Mechanisms for decentralized online scheduling

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Mechanisms for Decentralized Online Scheduling\footnote{This research was supported by NWO grant 2004/03545/MaGW ‘Local Decisions in Decentralised Planning Environments’.}

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Abstract

The paper introduces a model for online parallel machine scheduling, where any single machine is run on the basis of a locally optimal sequencing policy. Jobs choose the machine on which they want to be processed themselves, and in addition, any job \( j \) owns a piece of private information, namely its indifference cost \( w_j \) for waiting one additional unit of time before being processed. We study this setting from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design, and assuming that each job prefers to be completed as early as possible, the utilitarian social choice function minimizes the total weighted completion times \( \sum w_j c_j \). We prove that in this setting there exists an online mechanism, running in polynomial time, where rational jobs select their machine in such a way that the resulting schedule is 3.281-competitive with respect to the off-line optimal solution that maximizes social welfare. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs to truthfully report their indifference costs, in the sense that it is a myopic best response. Moreover, the payment scheme results in a balanced budget, that is, payments are only made between jobs. We also discuss extensions to mechanisms where truth-telling is even an ex-post weakly dominant strategy, while preserving the competitive ratio.

1 Introduction

We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time \( \text{OPT} [r_j | \sum w_j c_j ] \) in the notation of Graham et al. [6]—from a new perspective: We assume that the system needs to be organized without (too much of) central coordination. More precisely, we ask for the performance of the system if each of the parallel machines is run on the basis of a reasonable (yet suboptimal) sequencing policy locally, while the online arriving jobs have to decide for the machines themselves. Each arriving job would like to be scheduled as early as possible, and it comes with a piece of information that is not publicly known, namely its indifference cost \( w_j \) for waiting one unit of time. The processing times \( p_j \) of jobs are assumed to be publicly known. The indifference costs \( w_j \), together with the processing times \( p_j \) of the jobs, however, define the input for the local scheduling policies of the machines. An arriving job may thus have an incentive to lie about its true indifference cost, in order to strategically manipulate the schedule. The goal is to nevertheless set up a system that yields a reasonable overall performance. In this setting, it is typically desirable to implement a social choice function that is utilitarian, i.e., it maximizes the sum of the valuations of all the jobs [17]. Hence, since any job prefers to be completed as early as possible, with indifference cost \( w_j \) for waiting, a mechanism

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that minimizes the total weighted completion time \( \sum w_j c_j \) implements the utilitarian social choice function, or in other words, it maximizes the total social welfare.

From a pure algorithmic perspective, this problem poses two challenges, as stated also by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [11]. The first is the lack of information caused by the fact that jobs become known to the system only at the moment of their arrival (online algorithms). The second is the lack of unbounded computational resources, which allows only for approximate solutions to the underlying NP-hard optimization problem (approximation algorithms). A third obstruction, in fact the starting point for what is known as mechanism design, is the asymmetry of information: information that is required to run the system is private to the participants in the system. Selfish agents trying to maximize their own benefit can therefore do so by reporting strategically about their private information, thus manipulating the resulting outcome.

**Contribution.** The paper touches on three research areas, namely the design of approximation algorithms for NP-hard optimization problems, competitive analysis for online optimization, and mechanism design for resolving the asymmetry of information. Motivated by the observation that many real-life systems are not centrally but rather hierarchical organized, we assume that any of the parallel machines adopts a ‘reasonable’ scheduling policy locally without further reference to what is happening on other machines. More precisely, we assume that any machine locally utilizes the well known WSPT rule, since this is the locally optimal scheduling policy for the single machine scheduling problem \( 1 \mid \sum w_j c_j \mid 20 \). That is, jobs are scheduled in the order of relative shortest processing time \( p_j/w_j \) first. Intuitively, the computational complexity of parallel machine scheduling is thus bypassed, of course at a possible loss in overall performance. Moreover, we assume that the WSPT rule is used in a myopic, yet practically reasonable sense, namely without further consideration of the online situation. So at any time, a machine schedules among all jobs assigned to it the one with largest ratio \( w_j/p_j \) first. Clearly, some procedure is needed to coordinate the distribution of jobs over machines. Moreover, given that the knowledge of the private information of the jobs, their indifference costs \( w_j \), is vital to achieve a reasonable overall performance, and given that any job selfishly seeks to minimize its own completion time, we need to set up a mechanism that induces them to choose the ‘right’ machine, and to report their private information \( w_j \) truthfully to the respective machine.

We prove in this paper that such a mechanism exists. More precisely, we present a polynomial-time mechanism for the previously described model for decentralized online scheduling. As usual in mechanism design, our mechanism defines payments that have to be made by the jobs, depending on the machine they choose, and depending on the report of their private information \( w_j \). These payments are used for two different purposes. First, as a means of coordination, inducing the jobs to choose the ‘right’ machine, and second, as a means to stimulate truthful reports of the \( w_j \)’s. Building upon an analysis of Megow et al. [16], we show that the so-defined decentralized mechanism is 3.281-competitive, that is, under the assumption of rational behavior of the jobs, the obtained solution is never more than 3.281 times the optimal off-line solution that uses central coordination. Note that the performance bound matches the one obtained by Megow and Schulz [15] for the online parallel machine problem to minimize \( \sum w_j c_j \) (using central coordination). Moreover, the payments result in a balanced budget, that is, no payments are required from or to a central coordination authority. In the mechanism, a truthful report of the indifference cost \( w_j \) is a myopic best response for any job. We also give an example to show that no payments exist that would make truth-telling an ex-post weakly dominant strategy. In other words, the algorithm cannot be turned into a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism. However, we show that dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms can be obtained, while maintaining the same performance bound, at the cost of introducing central coordination for the distribution of the jobs.
over machines.

