2 EU Battlegroups
From standby to standstill

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The European Union (EU) has been slow in its military responses. To date, about 35 operations have taken place within the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), of which roughly one-third were military operations. None of these operations made use of the Battlegroups, the EU’s official military rapid response mechanism. As a result, the EU Battlegroups have remained unemployed ever since they came into being.

Although expectations about a potential Battlegroup deployment have repeatedly been voiced over the past few years, such as in response to the worsening crises in Mali in 2013 and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014, belief in the viability of the mechanism gradually waned, both among politicians and academics. However, threats at the EU’s eastern border, starting from the Russian annexation of the Crimea, combined with growing uncertainty about the American security guarantee, the Brexit vote of June 2016, and the increased threat of terrorist attacks, created a new momentum for defense integration and cooperation.

The EU’s Global Strategy, published in June 2016, marked the start of a series of proposals to re-raise the EU’s ambition level, guided by the recognition that “we need a stronger Europe.” In the autumn of 2017, the revitalized Franco-German engine of integration even managed to get an agreement by 25 member states on the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was long considered the EU’s “sleeping beauty.” Despite the considerable attention
that the EU Battlegroups have received in the academic literature over the past two decades, it is worth evaluating whether or not this renewed drive will also positively affect them.

This chapter addresses the past, present, and future of the EU Battlegroups. The first two sections outline the origins and the main features of the Battlegroups. The third section highlights the most pressing obstacles to deployment, illustrated by some concrete examples from the past. In light of the EU’s seemingly reinvigorated defense integration, the fourth part evaluates the future of the Battlegroups. It is argued that the political reluctance to put troops at risk is likely here to stay, in spite of steps that have been taken to facilitate future deployment. Moreover, the chapter draws attention to the fact that the future of the EU’s rapid response mechanisms cannot be discussed without taking into account the increased prominence of ad hoc coalitions and the questions about prioritization which arise due to inter-organizational overlap.

The Artemis template

The origins of the EU’s rapid response capability are to be found at the European Council summit in Helsinki on 10–11 December 1999. Being determined “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and … to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises,” EU heads of state and government agreed on what became known as the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003. The ambition was not only to develop a military corps-size capacity of 50,000–60,000 personnel, but also to make these forces capable of deploying within 60 days. Moreover, this military corps was envisioned to contain “smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.” Although these ideas were further developed at the French–British Le Touquet Summit in February 2003, it was the EU’s military deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) later that year that provided the necessary practical experience to give shape to these rapid response plans on paper.

On 12 June 2003, the EU deployed Operation Artemis to the Ituri region of the DRC. The EU’s action took place after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in May requested assistance from France’s president Jacques Chirac, as troops from the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were unable to stop escalating violence in the city of Bunia. The deployed EU force consisted of 1,800 troops from 12 member states, with France functioning as the “framework nation.” The operation was authorized by the UN Security Council with a mandate to use all necessary means, for the
duration of three months. It has been widely discussed how Artemis not only strengthened the belief among French, German, and British leaders that a rapidly deployable EU force was realistic, but also how it was used as an “operational template” for the further development of the EU’s rapid response concept.

Two lessons from Artemis are particularly noteworthy. First, it led to a downscaling of the initial corps-size ambition, in line with the Artemis set-up. Second, and related, it was recognized that such a size reduction would benefit the speed of deployment, leading to the ambition to make the Battlegroups deployable within 15 days. Following this Artemis template, the “EU Battlegroup Concept” was jointly proposed by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in February 2004, and approved by the European Council on 14 June that year.

### Key features

EU Battlegroups consist of 1,500 troops, which should ideally be deployable within 15 days for short-term missions, ranging in duration from one up to four months. These features constitute the core of what is assumed to be “the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable and coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations.” As such, Battlegroups are supposed to consist of all necessary military, service, and logistical assets that are required to act autonomously. This “standard” is argued to include a headquarter company, three infantry companies and personnel in support of these companies.

