeneity does not alter the main patterns of diversity. In most of the cases Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and maximum values for the EU25 as a whole: we find that Turkey’s scores on questions assessing religion/religious values and democracy as a political system fit well within the minimum and maximum values for the EU25. We conclude that the more significant differences between Turkey and the EU25 are of an economic and political nature and, as such, could only be addressed through increased integration of Turkey into Europe through formal and equitable membership, rather than pressures that could lead to Turkey’s isolation. Put differently, further work to bring Turkey into the EU’s fold can only be done through institutional capacity building with EU support in Turkey and within the EU based on full recognition of diversity and in pursuit of a multi-demoninational multi-culturalism.

2 Although EU25 states are all traditionally Christian, we use “overwhelmingly” here to acknowledge the small but growing non-Christian populations in the European Community as a whole. By the same token, although Turkey is officially secular, traditionally it is a country with an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Also, there is a significant difference between the laicism of Turkey and that of France as the role model: in France the state does not interfere with the affairs of the church whereas in Turkey the state “in practice, still exercises a strong control over religion” (WRR 2004: 52).
2. Historical and Institutional Context

Turkey’s wish to join Europe goes back over fifty years in modern times (see Table 1 for details) and has its roots in the sixteenth century when the Ottoman Empire under Süleyman the Magnificent was a major power to contend with. By the late nineteenth century the Empire had been reduced to a shadow of its former glory and earned the title “the sick man of Europe”. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) proclaimed the Turkish Republic as a secular nation state, one of whose first acts of modernization was to abolish the caliphate and replace it with legislative and other formal state institutions modeled after the French. The new state was formally committed to liberation of women, abolition of religious symbols, and a strong centralized state apparatus. After the Second World War the global power relations began to shift in favour of the United States as the strongest world power. Turkey willingly changed allegiances and became an ally of the United States in the fight to hold back Soviet influence and secure access to the rich oilfields of the Middle East. In 1949 Turkey joined the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a member.

During the 1950s Turkey served as the main source of labour for Western Europe’s expanding economies, particularly Germany’s. There are now second and third generation Turks in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium who call these countries home while maintaining strong cultural ties to Turkey and being Turkish. For many Turks membership in the EU is a natural step along the trajectory of becoming more and more integrated into Europe, economically, politically, and culturally. This expectation seems to have been stymied by the events following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of the Eastern Bloc. Since the early 1990s, Western Europe seems to have shifted its focus away from Turkey as a prospective EU member to Eastern Bloc countries, some of which became EU members in 2005.

Post-Soviet political change in Europe in the 1990s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and other regions culminating in the attack on the World Trade Center Towers on September 11, 2001, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and increased anxiety about the large number of Muslims in Western Europe are some of the key factors that have redefined the parameters of the discourse on Turkey’s membership into the EU. Other issues include the banning of the Islamic headcover for women in French schools, the politically motivated murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by a Muslim extremist, and the anti-Danish and anti-European demonstrations in Islamic countries following the printing of caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in Denmark and other European countries. There are those, like Valérie Giscard d’Estaing of France, Helmut Kohl of Germany, and Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel of Austria who have openly opposed Turkey’s membership or called for a special status arrangement – the so-called “privileged partnership”– between the EU and Turkey. The opposition is based in part on the premise that the
Muslim immigrants have not integrated well into the European way of life and thus are a threat to social cohesion in smaller countries like Denmark and the Netherlands. Another major issue is the prospect of a significant increase in the number of Muslims in formal European institutions if Turkey, with a population of 72 million, becomes a member of the EU.

Others reason that “a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-faith Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind...Europe could play an inestimable role in future relations between the ‘West’ and the Islamic world” (RICT, 2004: 16). This view is shared by the Bush Administration in the United States and the Blair government in the United Kingdom, who have pointed out that excluding Turkey from Europe may aggravate the already uneasy relations with Islamic nation states including Turkey. According to Wallerstein (2004), barring Turkey from European Union membership increases the likelihood that the moderately Islamic and pro-Europe government of Turkey might give way to a less moderate regime and something that would rebound on Europe significantly. Indeed, despite the reservations expressed by some EU members, the official view of the EU is consistent with this line of reasoning:

“If Turkish hopes [of EU membership] are disappointed, and advance of ultranationalist as well as Islamist currents should be expected and a revival of violence in the Kurdish populated regions would be likely leading to increased instability and the return of the military establishment to a more assertive role” (RICT, 2004: 22).

The Turkish government has taken a series of measures to counter the arguments against its membership. One such measure is the publication in 2000 of the results from a survey conducted by TESEV, Turkey’s leading think-tank. A key finding of the survey is that the secular system of government in Turkey has the overwhelming support of the Turkish people. While the majority of those surveyed considered themselves as devout Muslims, they also believed that religion should not interfere with political life (RICT, 2004: 28). This conclusion is consistent with our findings, based on an analysis of the EVS99, reported later in this paper. Before turning to our analysis of the EVS99 data, however, we wish to summarize the arguments for and against Turkey’s membership of the EU and contextualize them in the widely available macroeconomic data to carry out a preliminary institutional analysis.

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3 It is not a coincidence that of late these two countries have some of the most draconian anti-immigration laws in Europe. That many second and third generation immigrants still see themselves and are generally treated as “the other” is testament to the inadequacies in policies and programmes to institutionalize multi-culturalism in these countries.