We see the contribution of the paper twofold. First, we introduce a natural paradigm for decentralization of a parallel machine system: Each machine implements a locally optimal sequencing policy, while jobs have to choose the machines themselves. Moreover, the processing requirements \( p_j \) of the jobs are assumed to be publicly known, since they are publicly observable once the jobs are scheduled. Private information is only the indigence cost \( w_j \) of any job, measuring the private cost for being processed one unit of time later. Second, we show that in this decentralized model, both the lack of central coordination and the asymmetry of information can be bypassed by the definition of very simple and natural payments that even result in a balanced budget, at least assuming a certain notion of rational behavior. Most importantly, of course, the resulting mechanism for the online parallel machine scheduling problem provides a competitive ratio of 3.281.

**Related Work.** Mechanism design in combination with the design of approximation algorithms for scheduling problems has been studied, e.g., by Nisan and Ronen [18] and Archer and Tardos [2]. In both papers, not the jobs but the machines are the selfishly behaving parts of the system, and the private information is the processing speed of the machine. Archer and Tardos [2] consider as application of their main theorem a problem with related parallel machines, that is, each machine \( i \) has a processing speed \( s_i \), and a job \( j \) requires processing for \( p_j/s_i \) time if processed on machine \( i \). They define a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of truthful (dominant strategy incentive compatible) mechanisms, namely the monotonicity of the total work assigned to a machine in dependence on its reported speed \( s_i \). On the basis of this characterization, they design a randomized mechanism that yields a deterministic 3-approximation for the minimum makespan problem, \( Q|C_{\text{max}} \), while truthfully reporting \( s_i \) is a dominant strategy that maximizes the expected utility of each machine. A deterministic monotone algorithm with the same performance bound was recently proposed by Kovacs [12]. Nisan and Ronen [18] consider the minimum makespan problem on unrelated machines, \( R|C_{\text{max}} \). There, the processing time of any job \( j \) on any machine \( i \) is \( p_{ij} \), with no relation to speeds of the machines. In their paper, the private information of any machine \( i \) is multi-dimensional, namely the vector of processing times \( (p_{i1}, \ldots, p_{in}) \). They present a truthful (dominant strategy incentive compatible) \( m \)-approximation, where \( m \) denotes the number of machines. Furthermore, they prove that no truthful mechanism can yield a \( \rho \)-approximation for the minimum makespan problem with \( \rho < 2 \), and present a randomized mechanism that beats this deterministic lower bound. Decentralized scheduling is also subject of a paper by Wellman et al. [22]. In contrast to the model we propose, however, the term ‘decentralized’ in [22] describes the fact that agents choose their bidding strategy on the basis of local information, which differs from our notion of decentralization.

In the sequel of the paper, we formalize the model and introduce the required notation in Section 2. In Section 3 we first give a simple example to show that decentralization may be arbitrarily bad in general, and propose an algorithm for online scheduling on parallel machines using central coordination, inspired by [16]. In Section 4, we analyze this algorithm from a mechanism design perspective, and in Section 5 we introduce a simple payment scheme that yields a decentralized implementation of the same algorithm, in such a way that truthful reporting the indifference costs \( w_j \) is a myopic best response for any job. We analyze the performance of the resulting mechanism in Section 6 and conclude with further extensions and remarks in Section 7.

2 Model and Notation

We consider the online scheduling problem with non-trivial release dates on parallel machines with the objective to minimize the weighted sum of completion times, \( P|r_j|\sum w_j c_j \). We are given a
set of jobs $J = \{1, \ldots, n\}$, with processing requirements $p_j > 0$, $j \in J$, and each job needs to be processed on any of the parallel, identical machines from the set $M = \{1, \ldots, m\}$. We consider the time-stamp model of online optimization [19], that is, the jobs arrive over time, every job $j$ at its release date $r_j \geq 0$. Only at this time, the system learns about the existence of a job, and the processing time $p_j$ is revealed. We assume that any job $j$ prefers a lower completion time to a higher one, where the completion time $c_j$ is the moment in time when job $j$’s processing is finished. Each job owns a piece of private information, namely its indifference cost, or weight, which we denote by $w^*_j$. The weight represents the privately known cost to a job for one additional unit of time spent waiting. We use $w^*_j$ for the indifference cost to differentiate it from the reported weight, $w_j$, which may be different. We define the valuation of job $j$ with indifference cost $w^*_j$ for a schedule that gives it completion time $c_j$ as $-w^*_jc_j$. While jobs behave selfishly trying to maximize their valuations, the social welfare is maximized whenever the weighted sum of completion times $\sum_{j \in J} w^*_j c_j$ is minimum.

3 The MinIncrease Algorithm

Recall our assumption that each of the $m$ machines utilizes the WSPT rule locally, and suppose that each job tries to minimize its completion time with respect to the already present jobs, as it has no information about future job arrivals. Then the following can happen.