Remarkably, the small size of the Battlegroups does not imply an equally limited list of operation types which they should be able to undertake, at least not on paper. In line with the “Petersberg tasks,” a list of undertakings that finds its origins at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992, the Battlegroups can in theory be used for activities ranging from military advice and assistance operations, to humanitarian and rescue tasks, disarmament operations, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization, and combat activities such as peace enforcement. This extremely wide scope of duties, formalized in Article 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union, obviously leads to ambiguity about what the Battlegroups’ core task should be once deployed, and remains to date an unaddressed pitfall. Yet, in practice, not all of these Petersberg tasks require a rapid response, and the set-up of the EU Battlegroups rather reflects the ambition of a bridging force or a first-entry force (similar to the UN standby force).
Another key feature of the Battlegroups relates to their troop composition, which is based on voluntary commitments by EU member states. Following a rotation scheme, every six months a new pair of Battlegroups is placed on standby. Within this system of “rosterization,” troops are provided by either one member state, or—more commonly—by a multinational coalition within which one member state acts as a “framework nation.” This voluntary rosterization has over the years proven to come with both benefits and uncertainties.

On the positive side, while the EU Battlegroups have never been deployed, they have come with considerable benefits, of which three are particularly noteworthy. First, it is widely acknowledged that the introduction of rapid response forces such as the EU Battlegroups, but equally so the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Response Force, have led to coordinated modernization of military forces. The clearest examples thereof are to be found among the Nordic countries, which have repeatedly been described as “pioneers” in that regard.

For instance, Swedish troops have been made more capable of conducting operations in hostile contexts, which is just one out of many illustrations of how Sweden gradually aligned its defense planning with the Battlegroup concept. In general, many EU member states have over the past decade transformed their armies to a more expeditionary configuration, a mind-set to which the Battlegroups undoubtedly contributed.

Second, the Battlegroups have facilitated defense cooperation among like-minded EU member states. The gradual development of so-called “regional Battlegroups” is illustrative in that regard, although they have to date not been institutionalized and hence remain ad hoc collaborations. Again, Nordic military cooperation has expanded consistently since the creation of the Nordic Battlegroup, often making these countries the main advocates for an EU rapid deployment. But regional Battlegroups are also to be found elsewhere in the EU, such as there is the Visegrad Battlegroup or the Benelux Battlegroup. The EU Battlegroups have therefore even been considered a valuable integration tool, as it is a construct which pushes sub-regional partners to align their visions on when, where, and how to use armed forces. In addition, like-minded non-EU members have been given the opportunity to participate in Battlegroup cooperation, of which the most notable illustration is the opt-in that was granted to Norway to join the Nordic Battlegroup.

Third, and relatedly, standby nations train together. Because their military troops might have different backgrounds and standards, joint training becomes essential. It serves the aim of creating cohesion
among the troop-contributing nations on aspects such as rules of engagement, practicing coordination between the different levels of command, and synchronizing operating procedures. Joint preparation among the participating forces usually starts 12–18 months in advance of a standby responsibility.\textsuperscript{20} It includes processes of training and certification, both at the level of staff and troops. Increasingly, training also takes place at the level of ministers, in the so-called Political Exercise (POLEX).\textsuperscript{21} However, it should be noted that these training and certification processes take place under coordination of the framework nation. A more centralized and coordinated approach such as there is in NATO has repeatedly been suggested,\textsuperscript{22} yet agreement has to date not been reached.

In addition to these clear benefits, the Battlegroup’s rosterization system has also been filled with uncertainties, mainly due to its voluntary nature. For instance, the EU has repeatedly struggled to get member states to place troops on the roster.\textsuperscript{23} One of the main reasons is that commitment puts serious constraints on the flexibility of the EU members’ already limited defense capabilities.\textsuperscript{24} Earmarking troops for the Battlegroups is for EU member states often a serious and resource-expensive commitment, as many of them operate with a single set of forces. Furthermore, member states have been given the freedom to decide on what kind of forces they put on the roster, which allows them to approach the standby duty from their own specific background.\textsuperscript{25} While this discretion creates room for providing niche capabilities, it equally requires flexibility in terms of training standards and implies a risk of leading to variation, which may hinder continuity. In sum, the set-up of the EU Battlegroups reflects a constant tension between, on the one hand, the breadth of potential duties and crisis situations and, on the other, constraints in terms of size, composition, and member state commitment, which have repeatedly proven detrimental to deployment.

