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INTER-FIRM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PARTNERSHIP-EMBEDDED LICENSING OR STANDARD LICENSING AGREEMENTS?

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John Hagedoorn¹, Stefanie Lorenz-Orlean² & Hans Kranenburg³

Abstract
When companies decide to engage in technology transfer through licensing to other firms, they have two basic options: to use standard licensing contracts or to set-up more elaborate partnership-embedded licensing agreements. We find that broader partnership-embedded licensing agreements are preferred with higher levels of technological sophistication of industries, with greater perceived effectiveness of secrecy as a means of appropriability, and when licensors are smaller than their licensees. Innovative differentials between companies, innovative supremacy of the licensor, and market and technological overlap between partners appear to have no effect on the preference for a particular form of licensing.

Running headline: INTER-FIRM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Keywords: technology transfer, licensing, inter-firm partnership, innovation

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INTRODUCTION

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyse the preference of companies for either standard licensing agreements or broader partnership-embedded licensing agreements as they engage in technology transfer with other companies. When companies enter into a licensing agreement, they are subject to a contract or an agreement that regulates the transfer of technology, in which they, as legal entities, give permission or the 'right' to another legal entity, such as a company, to manufacture a product or use a service, with the objective of achieving commercial gain, in return for a fee to be paid by the licensee to the licensor. We understand a partnership-embedded licensing agreement to refer to those agreements where companies engage in technology transfer through a licensing agreement that is implanted in a broader agreement, a partnership, which also has other objectives than the single act of transferring technology from one company to the other. In that context, companies combine licensed technology transfer with the sharing of resources or even assets related to any element of the value chain, such as joint R&D, manufacturing, supply, and marketing.

Obviously, companies face a set of completely different issues when they engage in a standard licensing agreement or when they decide to make the licensing agreement part of a broader partnership. In this paper, we will consider a number of industry-specific conditions and pair and company-specific settings that we expect to be relevant in explaining under which circumstances firms might opt for technology transfer through either a standard license or a partnership-embedded licensing agreement. The main contingencies that we explore in this study refer to the level of technological sophistication of industries, the regime of appropriability with which companies are confronted, and the inter-firm differences between licensing partners in terms of their size, their innovativeness, their technological bases and their product-markets.
We study a sample of nearly 230 licensing agreements made between US companies in various industries during the 1990s. About 70% of these licensing agreements refer to partnership-embedded licensing, the other 30% are standard licensing contracts. All these licensing agreements are exclusive licenses, restricted to a specific user, a geographic region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific field of use. Most of the agreements are found in a small range of industries such as chemicals, instruments, and electrical and electronic equipment.

**HYPOTHESES**

The literature on partnerships (e.g. Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Hagedoorn, 2002) and licensing (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kim, 2005; Kim and Vonortas, 2006) both suggest that the preferences that companies might have for particular organizational modes and the architecture of inter-firm arrangements in the context of technology sharing depends on both environmental conditions, i.e. industry-specific conditions, and partnership and firm-specific conditions. Following these partnership and licensing literatures, we will discuss a set of hypotheses that stipulate the environmental as well as the firm and partnership conditions that might shape the preferences that companies have for standard licensing contracts or partnership-embedded licensing agreements.

When considering contributions that are relevant in the context of understanding the industry conditions that affect technology transfer through standard licensing contracts or partnership-embedded licensing, it becomes clear that the past two decades of empirical research have already generated a substantial body of literature on partnership formation while licensing has clearly attracted somewhat less attention. A relatively large number of contributions (see amongst others Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Dussauge and Gargette, 1999; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 2002; Oster, 1999) indicates that the growth
in the number of inter-firm partnerships, where companies share resources and assets, is
generally associated with so-called high-tech industries. In these high-tech industries, the
competitive landscape of companies is determined by technological competences, R&D
activities, learning and flexibility in terms of organization and innovative output. Partnerships
enable companies to learn with and from their partners in a flexible setting where many of the
leading companies engage in a multitude of partnerships with different partners. Although
partnerships are popular in a large number of industries and they are indeed established in all
sectors, across the spectrum from dynamic high-tech industries to more static and
technologically less advanced sectors, there is evidence that partnerships are more widespread
in high-tech industries. Research by amongst others Dussauge and Garette (1999) and
Hagedoorn (2002) indicates that a disproportionate share of these partnerships are made in a
limited number of R&D intensive industries, such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and
information technology industries.