Example 1. Let there be $m$ machines and $m$ jobs with processing times $1, 1 - \varepsilon, 1 - 2\varepsilon, \ldots, 1 - (m-1)\varepsilon$ for constant $\varepsilon$ with $0 < \varepsilon < 1/m$, and assume that each job has unit weights. Let all jobs arrive at time zero, but in the given order. (One could enforce this order by slightly changing the release dates and adding dummy jobs, which would not influence the demonstrated effect, but complicate notation.)

Then an optimal schedule assigns exactly one job to every machine, resulting in $\sum w^*_j c_j < m$. If each job can select a machine itself, an arriving job only finds jobs already scheduled on machines with a larger processing time. By an inductive argument, no incentives exist to report a false weight, since any arriving job will be the shortest, and therefore any of the $m$ machines would minimize the job’s completion time. It is therefore possible that all jobs choose the same machine\(^1\). The weighted sum of completion times is then larger than $$(1 - (m-1)\varepsilon)(m(m+1)/2)$$ and therefore the approximation ratio is bounded from below by

$$\frac{(1 - (m-1)\varepsilon)(m(m+1)/2)}{m} = \frac{m + 1}{2} - \frac{(m + 1)(m-1)}{2} \varepsilon,$$

which becomes arbitrarily large for large $m$.

Hence, a decentralized selection of machines by the jobs themselves can cause arbitrarily large deviations from the optimum. On the other hand, using central coordination one can enforce the solution to be $O(1)$-competitive, that is, not worse than a constant times the off-line optimum. We next propose an algorithm that is inspired by the MinIncrease algorithm in [16], which yields a competitive ratio of 3.281. Since we have to rely on reported weights $w_j$, we consider $\sum_{j \in J} w_j c_j$ instead of $\sum_{j \in J} w^*_j c_j$. In order to formulate the algorithm, we first introduce the necessary notation. Let $c_j(i)$ denote the completion time of job $j$ when assigned to machine $i$. Let $j \rightarrow i$ denote the fact that job $j$ is scheduled on machine $i$. Without loss of generality, we assume that the jobs are

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\(^1\) Again, one could make the first machine the only one maximizing the utility of an arriving job by adding dummy jobs with small processing times that occupy all other machines, before any ‘real’ job arrives.
numbered in order of their arrival, i.e. $j < k \Rightarrow r_j \leq r_k$. For any job $j$, let $H(j)$ denote the set of jobs that have higher priority than $j$ according to WSPT, i.e.,

$$H(j) = \left\{ k \in J \mid \frac{w_k}{p_k} > \frac{w_j}{p_j} \right\} \cup \left\{ k \leq j \mid \frac{w_k}{p_k} = \frac{w_j}{p_j} \right\}.$$

Note that $H(j)$ includes $j$, too. Similarly, let $L(j) = J \setminus H(j)$ denote the set of jobs with lower priority. In case of equal ratios $w_j/p_j$, we break ties by giving higher priority to jobs that arrive earlier according to the online sequence. Furthermore, let $s_j$ denote the starting time of $j$, i.e., the time when $j$ eventually starts being processed. Clearly, $s_j \geq r_j$. At a given point $t$ in time, machine $i$ might be busy processing a job. Let $b_i(t)$ denote the remaining processing time of that job at time $t$, i.e., at time $t$ machine $i$ will be blocked during $b_i(t)$ units of time for new jobs. If machine $i$ is idle at time $t$, set $b_i(t) = 0$. The algorithm consists of a local scheduling policy, the WSPT rule, that is applied by every machine and an assignment procedure that is used whenever a new job arrives.

**Algorithm 1: MinIncrease Algorithm**

**Local Sequencing Policy:** Whenever a machine becomes idle, it starts processing the job with highest priority among all available jobs assigned to it. Priority here means the ratio of reported weight over processing time. In case of equal ratios a job with smaller index has higher priority.

**Assignment:**

1. At time $r_j$ job $j$ arrives and reports a weight $w_j$ (possibly $w_j \neq w_j^*$).
2. For every machine $i \in M$ the increase in the objective value (where the true weights $w_j^*$ are replaced by the reports $w_j$) is computed. The increase of $j$ on machine $i$ is

   $$\text{incr}(j,i) = w_j c_j(i) + \sum_{k \in L(j), k < j, s_k > r_j} w_k - w_j r_j - \sum_{k \in H(j), k < j} p_k + p_j + \sum_{k \in L(j), k < j, s_k > r_j} w_k.$$

3. Job $j$ is assigned to machine $i_j \in \text{argmin}_{i \in M} \text{incr}(j,i)$ with minimum index.

The MinIncrease Algorithm still makes use of central coordination in Step 3. In the sequel we will first analyze the MinIncrease Algorithm, and then introduce payments that allow a decentralized implementation of the algorithm.