**Obstacles to deployment**

Although the EU Battlegroups reached full operational capacity in 2007, they have never been deployed in their ten years of existence. Yet, deployment was over the years repeatedly expected and often even openly called for. The list of missed opportunities is long, starting with the crises in the DRC in 2006 and 2008, Chad in 2007, Libya in 2011, to the escalating conflicts in Mali in 2012–2013,\textsuperscript{26} and the CAR in 2013–2014.\textsuperscript{27} Consequently, there is a wide scholarly literature which identifies the obstacles to Battlegroup deployment, usually triggered by
curiosity about the absence of an EU (rapid) response to one of these crises.28

Overall, the obstacles to Battlegroup deployment can be classified in three categories. First, there are doubts about the capacities of the EU Battlegroups and the mechanism’s command structure. As mentioned in the previous section, one shortcoming is their rather small size, which makes it hard to function as a full-fledged autonomous military operation. Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont in that regard even argued that “most EU Battlegroups simply lack the fighting power for any mission that goes beyond political symbolism.”29 Relatedly, one should bear in mind that the deployment of the Artemis operation, which served as a template for the Battlegroups, was greatly facilitated by the presence of French troops already in the region.30

Another problematic feature is the absence of an EU permanent military headquarters. As a result, a hypothetical Battlegroup deployment not only requires setting up a force headquarters, but also an operational headquarters (OHQ) for military-strategic planning. For the latter, the EU can select one of the five earmarked at its disposal (Paris, Potsdam, Northwood, Larissa, and Rome—all national OHQs), as well as the EU Operations Centre Horn of Africa & Sahel in Brussels (active since 2012). Moreover, it has the possibility to use NATO structures through the Berlin Plus arrangements. Although none of these three options is ideal and risks delaying deployment, the absence of a permanent headquarters should therefore not be considered a key obstacle to deployment.31

The second obstacle, and more crucial for explaining the lack of deployment over the past decade, is how the Battlegroups are funded. They are not supported by a sustainable financial solidarity mechanism, as troop contributors are expected to carry nearly all financial costs, except for the few costs covered by the Athena mechanism.32 Although the “costs lie where they fall” principle is an obstacle common to other organizations as well—such as NATO or the AU,33 it is one of the most frequently mentioned problems in analyses of the EU Battlegroups. Moreover, it implies that national financial constraints on military expenditures inherently also impact the likelihood of Battlegroup deployment.34 Examples of how these uneven funding provisions have hindered the Battlegroups from being deployed are manifold. For instance, Richard Gowan35 indicated that a key obstacle to deploying a Battlegroup to support the 2006 Congolese elections was that the proposed Battlegroup mainly consisted of German troops, meaning they would have to carry the bulk of the costs. But also more recently, in the context of the crisis in the CAR in 2014, have financial
concerns by the standby nations, and Greece in particular, shaped decision-making. The third, and most problematic obstacle to Battlegroup deployment has been the much-discussed lack of political willingness among EU member states, which have repeatedly refrained from putting their troops at risk. In standard CSDP operations, EU member states can decide in an ad hoc manner whether they wish to contribute forces. For the Battlegroups, to the contrary, standby nations cannot opt-out of deployment once unanimity has been reached in the Council. The unanimity requirement in CSDP decisions hence implies that avoiding one’s standby responsibility is only possible through blocking the entire deployment decision. As argued elsewhere, there is a clear rationalist reasoning behind this recurrent lack of political will. Deploying one’s troops comes with serious political costs, particularly when there is a mismatch between the interests of the standby nations and the crisis that is faced. For instance, when violence escalated in Mali during the winter of 2012–2013, standby nations of the Weimar Battlegroup—particularly Poland and Germany—refrained from deployment as they perceived the Mali situation primarily a French matter of interest. A similar logic shaped the decision to refrain from deploying a Franco-German Battlegroup to the 2006 elections in the DRC. Anand Menon indicated how this decision was also due to German concerns about “its lack of experience of high-risk deployments.” In the absence of tangible benefits through which member state governments can sell a deployment decision to their home constituencies, the political and financial costs of deployment are likely to prevail.