Most standard licensing agreements are found to be restricted to single technology
transfer, few of them are part of a multiple technology transfer exercise (Anand and Khanna,
2000). Based on a theoretical contribution, Arora and Fosfuri (2003) expect that in industries
characterized by homogeneous markets with little product differentiation, companies have a
higher preference for licensing, whereas this preference for licensing decreases in industries
where product differentiation is crucial for the competitive positioning of companies.

The above suggests that we can expect some relevant industry differences with regard
to the preference that companies have for licensed technology transfer that is either part of a
broader arrangement through a partnership or a standard licensing agreement. Given the
experience that many companies in technologically sophisticated sectors have with a range of
partnerships, we can expect companies in these sectors to routinely consider partnerships as
one of the first options, if not the first option, for any act of inter-firm collaboration, including
licensing. In addition, the complexity of technologies and the complementarity of innovative inputs in these industries will require intensive collaboration for technology transfer (Hagedoorn, 2002). Both, the prolificy of partnerships and the nature of complex technology transfer, will stimulate companies in technologically sophisticated industries to think of a combination of partnerships and licensing as a first option when they engage in technology transfer with other companies. As partnerships are less ‘popular’ in technologically less sophisticated industries, whereas standard licenses are a very well-known mechanism for the single transfer of straightforward technologies in these industries, we expect that companies in technologically less sophisticated industries have a disproportionate preference for standard licensing agreements. Hence:

*Hypothesis 1. The higher the level of technological sophistication of industries, the higher the likelihood that companies prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts.*

So far there is little research on the possible effect that the degree to which companies can protect their technology might have on their preference for either partnership-embedded licensing or standard licensing contracts. The empirical analysis of Anand and Khanna (2000) suggests that generally in industries with weaker regimes of appropriability, where patents are considered to offer little or no effective protection, licensing is to be less preferred by companies as the licensee can invent around the technology that is transferred (see also Kim and Vonortas, 2006, for similar results). In these industries with weaker regimes of appropriability, Anand and Khanna (2000) expect that broader inter-firm agreements, such as joint ventures, are more likely to occur as this form of partnership offers companies the possibility to monitor and control their technology transfer partners. They also state that
exclusive licensing, which limits technology transfer to a specific user, a geographic region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific field of use, might be preferred when companies operate in the context of a strong regime of appropriability and their technology is well protected through patents.

However, in case the efficiency of the regime of appropriability and the protection of technology in industries is based on secrecy and not on intellectual property rights, the effect of the regime of appropriability might change. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) and Arundel (2001) mention that in a large number of industries companies prefer to use secrecy to protect their technology. This suggests that in industries where companies see secrecy as an efficient protection mechanism for their technology, companies might also prefer partnership-embedded licensing agreements to standard licensing contracts. Partnerships allow companies to monitor and control the transfer of their technology in an inter-organizational context, but this monitoring and control of the relationship also enables partners to gradually build up a trusted relationship where confidentiality among partners facilitates the transfer of technology (Ahuja, 2000; Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1999; Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000). As secrecy is perceived as an effective mechanism to protect technology and control technology transfer by companies from a range of industries, companies operating in such industries will probably see closer collaboration through partnership-embedded licensing as more effective than market-based, arms-length transactions through standard licensing contracts. In addition, we can point at the role of tacitness in the transfer of technological knowledge in industries where secrecy is an important protection mechanism for innovative activities. Contributions by Braganza, Edwards and Lambert (1999), Merges (2003) and Torrisi (1998) indicate that industries where companies prefer secrecy to protect their innovative activities are also those sectors where tacit knowledge plays an important role in the transfer of technology. Standard licensing is based on a high degree of transferable
codified knowledge but partnership-embedded licensing enables companies to go beyond the transfer of codified knowledge and to communicate additional tacit knowledge in a broader set up of a partnership. Also, as demonstrated by Martin and Salomon (2002) increasing levels of the tacitness of knowledge to be transferred by companies to others, encourage them to prefer more organizationally complex partnerships to standard licensing contracts. Hence:

**Hypothesis 2.** *The stronger the regime of appropriability of industries, in terms of the prevalence of companies for secrecy, the higher the likelihood that companies will prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts.*

Turning to a number of more firm-specific and partnership-specific dimensions of the preference for standard licensing contracts or partnership-embedded licensing, we shall now first consider the possible effect of size inequality of companies that engage in technology transfer. In this context we understand size to be an indicator of the market power of a company that refers to its ability to benefit from and to influence the actual process of technology transfer in a licensing agreement, be it of an embedded or a non-embedded nature. As already well established in the industrial organization literature, we expect the size of firms to be an important aspect of market power as larger companies can reap benefits in terms of both economies of scale and scope and bargaining power vis-à-vis smaller firms (Barla, 2000; Bresnahan, 1989; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Schmalensee, 1989).

