Geographical Concentration and Editorial Favoritism within the Field of Laboratory Experimental Economics

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**Geographical Concentration
and Editorial Favoritism
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Experimental Economics**

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Geographical Concentration and Editorial Favoritism within the Field of Laboratory Experimental Economics

Janis Cloos, Matthias Greiff and Hannes Rusch✉

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Abstract: We examine geographical concentration, scientific quality, and editorial favoritism in the field of experimental economics. We use a novel data set containing all original research papers ($N = 583$) that exclusively used laboratory experiments for data generation and were published in the *American Economic Review*, *Experimental Economics* or the *Journal of the European Economic Association* between 1998 and 2018. The development of geographical concentration is examined using data on authors' affiliations at the time of the respective publication. Results show that research output produced by US-affiliated economists increased slower than overall research output, leading to a decrease in geographical concentration. Several proxies for scientific quality indicate that experiments conducted in Europe are of higher quality than experiments conducted in North America: European experiments rely on a larger total number of participants as well as participants per treatment, and receive more citations compared to experiments conducted in North America. Examining laboratory experiments published in the *AER* more closely, we find that papers authored by economists with US-affiliations receive significantly fewer citations in the first 5 and 10 years after publication compared to papers by authors from the rest of the world.

JEL classification: A11, A14, C90, I23

Keywords: laboratory experiments, favoritism, geographical concentration, methodological standards, network effects

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1 Introduction

Several studies on publications in academic top journals show a dominant position of US research. It is an important question whether this dominance is the product of the sheer size of the US, of discrimination, or of other barriers to entry for researchers from the rest of the world. In the last decades, research on geographical and institutional concentration has received a lot of attention. For economic top journals, several studies show that a large but declining share of research is produced by US-based economists (Ek and Henrekson 2019, Glötzl and Aigner 2017, Kocher and Sutter 2001, Kalaitzidakis et al. 1999, Hodgson and Rothman 1999, Elliott et al. 1998, Frey and Pommerehne 1988).

In this paper, we focus on one particular field: experimental economics. Our analyses cover all laboratory experiments published between 1998 and 2018 in three important journals: the *American Economic Review* (AER), arguably one of the top journals for general economics worldwide, *Experimental Economics* (EE), the top field journal, and the *Journal of the European Economic Association* (JEEA), arguably the European top journal for general economics.

Our first contribution is an analysis of geographical concentration. We examine its development using data on authors' affiliations at the time of publication. Similar to previous work, our analysis reveals that the US still has a dominant position, but also that US dominance has decreased over time.

Our second contribution is an analysis of several proxies for the scientific quality of the published experiments. Drawing on the literature on experimental methods, we identify four proxies that are indicative of the quality of laboratory experiments and can be determined by the experimenters: the total number of participants, the number of participants per treatment, the number of treatments, and the strength of monetary incentives (measured as real 2015-USD per average participant-minute). To ensure comparability between experiments, we restrict our analyses to laboratory experiments and exclude all other types of experiments.

Our results show substantial differences between Europe and North America, the two regions where more than 80% of the experiments were conducted. For all three journals, experiments conducted in Europe have a larger number of participants per treatment. In the AER and in EE, experiments conducted in Europe also have a larger total number of participants. We find no

differences in the strength of incentives. Hence, the (inflation-adjusted) total costs of experiments are higher for experiments conducted in Europe.

Our third contribution is a test for whether the dominance of US-affiliated economists on the editorial board of the AER could give rise to editorial favoritism. Editorial favoritism can be a serious problem for scientific progress (Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a). It arises when editorial decisions are not exclusively based on scientific criteria but also on non-scientific criteria, such as authors' institutional connections: if non-scientific criteria influence editorial decisions, colleagues with social ties to the members of a small elite of editors will find it "easier" to get their papers accepted. Such favoritism is a problem when the quality of published research suffers from it, i.e. when the editors' buddies' papers are published while better papers by no-names are rejected.

Unlike the existing literature (Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a), our analysis of editorial favoritism clusters groups by geographical region (North America and Europe) and not by individual institution (e.g., university). As we have no data on submissions, we focus on published papers. With editorial favoritism present, we expect papers from authors without social ties to the editors to be of higher quality than papers from authors with social ties to the editors, at least on average.

The number of participants and treatments, and the strength of monetary incentives constitute a set of *ex ante* proxies for quality that are available for editors when deciding about publication. However, originality, timeliness, and practical relevance are also strongly related to a paper's quality, but are not captured by our proxies for quality. Therefore, we use the number of citations that a paper received in the 5 and 10 years after publication as an *ex post* proxy for quality. Assuming that editors exclusively aim to maximize their journal's impact factor (which is debatable, but see Card and DellaVigna forthcoming), there should be no systematic difference in the quality of papers authored by economists with and without affiliations on the editorial board's continent. However, this is not always the case. We find that AER papers (co-)authored by economists with a US affiliation receive, on average, fewer citations in the 5 and 10 years following publication compared to papers by European authors published in the same outlet. We do not find this pattern for papers published in EE and the JEEA. This suggests

that the AER's selection criteria fail to maximize the journal's impact factor, or that editors pursue other goals¹.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in which the quality of laboratory experiments is compared across journals and geographical regions. By incorporating objectively measurable quality proxies into our analysis, we shed some light on the question of to what extent (differences in) citations are driven by (differences in) quality characteristics and social ties. In this respect, our analysis goes beyond the existing work on editorial favoritism. Surprisingly and despite the large differences in the total number of participants and participants per treatment, we find no robust evidence for any effect of these quality proxies on the number of citations. Yet, we are confident that our results provide insights for editors on how to improve their journals' selection criteria and increase their journals' impact factors.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the related literature in section 2. In section 3, we describe our data set and our selection criteria for journals and papers before we examine geographical concentration in section 4. In section 5, we compare the laboratory experiments conducted in Europe and North America using our proxies for quality. We describe our tests for editorial favoritism in section 6 and conclude in section 7.

2 Related Literature

2.1 Geographical Concentration

Kalaitzidakis et al. (1999) look at ten high-quality journals from 1991 to 1996 and show that between 69% and 90% of all authors have an affiliation in North America. Based on all papers in the top 15 journals between 1977 and 1997, Kocher und Sutter (2001) find that 72.2% of these papers were authored by economists working in the US. They also find that US dominance reduced over time. Ek and Henrekson (2019) look at the top-five economics journals and show that between 82% (in 1994) and 65% (in 2017) of all authors have an affiliation in North America, and 95% of the North American authors have their affiliation in the US. Other studies

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¹ We decided to focus on editors and not on referees for three reasons. First, editors have the power to overrule referees' suggestions. Second, editors tend to select referees to whom they have easy access, implying that social ties between author and editor and between author and referee are correlated (Hamermesh 1994). And third, data on referees is hard to obtain.

find similar results regarding the decline in US dominance (Glötzl and Aigner 2017, Neary et al. 2003)². For the field of laboratory experiments, we expect a similar pattern.

2.2 Social Ties and Editorial Favoritism

Editorial favoritism occurs when it is easier for an economist with a social tie to one or more editors to get her paper accepted, compared to a paper of the same quality submitted by an economist without such a social tie. Editorial favoritism might occur if, for example, editors favor their former PhD students, or authors employed at the same university or the same region³.

A relatively high share of papers by authors who are connected to one of the journal's editors is often taken as an indication for editorial favoritism. However, this is neither necessary nor sufficient. As pointed out by Brogaard et al. (2014, 252), the decisive question is "...whether editors use information advantages to improve selection decisions, or whether they bow to conflicts of interest."

The earliest study on editorial favoritism in economics is Laband and Piette (1994a), who analyze all papers published in 28 journals in the year 1984. Laband and Piette define a social tie as one of the authors and one member of the editorial board having received their PhD from the same university or one of the authors and one member of the editorial board being affiliated with the same university in 1984. Controlling for papers' length, journal quality, author's age, gender, and reputation, they find a positive correlation between the number of citations in the 5 years after publication and the existence of a social tie. They note that some well-cited high-quality papers mainly drive this positive correlation. However, their results also show that economists who had social ties to the editors authored more than two thirds of the papers with remarkably few citations. Thus, Laband and Piette find no clear evidence for or against editorial favoritism. Based on their results, they conclude that "on balance, journal editors use their professional connections to search out good papers, rather than print substandard material

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² US dominance can be observed not only among authors but also among editors. Hodgson and Rothman (1999, 168 - 170) look at 30 high quality journals and show that more than 83% of all editorial board members come from the US. In section 6.1 we describe the composition of the editorial boards for the journals we examined.

³ Discrimination implies that papers with a lower quality are accepted for publication, while papers with a higher quality are rejected. If the paper's true quality is somehow revealed after publication (possibly, by the number of citations), this might damage a journal's reputation (a loss in the journal's impact factor). So how can discrimination persist? It can persist as long as the true quality is not revealed, or if there is a form of collusion between editors of different journals, who all discriminate in the same way. In experimental oligopoly markets it has been found that a shrinking market facilitates collusion (Abbink and Brandts 2009). In economics we have a similar situation. As more and more journals are published in English but outside the US (e.g., the JEEA), the US-market is shrinking. However, rather than investigating discrimination over time, we focus on the possible existence of discrimination in one particular field.

written by their colleagues or buddies" (Laband and Piette 1994a, 200). Medoff (2003) analyzes all papers published in six core journals in 1990 and also finds that papers by authors with a social tie to the editors or co-editors receive a higher number of citations in the years following publication. He examines the citations received in the 5 and 10 years after publication and observes that the positive effect of social ties is stable over time.

More recently, several papers have examined further effects of social ties. Based on an analysis of 50,000 articles in 30 major economics and finance journals since 1955, Brogaard et al. (2014) show that the publication rates of authors in these journals increase by 100% as soon as one of their current colleagues is the editor in charge of the corresponding journal. Their results show that articles by authors with social ties to editors receive significantly more citations than articles by authors without such connections. Colussi (2018) analyzes all 1,620 papers published in four top-journals (AER, *Econometrica*, *Journal of Political Economy* (JPE), *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (QJE)) between 2000 and 2006. Colussi's results show that editors are more likely to accept papers from colleagues (an 8% increase at the baseline) and former PhD students (a 14% increase at the baseline). Further, he shows that about 43% of all papers were written by an author connected to at least one editor in charge of the journal at the time of publication. However, since the base-rate of submitting authors is unknown, this value is difficult to interpret. Heckman (2017) finds a similar pattern in two house journals, the University of Chicago's JPE and Harvard's QJE. Using data on publications from 2000 to 2016, he shows that 14.3% of all papers in the JPE come from authors affiliated with the University of Chicago, and that 24.7% of all publications in the QJE come from authors affiliated with Harvard.