In addition to these three groups of commonly identified obstacles, it is increasingly reasonable to add a fourth and often ignored category: inter-organizational competition and forum-shopping. Although inter-organizational relations and overlap undoubtedly have benefits, as demonstrated by NATO making available its headquarters to the EU through the Berlin Plus arrangements, it also comes with risks. For instance, national budgetary constraints and having only a single set of forces imply that states with a membership in both the EU and NATO have to decide which arrangement they prioritize. The failure to have two Battlegroups on permanent standby in the past few years is illustrative of this problem of prioritization. Moreover, the fact that ad hoc coalitions were preferred in several recent crises indicates that states are increasingly willing to operate outside the existing multilateral frameworks. This has also repeatedly occurred in crises where an EU Battlegroup operation was (openly) expected. The French-led interventions in Mali in January 2013 and in the CAR in 2013–2014
exemplify how an ad hoc coalition was deemed more appropriate and more capable of providing a rapid response to escalating violence than the Battlegroups, although both crises were initially perceived as an opportunity for deployment.42

Any future left?

Both external and internal developments have reinvigorated awareness within the EU of the need to strengthen defense integration and cooperation. Externally, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea at the EU’s eastern border, security concerns about the Baltics, increased threats of terrorism, and the migration crisis, as well as pressure from the United States to strengthen European defense, were all crucial push factors in that regard. Internally, momentum was created not only by a change of EU leadership in 2014, but particularly by the Brexit vote, which revamped the Franco-German engine of integration, with other member states (such as Italy) trying to use the momentum to take a more prominent position. In June 2016, this combination of developments led to the publication of “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,”43 which was adopted by the Council of the European Union in November.44 Guided by the premise that “we need a stronger Europe,” it set in motion a series of debates and projects on how to move forward. Remarkably, however, while there has been much scholarly attention devoted to these developments,45 there is to date little analysis of how this may or will affect the future of the EU Battlegroups.

The Franco-German axis that gradually emerged following the Brexit vote has been an important engine of several security and defense initiatives since the adoption of the Global Strategy. The most notable development is the signing of an agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation on 13 November 2017 by 23 member states (later expanded to 25), which was adopted during the Foreign Affairs Council on 11 December that year.46 This newly adopted framework finds its initial origins in the development of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty and was included in the Lisbon Treaty, yet it remained at an impasse for many years.47 With its adoption, the goal of PESCO is to deepen cooperation in the area of defense among EU members who are willing to do so. It provides a framework of binding commitments for further developing defense capabilities and making these available for operations, including EU Battlegroup operations. It is therefore worth questioning whether these developments, and particularly the operational dimension of the PESCO agreement, will help in “tackling the
procedural, financial and political obstacles” that have prevented the Battlegroups from being deployed, as stated in the Global Strategy. Although the operational provisions of PESCO have been argued to contain “the greatest possible benefit,” this is far from guaranteed if one keeps in mind the rationalist cost–benefit logic that has so often prevented standby nations from actually deploying their troops.

Regarding the Battlegroups’ funding, many suggestions have been made in the past about how to deal with the “costs lie where they fall” principle. Proposals have varied widely, from maintaining the status quo to a revision in order to cover both the deployment and withdrawal of the Battlegroups, or even creating a full and equal burden-sharing principle. Jan Joel Andersson hinted at broadening the list of shared costs and creating a so-called start-up fund for deployment. With the adoption of PESCO in December 2017, member states have made a commitment to “strive for an ambitious approach to common funding of military CSDP operations and missions,” which includes potential future Battlegroup operations. They agreed to set the ambition level beyond the common costs as defined in the Athena mechanism. Yet, what this ambition would be still remains vague. Moreover, one wonders how this will affect the rationalist calculations preceding future deployment decisions. From an optimistic perspective, this commitment could raise the likelihood of Battlegroup deployment, as it diminishes the financial costs that the standby nations would need to carry. A more pessimistic outlook, however, is that such a more equal sharing of the financial costs would meanwhile raise the burden for non-standby nations to agree upon a deployment to which they do not contribute forces. As argued by Tomas Valasek, this could pose an additional obstacle to reaching consensus in the Council.