The literature points out that the size of companies participating in partnerships and more in particular the size difference with their partners can play a role in the risk perception of companies during the partnership formation process as well as during the life span of the partnership (Berg, Duncan and Friedman, 1982; Mytelka, 1991). In general, this literature suggests that this kind of asymmetry in partnerships generates higher risks to the smaller firm.
Thus, when companies of different size cooperate in technology transfer, we assume that smaller licensors are running a greater risk of losing control over their technology than larger firms that have more resources to control and monitor their technology transfer. In case a large firm is the licensor to a smaller licensee, it has the resources and organizational capabilities to monitor the licensee. When the larger firm is the licensee, it also can use its resources and organizational capabilities to monitor the agreement and it has no incentive to engage in a more complex arrangement, such as a partnership-embedded licensing agreement.

The literature on licensing does indeed indicate that when companies of different firm size engage in technology licensing agreements, larger firms dominate the agreement due to bargaining asymmetries that affect the terms of the licensing agreement (Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Caves, Crookell and Killing, 1983). Research by Kolmer and Dowling (2004) on licensing practices of large integrated companies and smaller newly established firms in the bio-pharma industry demonstrates some major differences in the licensing strategies of these companies. Large companies appear to prefer to license less crucial technologies to others (see also Caves et al., 1983), whereas smaller firms are forced by market conditions, to license technologies related to their core products.

The above suggests not only some interesting differences between companies of dissimilar size, it also implies that is important for smaller companies with valuable technologies, when acting as licensors, to protect their technological competences and to exercise as much control as possible over their technology transfer. This implies that when smaller companies own valuable technologies that qualify them for licensing to larger partners, these smaller licensors should prefer to set up partnerships that act as broader agreements that enable them to monitor and control technology transfer in broader partnerships than through standard licensing contracts. Thus:
Hypothesis 3. In the context of firm size inequality, when licensors are smaller than their licensees, licensors prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts.

In a somewhat similar vein as with the size inequality of firms, we can expect that the different innovative capabilities or the differences in innovativeness of partners affect their preference for particular forms of licensing. There is always a risk of technology leakage in technology exchange between companies but when the licensor is more advanced in its technological capabilities and it transfers technology to its less developed partner there is a serious risk of technology leakage as a by-product of the licensing agreement that will upgrade the less developed partner beyond what was intended. It is difficult for companies to make an exact assessment of alternative applications and future uses of the technology that the licensee can exploit to improve its innovative capabilities beyond the improvement stipulated in the licensing agreement (Caves et al., 1983). Hill (1992) refers to this as the risk of second-order diffusion when technological know-how that underlies the licensed technology is ‘accidentally’ transferred. This additional technology may enable the licensee to innovate beyond the licensed technology and use this technology in other products outside the range of the licensing agreement. Partnership-embedded licensing, where companies collaborate on a broader project than the transfer of technology itself, gives more options for a licensor to monitor both its partner and the use of its transferred technology than in case of a standard licensing contract. Hence, we expect that:

Hypothesis 4. In the context of innovative differentials between companies, when licensors are more innovative than licensees, licensors prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts.
The licensing agreements that are analysed in this paper, both partnership-embedded licensing agreements and standard licensing contracts, are restricted to exclusive users, where the geographic regional use, the specific length of time of usage, and/or the specific field of use are specified in the agreement. This implies that licensors have the option to control the use of their licensed technology by companies that operate in similar product markets or that use a somewhat similar technology base. However, no matter how specified licensing contracts are drafted, they still contain some element of uncertainty. Therefore, even though licensing agreements are clearly less relational than many other forms of inter-firm cooperation, they are still to some degree incomplete contracts as not all contingencies of future and broader use can be foreseen (Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Hill, 1992).

When licensors enter into a technology transfer agreement with partners that are direct competitors, in the sense that they operate in similar product markets or apply similar technologies, they are expected to prefer to arrange this technology transfer through a partnership-embedded licensing agreement. Again, the main motive for this preference is that a partnership-embedded licensing agreement offers more options for a licensor to monitor its partner and the technology transfer than a standard licensing contract. Through partnership-embedded licensing it can avoid second-order diffusion of technological know-how that might enable its partner, with which there is overlap in markets and/or technologies, to use these unintended spill-overs in new or improved products or to upgrade its technology. Hence:

_Hypothesis 5. The larger the similarity of companies, in terms of market overlap (5a) and technological overlap (5b), the higher the likelihood that companies will prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contracts._
METHODOLOGY

Sample and Data Collection

We shall test our hypotheses on a sample of licensing agreements taken from the Thomson SDC database, using a binominal logit model (Limdep version 8.0). The sample consists of 228 licensing agreements of which, 28.9% are standard licensing agreements and 71.1% are embedded licensing agreements. Our research covers a ten years period, from 1990 until the end of 1999.