Taken together, thus, previous studies suggest that (1) social ties can improve the chances of getting published because they reduce editors' search costs for high-quality papers, and (2) that conditional on being accepted for publication, on balance, papers from authors with social ties receive more citations. None of the studies finds clear evidence for editorial favoritism (but see Shepherd, 1995, for anecdotal evidence).

The studies discussed above focus on editorial favoritism and the effects of social ties. They discuss social ties exclusively at the institutional level but not at the regional level. As Frey and Pommerehne (1988, 106-107) point out, it may also be generally possible that it is easier for American economists to publish in American-dominated journals than it is for non-American economists.

Existing studies on editorial favoritism (Laband and Piette 1994a, Medoff 2003) use data on individual authors (e.g., affiliations, age, gender, reputation) and characteristics of the papers (e.g., length, JEL code, position within the journal issue). These characteristics, however, are not related to any methodological standards. In section 5.1, we argue that there are four proxies that capture different methodological standards for laboratory experiments. Our analysis of editorial favoritism for laboratory experiments includes these four proxies, and thus extends the existing literature on editorial favoritism.

3 Data on Laboratory Experiments

3.1 Selection Criteria

Although we are interested in the overall development of experimental economics, we decided to focus exclusively on papers that report results from laboratory experiments. Precisely, we focus on laboratory experiments that generate data in a controlled process using student participants who interact in an artificial environment⁴. In order to ensure the greatest possible comparability, we do not consider papers that contain other types of experiments⁵.

For laboratory experiments, objectively measurable proxies for an experiment's quality exist. This is because, compared to field experiments, laboratory experiments have the exclusive advantage that the experimenter has a high degree of control. Proxies for an experiment's quality are the total number of participants, the number of treatments, the number of participants per treatment, and the strength of incentives. We describe these proxies in more detail in section 5.1.

There is no doubt that field experiments play an important role in experimental economics (for a detailed discussion see, Czibor et al. 2019, Carpenter et al. 2005, Harrison and List 2004). However, in field experiments at least one of our quality proxies cannot be controlled. For example, an artefactual field (or lab-in-the-field) experiment relies on a population of participants specifically selected for a given research question (e.g., chess players in Levitt et al. 2011) that cannot be fully controlled by the experimenter. Similarly, framed field experiments take place in a natural environment (e.g., the National Rural Support Programme Offices in Afzal et al. 2017) which also cannot be fully controlled by the experimenter. In

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⁴ Our data contain papers where the majority of the participants were students. Papers where the majority of participants belonged to special groups (such as job professionals or caste members) are not included in the data set.

⁵ For example, the AER paper by Imas (2016) is not included in our data set because the paper contains two laboratory experiments and a robustness check conducted online via Amazon M-Turk.

natural field experiments, moreover, both the participant population and the environment cannot be controlled exogenously.

3.2 Our Data Set

Our data set contains 583 papers published between 1998 and 2018 (410 from EE, 135 from the AER (including papers from AER's Papers and Proceedings) and 38 from the JEEA)⁶. We chose 1998 as the starting year for our analysis because EE was founded that year. EE is the specialized field journal of the *Economic Science Association*. It publishes laboratory and field experiments as well as related theoretical papers and reviews. We chose the AER and the JEEA because they are the official journals of the *American Economic Association* and the *European Economic Association*, respectively. Both are general interest journals and publish only a small share of laboratory experiments⁷. We have decided to collect data from these relatively high ranked journals to ensure that the individual papers have received a certain number of citations and because we assume that the journals receive a high number of submissions from different geographical regions.

For each paper in our data set, we collected data on:

- the authors and their affiliations at the time of publication,
- the number of citations received by the individual authors in the 5 years before publication,
- the total number of pages,
- the total number of references,
- the journal's impact factors in the year the paper was published, and
- the paper's number of citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication.

In addition, we extracted data on the characteristics of the laboratory experiments reported in the papers. If available, for each laboratory experiment we collected data on:

- the total number of participants,
- the number of treatments,
- the duration of the experiment,

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⁶ A full list of the included papers can be found in the supplementary material.

⁷ On the IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factors for Journals list the AER is ranked 10th, the JEEA is ranked 19th and EE is ranked 35th (see <https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html>, accessed August 29 2019). On the latest version of the Journal Quality List of Anne-Wil Harzing, which provides an overview of several different ratings, the AER is rated A+ and the JEEA and EE are both rated A (see https://harzing.com/download/jql_title_2019-02.pdf, accessed August 29 2019).

- average earnings per participant, and
- the year in which the experiment was conducted.

Citation data was obtained from *Web of Science*. Data on impact factors were taken from *CitEc*, a *RePEc* service that provides citation data for economics⁸. All other data were obtained directly from the published papers. As not all papers report data on all characteristics, our data set contains some papers for which some or all of the experiment's characteristics are missing. In case of missing values, we tried to obtain the data from working paper versions or directly from the authors, which was successful in some cases.

4 Geographical Concentration in Experimental Economics

In this section, we examine the geographical concentration of published laboratory experiments at the country-level. In section 4.1, we look at the country shares for each journal for the longest available period. In section 4.2, we examine how geographical concentration has changed over time.

We measure geographical concentration as follows (see also Combes and Linnemer 2003, Kocher und Sutter 2001). Let IF_i be the 2-year impact factor of the journal in which paper i was published in the year the paper was published. Let n_i be the number of authors of paper i . An author's weight is then given by IF_i/n_i . The weighted score for a single country and a given time period is calculated by aggregating the values of all authors whose affiliated institution was located in this country (at the time of publication). Given the weighted scores of all countries, we compute each country's share.

4.1 Pooled Over Time

Table 1 shows the shares for selected countries⁹. The first three columns depict the results by journal, the last column presents the aggregate results for laboratory experiments published in all three journals. Appendix *Table 14* lists all countries' scores and shares by journal. Our results are qualitatively similar if we do not weight individual papers by the journal's impact factor, so that each author's weight is given by $1/n_i$.

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⁸ For the AER see, <http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/aeaaecrev.html>, for EE see, <http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/kapexpeco.html> and for the JEEA see, <http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/blajeurec.html> (accessed July 9, 2019). Data for Experimental Economics' impact factor for 1998 and for the JEEA's impact factor before 2011 was not available.

⁹ We have assigned Israel, Russia and Turkey to Europe and Guatemala and Mexico to North America throughout the whole paper.

	Shares			
	AER	EE	JEEA	all three
Austria	2.81	4.86	0.00	3.73
France	0.69	3.03	3.28	2.28
Germany	4.35	12.08	11.62	9.47
Israel	1.59	0.84	0.00	1.01
Italy	0.42	3.50	1.73	2.31
Netherlands	3.15	4.68	8.21	4.50
Norway	0.58	0.68	7.05	1.24
Spain	2.87	5.88	2.28	4.55
Sweden	0.76	1.25	0.00	0.97
Switzerland	5.36	2.24	17.86	4.73
UK	5.79	8.80	10.61	7.97
Other European countries	0.83	1.89	0.00	1.36
Europe	29.20	49.73	62.64	44.11
US	62.51	37.84	29.10	45.22
Other North American countries	1.62	3.06	1.71	2.46
North America	64.13	40.90	30.81	47.68
Australia and NZ	2.58	4.99	2.32	3.94
Asia	3.56	4.09	2.96	3.81
South America	0.54	0.29	1.28	0.46
Other continents	6.67	9.37	6.55	8.21
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 1: Geographical concentration, countries' relative shares for selected countries, pooled data from 1998 to 2018 for the AER, from 1999 to 2018 for EE and from 2011 to 2018 for the JEEA. Continents are marked in bold.

We see that US economists are dominant in all journals. For the AER this dominance is most pronounced. When looking at the European countries, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Austria stick out because they have the highest outputs within Europe.

4.2 Development Over Time

Looking at development over time, we divide the 20-year period from 1999 to 2018 into four five-year periods¹⁰. *Table 2* shows the scores and shares of all countries with a share larger than 1% (for the whole period from 1999 to 2018). Scores and shares of all countries can be found in appendix *Table 15*. The analyses in *Table 2* and *Table 15* only contain data on papers from the AER and EE, as CitEc impact factors for the JEEA are available only for 2011-2018.

The first result that sticks out is the sharp increase in the field's research output. Looking at the total output by aggregating scores over all countries (*Table 2* and appendix *Table 15*), we see an increase from 105.85 (1999-2003) to 279.14 (2004-2008) to 584.54 (2009-2013) followed by a decrease to 416.92 (2014-2018). The decrease in the most recent period could be due to

¹⁰ We exclude observations from 1998, as CitEc impact factors for EE are only available from 1999 onward.

four reasons: First, field and online experiments have developed into an increasingly established research method in recent years (see e.g., Stewart et al. 2015), partially replacing lab experiments. Second, a larger fraction of papers use multiple methods for data collection. These papers are not included in our data set. Third, other journals have become more open toward laboratory experiments or new journals that publish laboratory experiments have been established. And fourth, editors' tastes may have changed so that other research methods are preferred to laboratory experiments.

Based on the scores (appendix *Table 15*), we computed compound growth rates. Aggregated over all countries, the field's research output increased by 57.93% from each five-year period to the next. As expected, the compound growth rate for US-economists is much smaller (30.64%). High growth rates are observed for Australia (211%), Austria (192%), Italy (157%), China (133%), Germany (118%), the UK (114%), the Netherlands (110%) and Japan (100%). Of course, these growth rates are partly due to the fact that some countries started from very low levels of research output in the period 1999-2003.

	Shares				
	Scores				
	1999-2003	2004-2008	2009-2013	2014-2018	1999-2018
Austria	0.63	0.12	6.79	3.99	4.09
	0.67	0.34	39.71	16.63	57.34
France	3.01	0.20	2.61	2.72	2.16
	3.18	0.55	15.27	11.33	30.33
Germany	4.78	5.53	9.56	12.63	9.22
	5.06	15.43	55.91	52.66	129.38
Israel	1.07	0.78	1.79	0.44	1.18
	1.13	2.18	10.44	1.82	16.58
Italy	0.61	1.23	3.06	2.66	2.40
	0.65	3.44	17.91	11.09	33.60
Netherlands	2.32	4.20	3.49	5.49	4.10
	2.46	11.73	20.40	22.88	57.48
Spain	1.70	2.81	8.46	1.82	4.78
	1.80	7.85	49.46	7.59	67.02
Sweden	1.01	1.70	0.23	1.86	1.07
	1.07	4.74	1.37	7.76	14.95
Switzerland	9.19	1.30	4.49	1.83	3.37
	9.72	3.64	26.24	7.64	47.24
UK	3.07	6.53	9.23	7.69	7.77
	3.25	18.24	53.93	32.08	109.00
Other Euro. countries	1.79	1.79	1.19	3.84	2.13
	1.89	5.01	6.95	16.01	29.86
Europe	29.18	26.21	50.91	44.97	42.26
	30.89	73.16	297.59	187.49	592.79
US	65.07	68.47	39.68	36.83	46.85
	68.87	191.12	231.94	153.56	657.18
Other NA countries	1.58	0.88	2.92	3.39	2.54
	1.68	2.46	17.08	14.14	35.69
North America	66.65	69.35	42.60	40.22	49.40
	70.55	193.58	249.02	167.70	692.87
Australia and NZ	2.34	1.57	4.59	5.67	4.09
	2.48	4.39	26.84	23.63	57.33
Asia	1.83	2.87	1.79	8.03	3.87
	1.94	8.01	10.45	33.47	54.33
South America	0.00	0.00	0.11	1.11	0.38
	0.00	0.00	0.64	4.63	5.27
Other continents	4.17	4.44	6.49	14.81	8.34
	4.42	12.40	37.93	61.73	116.93
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	105.85	279.14	584.54	416.92	1402.61

Table 2: Shares and scores for the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors for selected countries. Data pooled over different periods. For each country, the first row reports the country's share and the second row reports the country's score.