4 The Mechanism Design Perspective

In order to get hands on the quality of a schedule, our aim is to motivate the jobs to report their private piece of information, their indifference costs $w_j^*$, truthfully. Therefore we give a definition of truthfulness which requires some mechanism design notation first. In mechanism design, one refers to the private information of an agent as its type. Let us regard the job set $J = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ as a of agents, each having a true type $w_j^*$ from the space of possible types $W$. Given a vector of reports $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_n)$ of all agents (jobs), an allocation algorithm $A : W^n \rightarrow O$ computes an outcome $A(w)$ from the set of possible outcomes $O$. Here, the set of outcomes $O$ is the set of all possible schedules. A payment rule $\pi : W^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ determines payments $\pi_i(w), \ldots, \pi_n(w)$ for every agent. The tuple $\mu = (A, \pi)$ is called a mechanism. We confine ourselves to direct revelation mechanisms, where the strategy of each agent $j$ is simply to report a type $w_j \in W$. We assume that agents
have quasi-linear utilities, i.e., an agent’s utility is computed from its valuation \( v_j(A(w)|w^*_j) \) (i.e., its valuation \( v_j \) for the outcome \( A(w) \)), given its true type \( w^*_j \) and its payment \( \pi_j(w) \) as follows:

\[
 u_j(\mu(w)|w^*_j) = v_j(A(w)|w^*_j) - \pi_j(w).
\]

The valuation of a job \( j \) for a schedule that gives it completion time \( c_j = -w^*_j c_j \). The corresponding utility if \( j \) has to pay \( \pi_j \) will be abbreviated by \( u_j \) and is therefore \( u_j = -w^*_j c_j - \pi_j \). We will deal with non-negative payments \( \pi_j \geq 0 \) only, i.e., jobs have to pay a non-negative amount for being processed. With this notation, \( u_j \) is always negative. Therefore, we assume that a job has a constant and sufficiently large utility for ‘being processed at all’. That would add a constant to \( u_j \) such that the true utility is always positive. Since this does not change the jobs’ behavior when maximizing their utility, we will omit the constant and continue working with \( u_j \).

**Definition 2.** A direct revelation mechanism \( \mu \) is called truthful or dominant strategy incentive compatible if for all agents \( j \in J \), all fixed reports of the other agents \( w_{-j} = (w_1, \ldots, w_{j-1}, w_{j+1}, \ldots, w_n) \) and all possible reports \( w_j \in W \), \( u_j(\mu(w_{-j}, w^*_j)|w^*_j) \geq u_j(\mu(w_{-j}, w_j)|w^*_j) \). That is, if reporting the truth is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent.

An allocation algorithm that computes outcomes that would be desirable for a social planner is called social choice function. The overall goal is to design a mechanism that implements this social choice function. In the model we consider, we assume a utilitarian social choice function. This is one of the common goals when maximizing the social welfare [17].

**Definition 3.** A social choice function \( f \) is called utilitarian if it maximizes the sum of valuations of all agents, i.e., \( f(w) \in \arg \max_{o \in O} \sum_{j \in J} v_j(o w_j) \).

The social choice function is thus an algorithm maximizing \( \sum_{j \in J} -w^*_j c_j \), or equivalently minimizing \( \sum_{j \in J} w^*_j c_j \). Our goal is thus the design of a mechanism that implements this social choice function, i.e., a mechanism that yields a schedule minimizing \( \sum_{j \in J} w^*_j c_j \). For utilitarian social choice functions we have the following well known theorem.

**Theorem 4.** (Groves [7]) If the allocation algorithm \( A \) computes the utilitarian social choice function for every input vector \( w \), then there is a payment scheme \( \pi \) such that the direct revelation mechanism \( (A, \pi) \) is truthful.

In other words, an algorithm that computes an optimal schedule for \( \sum w_j c_j \) for any vector of weights \( w \), can be extended to a truthful mechanism with appropriate payments. Scheduling to minimize the weighted sum of completion times with release dates, however, is NP-hard, even in the off-line case [14]. Furthermore, no online algorithm for the single machine problem can be better than 2-competitive [9] regardless of the question whether or not P=NP, and lower bounds exist for parallel machines, too [21]. Therefore, the social choice function cannot be computed due to lack of both unbounded computational resources and information. Moreover, it is known that Theorem 4 does not generalize to the case where an approximation of the social choice function is used, this was shown by Nisan and Ronen [18]. And indeed, it is not possible to find a payment \( \pi \) that completes the MINCREASE Algorithm to a truthful mechanism. To illustrate the latter, we use the following necessary condition formulated by Lavi et al. [13].

**Definition 5.** (Weak Monotonicity) An allocation algorithm \( A \) satisfies weak monotonicity if for any agent \( j \in J \), every fixed report vector of the other agents \( w_{-j} \) and every pair of possible types \( \bar{w}_j \) and \( w_j \)

\[
v_j(A(w_{-j}, \bar{w}_j)|\bar{w}_j) - v_j(A(w_{-j}, \bar{w}_j)|w_j) \geq v_j(A(w_{-j}, w_j)|\bar{w}_j) - v_j(A(w_{-j}, w_j)|w_j).
\]
Lemma 6. (Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan [13]) Let $A$ be an allocation algorithm. If there is a payment scheme $\pi$ such that $(A, \pi)$ is a truthful mechanism, then $A$ satisfies weak monotonicity.

This result is now applied to our model. Lemma 7 reformulates weak monotonicity in terms of our valuation functions.

Lemma 7. For a job $j \in J$ and fixed reports $w_{-j}$ by the other jobs, let $A(w_{-j}, w_j)$ denote the resulting schedule if $j$ reports $w_j$. Let $c_j(A(w_{-j}, w_j))$ be the corresponding (ex-post) completion time of $j$ in that schedule. Then $A$ satisfies weak monotonicity in the described model if and only if it satisfies

$$w_j < \bar{w}_j \Rightarrow c_j(A(w_{-j}, w_j)) \geq c_j(A(w_{-j}, \bar{w}_j))$$

$$\forall j \in J, \forall w_{-j} \in W^{n-1}, \forall w_j, \bar{w}_j \in W.$$

Proof. See Appendix A. □

The above condition is in fact equivalent to the notion of decreasing work curves as formulated by Archer and Tardos [2]. An example in Appendix B shows that the MINCREASE Algorithm does not satisfy weak monotonicity, and therefore does not allow a payment scheme that extends the algorithm to a mechanism that makes truth-telling an ex-post weakly dominant strategy (i.e., a truthful mechanism). Let us summarize this.