There are some important features of our sample that have to be discussed briefly. First, we restrict our analysis of licensing agreements, both the partnership-embedded licensing agreements and the standard licensing contracts, to exclusive licensing. Contrary to non-exclusive licenses which are usually unrestricted in terms of users, geographic regions, length of time, and specific fields of use; exclusive licensing agreements refer to specific partners where technology is transferred from one company to another with restricted use. As such these exclusive licensing agreements are expected to be of greater importance to both licensor and licensee then the common non-exclusive licensing agreement. Second, in order to control for the effect of international technology transfer and to counter the effect of the lack of data on non-US companies, we concentrate on licensing agreements made within the domestic US context, i.e. agreements made between two US companies. Third, given the legal ramifications of intellectual property rights and licensing, certainly in an international context, this sample of US domestic licensing agreements has the advantage that these agreements are subject to the same legal system. Fourth, we only analyse agreements made between two companies; a small number of agreements between three or more companies were deleted from our sample. Fifth, due to the lack of some industry indicators for service industries and given the abundance of licensing agreements in manufacturing industries, we only include agreements for manufacturing sectors. Finally, but also critically, the licensing agreements
between the pairs of companies in this sample are unique and first combinations of these companies. Based on the information found in the Thomson SDC database, these partners did not engage in earlier licensing agreements or other forms of cooperation with each other during a period of at least five years prior to the licensing agreement in this sample. This implies that the preference for a partnership-embedded licensing agreement or an exclusive licensing agreement is not guided by previous or recent contacts between two companies that could be interpreted as joint, routinized and endogenous search behaviour. On the contrary, the decision to enter into either form of licensing can be seen as a distinctive and strategic decision, made in the context of a first time encounter between the two companies involved in the technology transfer.¹

To arrive at our sample we first selected all agreements in the Thomson SDC database that are flagged as licensing agreements and those agreements in which technology transfer and licensing were mentioned in the textual description (deal text). We only considered agreements labelled as completed/signed deals (status: completed/signed). Using the textual description, we also verified whether the Thomson identification of the licensor and licensee were accurate, similar to Anand & Khanna (2000) we found that licensor and licensee are generally correctly identified in the Thomson SDC database. Next, we selected only one-way licensing agreements that are indicated as exclusive licensing agreements, excluding a large number of cross-licensing agreements that are not flagged as such. Within the group of exclusive licensing agreements, we distinguish between partnership-embedded licensing and standard licensing agreements. A partnership-embedded licensing agreement is a licensing agreement that is part of an R&D agreement, marketing agreement, or manufacturing and supply agreement, the latter category contains manufacturing, supply, and original equipment manufacturing/value-added reseller agreements. As indicated in the above, we also only included exclusive licensing agreements that pertain to a US context, implying that the
participants are US firms (participant ultimate parent nation code: US, cross border participants: no) and that the licensing agreement refers to the US market (nation code of partnership contains US) as one of the main markets.

**Measures**

The dependent variable, *form of licensing agreement*, refers to the preference for a standard exclusive licensing contract or a partnership-embedded licensing agreement. The dependent variable is coded 0 if the licensing agreement is a standard exclusive licensing contract and 1 if it is a partnership-embedded exclusive licensing agreement, i.e. when the licensing contract is part of a partnership that also covers joint efforts of companies in R&D, manufacturing and supply or marketing.

*Level of technological sophistication* of an industry (hypothesis 1) refers to the R&D intensity of the sector in which a licensing agreement (either a standard exclusive licensing or a partnership-embedded exclusive licensing agreement) is found, as indicated by the Thomson SDC database. This measure accounts for the degree to which firms in a particular industry dedicate resources to R&D. It is measured as total R&D expenditures of companies as a percentage of total production (gross output) in an industry. The data refer to US industries and R&D intensity is reported as average of 1991 – 1997 (see OECD, 2001). Conversion tables were used to convert ISIC codes, in which the OECD R&D intensities are categorised, into SIC codes used by Thomson SDC to categorize industries to which licensing agreements refer. This industry R&D intensity indicates the extent to which companies in particular industries devote resources to R&D that generate a continuous flow of newly developed technologies, new products and new processes, representing differences in the sectoral levels of technological sophistication (OECD, 1992, 2001, 2003; Freeman and Soete, 1997). As also stated by Hatzichronoglou (1997, p. 146), this “… R&D intensity largely reflects an industry’s technological sophistication …”.