4 Another related concern is the projected financial burden imposed on the EU by the much poorer Turkey. However, in EU’s official assessment, these projections “have been based on current EU policies and the present performance of the Turkish economy, ...[and] are...highly speculative” (RICT, 2004: 25-26).
2.1 The Case for Turkey’s Membership

Turkey has come to be considered one of the world’s ten most promising emerging markets by the U.S. government (Rouleau, 2000: 101). The economic structure is market-based and liberalized, in line with the current trends in the overwhelming majority of the industrialized countries. Turkey’s political structure is compatible with the European parliamentary systems. In addition, there is a high degree of integration between the Turkish and EU economies. For example, around 50% of all imports into Turkey in the past ten years have come from EU countries. This figure stands at 60% with all European countries. Approximately 55% of Turkey’s exports are destined for EU countries and about 65% to European countries. There are numerous joint ventures, notably in the automotive sector. Fiat-Tofas founded in the 1970s is one of the largest automotive producers in Turkey. Other joint ventures include the Renault-Oyak, Toyota-Sabanci, and Ford-Otosan operations.

Figure 1

Share of EU-25 in Turkey’s trade and FDI

For a detailed analysis of Turkey-EU economic relations with a special attention on customs union, see Togan (2000, 2004). All the figures in this section are calculated from original data available from Turkish Statistical Institute and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. Summary tables are available from the authors upon request.
More than 60% of foreign owned companies operating in Turkey are European companies. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from European firms stands at roughly 60% of the total FDI received while Turkish FDI is clearly directed towards EU and other European countries: 53% of total Turkish FDI in the last 25 years has been invested in EU countries while the figure for Europe as a whole stands at about 60%. In monetary terms the share of FDI in Turkey by EU countries has doubled from 1986 to 2002, reaching 65% of all FDI Turkey received in the period 1986-2002. In 2004 around 78% of total FDI inflows into Turkey originated from EU Member States. Finally, and most importantly, Turkey is the only non-member state of the European Customs Union and recently has been described as a “functioning market economy” for the first time.

2.2 The Case against Turkey’s Membership

Cultural differences are played up by both Europeans and Turks opposed to Turkey’s membership. Religious fundamentalists in Turkey promote the view that Turkish Islamic culture would decline under pressure from the non-Muslim Europe. The ultra-Nationalists in Turkey play on the insecurity of Turks about their national identity and threats to its stability. Dissolution of a Turkish state is feared as a possible consequence of complying with the EU vision and rules about minority rights and the need for a more inclusive mode of governance that gives stronger voice to national ethnic and religious minorities, many of whom have historical misgivings about the Turkish Republic and its origins. Recently the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) changed its policy towards the EU and Turkey’s membership by arguing that neither Turkey nor the EU would benefit from Turkey’s membership. The ultra-left and the Communist Party of Turkey argue that the EU is nothing more than an instrument that rapidly integrates Turkey into world capitalism and the global market.

Khan (2005) argues that anti-Islamic sentiments in Europe strengthen anti-EU sentiments in Turkey which might play a significant role in undermining the accession talks:

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7 ibid, p. 54.
8 For different views of Turkish public see the article by Adnan Khan in Maclean’s published on 17.10.2005 titled “Pride and Prejudice”.
9 In a newspaper interview MHP’s leader Devlet Bahceli argues that Turkey should rethink EU membership as he views the negotiations as a “tactical distraction period” that would undermine Turkey’s current position. From Yeni Safak online accessed on 16.12.2005 http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/agustos/09/p05.html
“The more Turkey's culture is criticized by voices in Europe, the tighter Turks may pull the blanket of national and cultural identity around themselves. Ultimately, the real danger to Turkey's bid for EU membership may not lie in the difficult negotiations ahead in Luxembourg, but among those Turks who believe they will never really be accepted in the EU club – and who say good riddance.”  

There is a strong sentiment among many Turkish intellectuals (and a large proportion of the public) that the EU-Turkey relations are not based on reciprocity and shared interests. The EU is said to be benefiting more than Turkey from these relations with no demonstrated willingness to help Turkey with some of its many worries about national security and economic stability. Emre Kongar, a well-known Turkish intellectual, states that the EU would stand to benefit the most from the accession talks since the talks are largely focused on what Turkey should do in terms of reforms to meet the EU’s approval without the EU making any commitments to help Turkey in seeing to its domestic priorities including potential ethnic strife, Cyprus, and the diplomatic chasms with Greece. There are several underlying and inter-related reasons for this view.

Turkey’s application for full-membership in 1987 was rejected on the grounds that Turkey was not as yet a sufficiently developed economy. The EU recommended that Turkey should put efforts into increased economic integration with Europe, suggesting that Turkey enter a Customs Union agreement with the EU as a pre-requisite for being considered for membership. Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995. However, by the time of the 1997 Luxembourg meeting the priorities of the EU had changed, resulting in the decision to turn down Turkey’s membership application because Turkey did not meet the Copenhagen Criteria, laid down by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. There were now political as well as economic conditions to be met by Turkey prior to being considered for membership.

2.3 Discussion and Analysis

The key points in the arguments for and against Turkey’s membership of the EU may be summarized as follows:

11 See Khan (2005).
12 Even Ismail Cem, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, complains that EU has formed a deliberate habit of bringing specific issues (the Cyprus issue, problems with Greece, minorities issue etc.) into discussion over and over again, even if a consensus has been reached on them in previous negotiations. Cem, disappointedly, finds this “extremely unhealthy” as regards to the future negotiations between Turkey and the EU. For a thorough discussion see Cem (2005).
Arguments for:

- Turkey is a geopolitical bridge between the west and the east bordering the major oil fields
- Turkey is considered to be a large and dynamic emerging market with a liberalized market-based economy.
- Turkey’s parliamentary system is compatible with the western European political systems
- Turkey enjoys a high degree of economic integration with the EU (as indicated by its membership of the Customs Union, for example)
- Turkey’s membership would validate the claim that the EU is an open and inclusive community of nations capable of drawing strength from cultural and religious diversity

Arguments against:

- Cultural and religious differences as well as political volatility and weak democracy represent insurmountable barriers to Turkey’s membership of the EU. (This sentiment is shared by both EU members and different anti-EU membership groupings in Turkey)
- Increasingly, anti-EU membership proponents in Turkey argue that the EU is not sincere about accepting Turkey as a member.
- Turkey’s large and poor population would create direct (e.g., EU budget, structural funds) and indirect (e.g., flow of Turkish workers) financial burden to the other members.
- Turkey’s large population would create a bias in favour of Turkey in EU decision making: Turkey would be the second most powerful state in terms of the number of votes.