Theorem 8. There does not exist a payment scheme that extends the MINCREASE algorithm to a truthful mechanism.

Proof. Use Lemma 7 and the example in Appendix B. □

5 Payments for Myopic Rational Jobs

We cannot extend the MINCREASE algorithm with a payment scheme that makes truth-telling an ex-post dominant strategy. Therefore, we focus on the moment when a job arrives and is assigned to a machine, and propose a payment scheme that makes truth-telling at least a myopic best response for any arriving job. That is, at time $t$ when a job announces its reported weight $w_j$, truth-telling is a strategy that maximizes the job’s utility on the basis of the available information at time $t$.

The payments we introduce are motivated by the Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism [7]. That is, a job $j$ pays at the moment of its placement on one of the machines an amount that compensates the decrease in utility of the other jobs. Besides making the mechanism truthful (in a myopic sense that is weaker than dominant strategy incentive compatible!), these payments give us the opportunity to decentralize the algorithm. If we let jobs select a machine themselves, myopic rational jobs select the machine that the MINCREASE Algorithm would have selected, too. We will see in the next section that this can be turned into a constant-factor approximation of the off-line optimum, given that the jobs behave rationally. The algorithm including the payments is displayed below as the DECENTRALIZED MINCREASE Algorithm.

The DECENTRALIZED MINCREASE Algorithm together with the stated payments results in a balanced budget for the scheduler. That is, the payments paid and received by the jobs sum up to zero, since every arriving job immediately makes its payment to the jobs that are displaced by it.

Moreover, although reporting the truth does not necessarily result in an ex-post equilibrium, a truth-telling job is guaranteed the initial utility it achieves when being scheduled at arrival. That is, whenever a job’s utility is affected by an arriving job, the decrease in utility caused by an increasing completion time is immediately compensated for by a payment.
**Algorithm 2: Decentralized MinIncrease Mechanism**

**Local Sequencing Policy:** Whenever a machine becomes idle, it starts processing the job with highest priority among all available jobs assigned to it. Priority here means the ratio of reported weight over processing time. In case of equal ratios a job with smaller index has higher priority.

**Assignment:**

1. At time $r_j$, job $j$ arrives and reports a type $w_j$ (possibly $w_j \neq w_j^*$).
2. For every machine $i$, job $j$ observes the current situation and computes
   \[ c_j(i) = r_j + b_i(r_j) + \sum_{k \in U(j), k < j, s_k > r_j} p_k + p_j \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_j(i) = p_j \sum_{k \in L(j), k < i, s_k > r_j} w_k. \]
3. Job $j$ chooses a machine $i_j \in M$. Its utility for being scheduled on machine $i$ is $u_j(i) = -w_j^* c_j(i) - \pi_i(j)$.
4. The job is scheduled on $i_j$ according to WSPT among all currently available jobs on $i_j$ whose processing has not started yet. The payment $\pi_i(j)$ has to be paid by $j$.
5. The completion time for every job $k \in L(j)$, $k \rightarrow i_j, k < j, s_k > r_j$ increases by $p_j$ due to $j$’s presence. As compensation, $k$ receives a payment of $w_k p_j$.

**Theorem 9.** Under the Decentralized MinIncrease mechanism, an arriving job maximizes its current utility $u_j$ by reporting its true weight $w_j^*$. Also ex-post, the job will be left with the same utility $u_j$. Furthermore, any report $w_j \neq w_j^*$ may lead to a suboptimal utility.

**Proof.** We first regard the single machine case, i.e., $m = 1$. Suppose, at the arrival of job $j$ jobs $k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_r$ with corresponding processing times $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_r$ and reported weights $w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_r$ are queueing to be processed on the machine, but none of them has started being processed yet. Without loss of generality let $w_1/p_1 \geq w_2/p_2 \geq \cdots \geq w_r/p_r$. By choosing its weight appropriately, job $j$ could be scheduled at any position in front of, between or behind the already present jobs. Therefore, it has to decide for every job $k_s, s \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$, whether it wants to be placed in front of $k_s$ or not. Displacing $k_s$ would increase $\pi_j(1)$ by $w_j p_j$, whereas $c_j(1)$ is decreased by $p_s$. Thus, $j$’s utility changes by $w_j^* p_s - w_j p_j$ if $j$ displaces $k_s$. Therefore, it is rational for $j$ to displace $k_s$ if and only if $w_j^* p_s - w_j p_j > 0$, which is equivalent to $w_j^* / p_j > w_s / p_s$. As the machine schedules according to WSPT, $j$ is placed at the position that maximizes its utility when reporting $w_j^*$. Therefore, truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the myopic sense. Note that $j$ can achieve the position between job $k_{s-1}$ and $k_s$ by reporting any $w_j \in \{p_j w_s / p_s, p_j w_{s-1} / p_{s-1}\}$. Thus, reporting $w_j^*$ is not the only myopic best response.