Looking at countries' relative shares (the upper row of each country in *Table 2*), we find that the US-dominance decreased from about 65.07% (1999-2003) to 36.83% (2014-2018) while several countries increased their relative shares. The countries that gained most are Germany (7.85%), the UK (4.62%), Australia (4.43%), and the Netherlands (3.16%). All this shows that geographical concentration has decreased. Indeed, this is confirmed if we look at the Herfindahl index¹¹, which first increased from 0.332 (1999-2003) to 0.480 (2004-2008) but then decreased to 0.169 (2009-2013) and to 0.171 (2014-2018). In sum, our data show that for laboratory experimental economics, the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors has substantially decreased.

The discussion above focused on the development of impact-weighted research output. Note that we looked at output (i.e., published papers) without considering inputs (e.g., manpower, financial resources). Hence, we cannot say anything about a country's productivity. Because input data comparable across countries is not available, we follow Kocher and Sutter (2001) in using a country's population as proxy and compute each country's output per million inhabitants in appendix *Table 16* and *Table 17*¹².

Considering the first time period (1999-2003, see *Table 16*), we see that output per million inhabitants was below 0.2, except for Switzerland (1.36), New Zealand (0.46) and the US (0.25). Considering only the last period (2014-2018, see *Table 17*), we see that output was above 0.40 for several countries (Australia 0.90, Germany 0.65, Spain 0.60, UK 0.50, US 0.48) and we see some very high productivities in small countries (Austria 1.95, Singapore 1.40, the Netherlands 1.36, Norway 1.17, Switzerland 0.93, Denmark 0.83, Sweden 0.80, New Zealand 0.53).

Interestingly, there are some differences between our results and the results reported in Kocher and Sutter (2001, 414). They show that Israel has the highest and the US have the second-highest productivity. UK ranks third, Switzerland ranks 9th, Germany ranks 17th and Spain ranks 19th. Recall that while Kocher and Sutter consider papers from all areas, we focus on

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¹¹ The Herfindahl index is the sum of all countries' squared market shares. For a monopoly, the index is equal to one. Smaller numbers indicate less concentration.

¹² This approach only gives a crude picture and has several shortcomings (c.f. Kocher and Sutter 2001, 414). It implicitly assumes that resources devoted to experimental economics is highly correlated with a country's inhabitants, which is problematic especially in large less-developed countries. Data for population sizes was taken from the World Bank (see, <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/1ff4a498/Popular-Indicators>, accessed May 22, 2019) and for Taiwan from the UN (see, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/>, accessed May 22, 2019). To compute scores per million inhabitants for a specific time period we used the population size for the period's first year (e.g., 1999 population for the period 1999-2003).

laboratory experimental economics. In addition, Kocher and Sutter consider data until 1997 while our data on geographical concentration start in 1999. Because of the different time periods and our specialization on one particular field, the results are not directly comparable, but a tentative explanation for the differences is that several European countries (Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands) have specialized in experimental economics.

5 Quality Characteristics

In the preceding section, we described the development of geographical concentration by looking at the number of publications weighted by the journals' impact factor. Such an analysis neglects any differences between individual papers published within the same journal in a given year. If there are significant quality differences between different papers published in the same journal in a given year, the results from the preceding section could be biased. By focusing on the characteristics of individual experiments and papers, we try to uncover such differences in order to get a more detailed picture.

In subsection 5.1, we describe four proxies for the *quality of laboratory experiments*. We compare these proxies in subsection 5.2. This comparison reveals that there are differences regarding methodological standards between experiments conducted in North America and Europe. In subsection 5.3, we describe three proxies for the *quality of papers* that report experimental results. All seven proxies are available prior to publication and might inform editors' decisions. This is not the case for the number of citations a paper receives after publication, which we argue to be the most important ex post quality proxy in subsection 5.4. Finally, we compare the number of citations between experiments conducted in North America and Europe in subsection 5.5.

5.1 Proxies for the Quality of Laboratory Experiments

Our proxies for the quality of an experiment (shorthand: P1-P4) are objectively measurable. However, they are only proxies. Thus, it is possible that they only weakly correlate with the true quality of an experiment, which is of course unknown.

(P1 and P2) The first two quality proxies are the *total number of participants*, and the *number of participants per treatment*. Both are related to the experiment's statistical power. For a more detailed discussion of power analysis in experimental economics see Czibor et al. (2019), Ioannidis et al. (2017), Bellemare et al. (2016, 2014) and Zhang and Ortmann (2013).

Experiments with higher power tend to generate fewer false positives and, hence, their results are more likely to replicate. This in turn could increase confidence in the experiment's results¹³.

For a given number of treatments, a larger *total number of participants* results in more observations, which increases statistical power if statistical testing is carried out at the participant-level. A similar proxy for quality is the *number of participants per treatment*. If an experiment contains a large number of treatments, and if the statistical analysis involves a pairwise comparison of treatments, the *number of participants per treatment* is a better proxy for the experiment's power.

Arguably, another possibility would be using the number of independent observations as a proxy for quality. Since the question of what constitutes an independent observation has no clear answer, we did not follow this route (see chapter 3 in Svorenčík and Maas 2016). Another, but related, aspect concerns the possibility to econometrically control for dependencies (see Moffatt 2015, 5-6). If dependencies are controlled for, the number of independent observations will underestimate the quality of the experiment¹⁴.

(P3) The third proxy is the *number of treatments*. *Ceteris paribus*, a larger *number of treatments* increases quality because it allows to test for more alternative explanations. By testing for a higher number of alternative explanations, authors increase the scientific value of their papers by linking the interpretation of their results to a larger number of existing papers and corroborating their claims better by ruling out more alternative hypotheses.

(P4) The fourth proxy is the *strength of monetary incentives*. According to the methodological literature on laboratory experiments, monetary incentives are related to the quality of an experiment. In fact, the use of monetary incentives is an established methodological standard in economics (see Hertwig and Ortmann 2001, 390) and all experiments in our data set use monetary incentives. Possibly, this is the case because experimental economists expect that they cannot publish their paper if they would use hypothetical rather than monetary incentives

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¹³ Camerer et al. (2016) were able to successfully replicate the results of 11 out of 18 experiments. With the goal of making replication studies more attractive, Drazen et al. (2019) suggest journal-based replication, in which the journal contracts a replication after a paper has been accepted but before it is published.

¹⁴ For example, consider a T -times repeated public good game with stranger matching. Assume the experiment consists of two treatments, S sessions per treatment, and N participants per treatment. Due to the stranger matching protocol, all observations within the same sessions are dependent. The most conservative way would be to take a session's average contribution (pooled across participants and time) as one independent observation and compare session averages across treatments. Proceeding this way, we would have S independent observations per treatment. If we would exploit the panel structure of the data and use a random effects model, we could use each single decision as an observation resulting in a total of $2STN$ observations.

(Camerer and Hogarth 1999, 31)¹⁵. We operationalized the *strength of monetary incentives* by dividing a participant's average earnings (including the show-up fee) by the duration of the experiment (in minutes) and converting the result into real 2015 US-Dollars¹⁶.

Regarding the *strength of monetary incentives*, Davis and Holt (1993, 24-25) argue that incentives should be high enough to cover opportunity costs. This rule defines a lower limit for incentives but remains silent about the relation between the strength of incentives and behavior. Camerer and Hogarth (1999, 31) show that the *strength of monetary incentives* affects behavior and increases data quality. With stronger incentives, subjects are less likely to show thoughtless behavior or make errors, leading to lower variance and less noise in the data. This, in turn, leads to an increase in power, allows for more precise statistical testing, and increases the likelihood of successful replication. According to this line of reasoning, experimental economists could increase the quality of their experiments by paying higher rewards¹⁷.

Table 3 gives an overview of mean values for the quality proxies for the three journals. At first glance, we see that *total number of participants*, *number of participants per treatment* and *number of treatments* are higher for the AER and the JEEA than for EE. As Table 3 illustrates, the variable *strength of monetary incentives* could only be computed for 53% of AER papers, 72% of EE papers and 63% of JEEA papers. This is because, even in these prestigious journals, many papers do not report the number of participants, average earnings per participant, or the duration of the experiment.

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¹⁵ For a more detailed discussion of monetary incentives see Bardsley et al. (chapter 6, 2010), Ortmann (2009), Read (2005), Guala (chapter 11, 2005) and Rydval and Ortmann (2004).

¹⁶ Data for exchange rates comes from fxtop.com. Data for CPI comes from <https://data.oecd.org>. In some papers it was not stated, in which year the experiment was conducted. In these cases we estimated the corresponding value by subtracting three years from the year of publication.

¹⁷ A related aspect that is discussed by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) concerns participants' cognitive abilities. Together with monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation, cognitive abilities affect participants' mental effort. However, the effect from incentives on mental effort is likely to be non-monotonic, as recognized by Davis and Holt: "No amount of money can motivate participants to perform a calculation beyond their intellectual capacities, any more than generous bonuses would transform most of us into professional athletes" (Davis and Holt 1993, 24). Because no data on participants' cognitive abilities are available, we could not include cognitive abilities in our set of quality proxies. We believe that this is unproblematic because there is no reason to expect any systematic differences in participants' cognitive abilities across experiments.

	AER <i>N</i> = 135	EE <i>N</i> = 410	JEEA <i>N</i> = 38
P1: total # of participants	255.93 (203.37) <i>N</i> = 128	194.49 (128.45) <i>N</i> = 407	289.65 (183.78) <i>N</i> = 37
P2: # participants per treatment	69.39 (90.00) <i>N</i> = 126	55.33 (40.97) <i>N</i> = 405	61.50 (43.44) <i>N</i> = 31
P3: # treatments	4.40 (3.01) <i>N</i> = 133	3.90 (2.29) <i>N</i> = 407	4.84 (2.50) <i>N</i> = 32
P4: strength of monetary incentives	0.40 (0.24) <i>N</i> = 72	0.31 (0.14) <i>N</i> = 294	0.32 (0.16) <i>N</i> = 24

Table 3: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for experiments' proxies.