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The *regime of appropriability* of industries is measured as the level of perceived effectiveness of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism in different US industries as reported in Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000). This indicates the degree to which companies in different industries appreciate secrecy as an effective appropriability mechanism for innovation (hypothesis 2). Using a conversion table, we transformed ISIC codes, in which the regimes of appropriability are reported, into the SIC codes to which both forms of exclusive licensing are assigned in the Thomson SDC database.

*Size inequality* of companies is based on a size ratio which is the ratio of the numbers of employees for both companies engaged in an agreement (see Barla, 2000; Hagedoorn, Cloo dt, van Kranenburg, 2005). This ration is calculated as the size differential of $1 - \left( \frac{\text{size of smaller firm}}{\text{size of larger firm}} \right)$, which creates values between 0 and 1. Data for this variable were retrieved from Compustat, CorpTech, Dun & Bradstreet’s Hoovers, Osiris and Worldscope and, in a small number of cases, annual reports. For both partners in an agreement, we took employment data from one year before the agreement was established. Obviously, this ratio only captures the size difference between licensors and licensees, it does not indicate whether licensors or licensees are larger (or smaller). A dummy variable, *licensor smaller*, was constructed to measure the effect when licensors are smaller than licensees (hypothesis 3). Based on the number of employees of both companies, the value is set at 1 if the licensor is smaller than licensee and 0 if the licensee is smaller.

*Innovative differentials* between licensing partners are measured through patent intensity ratios. See Griliches (1998) for a discussion of patents as a useful indicator of innovation. The patent intensity ratio is based on the total number of US patents issued to companies during five years prior to the year when the agreement was established. For each partner in an agreement, we calculated a patent intensity ratio, controlling for firm size as measured by the number of employees. From these individual ratios, we calculated the
innovative differential as the difference in patent intensity at the pair level. Patent data were retrieved from the US Patent and Trademark Office. Based on patent intensity ratios at the pair level, we can also indicate whether licensors are more innovative or have higher patent ratios than their partners. A dummy variable, \textit{licensor more innovative}, was constructed for which the value was set at 1 if the licensor is more innovative than the licensee and 0 if the licensee is more innovative (hypothesis 4).

\textit{Market overlap} of companies is measured by primary 4-digits SIC code overlap between licensor and licensee. Primary SIC codes of companies are reported in the Thomson SDC database. Based on primary 4-digits SIC codes we computed a market overlap dummy, which was set at 1 if the licensor and the licensee are in the same market, as measured by primary 4-digits SIC code, and 0 if they are not (hypothesis 5a).

\textit{Technological overlap} is measured by a patent class overlap dummy (hypothesis 5b). This measure is based on the number of patent classes listed for all US patent applications of both partners in an agreement, during a period of five years before a licensing agreement was established. The dummy is 1 if at least one full patent class (nine digits) is the same and 0 if there is no patent class overlap. These data were retrieved from the US Patent and Trademark Office.

We also included a number of control variables. A trend variable \textit{time} is included to control for possible growth in the number of agreements (see e.g. Gulati, 1999) and a gradual change in the distribution between partnership-embedded licensing and exclusive licensing agreements. This trend variable was calculated by assigning a value to each particular year, which reflects the distance to the first year of the period under investigation.

The \textit{average experience} is the log of the count of the total number of licensing agreements accumulated by each pair of companies during a period of five years before the agreement (see e.g. Gulati, 1999). This experience refers to all forms of licensing, embedded
and non-embedded (i.e. standard) licensing, exclusive and non-exclusive licensing, and cross licensing agreements.

We control for possible industry effects by constructing dummies for the three largest industries in our sample. We include an industry dummy for chemicals and allied products (129 agreements), instruments and related products (30 agreements) and electrical and electronic equipment (18 agreements). The default ‘industry’ refers to the remaining 51 agreements that are scattered across 13 different industries.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables in this study. Correlation is very low for most variables and only moderate (< 0.45) for some industry variables, well below the suggested cut-off point of 0.70 (Cohen, West, Aiken and Cohen, 2003) indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem.6

------------- Insert table 1 about here -------------

Table 2 provides the results for the stepwise logit analysis, where industry and pair-related variables are added to the analysis. An alternative procedure, where each step remains in the analysis as the other variables are added, generated similar results. Given the rather unambiguous nature of the results, we shall only concentrate our discussion on the results for the full model (model 4). Compared with the other models, the full model has the expected lowest log-likelihood value and it generates a very significant improvement (p < 0.001) over the base model (model 1) and models 2 and 3.