For $m > 1$, recall that $j$ can select a machine itself. As reporting the truth maximizes its utility on every single machine, and as $j$ can then choose the machine that maximizes its utility among all machines, truth-telling will maximize $j$’s immediate utility at arrival.

For the second part of the claim, suppose $k$ is displaced by the arriving job $j$. The current completion time of $k$ thus increases by $p_j$. Therefore, $k$’s utility decreases by $w_k^* p_j$. If $k$ has reported truthfully it receives a payment of $w_k^* p_j$ in Step 5 of the algorithm, upon $j$’s arrival. Hence, job $k$ immediately receives a payment from job $j$ that exactly compensates for the delay.

For the last claim, suppose $j$ reports $w_j > w_j^*$. Then it may happen that some job $k$ is assigned to the same machine, and $w_j / p_j > w_k / p_k > w_j^* / p_j$. With report $w_j$, job $j$ would be scheduled in front of $k$, whereas $w_j^*$ would give it the place behind $k$. The increase in $j$’s utility when reporting
$w_j$ over its utility for reporting $w^*_j$ is therefore $w^*_j p_k - w_k p_j < 0$. An analogous argument shows that reporting less than $w^*_j$ can be non-optimal, too.

6 Performance of the mechanism

It is not a goal in itself to have a truthful mechanism, but to use the truthfulness in order to achieve a reasonable overall performance in terms of the social welfare $\sum w^*_j c_j$. The Decentralized MinIncrease Algorithm as stated above, however, does not yet yield a constant approximation factor; simple examples can be constructed in the same flavor as in [15]. In fact, it can be considered folklore that early arriving jobs with large processing times are critical and have to be delayed [1, 15, 16]. In order to achieve a constant competitive ratio, we also adopt this idea and use modified release dates as [15, 16]. To this end, we change the release date of every job $j \in J$ from $r_j$ to $r'_j = \max\{r_j, \alpha p_j\}$, where $\alpha$ is a constant that will later be chosen appropriately. That is, a job is considered critical if the job’s original release date $r_j$ is smaller than $\alpha$ times its processing time $p_j$. A critical job will be ignored until time $\alpha p_j > r_j$. Only then it has to select a machine and report a weight $w_j$. Note that the aforementioned properties concerning the balanced budget and the conservation of utility still apply to the algorithm with modified release dates. According to Theorem 9, rational jobs report their weights truthfully. The theorem still applies to the case with modified release dates, as the arguments in the proof of Theorem 9 do not depend on the actual time when the job has to decide (and report a $w_j$). Yet, it has to be noted that the modification of release dates restricts the level of decentralization in the resulting mechanism, as some central control has to assure that a critical job cannot advance to a machine between its true and its modified release date. We obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 10.** Suppose every job is rational in reporting a weight $w_j$ and selecting a machine. Then the Decentralized MinIncrease algorithm, together with the modified release dates $r'_j = \max\{r_j, \alpha p_j\}$ for critical jobs, is $\varrho$-competitive, with $\varrho = 3.281$.

**Proof.** First, according to Theorem 9, we can assume that jobs report their weights $w^*_j$ truthfully, and moreover, select a machine that minimizes their utility. That is, they select a machine $i$ that minimizes

$$u_j(i) = w^*_j c_j(i) + \pi_i(j) = w^*_j [r'_j + b_i(r_j) + \sum_{k \in H(j), k \rightarrow i, k < j, s_k > r'_j} p_k + p_j] + p_j \sum_{k \in L(j), k \rightarrow i, k < j, s_k > r'_j} w^*_k.$$ 

This, however, exactly equals the immediate increase of the objective value $\sum w^*_j c_j$ that is due to the addition of job $j$ to the schedule. We now claim that we can express the objective value $Z$ of the resulting schedule as

$$Z = \sum_{j \in J} u_j(i_j),$$ 

where $i_j$ is the machine selected by job $j$. Here, it is important to note that $u_j(i_j)$ does not express the total (ex-post) contribution of job $j$ to $\sum w^*_j c_j$, but only the increase upon arrival of $j$ on machine $i_j$. However, further contributions of job $j$ to $\sum w^*_j c_j$ only appear when job $j$ is displaced by some later arriving job with higher priority, say $k$. This contribution by job $j$ to $\sum w^*_j c_j$, however, will be accounted for when adding $u_k(i_k)$. 

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Next, since we assume that any job maximizes its utility upon arrival, or equivalently minimizes $u_j(i)$ when selecting a machine $i$, we can apply an averaging argument over the number of machines, like in [16], to obtain:

$$Z \leq \sum_{i \in J} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} u_j(i).$$

The remainder of the proof utilizes the definitions of $u_j(i)$ and particularly the fact that, upon arrival of job $j$ on any of the machines $i$ (at time $r'_j$), machine $i$ is blocked for time $b_i(r'_j)$, which is upper bounded by $r'_j/\alpha$. This upper bound is machine-independent, and follows from the definition of $r'_j$, since any job $k$ in process at time $r'_j$ fulfills $\alpha p_k \leq r'_k \leq r'_j$. Furthermore, the proof utilizes a lower bound on any (off-line) optimum schedule from Eastman et al. [5, Thm. 1]. The details are moved to Appendix C, due to space limitations. The resulting performance bound $3.281$ is identical to the one of [15], letting $\alpha$ equal $(\sqrt{17}m^2 - 2m + 1 - m + 1)/(4m)$. \hfill \Box

7 Discussion and Extensions

In the proposed model for decentralized online scheduling, our assumption was that any job experiences costs $w_j^*$ for waiting one extra unit of time, known only to the job itself. Moreover, we demand a certain level of decentralization by letting the arriving jobs choose their machines themselves. The social welfare is maximal when the total weighted completion time $\sum w_j c_j$ is minimal. There are three drawbacks of the proposed mechanism that we briefly discuss next.