Yet, as mentioned, financial costs are only one part of the problem. The persistent lack of political will among EU members to actually commit their troops when needed is much harder to overcome. Also here, the PESCO agreement provides an opportunity for changing the balance in standby nations’ cost–benefit calculations towards committing troops to the Battlegroups. Most crucially, standby nations have to be convinced of the value of putting their troops at risk, even in areas where they do not have a direct interest at stake. In that regard, the PESCO agreement includes a commitment of the signing parties to make available “formations, that are strategically deployable, for the realization of the EU Level of Ambition, in addition to a potential deployment of an EUBG.” It furthermore stipulates that the PESCO parties agree on “substantially contributing to EUBG by confirmation of contributions in principle at least four years in advance.”
Fiott, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry Tardy highlighted the “rational choice” dimension behind this peer pressure provision, as it raises the costs of shirking one’s standby responsibility.

Meanwhile, a critical reader might wonder what a “substantial” contribution actually entails and in how far the notion of “in principle” creates room for incompliance with this agreed commitment. It is hence highly unlikely that this agreement will function as a panacea as it only constitutes a commitment to provide troops on standby (and make them available). While it might serve to avoid problems in filling the standby roster, it is not at all a commitment to also deploy these troops. It is doubtful whether these provisions can also accommodate the self-interest driven reasoning of troop contributors that has hitherto prevented Battlegroup deployment when needed. Moreover, while the list of potential operation types is long, as mentioned before, it has often been argued that the Battlegroups’ “full potential would be best realised in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their limited size.” Given that combat operations come with high political costs for the troop-contributing governments, the likelihood of actual deployment is heavily contingent upon the extent to which the PESCO commitments are really “binding.” This requires concrete indicators to assess these commitments, as recognized in the Council’s recommendation on the roadmap for the implementation of PESCO of 6 March 2018.

Interestingly, at the time of finalizing this chapter (late June 2018), nine European member states (France, Germany, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain and Portugal) signed off on a Letter of Intent for a so-called European Intervention Initiative. The initiative, which was first proposed by French president Emmanuel Macron during a speech at the Sorbonne in November 2017, follows the recognition that the lack of a shared strategic culture has repeatedly hindered the EU from deploying troops in a coordinated and autonomous fashion. Although the European Intervention Initiative is a non-binding and rather flexible forum, which is argued to build upon existing standing rapid reaction forces, it is yet another clear sign of the growing willingness of several EU member states to improve their capacity to respond to crises. The fact that it will take place outside the EU’s structures, thereby achieving British support, signals a preparedness to maintain security and defense ties even after Brexit. Meanwhile, however, it remains to be seen whether the initiative will serve as a facilitator rather than as a competitor to the EU Battlegroups, as its participants might want to use it as a means to avoid the latter’s formal limitations. Its non-binding character in that regard could perhaps even
be interpreted as a move towards further ad hocism among European states.

On a final note, there is an important inter-organizational dimension to the increased awareness among EU member states of the need to strengthen defense integration and cooperation. Inter-organizational overlap between the EU and NATO has received much scholarly attention in the past, and it will remain a determining factor for both organizations’ rapid response mechanisms. Membership overlap between the EU and NATO also implies that the latter can potentially benefit from these dynamics. For instance, the PESCO commitment to make troops available for operations is not limited to CSDP operations per se and might thus also positively affect NATO, and its Response Force. However, functional overlap between the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force comes with a risk of inter-organizational competition. In addition to the aforementioned problem of committing troops to the Battlegroups standby roster, this risk is particularly apparent when it comes to the priorities that member states will need to set regarding where to spend their (scarce) defense money.

**Conclusion**

With no deployments after more than a decade of existence, the EU Battlegroups have the reputation of a paper tiger. This is not to say that the Battlegroup story is completely negative—positive effects can be found in domains such as joint training, force modernization, and enhanced cooperation among (groups of) EU member states. However, this chapter has highlighted that making the Battlegroups actually deployable requires solving problems related to their set-up, their funding mechanism, and mustering the necessary political will.