5.2 Are there Differences in Methodological Standards?

In this subsection, we examine whether there are clearly defined methodological standards with regard to the ex ante proxies for quality described above. If this were the case, one would expect to find no differences regarding these proxies between experiments conducted in different regions.

In the following, we look only at laboratory experiments conducted in North America or Europe. More than 82% of the papers in our dataset contain laboratory experiments conducted in these two regions.

P1: total # participants	North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
AER	220.16 (170.85) <i>N</i> = 69	368.49 (257.87) <i>N</i> = 37	271.93 (216.22) <i>N</i> = 106	0.0004
EE	167.03 (94.83) <i>N</i> = 164	204.93 (126.44) <i>N</i> = 169	186.27 (113.42) <i>N</i> = 333	0.0078
JEEA	246.92 (121.16) <i>N</i> = 13	301.81 (221.31) <i>N</i> = 21	280.82 (189.09) <i>N</i> = 34	0.9294
all three	186.15 (124.78) <i>N</i> = 246	240.56 (175.46) <i>N</i> = 227	212.26 (153.51) <i>N</i> = 473	0.0003

Table 4: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for total number of participants by region and journal. Last column is the *p*-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test.

P2: # participants per treatment	North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
AER	54.78 (45.74) <i>N</i> = 68	111.26 (146.45) <i>N</i> = 37	74.68 (97.50) <i>N</i> = 105	0.0001
EE	49.07 (33.96) <i>N</i> = 163	59.97 (40.76) <i>N</i> = 168	54.60 (37.91) <i>N</i> = 331	0.0031
JEEA	37.69 (19.22) <i>N</i> = 10	73.10 (49.63) <i>N</i> = 19	60.89 (44.68) <i>N</i> = 29	0.0276
all three	50.21 (37.28) <i>N</i> = 241	69.56 (72.56) <i>N</i> = 224	59.53 (57.82) <i>N</i> = 465	<0.0001

Table 5: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for participants per treatment by region and journal. Last column is the *p*-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test.

P3: # treatments	North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
AER	4.30 (2.96) 3 <i>N</i> = 73	4.79 (3.47) 4 <i>N</i> = 38	4.47 (3.13) 3 <i>N</i> = 111	0.5527
EE	3.92 (2.30) 4 <i>N</i> = 165	3.79 (2.34) 4 <i>N</i> = 168	3.85 (2.31) 4 <i>N</i> = 333	0.4391
JEEA	5.00 (3.16) 2 <i>N</i> = 11	4.63 (2.14) 3 <i>N</i> = 19	4.77 (2.51) 3 & 4 <i>N</i> = 30	0.9479
all three	4.08 (2.55) 4 <i>N</i> = 249	4.03 (2.57) 4 <i>N</i> = 225	4.05 (2.56) 4 <i>N</i> = 474	0.7020

Table 6: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), modes and number of observations for number of treatments by region and journal. Last column is the *p*-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test.

P4: strength of monetary incentives	North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
AER	0.37 (0.17) <i>N</i> = 35	0.45 (0.32) <i>N</i> = 29	0.41 (0.25) <i>N</i> = 64	0.2544
EE	0.30 (0.12) <i>N</i> = 116	0.33 (0.16) <i>N</i> = 131	0.32 (0.14) <i>N</i> = 247	0.0791
JEEA	0.33 (0.14) <i>N</i> = 6	0.32 (0.17) <i>N</i> = 16	0.32 (0.16) <i>N</i> = 22	0.8828
all three	0.32 (0.14) <i>N</i> = 157	0.35 (0.20) <i>N</i> = 176	0.33 (0.17) <i>N</i> = 333	0.0693

Table 7: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for strength of monetary incentives by region and journal. Last column is the *p*-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test.

Table 4 to Table 7 show the mean values of the ex ante proxies for quality by journal and region. With respect to the *total number of participants* or the *number of participants per treatment*, there seems to be no universal methodological standard. Rather, there seem to be systematic differences between experiments conducted in both regions.

Except for the JEEA, experiments conducted in Europe involve a significantly larger *total number of participants*. For all journals, European experiments have a significantly larger *number of participants per treatment*. Possibly, these differences indicate differences with regard to what constitutes an independent observation, as emphasized by Frans van Winden:

"I can remember at the Amsterdam meetings that there were some heated discussions, and they were related to three topics. First of all, what is an independent observation? What I remember is that people from the United States were more liberal in the sense that they applied parametric statistics whereas the Germans, especially of course Reinhard Selten and the group he influenced, were stricter on that."

(Frans van Winden, cited in Svorenčik and Maas 2016, 188-198).

Another possible explanation for the differences in the *total number of participants* and the *number of participants per treatment* (P1 and P2) is that there are differences in the types of experiments conducted in the two regions (e.g., individual decision making, public good games, market experiments...) that require different numbers of participants. If there are systematic differences in the distribution of types, our measures P1 and P2 will be biased. A cursory look into our data reveals that for almost all types the number of participants is higher for experiments conducted in Europe, indicating that it is unlikely that our results are driven by

differences in types. However, while some experiments can be easily classified as certain types, there are many experiments that are hard to classify.

With regard to the *number of treatments*, there are no significant differences between North-American and European experiments. Across journals and continents, the mode of treatments per experiment is four.

Regarding the *strength of monetary incentives* there also are no significant differences. This observation is compatible with the existence of a common standard for how to incentivize participants in Europe and North America.

Our results for the *total number of participants* and the *strength of monetary incentives* could suggest that experimental economists from Europe have to pay a higher price for publishing their papers, compared to experimental economists from North America. Another explanation might be that economists in Europe have easier access to research funding compared to their colleagues in the US¹⁸.

The differences in the *total number of participants* could be driven by a cohort effect. Section 4.2 showed that the US's research output was very high in the first two periods before it decreased. If the *total number of participants* increases over time, and if this increase has the same magnitude for experiments conducted in North America and Europe, the differences in the *total number of participants* in Table 4 would only reflect the fact that the share of experiments conducted in the US decreased. To rule out such cohort effects, we look at the *total number of participants* for four periods. Table 8 shows that there are almost no significant differences in the *total number of participants* for the first and second period. However, from the periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018, the *total number of participants* for European experiments for both journals is always higher and in most cases the difference is statistically significant. Moreover, the difference between North America and Europe increases over time. This suggests that the differences in the *total number of participants* for the pooled data (1999-2018) are not driven by the decreasing share of US output. Rather, it is driven by differences in the *total number of participants* in the two most recent periods.

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¹⁸ We thank Gary Charness for drawing our attention to this aspect. Unfortunately, there are no sources for the amount of research funding for experimental economists in different regions. However, we consider it unlikely that there is a causal relationship between the availability of research funding and the average *total number of participants*. Even if research funds were easier available in Europe, they could be used, for example, to carry out more single projects.

period	P1: total number of participants	North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
1999 - 2003	AER	240.65 (163.21) <i>N</i> = 20	230.00 (124.78) <i>N</i> = 10	237.10 (149.37) <i>N</i> = 30	0.9140
	EE	134.15 (75.65) <i>N</i> = 41	154.85 (99.97) <i>N</i> = 34	143.53 (87.51) <i>N</i> = 75	0.3522
	both	169.07 (121.62) <i>N</i> = 61	171.93 (109.29) <i>N</i> = 44	170.27 (116.08) <i>N</i> = 105	0.6353
2004 - 2008	AER	205.54 (183.73) <i>N</i> = 24	432.71 (294.28) <i>N</i> = 7	256.84 (229.18) <i>N</i> = 31	0.0170
	EE	138.66 (72.10) <i>N</i> = 35	130.52 (104.34) <i>N</i> = 21	135.61 (84.79) <i>N</i> = 56	0.2332
	both	165.86 (132.41) <i>N</i> = 59	206.07 (212.29) <i>N</i> = 28	178.80 (162.26) <i>N</i> = 87	0.8905
2009 - 2013	AER	270.31 (190.69) <i>N</i> = 16	389.56 (257.60) <i>N</i> = 16	329.94 (231.03) <i>N</i> = 32	0.1458
	EE	162.86 (79.42) <i>N</i> = 28	217.24 (129.07) <i>N</i> = 49	197.47 (116.00) <i>N</i> = 77	0.0376
	both	201.93 (139.21) <i>N</i> = 44	259.66 (183.42) <i>N</i> = 65	236.36 (168.71) <i>N</i> = 109	0.0229
2014 - 2018	AER	124.44 (51.06) <i>N</i> = 9	518.00 (374.84) <i>N</i> = 4	245.54 (269.46) <i>N</i> = 13	0.0699
	EE	208.00 (110.17) <i>N</i> = 60	245.89 (126.28) <i>N</i> = 65	227.70 (119.86) <i>N</i> = 125	0.0638
	both	197.10 (107.90) <i>N</i> = 69	261.67 (159.09) <i>N</i> = 69	229.38 (139.25) <i>N</i> = 138	0.0069

Table 8: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for number of total participants by period, region and journal. Last column is the *p*-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test.

5.3 Ex Ante Proxies for a Paper's Quality

Ex ante proxies represent information that is available before the paper is accepted for publication. Thus, such proxies can be used by referees and editors when deciding about whether to accept or reject a submitted paper. Our four proxies, P1 to P4, are such ex ante proxies. However, aspects like novelty, originality, and practical relevance are also available ex ante and important for a paper's quality. Attempting to account for such additional ex ante

proxies, we include three additional variables: the number of pages, the number of references, and authors' reputation. When testing for editorial favoritism (in section 6), we will control for these variables.

(P5) Consistent with the results of Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a) we expect a positive correlation between the *number of pages* and quality. We assume that editors are willing to allocate more journal space to high quality papers. Since the journals have different formats and therefore different numbers of words per page, whenever necessary we converted the number of pages into EE-equivalent pages.

(P6) We expect a positive correlation between the *number of references* and quality. We assume that authors who cite a larger number of references have studied a larger amount of related literature before conducting their own research. As we explain in subsection 5.4 below, we use citations received in the 5 and 10 years after publication of a paper as a proxy for the ex post quality. It seems plausible that a paper with a higher *number of references* also receives more attention from the scientific community than a paper with only a small *number of references*.

(P7) As shown in Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a) an *author's reputation* is likely to have a positive effect on the paper's quality. We proxy authors' reputation by their stock of citations. In case of a single author, we take the total number of citations received by the author during the 5 years prior to the publication of the paper. In case of more than one author, we take the average of all authors' citations during the 5 years prior to the publication of the paper¹⁹. Editors could take a scholar's stock of prior citations as a signal of the expected scientific contribution of her paper (see Medoff 2003, 428-429)²⁰. Also, it is conceivable that, regardless of the paper's quality, papers authored by well-known economists tend to attract more citations (Merton's Matthew effect, see Merton 1968).