The jobs truthfully report their weights $w_j^*$ under the assumption of myopic rational behavior. A stronger result would be that truth-telling is an ex-post dominant strategy. This can indeed be achieved when giving up the requirement that jobs choose the machines themselves. For example, when jobs are distributed over machines uniformly at random, utilizing a characterization of Gui et al. [8], we can determine a payment scheme in polynomial time such that the resulting mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible, independent of the realization of the random choices. The performance bound remains $3.281$ (in expectation). However, when giving up on the decentralization, one can as well set up a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that is based upon a recently proposed algorithm by Correa and Wagner [4], yielding a (deterministic) competitive ratio of 2.62. But notice that, in both cases, the resulting payments can only be determined ex-post, and cannot be implemented online, like with the mechanism we propose.

As a tribute to the desired constant competitive ratio, we had to take special care of critical jobs (i.e., jobs with $\alpha p_j > r_j$), delaying their moment of decision from $r_j$ to $r'_j = \alpha p_j$. Clearly, as stated already above, this restricts the level of decentralization, as some central control has to implement this delay of critical jobs. However, given the restriction that jobs choose machines themselves, we are not aware of a better way to handle critical jobs.

We argued that the social welfare is maximized whenever the total weighted completion time of jobs $\sum w_j c_j$ is minimal. Given that we have to confine ourselves with approximations, it would be more desirable, though, to minimize the total weighted flow time, $\sum w_j(c_j - r_j)$. However, note that for a single machine and unit weights, this problem does not even admit a constant-factor approximation algorithm in the off-line setting [10], unless P=NP. Nevertheless, it would be an interesting direction for future research to consider also other metrics than $\sum w_j c_j$, e.g. stretch metrics as proposed in [3].

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References


Appendices

A Proof of Lemma 7

Lemma 7. Let for a job \( j \in J \) and fixed reports \( w_j \) for the other jobs \( A(w_j, w_j) \) denote the resulting schedule if \( j \) reports \( w_j \) as computed by allocation algorithm A. Let \( c_j(A(w_j, w_j)) \) be the corresponding (ex-post) completion time of \( j \) in that schedule. Then \( A \) satisfies weak monotonicity in our described model if and only if it satisfies

\[
w_j < \bar{w}_j \Rightarrow c_j(A(w_j, w_j)) \geq c_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j))\]

\( \forall j \in J, \forall w_j \in W^n, \forall w_j, \bar{w}_j \in W. \)

Proof. Let \( w_j < \bar{w}_j \). Using the special structure of the valuation function in our model the weak monotonicity condition becomes:

\[
v_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j)|\bar{w}_j) - v_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j)|w_j) - v_j(A(w_j, w_j)|\bar{w}_j) + v_j(A(w_j, w_j)|w_j) \geq 0
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow
\]

\[
-\bar{w}_j c_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j)) + w_j c_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j)) + \bar{w}_j c_j(A(w_j, w_j)) - w_j c_j(A(w_j, w_j)) \geq 0
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow
\]

\[
(\bar{w}_j - w_j)[c_j(A(w_j, w_j)) - c_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j))] \geq 0
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow
\]

\[
c_j(A(w_j, w_j)) - c_j(A(w_j, \bar{w}_j)) \geq 0,
\]

where the last equivalence follows from \( w_j < \bar{w}_j \).

B The MinIncrease algorithm is not weakly monotone

Example 11. Let \([w/p]\) denote a job with (reported) weight \( w \) and processing time \( p \). Suppose that we have to schedule the following four jobs on two machines: \([6/3],[5/4], j = [w/\frac{1}{2}], [20/4] \), where \( w \) is a parameter. Let all jobs have release date zero, but let us assume that they nevertheless arrive in the given order. (We could alternatively enforce this order by adding small but positive constants to some of the release dates without changing the effect demonstrated below.)

Let us consider the MinIncrease algorithm. The first job \([6/3]\) increases the objective value on both machines by the same amount and is therefore scheduled on the first machine. The second job \([5/4]\) is then assigned to the second machine. We consider two values for the weight of \( j \), namely \( w_1 = \frac{1}{12} \) and \( w_2 = \frac{1}{6} \). In the first case the weight over processing time ratio is \( \frac{1}{2} \) and therefore smaller than the respective ratios of the two jobs already assigned to machines. Thus, \( j \) would be scheduled last on each of the machines according to the WSPT rule. It would cause the following increases:

\[
\text{incr}(j, 1) = \frac{1}{7} w_1 + 3w_1
\]
\[ \text{incr}(j, 2) = \frac{1}{t}w^1 + 4w^1. \]

Therefore, \( j \) is assigned to the end of machine 1, which results in the preliminary schedule depicted on the left of Figure 1.