------------- Insert table 2 about here -------------
Turning to the hypothesis testing, we find some clear results for the industry related hypotheses and some mixed findings for the pair-level hypotheses. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the higher the level of technological sophistication of industries, in terms of R&D intensity, the more companies operating in these industries prefer partnership-embedded licensing agreements, where technology transfer is part of a broader partnership, to standard exclusive licensing agreements. Also, as suggested by hypothesis 2, the more companies operate in an industry environment where secrecy is an important dimension of the protection of their innovations and technology, the more they prefer to embed their technology transfer to other companies in a partnership rather than arrange for technology transfer through standard licensing contacts.

The firm or pair level effects on the preference for licensing agreements indicate that only the size inequality in pairs of companies seems to have a significant impact on the preference of these companies. As indicated by the result for the size ratio of partners, larger size inequalities between partners lead to a preference for partnership-embedded licensing. Consistent with hypothesis 3, when licensors are smaller than their licensees, companies prefer to transfer technology through a licensing agreement that is part of a wider partnership that covers multiple elements of the value chain. However, the other hypotheses did not generate the expected results. We expected that when licensors are more innovative than their licensees, they would be inclined to protect their technology transfer by means of additional control, beyond the protection offered by a contract, through a broader partnership (hypothesis 4). Our results indicate that neither the innovative differential between partners nor the innovative supremacy of the licensor has an effect on the preference for a particular form of licensing. Also, the degree to which partners are direct competitors as they are operating in similar markets (hypothesis 5a) or the degree to which their technologies are somewhat
similar (hypothesis 5b) appear to have no impact on the preference for partnership-embedded licensing. Both market overlap and technological overlap have the expected positive sign and technological overlap is even marginally significant in model 3, but we find no significant results in the full model (model 4).

The control variables, time, average experience of partners with a wider range of licensing agreements, and the industry dummies have no effect on the preference for particular forms of licensing. Given some suggestions on the possible effect of the regime of appropriability on the licensing strategy of different companies (Anand and Khanna, 2000), we considered a number of interaction effects of the regime of appropriability with the size of licensors, the innovativeness of licensors, the market overlap of partners and their technological overlap. However, none of these findings generated meaningful results.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Our findings clearly indicate that industry-specific conditions, both in terms of the level of technological sophistication and the regimes of appropriability, have an effect on the preference of companies for technology transfer through either standard licensing contracts or through partnership-embedded licensing. The more industries are characterized as technologically sophisticated and R&D intensive, the higher the preference for partnership-embedded licensing. Such industries where hyper-competition (D’Aveni, 1995), with a combination of product differentiation, large R&D efforts, speedy innovation and flexibility, affect the competitive positioning of companies are also those sectors where we witness a growth in the number of partnerships (see Dussauge and Garette, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002). Inter-firm partnerships in these technologically sophisticated industries combine multiple technologies of partners that can actually overarch different fields of technology, where companies jointly develop new technologies and new products and processes. The sharing of
technological competences and learning with and from partners are the main goals of partnerships in these industries (Hagedoorn, 2002). As the transfer of multiple and complex technologies is less enhanced by standard licensing agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000), we submit that in technologically sophisticated industries, where companies have already built up considerable experience with partnerships, licensing of complex technologies is embedded in partnerships to facilitate the collaboration and transfer of technology from one company to the other.

Industries characterized as technologically less sophisticated represent more homogeneous markets with less product differentiation and less emphasis on continuous innovation. It is also in these industries that we find fewer partnerships and less partnership experience of individual companies (Dussauge and Garette, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002) with more single technology transfer (Anand and Khanna, 2000). As such the need for companies to embed their technology transfer in broader partnerships seems limited. In these industries, technology transfer is also less geared towards complex, multiple technology sourcing, where the tacit nature of knowledge would require a more extended cooperation between licensor and licensee.