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¹⁹ The average number of authors increased significantly from the first period (1999-2003, mean: 2.30) to each of the three subsequent periods (2004-2008, mean: 2.54, $p = 0.034$; 2009-2013, mean: 2.66, $p < 0.01$; 2014-2018, mean: 2.53, $p = 0.024$; p -values from two-sided Mann-Whitney tests). However, the increase is small and there are no significant differences in the average number of authors in the last three periods. We therefore assume that our measure of reputation is not distorted by changes in the average number of authors.

²⁰ This requires that editors can identify authors' identities despite the referee process being double blind. In a field experiment, Blank (1991) found that in AER's double blind referee process about 50% of referees could correctly identify the identity of authors. Given that many authors post preliminary versions of their papers online, we assume that in many cases, editors can also identify authors' identities.

5.4 Citations as Proxy for Ex Post Quality

Ex post proxies measure the quality of a paper after its publication. We focus on just one proxy, citations²¹. This does not imply that citations reflect a paper's true quality. Rather, we decided to use the *number of citations* because data on citations is widely available and is heavily used to allocate positions and resources (Card and DellaVigna forthcoming, Hamermesh 2018, Moed 2006, Laband and Piette 1994b). Moreover, assuming that it is a concern of the editors to maximize their journals' impact factor, they have an incentive to accept papers that they expect to receive a high number of citations.

Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. and Figure 2 show the distributions of citations received in the 5 and 10 years following publication by journal. Due to the small number of observations for the JEEA, we plot the distributions only for AER and EE (but see Table 9 for some descriptive statistics). The distributions are heavily skewed to the right. As one would expect, laboratory experiments published in the AER receive significantly more citations than laboratory experiments published in EE.

Figure 1: Distribution of citations for laboratory experiments published in the AER, 5 and 10 years after publication.

²¹ Other ex post proxies are being reprinted in anthologies or the amount of media-coverage.

Figure 2: Distribution of citations for laboratory experiments published in EE, 5 and 10 years after publication.

5.5 Are there Differences in Citations?

Subsection 5.2 showed that North American and European experiments differ with respect to the *total number of participants* (P1) and the *number of participants per treatment* (P2). One might wonder whether this difference is associated with a difference in ex post quality, i.e., the *number of citations*. If there is a positive correlation between the *total number of participants* or the *number of participants per treatment* and the experiment's quality, one would expect that European experiments receive a higher *number of citations* on average.

Table 9 and *Table 10* show that laboratory experiments conducted in Europe receive more citations compared to laboratory experiments conducted in North America. For the 5-year period after publication, this holds for all three journals and for the 10-year period after publication this holds for papers published in the AER and EE. For JEEA, there are too few observations because JEEA started only in 2003.

Most differences for mean values are statistically significant, and, more importantly, they are very large. For example, looking at citations in the 10 years after publication for experiments published in the AER, we see that European experiments received on average 124 citations while North American experiments received on average 61 citations. Since citations are heavily skewed to the right we also perform a test for differences in medians in *Table 9* and *Table 10*. There are only significant differences in medians for citations received in the 5 years after publication for laboratory experiments published in the AER and EE.

citations five years after publication		North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
AER	mean	23.63	38.62	28.78	0.0045
	median	17.00	31.50	20.00	0.034
	90%-p.	61.00	82.00	65.00	
	sd	(23.15)	(34.82)	(28.45)	
	<i>N</i>	65	34	99	
EE	mean	6.20	10.62	8.50	0.0039
	median	4.00	6.00	4.00	0.007
	90%-p.	15.50	23.00	17.00	
	sd	(7.87)	(13.03)	(11.06)	
	<i>N</i>	80	87	167	
JEEA	mean	22.13	29.00	25.76	0.7726
	median	12.50	9.00	12.00	0.797
	90%-p.	83.00	160.00	83.00	
	sd	(26.01)	(50.10)	(39.54)	
	<i>N</i>	8	9	17	
all three	mean	14.44	19.22	16.63	0.0696
	median	7.00	10.50	9.00	0.097
	90%-p.	36.00	46.00	40.00	
	sd	(19.08)	(27.10)	(23.19)	
	<i>N</i>	153	130	283	

Table 9: Mean values, medians, 90% percentiles, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for citations in the 5 years after publication ('c5') by region and journal. The upper (lower) row of the last column contains the *p*-values of a two-sample Mann-Whitney test (continuity corrected Pearson Chi-square test), comparing the distribution of c5 between North America and Europe.

citations ten years after publication		North America	Europe	both regions	<i>p</i> -value
AER	mean	61.28	123.62	75.75	0.0170
	median	44.00	101.00	49.50	0.527
	90%-p.	128.00	275.00	171.00	
	sd	(75.44)	(106.33)	(86.71)	
	<i>N</i>	43	13	56	
EE	mean	13.55	33.57	20.63	0.0511
	median	9.00	14.00	11.00	0.541
	90%-p.	27.00	88.00	43.00	
	sd	(15.07)	(45.69)	(30.92)	
	<i>N</i>	42	23	65	
JEEA	mean	8.00	31.50	23.67	<i>not enough observ.</i>
	median	8.00	31.50	17.00	
	90%-p.	8.00	46.00	46.00	
	sd		(20.51)	(19.86)	
	<i>N</i>	1	2	3	
both	mean	37.69	66.08	46.14	0.0807
	median	19.00	35.00	21.00	0.311
	90%-p.	86.00	176.00	118.00	
	sd	(59.44)	(84.34)	(68.68)	
	<i>N</i>	85	36	121	

Table 10: Mean values, medians, 90% percentiles, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for citations in the 10 years after publication ('c10') by region and journal. The upper (lower) row of the last column contains the *p*-values of a two-sample Mann-Whitney test (continuity corrected Pearson Chi-square test), comparing the distribution of c10 between North America and Europe.

6 Citations, Quality Proxies and Editorial Favoritism

In this section, we examine whether the differences in citations are driven by differences in the quality proxies P1 to P7 or if they are indicative of editorial favoritism, which could result from the US dominance, as described in sections 4.1 and 4.2.

6.1 Editorial Favoritism

With regard to the quality proxies discussed in subsection 5.1, there is no reason to assume that clearly defined standards exist. Without such clearly defined standards, editors have a lot of leeway. Also, the proxies do not capture a paper's originality and relevance. Originality and relevance are highly subjective and might be unknown to editors when deciding about publication. This makes it possible that non-scientific criteria can have an influence on editors'

decisions, thus facilitating discrimination. Possibly, the US dominance itself even results from the behavior of editors, whose decisions are influenced by non-scientific criteria²².

In order to see if there is editorial favoritism in experimental economics, we use an analysis similar to Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a). Unlike Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a), we do not focus on a single year of publication but a period of several years. In the existing literature (Colussi 2018, Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a) there are multiple methods for measuring social ties. For our analysis we do not consider social ties between authors and editorial board members at the institutional level. Instead, our measure of social ties is the share of authors with a US affiliation²³. More specifically, we test the hypothesis that for AER papers, the share of US-affiliated authors is negatively correlated with the number of citations.

If confirmed, this would indicate that there is editorial favoritism in the AER. We hypothesize editorial favoritism for the AER, because almost all members of AER's editorial board are affiliated with a North American institution²⁴. We do not hypothesize editorial favoritism for EE and the JEEA, because only half of their editorial boards consist of North American-affiliated economists²⁵.

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²² Other reasons for the US dominance are mentioned in Frey and Pommerehne (1998). Firstly, the social and political conditions for research are very good in the US, leading to immigration of skilled researchers into the US. Secondly, the incentives for good research (in terms of publications in top journals) are very strong in the US. And thirdly, language. Papers published in a language other than English will rarely receive the same amount of attention like papers published in English because English is the lingua franca of economics. For economists whose native language is not English, publishing in English is associated with higher costs because one has to adopt language, style and format common in the US. We believe that these reasons have become weaker during the last years.

²³ Laband and Piette (1994a: 201) note that a broad range of social ties between editors and authors are not included in their analysis. Due to this fact and due to our long observation period, we are confident that our measure of social ties is suitable to show possible effects of editorial favoritism.

²⁴ AER's editorial board consists of 77 individuals, serving as editor, coeditor or board member. 72 individuals (93.50%) are affiliated with a North American-institution. Out of the five remaining individuals, three received their PhDs from US universities (<https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer/about-aer/editors>, accessed May 22, 2019).

²⁵ EE's editorial board consists of 59 individuals, serving as editor, advisory editor or member of the editorial board. 28 individuals (47.46%) are affiliated with North American-institutions. The rest of the editorial board includes 23 individuals (38.98%) with a European affiliation, 6 individuals with an affiliation in Australia or New Zealand and one individual each with an affiliation in Asia or South America (<https://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/10683?detailsPage=editorialBoard>, accessed May 22, 2019). JEEA's editorial board consists of 72 individuals, serving as editor, associate editor or member of the advisory board. 37 individuals are affiliated with a European institution, 34 individuals are affiliated with a North-American institution and one individual is affiliated with an institution in Asia (<https://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?site=JEEA&page=175&trs=45>, accessed October 1, 2019).

In order to test our hypothesis, we use the following regression models.

Models 1 and 4:

$$c_i(5, 10) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ST_i + \gamma_5 P5_i + \gamma_6 P6_i + \gamma_7 P7_i + \delta_i P\&P_i + u_i \quad (1)$$

Models 2 and 5:

$$c_i(5, 10) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ST_i + \gamma_1 P1_i + \gamma_4 P4_i + \gamma_5 P5_i + \gamma_6 P6_i + \gamma_7 P7_i + \delta_i P\&P_i + u_i \quad (2)$$

Models 3 and 6:

$$c_i(5, 10) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ST_i + \gamma_2 P2_i + \gamma_3 P3_i + \gamma_4 P4_i + \gamma_5 P5_i + \gamma_6 P6_i + \gamma_7 P7_i + \delta_i P\&P_i + u_i \quad (3)$$

The independent variables $c_i(5)$ and $c_i(10)$ represent the total number of citations paper i received during the 5 or 10 years after publication. Because the number of citations is left-censored by 0, we used Tobit regressions. Note that data on $c_i(5)$ ($c_i(10)$) is available only for papers published in 2013 (2008) or earlier.

Our measure of social ties, ST_i , is the relative share of US-affiliated authors for paper i ²⁶. The coefficient β_1 estimates the difference in quality (measured by the number of citations) between AER papers authored by scholars with and without a US-affiliation. In the presence of editorial favoritism, we expect $\beta_1 < 0$.