The second case for \( w^2 = \frac{1}{t} \) yields a ratio of \( \frac{2}{t} \), which would place \( j \) first on both machines. The respective increases are:

\[ \text{incr}(j, 1) = \frac{1}{t}w^2 + 6 \cdot \frac{1}{t} \]
\[ \text{incr}(j, 2) = \frac{1}{t}w^2 + 5 \cdot \frac{1}{t}. \]

Job \( j \) would be scheduled on machine 2 yielding the schedule depicted on the right of Figure 1. The last job \([2/4]\) has a ratio larger than all the ratios of the present jobs. Therefore it would be scheduled first on both machines. In both cases the total weight of jobs on the first machine is larger than the total weight of jobs on the second machine. Therefore the increase in the objective value caused by the last job is in both cases smaller on the second machine. Thus the job is scheduled on the second machine, which increases \( j \)'s completion time only in the second case. Thus, \( j \) is completed at time \( 3 + \frac{1}{t} \) when reporting \( \frac{1}{t} \) and at time \( 4 + \frac{1}{t} \) when reporting \( \frac{1}{t} \). Therefore, the MinIncrease algorithm does not satisfy weak monotonicity.

**C Proof of Theorem 10**

**Theorem 10.** Suppose every job is rational in reporting a weight \( w_j \) and selecting a machine. Then the Decentralized MinIncrease algorithm, together with the modified release dates \( r'_j = \max\{r_j, \alpha p_j\} \) for critical jobs, is \( \alpha \)-competitive, with \( \alpha = 3.281 \).

*Proof.* Recall that \( Z \) denotes the objective value of the final schedule produced by the Decentralized MinIncrease algorithm. Let \( Z^{Opt} \) denote the value of the optimum off-line solution. We have already argued that

\[ Z \leq \sum_{i \in J} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} u_j(i). \]

Next, recall that upon arrival of job \( j \) on any of the machines \( i \) (at time \( r'_j \)), machine \( i \) is blocked for time \( b_i(r'_j) \leq r'_j/\alpha \). Therefore we get, for any \( j \),

\[
\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} u_j(i) = w_j^* r'_j + w_j^* \sum_{i=1}^{m} \frac{b_i(r'_j)}{m} + w_j^* \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{k \in H(j)} \sum_{k < j, k \leq i, k_s > r'_j} \frac{p_k}{m} + w_j^* p_j + p_j \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{k \in L(j)} \sum_{k < j, k_s > r'_j} \frac{w_k}{m}
\]

\[
= w_j^* r'_j + w_j^* \sum_{i=1}^{m} \frac{b_i(r'_j)}{m} + w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \sum_{k < j, k \leq i} \frac{p_k}{m} + w_j^* p_j + p_j \sum_{k \in L(j)} \sum_{k < j} \frac{w_k}{m}
\]

\[
\leq w_j^* r'_j + w_j^* \frac{r'_j}{\alpha} + w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \sum_{k_s > r'_j} \frac{p_k}{m} + w_j^* p_j + p_j \sum_{k \in L(j)} \sum_{k < j} \frac{w_k}{m}.
\]

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The last term can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\sum_{j \in J} p_j \sum_{k \in L(j)} \frac{w_j^k}{m} = \sum_{(j,k) : \quad j \in H(k) \quad k < j} \frac{p_j}{m} = \sum_{(j,k) : \quad j \in H(j) \quad k > j} \frac{p_k}{m} = \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \frac{p_k}{m}.
\]

Thus,

\[
Z \leq \sum_{j \in J} w_j^*(1 + \frac{1}{\alpha})r_j^* + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \frac{p_k}{m} + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* p_j + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \frac{p_k}{m} = \sum_{j \in J} w_j^*(1 + \frac{1}{\alpha})r_j^* + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \frac{p_k}{m} + \frac{m-1}{m} \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* p_j.
\]

Now, we apply a lower bound on the optimal off-line schedule from [5, Thm. 1], namely

\[
Z^{OPT} \geq \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* \sum_{k \in H(j)} \frac{p_k}{m} + \frac{m-1}{2m} \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* p_j,
\]

yielding:

\[
Z \leq Z^{OPT} + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^*(1 + \frac{1}{\alpha})r_j^* + \frac{m-1}{2m} \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* p_j.
\]

\[
\leq Z^{OPT} + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^*(1 + \frac{1}{\alpha})(r_j + \alpha p_j) + \frac{m-1}{2m} \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* p_j
\]

\[
= Z^{OPT} + \sum_{j \in J} w_j^* \left[ (1 + \frac{1}{\alpha})r_j + (1 + \alpha + \frac{m-1}{2m})p_j \right],
\]

where in the second inequality \(r_j + \alpha p_j\) is used as an upper bound on \(r_j^*\). Applying the trivial lower bound \(\sum_{j \in J} w_j^*(r_j + p_j) \leq Z^{OPT}\), we get:

\[
Z \leq Z^{OPT} + \max \left\{ 1 + \frac{1}{\alpha}, 1 + \alpha + \frac{m-1}{2m} \right\} Z^{OPT}
\]

\[
= 2Z^{OPT} + \max \left\{ \frac{1}{\alpha}, \alpha + \frac{m-1}{2m} \right\} Z^{OPT}.
\]

Therefore, we get the performance bound

\[
\rho = 2 + \max \left\{ \frac{1}{\alpha}, \alpha + \frac{m-1}{2m} \right\}.
\]

This can now be optimized for \(\alpha\), which was already done in [15]. There it was shown that \(\rho < 3.281\) for \(\alpha = \sqrt{14m^2 - 2m + 1 - m + 1} / (4m)\). □