When we consider the regime of appropriability of industries, in terms of the degree to which companies use secrecy to protect their innovative input and output (Cohen et al., 2000), our research indicates some interesting findings. When tacit knowledge and confidentiality become important social mechanisms to protect innovation and technological knowledge in industries, the relevance of partnership-embedded technology transfer also increases. Standard licensing contracts are clearly less relational in nature than partnerships (Eisenberg, 2000) but even licensing agreements are in principle not 100% complete and as such second-order diffusion (Hill, 1992) remains a risk even in exclusive licensing agreements. Partnership-embedded licensing does offer partners the possibility to create more elaborate cooperation...
than through a standard licensing contract, yet it also gives them the opportunity to closely monitor technology transfer and partly control their relationship through a partnership. This extended licensing relationship through a partnership also allows companies to intensify their relationship through in-depth collaboration that includes elements of R&D, manufacturing & supply or marketing, which we expect to be particularly relevant in industries where the regime of appropriability and the protection of innovative activities is to a large extent based on secrecy.

When we consider company and pair effects on the preference for standard licensing contracts or partnership-embedded licensing, it appears that the size inequality of partners engaging in technology transfer is the only factor that is relevant. Neither the difference in innovative capabilities nor the conflicting interests through overlap in product market combinations or similar technology sourcing seem to be relevant. It is important to note that the form of licensing that this study analyses refers to technology transfer where companies made an agreement where the technology to be transferred is restricted to one licensee who can use it for a specific geographic region, a specific length of time, and/or a specific application. This suggests that when licensors are more innovative than their licensees, or when both companies operate in similar markets and depend on similar technologies, companies are probably confident that licensing agreements, regardless of some contractual incompleteness, provide ample safeguards against opportunistic behaviour and second-order diffusion that might enable licensees to exploit the technology beyond what was intended initially (Caves et al., 1983; Hill, 1992).

Partnership-specific effects are relevant when we consider size inequalities between companies that engage in technology transfer through licensing. As suggested by our findings, the more partners differ in size, the higher the likelihood that they prefer partnership-embedded licensing agreements to standard licensing contracts. More specifically, when the
licensor is the smaller partner, we see that a partnership-embedded licensing agreement is the preferred mode of technology transfer. By definition, the licensor holds the property rights on the technology to be transferred and it probably has the relevant experience and knowledge about how to use the technology, which gives it an information advantage (Caves et al., 1983). However, as indicated in research by Kolmer and Dowling (2004), compared to larger companies, small firms are more inclined, or forced due to lack of financial resources or complementary assets, to license core technologies to other companies. Smaller companies are also engaged in fewer technologies than large companies that tend to be more multi-technology and multidivisional in nature (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Scherer, 1980). This implies that when smaller companies act as licensors it is likely that their technology transfer refers to an activity that is relatively crucial for these companies as their pool of technologies from which to transfer a specific technology is limited. Even though exclusive licensing contracts limit the scope of the application by the licensee, smaller licensors are limited in their abilities to counter the risk of impacted information and opportunism on part of the licensees. All of this suggests that when licensors are confronted with larger licensing partners, smaller licensors prefer to organize their technology transfer through partnership-embedded licensing agreements. These partnership-embedded licensing agreements provide them with more control over the use of the technology and enable them to monitor their partner through a broader partnership set-up over an extended period of time than through a single licensing contract. As suggested by transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson, 1996), when monitoring of the actual collaboration, enforcement of contractual terms, and adequate specification of property rights are contingent upon inter-firm cooperation, its governance is most adequately served by a partnership that offers an acceptable level of control to partners. This line of reasoning clearly assumes that it is the smaller licensor which, given the risk of unintended leakage of crucial technology, sets the parameters of control from the early stages
in a partnership-embedded licensing agreement. In theory, it is possible that the larger licensee would also favour such a partnership-embedded licensing agreement. However, given the market power of larger companies, their bargaining strength, and their ability to oversee the process of technology transfer due their advantages in scale and scope (Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Caves, et al., 1983), we expect that there are fewer incentives for larger licensees (and also larger licensors) to engage in partnership-embedded licensing agreements.

