

Human capital, incentives, and performance outcomes

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Propositions

accompanying the dissertation

Human Capital, Incentives, and Performance Outcomes

by

Jan Sauermann

1. Being placed in teams with more experienced peers improves informal learning of newly hired workers. (Chapter 3)
2. Work-related training can have substantial positive effects not only on a worker's own performance, but also on co-workers' performance. (Chapter 4)
3. The effect of team leaders' pressure on workers' performance is strongest for highest-ranked workers. (Chapter 5)
4. The average effects of bonus payments can be driven by opposite effects for low-performing and high-performing agents (Chapter 6).
5. Though there is a large number of studies on the effects of training on productivity, there are hardly any studies analysing whether this increase is driven by an increase in human capital or by other factors.
6. Labour economists prefer a conference with high-quality keynote speakers over a conference at attractive locations (Borghans / Romans / Sauermann, *LE* 2010).
7. Previous migration episodes at a young age are important predictors for future migration decisions (De Grip / Fouarge / Sauermann, *EINT* 2010).
8. Distraction at work does not necessarily lead to lower performance as it might induce individuals to start early (Saez-Marti / Sjögren, *JET* 2008).
9. Externalities should be taken into account when assigning PhD students to offices.