The paper's quality proxies *number of pages* (P5), *number of references* (P6) and *authors' reputation* (P7) are included in each model specification. Models 1 and 4 include only these proxies. In models 2 and 5, we add the *total number of participants* (P1) and the *strength of incentives* (P4). In models 3 and 6, we add the *number of participants per treatment* (P2), the number of treatments (P3), and the *strength of incentives* (P4). Based on sections 5.1 and 5.3, we expect all proxies' coefficients to be positive. For the AER regressions, $P\&P_i$ is an indicator

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²⁶ This is different from Laband and Piette (1994a) and Medoff (2003) who focus on authors who received their PhDs from the same university the editor was affiliated with at the time of the publication. We focus on US versus non-US-affiliations because the AER has several rules that prevent editorial favoritism on the level of institutions. For example, "[c]oeditors are recused from papers involving current colleagues at the same institution (regardless of department), as well as graduate students at the same institution" (for all rules see: <https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer/about-aer/editorial-policy>). We excluded papers ($N = 7$) reporting laboratory experiments conducted in the US by authors that do not have an affiliation in the US, because for these papers it is unclear whether a social tie exists.

variable for papers published in AER's Papers and Proceedings, which we include in models 1 to 6.

	(1) c5	(2) c5	(3) c5	(4) c10	(5) c10	(6) c10
Constant	18.75** (8.60)	26.20 (18.52)	29.10 (20.99)	139.90*** (38.04)	219.50*** (68.00)	283.46*** (77.83)
ST	-7.70 (5.45)	-18.03* (9.67)	-19.86* (10.26)	-44.91* (25.61)	-101.30** (35.77)	-141.80*** (37.08)
Experiment Quality						
P1 (total nr. of part.)		-0.01 (0.02)			-0.01 (0.07)	
P2 (part. per treatm.)			-0.04 (0.03)			-0.20* (0.10)
P3 (treatments)			-0.91 (1.61)			-3.37 (8.09)
P4 (incentives)		-2.70 (15.35)	-2.47 (15.84)		-18.85 (45.24)	-37.74 (45.85)
Paper Quality						
P5 (pages)	-0.40 (0.28)	-0.17 (0.50)	-0.08 (0.52)	-2.16 (1.30)	-0.68 (2.33)	-0.50 (2.87)
P6 (references)	0.64*** (0.17)	0.50* (0.28)	0.49* (0.28)	0.60 (0.90)	-2.12 (1.31)	-2.67 (1.60)
P7 (reputation)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.09)	0.11 (0.24)	0.26 (0.29)
Papers&Proceed.	-11.73 (8.22)	-8.35 (17.79)	-6.25 (19.88)	-67.22** (29.34)	-49.16 (58.94)	-60.06 (62.62)
N	118	61	59	70	26	25
Pseudo R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.05

Table 11: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on papers' and experiments' quality proxies. AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 11 contains the regression results for papers published in the AER. Taking the *number of citations* in the 5 years after publication as a proxy for quality, we find a significant negative effect of social ties for models 2 and 3 ($\beta_1 < 0$). This suggests that papers from authors with stronger social ties (i.e., a larger share of US-affiliated authors) have a lower quality compared to papers from authors with affiliations outside the US. More precisely, β_1 measures the difference in citations between a paper with solely US-affiliated authors and a paper without

any US-affiliated authors. Based on model 2, papers with solely US-affiliated authors receive 18 citations less in the 5 years after publication. Model 3 predicts a similar effect. The results are even stronger when we take the *number of citations* in the 10 years after publication as a proxy for quality (models 4 to 6). On average, papers with solely US-affiliated authors receive between 45 and 142 citations less compared to papers without any US-affiliated authors²⁷.

This difference can be interpreted as indirect evidence for discrimination, which would indicate that a paper from a US-based author is accepted for publication when a higher-quality paper from an author with an affiliation outside the US is available. Of course, this only holds if high-quality papers from authors without social ties to the editorial board were submitted and rejected, but given AER's rejection rate, we think that this is highly likely²⁸.

This, however, does not imply that editors consciously discriminate against authors from outside the US. Rather, it is possible that editors systematically mispredict the number of citations a paper will receive in the years following its publication (i.e., editors wrongly predict that papers authored by US-based economists receive more citations than they actually do). Nonetheless, if citations can be taken as a proxy for quality, this will slow down scientific progress, and editors will fail to maximize their journal's impact factor.

6.2 How do the Quality Proxies of AER Papers Affect Citations?

Regarding the proxies for experimental quality (P1 to P4), only the *number of participants per treatment* (P2) affects citations. For each model, the *total number of participants* (P1), the *number of treatments* (P3), and the *strength of monetary incentives* (P4) have no effect on the *number of citations* in the 5 or 10 years after publication. This does not imply that editors do not care about the experiments' quality proxies. Rather, it could be that there are minimum standards that have to be fulfilled in order to get published, but going beyond those standards does not increase experimental quality any further. In other words, the perceived quality of an

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²⁷ As a robustness check, we test how our results from subsections 6.1 to 6.3 change if we use another proxy for social ties (see *Table 18* and *Table 19* in the appendix). Instead of ST_i we introduce an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if all experiments included in a paper have been carried out exclusively in the US. For models 2, 3, 5 and 6 in *Table 18* (AER) and for models 1, 2, 3 and 4 in *Table 19* (EE) we see that experiments conducted in North America receive significantly fewer citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication. The results for the quality characteristics (P1 to P7) are qualitatively similar.

²⁸ In 2018, for example, only 5.85% of all submissions were accepted at the AER (Duflo 2019). Medoff (2003, 427) discusses several reasons why it is problematic to infer a possible editorial favoritism from the acceptance rates of a journal.

experiment that has a sufficient number of treatments and sufficiently strong incentives might not increase by adding additional treatments or paying higher incentives.

In model 6 in *Table 11*, the *number of participants per treatment* (P2) is statistically significant but negative – contrary to what we expected. Why should a paper's quality decrease when the *number of participants per treatment* increases? Finding a smaller effect requires an experiment with a larger *number of participants per treatment*. Thus, if there is an inverse relation between quality and effect size, possibly because smaller effects are perceived as less interesting, this could explain the negative effect.

Next, we look at the paper's quality proxies (P5 to P7). The *number of pages* (P5) has no effect on citations. Taking *the number of citations* in the 5 years after publication as a proxy for quality, the *number of references* (P6) has a robust effect. Approximately 1.5 to 2 additional references yield one additional citation. Only in model 1, the *author's reputation* (P7) has a significant but small effect. For 50 citations an author has accumulated in the 5 years prior publication, the expected number of citations increases by 1²⁹. However, if we take citations in the 10 years after publication as dependent variable, the *author's reputation* has no effect.

It seems that if the paper's quality proxies have any effects on citations, there are positive effects for citations during the 5 years after publication, but no effects for citations during the 10 years after publication. Possibly, the *number of references* (P6) and the *author's reputation* (P7) attract some attention to the paper, and this increased attention leads to more citations, but this effect vanishes as the paper grows older.

6.3 How do the Quality Proxies of EE and JEEA Papers Affect Citations?

In *Table 12* and *Table 13*, we report the main results for papers published in EE and the JEEA respectively.

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²⁹ Note that our proxy for reputation (the number of citations an author has received in the 5 years before the paper's publication) is left-skewed (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 in the appendix). For AER-papers from North America (Europe), the median is 72 (88) and the mean is 138 (244). This reflects Merton's Matthew effect. Those who already have large number of citations receive more citations.

	(1) c5	(2) c5	(3) c5	(4) c10	(5) c10	(6) c10
Constant	8.18*** (2.61)	6.42* (3.32)	5.53 (3.69)	31.57** (12.85)	12.86 (16.91)	-2.77 (17.35)
ST	-2.44 (1.58)	-1.88 (1.72)	-1.86 (1.71)	-10.80 (7.32)	-3.43 (9.44)	-10.89 (9.11)
Experiment Quality						
P1 (total nr. of part.)		0.00 (0.01)			0.08* (0.05)	
P2 (part. per treatm.)			0.00 (0.02)			0.06 (0.15)
P3 (treatments)			0.57 (0.37)			7.30*** (2.23)
P4 (incentives)		4.20 (4.45)	2.73 (4.53)		18.00 (24.82)	23.01 (23.13)
Paper Quality						
P5 (pages)	-0.44*** (0.13)	-0.43*** (0.13)	-0.44*** (0.13)	-1.24** (0.59)	-1.40* (0.69)	-1.01 (0.65)
P6 (references)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.57** (0.28)	0.63* (0.35)	0.50 (0.33)
P7 (reputation)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)
N	201	138	138	84	50	50
Pseudo R ²	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04

Table 12: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on social ties and experiments' and papers' quality proxies. EE papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

As can be seen from *Table 12*, for EE papers the relative share of US-based authors (*ST*) has no significant effect on citations. The *number of treatments* (P3) has a positive effect on citations in the 10 years after publication. For each additional treatment, the expected *number of citations* increases by 7.30. The *total number of participants* (P1) has no effect on citations in the 5 years and a small positive effect on citations in the 10 years after publication. The *number of participants per treatment* (P2) and the *strength of monetary incentives* (P4) are not significant.

The *number of references* (P6) has a small but positive effect on citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication. The *author's reputation* (P7) has a small positive effect, but only on citations in the 5 years after publication. Finally, papers with a higher *number of pages* (P5) tend to

receive fewer citations. Possibly, the non-significant effects of P1 to P4 stem from the fact that the distribution of citations in the 5 years after publication is much narrower for EE, compared to the AER and the JEEA (see Table 9).

	(1) c5	(2) c5	(3) c5
Constant	-5.49 (23.50)	19.06 (26.52)	-1.06 (44.81)
ST	18.29 (25.82)	18.75 (16.30)	37.27 (29.68)
Experiment Quality			
P1 (total nr. of part.)		0.17*** (0.03)	
P2 (part. per treatm.)			0.55** (0.21)
P3 (treatments)			4.64 (3.53)
P4 (incentives)		-68.10 (52.46)	-113.03 (77.11)
Paper Quality			
P5 (pages)	-1.40 (1.01)	-2.43*** (0.60)	-2.46** (0.98)
P6 (references)	1.55** (0.67)	0.99* (0.51)	1.45 (0.79)
P7 (reputation)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)
N	19	13	13
Pseudo R ²	0.04	0.19	0.11

Table 13: Tobit regressions of c(5) on social ties and experiments' and papers' quality proxies. JEEA papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 13 shows that for papers published in the JEEA, the relative share of US-affiliated authors (ST) also has no significant effect on citations in the 5 years after publication. Note that Table 13 only reports the results for models 1 to 3 because there are only three laboratory experiments for which we have data on the citations in the 10 years after publication. The *total number of participants* (P1) and the *number of participants per treatment* (P2) each have a positive effect. The *number of treatments* (P3) and the *strength of monetary incentives* (P4) are not significant.

For the JEEA the results for a papers' quality (P5 to P7) are very similar to the results for EE. In models 1 and 2 the *number of references* (P6) has a positive effect on citations in the 5 after publication. For the JEEA this effect is more pronounced than for EE. For models 2 and 3 also the *author's reputation* (P7) has a small positive effect on citations and papers with a higher *number of pages* (P5) tend to receive fewer citations.