Turkey is a young liberal democracy undergoing numerous growing pains: It is a formally secular nation state functioning in a geographically, demographically, and ethnically diverse country determined to industrialize and sustain economic growth. Since the late 1980s numerous measures have been implemented by the national government to increase and/or enhance the institutional capacity to support economic development. Intensive reform over the last few years has introduced various amendments in Turkish Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure (2004-2005), Law on Associations (2004), Law on Municipalities (2005), Law on Association of Local Governments (2005), Law of Enforcement of Sentences (2005), Tax Law (2005), The Public Financial Management and Financial Control Law (2003), Law of Topographies and Integrated Circuit (2005). All of these measures have been aimed at preparing the grounds for Turkey’s membership into the EU.

For our analysis we highlight the following key points. First, with the signing of the Customs Union in 1995 Turkey’s economy became more progressively integrated into the European economy (e.g. Togan 2000 and 2004). Under the Customs Union agreement Turkey is expected to act in accordance with the common trade policy of the EU. But, as Manisali (2004) points out, because Turkey does not have membership privileges, complying with the agreement restricts Turkey’s policy space. Turkey is yet
to receive most of the $3.3 billions (US) promised by the EU to compensate for possible adverse effects of Customs Union on the Turkish economy.\textsuperscript{14}

Second, there are also allegations of \textit{unwritten criteria} for Turkey’s membership. These include the demand by some member states that accession talks be “open-ended” and not necessarily result in full membership, that there should be “permanent” limitations on (Turkish) labour-mobility, insistence on the recognition of Cyprus, admission by Turkey to responsibility for the killing, displacement, and persecution of Armenians during the first world war, and a willingness to address the unresolved Kurdish question. Given this long list of debilitatingly complex issues, it is perhaps little wonder that many of the EU member states have no intention of embracing Turkey as a member. The key question here is not whether or not these issues should be used against Turkey’s membership but how the membership of the EU will accelerate and strengthen Turkey’s attempts to address the issues.

Third, a public opinion survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies foundation in 2002 reveals that although around 65\% of the respondents support EU membership, the question on sincerity of the EU regarding Turkey’s membership rated as 3.7 on a scale of 1 to 10.\textsuperscript{15} This disappointment is noted by Ahtisaari and Rohan of the Independent Commission on Turkey:

“The same is true of the reported intention of some Governments to have the so called ‘Privileged Partnership’ concept explicitly included in the negotiating framework as alternative to full membership. This proposal has also been discussed at last December's [2001] European Council meeting and was rejected, resulting in a reference to "open-ended negotiations" in the Council's conclusions. Such wording, which has never been used in previous enlargement rounds, may have somewhat ruffled Turkey's feathers, but was finally accepted as constructive ambiguity so often used in international diplomacy”.\textsuperscript{16}

It is perhaps not very surprising that the public opinion in Turkey is increasingly turning against Europe\textsuperscript{17}, harking back to the historical distrust in relations between Turkey and its European neighbours. Many of the Turkish opponents of membership draw parallels between the Turkey-Europe relations in the second half of the twentieth century and the relations between the Ottoman Empire and European powers in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, arguing that joining Europe

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{14} Manisali (2004) argues that Greece played a central role in forcing the EU to withhold the major portion of this amount.
\textsuperscript{15} See Kirisci, K. (2002).
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{17} In a recent study Ulagay (2005) argues that there has been an increase in an anti-EU sentiments in Turkey and anti-integration sentiments in EU countries. Ulagay (2005) also points out that there is general disappointment with what the EU has delivered to date. This was manifested in the rejection of the European Constitution in the referenda in France and the Netherlands.
\end{flushright}
now could well result in the demise of the Turkish Republic just like closeness to Europe undermined the Empire in the nineteenth century (see Table 2 for an overview). The implied trajectory of this sentiment is undesirable for increased cohesion between Turkey, the Islamic world and the rest of Europe and should be avoided at all costs.

Fourth, in Europe, opposition to Turkey’s membership is expressed in terms of Turkey having a weak and volatile democracy, a much larger population (72 millions) than many member states, and much lower standards of living. The question of democracy in Turkey notwithstanding, Turkey’s membership will impose a financial burden on the EU while the country assumes a strong voice in the decision making process due to its large population. In assessing the impact of Turkey’s membership on EU voting Baldwin and Widgren (2005) argue that under the Constitutional Treaty scheduled to come into effect on November 1, 2009 Turkey would be the second most powerful member state after Germany superseding other member states such as France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. There is also a general concern that on membership, Turkish workers would “flood” western European labour markets. It is worth pointing out that similar concerns were raised about Polish workers moving to Western Europe in search of better employment prospects after the Polish membership of the EU. While there was some movement in the short-term from Poland to Western European countries, this did not persist. It is also worth noting that since the last enlargement in 2004 a monthly average of 14,000 people have been immigrating to the United Kingdom from eastern EU countries. However, the British economy seems to have had the capacity to absorb them and there has been no sign of disruptions in the labour market as a result of these developments.