While external and internal developments have set in motion a series of projects to increase the commitment of EU member states to create a more equal funding mechanism and make forces available, deployment remains a decision that is primarily made at the national level. As repeatedly illustrated in the past, rationalist behavior remains the rule when standby nations face a crisis that demands a military rapid response. The challenge is then to ensure that these standby nations will actually put their troops at risk for a crisis whose resolution has no immediately visible benefits. Despite the efforts following upon the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, this is an obstacle that is likely here to stay. Moreover, several ambiguities remain unaddressed. For instance, the list of operation types for which the EU Battlegroups can in theory be deployed remains broad, and there is still no agreement on
what types of operation have priority. Combined with the different opinions of member states about what constitutes a threat and when the use of force is acceptable, many hurdles on the path to reaching consensus on deployment are still present. On a final note, it remains to be seen how far the overlap between the EU and NATO in terms of membership and functionality will serve as a driver for cooperation, rather than competition, between both organizations’ rapid response capabilities.

Notes

1 The author would like to thank Dr John Karlsrud, Brig. Gen. Jo Coelmont, and the Military Representation of Belgium to the European Union for their valuable input in this chapter.


6 European Council, European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10–11 December 1999, para. 27.

7 Ibid., para. 28.

8 See also Thomas Mandrup, “Multinational Rapid Response Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Chapter 5, this volume.


Lindstrom, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, 15.


Nonetheless, some member states (such as Germany and Poland) are seen as laggards in that regard. Author interview with national military representative to the EU, 8 March 2018.


Author interview with national military representative to the EU, Brussels, 8 March 2018.

Also here Sweden is considered among the frontrunners.

Barcikowska, *EU Battlegroups—Ready to Go?*

In March 2018, these problems once again became clear when the United Kingdom informed the EU Military Committee chairman that it would withdraw its troops from the roster for the second six-month term of 2019, for which it was scheduled as being the lead nation. This decision was a direct result of the Brexit negotiations. See Tom McTague and David M. Herszenhorn, “Britain Pulls Out of EU Defense Force,” *Politico*, 20 March 2018.


See also John Karlsrud, Natasja Rupesinghe, and Denis M. Tull, “Tangled Up in Glue,” Chapter 7, this volume.

See also Martin Welz, “Rapid Response and Inter-Organizational Competition,” Chapter 6, this volume.


The absence of a permanent military command structure has nonetheless proven detrimental in the past, as illustrated by the British refusal in 2008 to put its Northwood HQ at the disposal of the Nordic Battlegroups for deployment to the DRC. See Balossi-Restelli, “Fit for What?”: 167; and Gowan, “The Case of the Missing Battlegroups”: 58.

It is estimated that the costs covered by the Athena mechanism (i.e. costs of installing the OHQ and of medical services on the ground) fluctuate around 10–15 percent of the total costs of a deployment. See Jan Joel Andersson, *Adapting the Battlegroups* (Paris: EUISS, 2017), https://doi.org/10.2815/290989.


See Reykers, “No Supply without Demand.”

Reykers, “EU Battlegroups.”


For example, Thierry Tardy, *EUFOR RCA: Tough Start, Smooth End* (Paris: EUISS, 2015), https://doi.org/10.2815/157620. A more detailed analysis of the actual considerations that shaped these decision-making processes is presented in Reykers, “No Supply without Demand.”


Council of the European Union, Council Decision Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating Member States, 11 December 2017.


Andersson, *Adapting the Battlegroups*.

Valasek, “The EU’s New Defense Pact.”

Reykers, “EU Battlegroups.”


Council of the European Union, Council Recommendation Concerning a Roadmap for the Implementation of PESCO, 6 March 2018. In this meeting it was agreed to “specify more precise objectives” by June 2018 (ibid.).

For example, Carmen Gebhard and David Galbreath, *Cooperation or Conflict? Problematizing Organizational Overlap in Europe* (Farnham, UK:
According to Hofmann, “Why Institutional Overlap Matters,” overlap can occur on three dimensions: membership, mandate, and resources. Valasek, “The EU’s New Defense Pact,” highlighted that “The PESCO agreement also potentially puts the EU and NATO on a path to compete for member states’ defense money.”