Regarding the *author's reputation* (P7) for EE and the JEEA our results are in line with the results of Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a). However, our results differ regarding the *number of pages* (P5), since Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a) find that longer papers increase the number of citations.

6.4 Network Effects as an Alternative Explanation

Differences in citation practices and network effects could be an alternative explanation for the significantly lower number of citations received by US-affiliated authors in the AER. The majority of experimental economists (about 58 %) are affiliated in Europe³⁰. If they are more familiar with each other's work, this could lead to a high number of citations from European authors to other European authors. Put bluntly, most experimental economists are in Europe, and if they cite each other, this increases the number of citations received by European economist but not by non-European economists. This is in line with Frey and Pommerehne (1988, 107), who argue that economists may tend to cite economists from the same country more often for personal or professional reasons, or simply because they know them best. If true, citations are a biased measure of quality. Moreover, the results from *Table 11* might not be driven by the composition of AER's editorial board, but simply by network effects resulting from differences in citation practices and differences in the populations of experimental economists with a US- or European-affiliation.

To test this alternative explanation, we look at where citations come from. We selected the most cited papers from our dataset³¹ that were authored solely by economists with a US- (16 papers) or European-affiliation (11 papers), and analyzed where their received citations come from. The results show that the US-affiliated authors received on average 38.72% of their citations

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³⁰ To get an idea of the total number of experimental economists in different regions, we checked the affiliations of all authors of the current RePEc list of authors in experimental economics ($N = 1831$). With 57.84%, more than half of all experimental economists on this list have a European affiliation, followed by economists with an affiliation in North America (30.20%), Asia (5.90%), Australia or New Zealand (3.82%), South America (1.86%) and Africa (0.38%). See, <https://ideas.repec.org/i/eeexp.html> (accessed October 5, 2019).

³¹ The criteria were that these papers received at least 40 (100) citations in the 5 (10) years after publication.

from North America, 50.42% of their citations from Europe, and 10.86% of their citations from the rest of the world. The respective numbers for the European-affiliated authors are 63.17% from Europe, 27.53% from North America and 9.31% from the rest of the world.

The numbers for the European-affiliated authors thus almost match the geographical distribution of experimental economists on the RePEc list. Compared to the European-affiliated authors, the US-affiliated authors received a considerably lower share of their citations from Europe. This suggests that differences in citation practices and network effects that increase the citations of European-affiliated authors could at least partly drive our results. However, if differences in citation practices and network effects were solely responsible for our findings regarding ex post quality, we would expect a negative effect of social ties across all journals. As shown in *Table 12* and *Table 13*, this is not the case. Moreover, the assumption that social ties between experimental economists in Europe are as strong as those between experimental economists in the US does not seem plausible. While the majority of US-affiliated authors are likely to be native English speakers, all of whom work within one country, our dataset for the European region includes authors with affiliations in 20 different countries. Only a few of the European-affiliated authors share the same mother tongue, and it is also likely that the European-affiliated authors will most frequently attend conferences and seminars at national level. For our dataset we therefore believe that social ties between US-affiliated authors are more pronounced than between European-affiliated authors.

6.5 Limitations

There are a number of limitations to our approach. First, we only collected data on laboratory experiments published in three journals. It is not clear whether a different journal selection would yield similar patterns on geographical concentration and the experiments' quality proxies. Despite the focus on three journals, we think that our results are noteworthy considering the ex ante and ex post quality differences between experiments conducted in North America and Europe.

Second, for the collection of citation data we used *Web of Science*. Since *Web of Science* has not indexed all journals and literature sources, the citations of *Web of Science* deviate from the citations counts by other platforms, e.g. *Google Scholar*³². For our data set we therefore do not

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³² See Hamermesh (2018) for a detailed analysis of the relation between *Web of Science* and *Google Scholar* citations.

claim to have recorded all citations received by a paper in the years after its publication, or to have recorded all citations received by a single author in the 5 years prior publication of the respective paper. However, we do not regard this incomplete recording of citations as problematic, as it can be expected to introduce a level effect but not any systematic misrepresentations between authors.

Third, when testing for editorial favoritism, our data set contains only a small number of laboratory experiments published in the AER. This implies that our results must be interpreted with caution. Our results are compatible with the existence of editorial favoritism, but they do not prove its existence (see section 6.4). And, of course, there is no reason to believe that our results, which are based exclusively on papers reporting results from laboratory experiments, carry over to other subfields of economics. In addition, in our test for editorial favoritism, we assume that editors have the primary goal of maximizing the impact factor of their journal and thus the number of citations that the published papers receive. However, we can neither be sure that this assumption is correct nor that other quality characteristics, such as relevance for policy-making or expected media coverage, do not play a stronger role in the selection of papers.

Finally, it should be noted that we only recorded authors' affiliations at the time of publication. We have therefore not captured any social ties that existed due to previous employment, research or study stays.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we examined geographical concentration, compared objectively measurable quality proxies and tested for editorial favoritism in experimental economics.

We found that geographical concentration decreased. More precisely, the US's share in research output decreased from 65% to 47% while the shares of several European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) and Australia increased. This is in line with other studies (Ek and Henrekson 2019, Kocher and Sutter 2001) that do not focus on any particular field but report a decreasing US dominance across fields.

Looking more closely into the papers, we examine if four ex ante proxies for the quality of the experiments (*total number of participants*, *participants per treatment*, *number of treatments* and *strength of monetary incentives*) differ between journals.

Comparing experiments conducted in North America and Europe, there are no differences regarding the *number of treatments* and the *strength of monetary incentives*. However, European experiments rely on a significantly larger *total number of participants* and a significantly larger *number of participants per treatment*. This holds for all journals, but the difference is most pronounced for the AER, where, on average, experiments conducted in North America have 54 participants per treatment while experiments conducted in Europe have 111 participants per treatment.

The differences in the *total number of participants* and *participants per treatment* could reflect different methodological standards. However, they could also indicate substantial barriers to entry for European economists, especially at the AER, where the North American dominance is more pronounced in the composition of the editorial board.

Analyzing the *number of citations* papers receive in the 5 and 10 years after publication, we find that experiments conducted in Europe receive more citations compared to experiments conducted in North America. The differences are statistically significant and large, except for papers published in the JEEA, possibly because of the small number of observations for this journal. In the 10 years after publication, North American AER papers receive, on average, 61 citations while European AER papers receive, on average, 124 citations. For EE, the corresponding numbers are 14 and 34.

Finally, we test for editorial favoritism. Editorial favoritism means that social ties (here: a vast majority of members of the editorial board and a positive share of authors having a US affiliation) have a negative effect on the quality of the published papers. We focus on the AER, where almost all members of the editorial board are affiliated with US universities.

Our data provide some indications of editorial favoritism for the AER: papers authored by economists with a social tie to the editorial board receive between 18 (45) and 20 (142) fewer citations in the 5 (10) years after publication, compared to papers authored by economists without a social tie to the editorial board. Due to the higher number of experimental economists in Europe, network effects may at least partly drive these results. Nevertheless, network effects do not seem to be the whole explanation, since a positive share of US-affiliated authors of a paper has no negative effect on the citation counts of EE and JEEA papers.

For AER papers, we find only small or no effects of the experiment's quality proxies on citations. This could be due to the small number of observations. The *number of references* has

a positive effect on citations in the 5 years but no respectively a negative effect on citations in the 10 years subsequent publication. For EE papers we find that the *number of pages* has a negative effect and that the *number of references* has a positive effect on citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication. Further, for EE papers our results show that *authors' reputation* has a positive effect on the *number of citations* only in the first 5 years after publication.

As a concluding remark: we found that about one third of the papers reported incomplete information about their experimental procedures. This is of particular concern in view of the replication crisis in the social sciences. Only a well-documented experiment can be replicated. In addition, the statistical processing of individual results in meta-studies is hampered if, for example, it is not clear how many persons participated in an experiment. Future research would benefit from clearly defined standards that specify which characteristics of a laboratory experiment should be reported in a paper.

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Appendix

	Shares			
	Scores			
	AER	EE	JEEA	All three
Argentina	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.18
	2.73	0.00	0.00	2.73
Australia	2.42	3.80	2.32	3.20
	12.37	33.62	3.32	49.31
Austria	2.81	4.86	0.00	3.73
	14.35	42.99	0.00	57.34
Azerbaijan	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.08
	0.00	1.29	0.00	1.29
Belgium	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.04
	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.60
Canada	1.62	2.71	1.71	2.25
	8.27	23.98	2.44	34.70
China	2.64	1.07	0.00	1.49
	13.48	9.42	0.00	22.90
Colombia	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.17
	0.00	2.54	0.00	2.54
Czech Republic	0.32	0.12	0.00	0.18
	1.66	1.07	0.00	2.73
Denmark	0.19	0.65	0.00	0.44
	0.97	5.76	0.00	6.72
Finland	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.07
	0.00	1.13	0.00	1.13
France	0.69	3.03	3.28	2.28
	3.53	26.80	4.69	35.03
Germany	4.35	12.08	11.62	9.47
	22.20	106.85	16.62	145.67
Guatemala	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.09
	0.00	1.42	0.00	1.42
India	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.17
	0.00	2.62	0.00	2.62
Israel	1.59	0.84	0.00	1.01
	8.12	7.46	0.00	15.58
Italy	0.42	3.50	1.73	2.31
	2.15	30.95	2.47	35.57
Japan	0.29	1.21	0.00	0.79
	1.49	10.74	0.00	12.23
Latvia	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.07
	0.00	1.11	0.00	1.11
Luxembourg	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.06
	0.00	0.92	0.00	0.92
Mexico	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.11
	0.00	1.69	0.00	1.69

Netherlands	3.15	4.68	8.21	4.50
	16.12	41.36	11.75	69.23
New Zealand	0.16	1.19	0.00	0.74
	0.80	10.54	0.00	11.34
Norway	0.58	0.68	7.05	1.24
	2.94	6.00	10.09	19.03
Portugal	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.26
	0.00	4.01	0.00	4.01
Russia	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.08
	0.00	1.28	0.00	1.28
Singapore	0.54	0.80	0.00	0.64
	2.73	7.06	0.00	9.79
South Korea	0.09	0.18	2.96	0.41
	0.46	1.59	4.23	6.28
Spain	2.87	5.88	2.28	4.55
	14.64	52.05	3.26	69.95
Sweden	0.76	1.25	0.00	0.97
	3.89	11.06	0.00	14.95
Switzerland	5.36	2.24	17.86	4.73
	27.39	19.85	25.55	72.79
Taiwan	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.14
	0.00	2.18	0.00	2.18
Turkey	0.32	0.09	0.00	0.16
	1.61	0.81	0.00	2.42
UK	5.79	8.80	10.61	7.97
	29.60	77.89	15.18	122.68
US	62.23	37.84	29.10	45.22
	319.39	334.79	41.64	695.82
UAE	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.08
	0.00	1.27	0.00	1.27
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	1.28	0.12
	0.00	0.00	1.83	1.83
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	510.90	884.70	143.07	1538.68

Table 14: Countries' shares and scores, all countries, pooled data from 1998 to 2018 for the AER, from 1999 to 2018 for EE and from 2011 to 2018 for the JEEA.