Fifth, a key argument against Turkey’s membership is its geographical location. It is argued that only 5% of Turkey’s total area lies in Europe and therefore Turkey cannot be counted as European. This is countered by the supporters for Turkey’s membership of the EU by the argument that the condition of being in Europe geographically is not applied to Cyprus, which is geographically located to the east of more than 50% of Turkey, or Malta, which is closer to Africa than Europe. The supporters point out that Cyprus is “European” because of its historical (economic and political) links with Europe and not because of geography. The same argument can be applied in support of Turkey’s membership. The geographic argument is particularly redundant when one views Europe as a “dynamic social construct” or “an imagined community that can change according to circumstance and political leadership” (WRR 2004:25). There are numerous political, economic, and social reasons for the construct to include Turkey.

18 For a thorough discussion see Kazgan (1999).
19 See Baldwin and Widgren (2005).
Finally, many of the opponents of Turkey’s membership point to the weaknesses of the Turkish legal system which, while modelled after the French and American systems, remains ineffective. As well, almost everyone agrees that corruption is rife in the country and there is a sizeable informal economy. The Turkish government’s efforts in recent years to reform its judicial system and set up functioning state institutions to effectively structure and regulate the economy have been lauded by the European Commission but deemed insufficient to warrant grounds for membership talks. But there is a limit to how much of the institution building can be “engineered” and imposed by the Turkish state in a top-down and isolated fashion. At any rate, there are numerous historical examples that suggest that top-down institution building runs the risk of never becoming fully embedded and is prone to reversal or implosion, as was the case with many state-enforced formal institutions in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Embeddedness of new institutional forms imposed from above requires external impetus and support from the ground up.

2.3.1 Analyzing Turkey’s Institutions

A preliminary analysis of the formal and informal institutions in Turkey shows that many pieces of the institutional puzzle for Turkey’s membership are in fact in place but require additional external impetus to become fully embedded. In our analysis we view institutions as structuring phenomena and manifest at different levels of inter-relation, scales of governance, and spheres of the political economy. Applying the levels-scales-spheres perspective to institutions yields a loose but necessary typology of institutions (Figure 2).

Implicit in the arguments that Turkey is not yet ready for EU membership is the largely justified claim that Turkey has fewer and less effective formal institutions for democratic government than industrialized economies of Western Europe. Some of the key existing formal institutions such as the military, the National Security Council, and the Constitutional Court tend to serve an authoritarian state while others such as the various amendments to the judicial code remain ineffective or poorly implemented. A significant portion of socio-economic activity is governed through “clientalism” and patronage (Sozen and Shaw 2003). However, Turkey is not alone in this characterization. To illustrate, corruption is often cited as one of the key undesirable institutions that play a major role in Turkish society. No attempt has been made, as far as we have been able to determine, to compare corruption in Turkey with well-documented corruption and organized crime in southern Italy. That Turkey should be singled out for having an abundance of informal institutions is arguably one-sided.

21 For an elaborate discussion of levels, scales, and systems see Parto (2005a).
22 This typology and the subsequent discussion are based on Parto (2005b).
Figure 2. Characteristics and Manifestations of Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavioural</th>
<th>Cognitive</th>
<th>Associative</th>
<th>Regulative</th>
<th>Constitutive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions as standardized (recognizable) social habits – manifest in instinctive behaviour of individuals and groups as reflections of social norms</td>
<td>Institutions as mental models and constructs or definitions, based on values and embedded in culture – aspired to by individuals and groups</td>
<td>Institutions as mechanisms facilitating prescribed or privileged interaction among different private and public interests – manifest in activities of groups of individuals</td>
<td>Institutions as prescriptions and proscriptions – manifest as the immediate boundaries of action by individuals and groups</td>
<td>Institutions setting the bounds of social relations – manifest as the ultimate boundaries of action by individuals and groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Informal; Social

Formal; Societal

Adapted from Parto (2005b)

The use of this typology of institutions in analysis elsewhere has illustrated that managing fundamental change will require government intervention as a main catalyst. However, such intervention succeeds only if it resonates with the pre-existing behavioural and cognitive institutions (Parto 2005c). In the context of the EU and in the case of Turkey, governing change as a role needs to be assumed jointly by the European Commission and the Turkish government. The former can provide structural support (including funds, expertise, and incentives) while the latter can ensure that any and all proposed changes are cognizant of the nature and importance of behavioural and cognitive institutions, i.e., knowing what “works” in the local environment and what is acceptable to the general populace. The impetus required for embedding associative, regulative, and constitutive institutions in Turkey needs to come from a higher level of government that includes the European Commission as a major player. Put differently, institutional change-making in Turkey requires policy making at a supranational scale of governance, i.e., the EU. It appears that the mode of governance at the EU scale is not (yet) conducive or committed to institutional change-making in Turkey as described along the above lines.

However, it is important to recognize that commitment by the EU to accept and integrate Turkey as a full member will serve only as a first step, albeit an important one, in a long and challenging process of institutional change in Turkey. The Republic of Turkey continues to be governed by a strong-handed, centralized, and bureaucratic state apparatus inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Under this system of governance, the society belongs to, and is expected to, serve the state (Erdogan 1996, cited in Sozen and Shaw 2003:110). This mode of governance severely limits the emergence and
sustenance of independent civil society organizations and other institutional forms characteristic of democratic governments. Sozen and Shaw (2003) point to the autonomous military, the National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, and the civil service as the (regulative and constitutive) institutions (Figure 2) of the state to maintain the status quo through their dominant role in the policymaking structure. In Turkey “the views of the military normally dominate the decisions of the [National Security Council] whose recommendations … have always become national policies” (Yücel 2002, cited in Sozen and Shaw 2003:110).