In this context, we can also briefly discuss some interesting legal aspects of the preference of companies for partnership-embedded licensing. Given the legally problematic status of pre-contractual liability regarding intellectual property due to the early disclosure of technical information, i.e. prior to the actual technology transfer under a licensing agreement, companies might prefer to engage in partnership-embedded licensing agreements to better monitor and control the agreement from the early start. However, as explained by Merges (2006), when the technology to be transferred is protected by intellectual property such as a patent, companies are already well-protected by law. Assuming that most of the licensing agreements in our sample are backed by intellectual property such as patents, this could explain why companies that engage in technology transfer with companies in similar markets, with technologically overlapping partners, and with less innovative partners are well-protected by their relevant patents and do not have to rely on embedded licensing agreements per se. When companies are smaller than their partners, they prefer partnership-embedded licensing which could indicate that smaller companies might fear that litigation of larger companies is troublesome and time-consuming. If, the licensing agreement would be violated by the larger partner, then monitoring the technology transfer through a partnership-embedded licensing agreement will give more useful information about how, where and to what extent the license is implemented by the partner and which activities take place outside the parameters set by the agreement.
Although, the above suggests a number of interesting findings that clarify under which conditions companies prefer partnership-embedded licensing to standard licensing contract, our research still leaves quite a number of questions unanswered and additional research is required. As already indicated in the Introduction, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the very first attempt to analyze the choices that companies make when they consider technology transfer through a standard licensing contract or through a more extended partnership. A number of subjects that warrant further research come to mind. First, our research is based on a limited sample of licensing agreements and further research on an extended sample with a larger number of companies in a more multi-sectoral and international setting will enable us to look at research questions from an international perspective while broadening the picture to a broader range of industries. Second, our data are restricted to a limited number of publicly announced agreements with some information on the content of the agreement. Obviously, we need more information on the motives of firms to arrive at a more complete understanding of the alternative options that they consider. Survey research and case-studies can generate further insight into the considerations of companies, asking a much broader set of questions about the motives to engage in technology transfer and its organizational and contractual setting than is possible through database research. Third, a relatively unknown territory for future empirical research is found in the interaction of the legal set-up of various forms of technology transfer, their organizational setting, and the strategic implications of the choices that companies make when they transfer technology to other companies. Obviously, these topics for future research also indicate the limitations to our current contribution, in terms of the relatively small sample for US companies, largely limited to a small number of industries, while we addressed only a small number of research questions. Given the exploratory nature of our contribution, we hope that despite some limitations, our work has explored a number of interesting subjects that lay out some of the groundwork for future studies.
REFERENCES


### TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations (s.d.)) and bivariate correlations for all variables, N=228

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<th>4</th>
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<td>-0.11</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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TABLE 2

Estimation results of binomial logit model

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<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
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<td>0.07†</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Effectiveness of secrecy</td>
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<td>0.05*</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
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<td>Licensor more innovative</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market overlap</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.59)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td>Chemicals and allied products</td>
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<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
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<td>(0.38)</td>
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<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>(0.51)</td>
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<td>Electrical and electronic equipment</td>
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<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>228</td>
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<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Log likelihood</td>
<td>134.5065</td>
<td>124.9702</td>
<td>121.5449</td>
<td>113.3571</td>
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</table>

Standard Errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.10
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>2007-01</td>
<td>Developing science, technology and innovation indicators: what we can learn from the past</td>
<td>Christopher Freeman &amp; Luc Soete</td>
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<td>2007-02</td>
<td>The impact of innovation activities on productivity and firm growth: evidence from Brazil</td>
<td>Micheline Goedhuys</td>
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<td>2007-03</td>
<td>Estimations of US debt dynamics: Growth cum debt and the savings glut in Kouri’s model</td>
<td>Thomas Ziesemer</td>
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<td>How Do Consumers Make Choices? A Summary of Evidence from Marketing and Psychology</td>
<td>Zakaria Babutsidze</td>
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<td>2007-06</td>
<td>Inter-firm Technology Transfer: Partnership-embedded Licensing or Standard Licensing Agreements?</td>
<td>John Hagedoorn, Stefanie Lorenz-Orlean &amp; Hans Kranenburg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, during the period 1990-1999, only sixteen pairs of companies, i.e. 7% of the sample, have set up any form of subsequent collaboration registered in the Thomson SDC database after their first agreement, of which only one pair entered into a third consecutive collaboration agreement with each other.

In additional analyses, we also used the size difference in terms of the nominal difference and the average number of employees at the pair level, these measures generated similar results as the ratios. Furthermore, one could argue that revenues are a more adequate indicator of the size of companies. Statistical analysis with revenue-based size differentials on a slightly smaller sample (N=211), due to missing values for at least one of the companies in 17 pairs of our overall sample, lead to similar results.

We also used patent intensity ratios and average patent intensity in unreported statistical analyses, this generated similar results.

Measures for market overlap in 2 and 3-digits SIC codes generated similar results.

An alternative technology overlap measure, based on the number of patent classes, at the three digit level, that licensors and licensees share divided by the total number of patent classes of both companies, generated similar results.
Given the moderate level of correlation between the industry variables, we also ran the regressions without industry dummies which generated similar results as those presented in table 2.