

Signaling games : theory and applications

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STELLINGEN

Behorende bij het proefschrift

Signaling games: Theory and Applications

1. You play a signaling game when you like to know a secret about someone, but the only way to learn about the secret is to interpret her message.
2. When she has enough different messages available, you may be able to get perfectly informed about the secret.
3. A signaling game is related to a graph with nodes and arcs, for example, an electronic circuit. Whether you can fully learn about her secret is the same problem as whether you can draw a graph of which the set of arcs satisfies a certain property.
4. When there are many different dimensions in her secret, it is not generally possible for you to fully learn about it through her message. But, in some cases it is doable.
5. In the early 1990s, Russia chose to distribute vouchers to all people as a mean of selling state-owned firms. People could trade away their vouchers immediately or purchase more vouchers and later exchange them for shares of the firm. It was not a good idea.
6. It is no contribution to economics when human behaviour gets lost in the set of equations.
7. Economics is the painful elaboration of the obvious.
8. "Economists do it with models."
9. Q: Why did God create economists? A: In order to make weather forecasters look good.
10. It is not true that all Stellingen include negative statements about the Netherlands, although it is true that my Dutch landlord did not return the deposit without any explanation.