The insistence by the state apparatus that constitutive and regulative institutions of governance should serve the sovereignty and authority of the Turkish state above all else has had significant repercussions for the emergence and legitimization of civil society-based associative institutions. For example, trade unions and business associations are strongly discouraged from voicing opinions about public policy. The modus operandi for engaged participation in matters of policymaking seems to be through “a wide variety of clientelistic relationships” (Özbudun 1981, cited in Sozen and Shaw 2003:112), patronage, and sometimes corruption. Informal institutions such as patronage, kinship, and even corruption play important instrumental roles and represent part of the society’s fabric in authoritarian societies. Change in informal institutions is often slow and requires a time perspective that spans generations rather than elected governments. Policy aimed at further integration of Turkey into Europe needs to recognize the likely persistence of older, culturally embedded informal (behavioural and cognitive) Turkish institutions and devise innovative incentives and disincentives to catalyze the formation of new institutional forms that minimize or neutralize the role of older institutions.

Tabellini (2005) uses “culture” as a catchall for culturally embedded behavioural and cognitive institutions. He attributes uneven economic performance in European regions to regional differences in behavioural and cognitive institutions. Where these institutions act as impediments to better economic performance, policy should provide for investments in education, cheap finance to facilitate the emergence of local entrepreneurs, and decentralization of administrative and political powers to stimulate the accumulation of social capital.

More generally, institutions are created formally through actions of authority or emerge organically to bring order and predictability to interactions among individuals and organizations. In either case, institutions are reflections of learning by individuals and organizations and created to structure inter-relations (and thus determine the mode of governance) among individuals and organizations. Much of what remains to be done for Turkey in its attempts to develop institutional capacity for EU membership has to

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23 See Parto (2005a) for a more elaborate discussion of institutions.
be prompted by the EU, not only as ideal type models to be adopted by Turkey (as was
the case with the legal system, for example) but also through “interactive learning” and
“learning by doing”, to paraphrase Bengt Lundvall and Richard Nelson. To continue on
its path of learning from the EU member states, Turkey needs to interact with the EU
Community socially, economically, and politically as an equal partner in need of direct
assistance from the other members. Further industrialization of Turkey will need to be
supported by a political economy integrated with Europe’s most advanced economies
and with the political, economic, and social institutions to match. EU membership for
Turkey is likely to provide a much-needed impetus for the emergence of an institutional
landscape more compatible with Europe’s liberal democracies and capable of
facilitating further economic expansion of Turkey and its integration with the EU.

From a policy perspective, and before offering a “to-do” list of specific policy
measures, we need to ask the question: “How really different is Turkey compared with
the rest of the EU?” The next section uses available empirical data to answer this
question.

3. Analysis of the European Values Study Data

Our starting point is that European “common values” are not as common as they
are believed to be. We will also note that Turkey fits reasonably well within this range
of “uncommonality”. We support this claim by presenting empirical evidence from the
European Values Study 1999 (EVS99). In our analysis we have focused on fundamental
values such as individual’s views on religion, democracy, and politics since these values
seem to feature strongly in statements against Turkey’s membership. We then turn our
attention to traditional values and culture, since these are the most important concerns
expressed within Turkey in opposition to Turkey’s membership of the EU. We show
that there are fewer actual differences between Turkey and the EU countries, evidence
that perhaps the foundations for these arguments are less than empirically sound and
perhaps motivated by other concerns.

EVS99 was designed to measure change and persistence in people’s social and
demographic characteristics, fundamental value orientations, attitudes, and norms in
ordinary life. The study was designed to provide detailed data on social structure and
occupation, family, religious affiliation, politics, and various measures of social capital.
One common problem in such datasets is that the sample size for each country may
not reflect the true population of the country. Since our intention is to compare
countries we adjusted the original data using population weight as a remedy to
complications that may arise from over-sampling. This adjustment ensures that each
country is represented in proportion to its population size. We formed seven country groups:

- EU15: 15 EU member countries prior to the latest enlargement.
- EU25: All current EU member states excluding Cyprus.
- EU10: 9 member states joined EU in 2004, excluding Cyprus.
- EUNORTH: Four northern member states included in the EU15; Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden.
- EUSOUTH: Four southern member states included in the EU15; Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
- EUAPP3: Three candidate countries; Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania.
- FORMER_SOV: Three former soviet countries; Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

The analysis simply consists of calculating the average score for each group and then comparing the scores of Turkey with the average score for each of the seven-country group to see whether Turkey stands out from the rest. To highlight the heterogeneity within EU15 and EU25, we make use of the range, i.e., the minimum and the maximum score of each question, and present in brackets the code for the country corresponding to these maximum and minimum scores. We have not performed any statistical tests assessing the statistical significance of the difference since these tests scores reflect the magnitude of the difference but not the direction. In other words, the test scores indicate whether Turkey’s scores are significantly different from EUAPP3 for instance, but not whether Turkey performs better or worse than EUAPP3. Instead, we have indicated four alternative classifications for every table [see Tables 3-4, for details]:

i. Variables for which Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH or EU10
ii. Variables for which Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups; EUAPP3, EU10 and EUSOUTH
iii. Variables for which Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 and do not belong to the first two groups
iv. Variables for which Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25

4. Findings

Table 3 and Table 4 summarize our main findings. A key finding is that for almost all the variables relating to religion, Turkey falls within the range of values representing the importance of religion among the EU25. However, for a better understanding we need

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24 Country scores are available in request. EVS99 does not provide data on Cyprus.
to compare the variables (v6, v101 and v115) which relate to questions on believing in god and on whether the respondents belonged to a religious denomination. As expected the proportion of respondents who believe in god or who at least belong to a religion is higher in Turkey when compared to the average of EU15 or EU25 (Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4). What is striking is that Turkey’s scores are close to the EU average when respondents are asked how religious they are or how often they attend religious services (see for instance variables v110 and v105, Table 3, Figures 3 and 4). This indicates that Turkey’s population is not as religious as commonly perceived or, to put it in another way, is only as religious as other EU countries.

We also examined the role of religion in education (v106 and v172, Table 3 and Figure 3 and 4). In European countries attendance in religious services is higher in childhood than in adulthood. However, Turkey’s scores do not display such a structure. When the responses to the two questions are combined it is hard to assert that the children in Turkey are exposed to more religious education (either from the family or the from education system), than their European counterparts. This finding is also supported by an optional question in the EVS99. Respondents were asked whether

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25 This question is not included in our general analysis since the responses were collected only from 7 countries. The question (o13) asks “How much do you agree or disagree with the following?: In my opinion, some time should be set aside for prayer, meditation and contemplation in all schools”. We have reversed the answer categories so that (1) represents “I strongly disagree” and (5) represents “I strongly agree”. The averages for
they supported the argument that time should be set aside for prayers and meditation in all schools. The findings show that the respondents from Italy and Austria support this argument more strongly than the respondents in Turkey. With respect to parental views on religion in education, we find that Turkey is not that different from the rest of the EU.

Turkish respondents’ position regarding the three questions assessing the effect of religion on public office and government decision making is in line with the above findings (see Table 3 and Figure 4 variables v130, v131 and v132). This is further supported by an optional question that asks the respondents to assess the involvement of church/mosque in national politics on a 1 to 4 scale.26 With respect to religion and government, our result show that Turkey does not stand out when compared to other European countries.

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26 The optional question 15 asks; “Do you think that the church/mosque has an influence on national politics or not? We have reversed the answer categories so that (1) represents “no, absolutely not” and (4) represents “yes, absolutely”. The averages for seven countries are; Luxemburg, 2.98; Germany 2.89; Croatia, 2.79; Turkey, 2.79; Finland, 2.71; Austria, 2.68; Lithuania, 2.66; Czech Republic, 2.58 and Romania, 2.52.
Turkey’s scores on the indicators regarding individuals’ responses about the democratic political system is promising when compared to other EU countries (see questions v220 – v223, Table 4 and Figure 5). For all of the four cases Turkey’s position is at least better than the four southern EU member states and the three applicant countries. This finding is a clear indication of how, in relative terms, democracy is ingrained in Turkish political system despite the young age of the republic.

It seems that the idea of a political system with a strong government and where the army is a major ruling factor receives more support in Turkey than its European counterparts (see questions v216 and v218, Table 4 and Figure 5). While significant, this finding needs to be contextualized: The army is viewed by many in Turkey as a major force to ensure the sustenance of a modern, secular (though authoritarian) nation state. It is only recently that the Turkish political system has been able to function without explicit reference to or intervention from the army. There continues to exist strong popular support for the army as a major stabilizing force in Turkey’s system of governance despite human rights concerns as a major issue for Turkey due to the army’s periodic use of excessive force and political suppression to bring about order and maintain the state apparatus. In this case our findings show that Turkey’s score falls significantly out of the range of values for EU25 (see question v224, Table 4 and Figure 5).

![Figure 5: How Far is Turkey from the EU25: Democracy](image-url)
The mostly legitimate criticisms of Turkey’s weak democracy notwithstanding, it appears that the objection by some EU member countries to Turkey’s membership is based on a misperceived belief that Turkey’s mix of ethnicity and culture (including religion) is incompatible with that of Europe in general.\textsuperscript{27} This misperception is systemic and shared by even those who hold a conciliatory view on Turkey’s membership. For example, a recent speech by Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, on the issue of the cartoons of the prophet Mohammad makes reference to Europe’s “common values and traditions” such as respect for personal life and freedom, freedom of speech and a clear distinction between politics and religion.\textsuperscript{28} However, as Table 3 clearly shows there are significant differences in the common values and traditions of the EU member states, including the relation between politics and religion (v129-v132).

To sum up, there is significant heterogeneity of views on basic values in EU15 and EU25, particularly when we compare northern and southern European countries. Rather than disappoint, this finding should be the beacon call for the EU policy makers to recognize the differences and look for common grounds based on a vast reservoir of strengths. The success of the European project significantly depends on the performance of the EU in bonding, bridging and managing this heterogeneity. It is clear that a well-designed institutional system is a prerequisite for success in this regard.

5. Conclusion

Having established that many of Turkey’s supposed differences with EU15 and EU25 are exaggerated and unsupported by empirical data, we are led to conclude that Turkey should not be held hostage for its poor record of addressing ethnic and structural questions in membership discussions. Further, Turkey is less likely to effectively address the outstanding membership requirement issues in isolation from the EU. In our analysis we have made the point that it would be at best difficult for Turkey to overcome barriers to membership and integration into the EU without the support from the EU. If the question is simply “why should the EU help Turkey overcome its challenges?”, we have argued that there are numerous political benefits for Europe and the global community to justify direct and overt assistance by the EU to integrate Turkey into Europe through full membership.

However, the formal acceptance of Turkey into the EU and the commitment to assist Turkey to overcome its many issues are only the start of a long process of structural and institutional change likely to span generations. The slowness in the

\textsuperscript{27} See, for example, McLaren (2000), Lino (2004), and Wood and Quaisser (2005).

\textsuperscript{28} Jose Manuel Barroso, “Statement on the issue of the cartoons of prophet Mohammad” European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2006, SPEECH/06/86.
process of change is largely attributable to Turkey’s institutional landscape. Turkish institutions, like institutions in other countries, are manifestations of historical circumstances, learning, and evolution. One policy implication of our argument is that the EU should recognize the many similarities between Turkey and EU25, as indicated in our analysis of EVS99 data, and assist Turkey to overcome its institutional capacity deficiencies for membership through cooperation. In addition to various forms of incentives provided by the EU, conscious efforts need to be made to collect valuable empirical data through frequent follow-ups to surveys like EVS99. For example, a Turkish Social Survey modelled after the German and American Social Surveys can provide valuable information on social issues and values that could be used in conjunction with basic census statistics. For Turkey, this survey should provide regional information drawn from adequately sized samples.

Collection and analysis of quantitative survey data will need to be complemented with qualitative narratives to generate the contextual richness often missing from quantified data and analysis. For example, to establish, as accurately as possible, the largely informal behavioural and cognitive institutions (Figure 2) requires adopting research methodology consistent with Neale’s (1987) method for identifying institutions (Box 1).

Box 1. Identifying Institutions

Components of institutions are manifest as activities of people in situations and in contexts. Observation and characterization of these components allow operational recognition, not definition, of institutions. There are three characteristics that allow institution identification: “First, there are a number of people doing. Second, there are rules giving the activities repetition, stability, predictable order. Third, there are folkviews – most certainly what Walton Hamilton meant by a ‘bundle of intellectual usages’ – explaining or justifying the activities and the rules” (Neale 1987:1182). “Doing” can be seen and thus identified; “rules” can be identified by “ordering the doings into repetitive event sequences”; and the “folkviews justify the activities or explain why they are going on, how they are related, what is important and what is unimportant in the patterns of regularity. Folkviews can be discovered by observation, but here the eye is a minor instrument and the ear is a major one” (Neale 1987:1183).

Source: Parto (2005a)

Conducting research along the above lines can be supported through funding programmes focused on social cohesion. In operational terms this points to policy measures that target increases in human and social capital in the larger EU Community and beyond, to include borderline cases like Turkey which could well serve as beachheads toward the institutionalization of mutual respect for deeply held (and often
religion-based) social and cultural values. The question is not which set of cultural values is “better” but to identify them and find ways to engage parties of fundamentally different creed and religion in equitable discourse about the future.

Two recent studies have shown that historical political institutions and the educational system have played significant roles in shaping the current state of European regions (Tabellini 2005; Akcomak and ter Weel 2006). Tabellini (2005) reports that culture, defined as current values and norms, is a key determinant of economic growth. Using a similar methodology, Akcomak and ter Weel (2006), not only support these findings but also underline the importance of social capital in explaining differences in innovation performance, which in turn contributes to differences in regional development. An immediate implication of these findings is that EU policies on provision of structural funds and framework programs should be complemented with specific programs to enhance institutional capacity and human capital. In the long run, such policies will nurture the formation of formal institutions in such arenas as education which in turn encourages the emergence of informal institutions manifested as changed values, increased trust, and increased social capital.

That Turkey does not have a stellar record in modern times on dealings with its ethnic questions, while not condonable, is not surprising given the young age of the Republic. It took hundreds of years and much strife before most of the industrialized nations of Europe managed to define themselves as cohesive nation states. Rather than holding Turkey hostage for its poor record of addressing its ethnic questions, the EU could seize the opportunity represented by the accession negotiations to promote and institutionalize economic progress, equity, and democracy in the Turkish political economy to create the economic and political foundations of a liberal democracy. By embracing Turkey as a member state the EU can help the young Republic in efforts to build the formal institutions that will serve as the pillars of liberal democracy in Turkey. Carefully designed and culturally sensitive formal institutions that reconcile the cultural and political differences between Turkey and industrially advanced European countries can, in time, nurture the emergence of deeply rooted political democracy, trust, and a flourishing civil society. Turkey has made a series of first steps in reforming existing institutions and establishing new ones. To bear fruit these institutions need to be seen as an extension of the liberal democratic traditions that define most of the EU25 member states, and as such supported by further engagement of Turkey in EU affairs through full membership as soon as possible. A positive and timely response to Turkey’s wish to join the EU would pre-empt the likely popular backlash against joining the EU on the account of being rejected by the rest of the Community despite demonstrated goodwill on Turkey’s part.
References


Table 1: Milestones of Turkey – EU relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 1959</td>
<td>Application to European Economic Community (EEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12, 1963</td>
<td>Ankara Agreement creating an association with the EEC. The agreement was signed with the main intention that Turkey to become a member after completion of three phases of negotiations: a five-year preparation period, a two-phase transition period (customs union to be completed at the end of this two-phase) and a final period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 13, 1970</td>
<td>Additional protocol that determined the responsibilities of both parties, was signed (came into effect in 1973). However due to political distress and the military takeover in 1980 these responsibilities were never met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14, 1987</td>
<td>Application for full-membership. This was rejected on economic basis that Turkey was not a fully-developed economy. Instead formation of a customs union was recommended as a first step.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Customs union negotiations started.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 6, 1995</td>
<td>Customs union agreement that took affect on 01.01.1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>Contrary to the expectations, Turkey was not granted a candidate country status in the Luxembourg summit at the end of 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>Turkey was finally given candidate country status in the Helsinki Summit. The EU Council decision clearly states that “…The Council welcomes the recent positive developments in Turkey and Turkey’s willingness to continue its reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate country on the road to joining the Union based on the same criteria applied to the other candidate countries…”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 2003</td>
<td>Turkey’s national program for the adoption of the acquis communautaire was revised and published in the Official Gazette.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 17, 2004</td>
<td>The European Council decided to open accession talks with Turkey as of 03.10.2005</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Ottoman Empire vs Europe, 19th century</th>
<th>Turkey vs European Union, 20th century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic demands</strong></td>
<td>Starts with extending capitulations in the 18th century and ends with Baltalimani trade agreement with the United Kingdom (1838) which grants certain privileges to UK traders. These privileges were extended to other countries such as France (1838), Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Norway and Sweden (1840), Denmark (1841), Portugal (1843) and Russia (1846). Consequently, the status of the foreign traders became even better than the local (Turkish) traders. Local traders and producers were unable to compete with foreign traders that later caused the financial and economic bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century.</td>
<td>Starts with the agreement of Ankara (1963). First phase was the liberalization attempts of the capital markets and finalized in 1989 by full capital mobility. Economic integration accelerated after 1989 when the full-membership application of Turkey was rejected on the basis of Turkey’s economic underdevelopment. Economic integration ends with customs union (6 March 1995). As a result, Turkey is entitled to act in accordance with the common trade policy of the EU, unfortunately is not able to shape this policy since Turkey is not a member state. This fact means that the trade and economic integration is based on a one-way relation rather than reciprocity (Manisalı, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political demands</strong></td>
<td>Most of the political demands by the Europeans regarding the so-called human rights, but specifically rights of minorities (and more specifically the rights of the Christian minorities, not others) and foreigners (foreigners living in Ottoman territory especially foreign traders) was granted with the modernizations attempts “Tanzimat” (1839) and “Islahat” (1856).</td>
<td>After the one-way economic integration finalized, Turkey was not granted a candidate status because of political reasons (1989). Most of the political demands (human rights, the issue of Cyprus etc.) were granted by amendments in constitution, civil law and a variety of other adjustments within a period of ten years (especially in the last two years). This resulted in meeting the terms of the Copenhagen criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognition as a European state</strong></td>
<td>Ottoman Empire is recognized as a part of the “European Concert”. Paris Peace Agreement (1856)</td>
<td>Turkey is recognized as a candidate country (The period from December 1999 to 17 December 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other demands</strong></td>
<td>A mixture of political and economic demands. For instance land reform (1858) changed the land ownership structure which enables foreign ownership of Ottoman lands.</td>
<td>A mixture of political and economic demands. For instance the legal adjustments that would enable foreign ownership of immovable are completed at the beginning of 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Fundamental Values I: Religion, Politics and Education

<table>
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Variable coding  
1: Not at all  
0: No  
0: No  
1: Convinced  
0: No  
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0: No  
0: No  

Legend  
Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH (and/or EU10)  
Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups, EUAPP3, EUSOUTH and EU10  
Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 (and do not belong to the first two groups in the legend)  
Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25  

Note: See Table 10 for mean number of observations for each country (country group) and the codes for countries.
Table 3: Fundamental Values I: Religion, Politics and Education (continued)

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Variable coding

- 0: No
- 1: Yes
- 8: More than once a week
- 5: Agree strongly
- 1: Mentioned
- 4: Agree
- 0: Not mentioned
- 3: Agree
- 2: Agree strongly
- 1: Agree
- 0: Not mentioned
- 5: Agree strongly
- 4: Agree
- 3: Agree
- 2: Agree strongly
- 1: Agree
- 0: Not mentioned

Note: See Table 5 for mean number of observations for each country (country group) and the codes for countries.

Legend

- Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH (and/or EU10)
- Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups, EUAPP3, EUSOUTH and EU10
- Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 (and do not belong to the first two groups in the legend)
- Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25
### Table 4: Fundamental Values II: Political System and Democracy

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**Variable coding**

1: Not at all satisfied  
1: Very bad  
1: Very bad  
1: Very bad  
1: Disagree strongly  
1: Disagree strongly  
1: Disagree strongly  
1: No respect at all  
4: Very satisfied  
4: Very good  
4: Very good  
4: Very good  
4: Agree strongly  
4: Agree strongly  
4: Agree strongly  
4: Lot of respect

**Legend**

1. Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH (and/or) EU10
2. Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups, EUAPP3, EUSOUTH and EU10
3. Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 (and do not belong to the first two groups in the legend)
4. Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25

Note: See Table 5 for mean number of observations for each country (country group) and the codes for countries.
Table 5: Mean number of observations and country codes

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APPENDIX

The actual questions, the variable numbers and the original coding of the variables from the EVS 1999 are presented below, as it is in the *European Values Study (1999) Methodological Questionnaire*. We have coded the yes-no questions as [1: yes, 0: no]. In most of the cases we have reversed the coding. Such cases are denoted with an asterisk.

V6* Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life: Religion
[1: very important, 4: not at all important]

V101 Do you belong to a religious denomination?
[1: yes, 2: no]

V105* Apart from weddings, funerals and christening, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
[1: more than once a week, 8: never, practically never]

V106* Apart from weddings, funerals and christening, about how often did you attend religious services when you were 12 years old?
[1: more than once a week, 8: never, practically never]

Do you personally think it is important to hold a religious service for any of the following events;  [1: yes, 2: no]

V107 Birth
V108 Marriage
V109 Death

V110* Independently of whether you go to the church or not, would you say you are;
[1: a religious person, 2: not a religious person, 3: a convinced atheist]

Generally speaking do you think that your church is/the churches are giving, in your country, adequate answer to; [1: yes, 2: no]

V111 The moral problems and needs of the individual
V112 The problems of family life
V113 People’s spiritual needs
V114 The social problems facing our country today

Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? [1: yes, 2: no]

V115 God

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following.
[1: agree strongly, 5: disagree strongly]

V129* Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office
V130* Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections
V131* It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office
V132* Religious leaders should not influence government decisions

Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.
V172  Religious faith

V213* On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied not very satisfied with the way democracy is developing in your country?  
[1: very satisfied, 4: not at all satisfied]

I am going to describe various types of political system and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?  
[1: very good, 4: very bad]

V216* Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament
V217* Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
V218* Having the army rule the country
V219* Having a democratic political system

I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them?  
[1: agree strongly, 4: disagree strongly]

V220* Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government
V221* In democracy, the economic systems runs bad
V222* Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling
V223* Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order
V224* How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in your country?) Do you feel there is;  
[1: A lot of respect for individual human rights, 4: not respect at all]

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