	Shares				
	Scores				
	1999-2003	2004-2008	2009-2013	2014-2018	1999-2018
Argentina	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.66	0.19
	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.73	2.73
Australia	0.67	1.41	3.44	5.09	3.28
	0.71	3.94	20.12	21.23	46.00
Austria	0.63	0.12	6.79	3.99	4.09
	0.67	0.34	39.71	16.63	57.34
Azerbaijan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.09
	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.29	1.29
Belgium	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.04
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.60	0.60
Canada	1.58	0.88	2.78	2.85	2.32
	1.68	2.46	16.23	11.89	32.58
China	1.22	1.06	0.38	3.94	1.63
	1.29	2.95	2.23	16.42	22.90
Colombia	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.46	0.18
	0.00	0.00	0.64	1.90	2.54
Czech Republic	0.00	0.59	0.00	0.26	0.19
	0.00	1.66	0.00	1.07	2.73
Denmark	0.00	0.15	0.28	1.13	0.48
	0.00	0.41	1.61	4.71	6.72
Finland	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.08
	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.85	1.13
France	3.01	0.20	2.61	2.72	2.16
	3.18	0.55	15.27	11.33	30.33
Germany	4.78	5.53	9.56	12.63	9.22
	5.06	15.43	55.91	52.66	129.38
Guatemala	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.10
	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.42	1.42
India	0.00	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.19
	0.00	0.65	1.11	0.86	2.62
Israel	1.07	0.78	1.79	0.44	1.18
	1.13	2.18	10.44	1.82	16.58
Italy	0.61	1.23	3.06	2.66	2.40
	0.65	3.44	17.91	11.09	33.60
Japan	0.61	1.10	0.57	1.24	0.87
	0.65	3.07	3.36	5.16	12.23
Latvia	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.08
	0.00	0.00	1.11	0.00	1.11
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.07
	0.00	0.00	0.92	0.00	0.92
Mexico	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.20	0.12
	0.00	0.00	0.85	0.83	1.69
Netherlands	2.32	4.20	3.49	5.49	4.10
	2.46	11.73	20.40	22.88	57.48

New Zealand	1.67	0.16	1.15	0.58	0.81
	1.77	0.45	6.72	2.40	11.34
Norway	0.00	1.05	0.00	1.44	0.64
	0.00	2.94	0.00	6.00	8.94
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.67	0.29
	0.00	0.00	1.23	2.78	4.01
Russia	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.09
	0.00	0.00	1.28	0.00	1.28
Singapore	0.00	0.00	0.37	1.83	0.70
	0.00	0.00	2.16	7.63	9.79
South Korea	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.15
	0.00	0.00	1.59	0.00	2.05
Spain	1.70	2.81	8.46	1.82	4.78
	1.80	7.85	49.46	7.59	67.02
Sweden	1.01	1.70	0.23	1.86	1.07
	1.07	4.74	1.37	7.76	14.95
Switzerland	9.19	1.30	4.49	1.83	3.37
	9.72	3.64	26.24	7.64	47.24
Taiwan	0.00	0.48	0.00	0.20	0.16
	0.00	1.34	0.00	0.83	2.18
Turkey	1.52	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.17
	1.61	0.00	0.81	0.00	2.42
UK	3.07	6.53	9.23	7.69	7.77
	3.25	18.24	53.93	32.08	109.00
US	65.07	68.47	39.68	36.83	46.85
	68.87	191.12	231.94	153.56	657.18
UAE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.09
	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.27	1.27
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	105.85	279.14	584.54	416.92	1402.61

Table 15: Development of geographical concentration of AER and EE authors for all countries, data pooled over different periods. For each country, the first row reports the country's share and the second row reports the country's score.

Country	I: Score	II: Pop. (in 1000)	III: $\frac{I}{II} * 10^6$	IV: Score	V: Pop. (in 1000)	VI: $\frac{IV}{V} * 10^6$
Period	1999–2003	1999		2004–2008	2004	
Argentina	0.00	36,648.1	0.00	0.00	38,728.7	0.00
Australia	0.71	18,926.0	0.04	3.94	20,127.4	0.20
Austria	0.67	7,992.3	0.08	0.34	8,172.0	0.04
Azerbaijan	0.00	7,982.8	0.00	0.00	8,306.5	0.00
Belgium	0.00	10,226.4	0.00	0.00	10,421.1	0.00
Canada	1.68	30,499.2	0.05	2.46	31,995.0	0.08
China	1.29	1,252,735.0	0.00	2.95	1,296,075.0	0.00
Colombia	0.00	39,819.3	0.00	0.00	42,724.2	0.00
Czech Rep.	0.00	10,283.9	0.00	1.66	10,197.1	0.16
Denmark	0.00	5,321.8	0.00	0.41	5,404.5	0.08
Finland	0.28	5,165.5	0.05	0.00	5,228.2	0.00
France	3.18	60,496.7	0.05	0.55	62,704.9	0.01
Germany	5.06	82,100.2	0.06	15.43	82,516.3	0.19
Guatemala	0.00	11,387.2	0.00	0.00	12,796.9	0.00
India	0.00	1,034,539.2	0.00	0.65	1,126,135.8	0.00
Israel	1.13	6,125.0	0.19	2.18	6,809.0	0.32
Italy	0.65	56,916.3	0.01	3.44	57,685.3	0.06
Japan	0.65	126,631.0	0.01	3.07	127,761.0	0.02
Latvia	0.00	2,390.5	0.00	0.00	2,263.1	0.00
Luxembourg	0.00	430.5	0.00	0.00	458.1	0.00
Mexico	0.00	100,300.6	0.00	0.00	106,995.6	0.00
Netherlands	2.46	15,812.1	0.16	11.73	16,281.8	0.72
New Zealand	1.77	3,835.1	0.46	0.45	4,087.5	0.11
Norway	0.00	4,461.9	0.00	2.94	4,591.9	0.64
Portugal	0.00	10,217.8	0.00	0.00	10,483.9	0.00
Russia	0.00	147,214.4	0.00	0.00	144,067.1	0.00
Singapore	0.00	3,958.7	0.00	0.00	4,166.7	0.00
South Korea	0.00	46,616.7	0.00	0.00	48,082.5	0.00
Spain	1.80	40,386.9	0.04	7.85	42,921.9	0.18
Sweden	1.07	8,857.9	0.12	4.74	8,993.5	0.53
Switzerland	9.72	7,144.9	1.36	3.64	7,389.6	0.49
Taiwan	0.00	21,712.0	0.00	1.34	22,462.0	0.06
Turkey	1.61	62,287.3	0.03	0.00	67,007.9	0.00
UK	3.25	58,682.5	0.06	18.24	59,987.9	0.30
US	68.87	279,040.0	0.25	191.12	292,805.3	0.65
UAE	0.00	2,988.2	0.00	0.00	4,087.9	0.00
Total	105.85			279.14		

Table 16: Scores for the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors per one million inhabitants. Data pooled for periods 1999–2003 and 2004–2008.

Country	I: Score	II: Pop. (in 1000)	III: $\frac{I}{II} * 10^6$	IV: Score	V: Pop. (in 1000)	VI: $\frac{IV}{V} * 10^6$
Period	2009-2013	2009		2014-2018	2014	
Argentina	0.00	40,799.4	0.00	2.73	42,981.5	0.06
Australia	20.12	21,691.7	0.93	21.23	23,475.7	0.90
Austria	39.71	8,343.3	4.76	16.63	8,546.4	1.95
Azerbaijan	0.00	8,947.2	0.00	1.29	9,535.1	0.14
Belgium	0.00	10,796.5	0.00	0.60	11,209.1	0.05
Canada	16.23	33,628.6	0.48	11.89	35,535.3	0.33
China	2.23	1,331,260.0	0.00	16.42	1,364,270.0	0.01
Colombia	0.64	45,416.2	0.01	1.90	47,791.9	0.04
Czech Rep.	0.00	10,443.9	0.00	1.07	10,525.3	0.10
Denmark	1.61	5,523.1	0.29	4.71	5,643.5	0.83
Finland	0.00	5,338.9	0.00	0.85	5,461.5	0.16
France	15.27	64,707.0	0.24	11.33	66,316.1	0.17
Germany	55.91	81,902.3	0.68	52.66	80,982.5	0.65
Guatemala	0.00	14,316.12	0.00	1.42	15,923.6	0.09
India	1.11	1,214,270.1	0.00	0.86	1,293,859.3	0.00
Israel	10.44	7,485.6	1.39	1.82	8,215.7	0.22
Italy	17.91	59,095.4	0.30	11.09	60,789.1	0.18
Japan	3.36	128,047.0	0.03	5.16	127,276.0	0.04
Latvia	1.11	2,141.7	0.52	0.00	1,993.8	0.00
Luxembourg	0.92	497.8	1.85	0.00	556.3	0.00
Mexico	0.85	115,505.2	0.01	0.83	124,221.6	0.01
Netherlands	20.40	16,530.4	1.23	22.88	16,865.0	1.36
New Zealand	6.72	4,302.6	1.56	2.40	4,509.7	0.53
Norway	0.00	4,828.7	0.00	6.00	5,137.2	1.17
Portugal	1.23	10,568.2	0.12	2.78	10,401.1	0.27
Russia	1.28	142,785.3	0.01	0.00	143,819.7	0.00
Singapore	2.16	4,987.6	0.43	7.63	5,469.7	1.40
South Korea	1.59	49,307.8	0.03	0.00	50,746.7	0.00
Spain	49.46	46,362.9	1.07	7.59	46,480.9	0.16
Sweden	1.37	9,298.5	0.15	7.76	9,696.1	0.80
Switzerland	26.24	7,743.8	3.39	7.64	8,188.7	0.93
Taiwan	0.00	23,017.0	0.00	0.83	23,414.0	0.04
Turkey	0.81	71,339.2	0.01	0.00	77,030.7	0.00
UK	53.93	62,276.3	0.87	32.08	64,613.2	0.50
US	231.94	306,771.5	0.76	153.56	318,386.4	0.48
UAE	0.00	7,666.4	0.00	1.27	9,070.9	0.14
Total	584.54			416.92		

Table 17: Scores for the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors per one million inhabitants. Data pooled for periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018.

Figure 3: Distribution of citations received 5 years prior publication, for AER authors and experiments conducted in North America or Europe.

Figure 4: Distribution of citations received 5 years prior publication, for EE authors and experiments conducted in North America or Europe.

	(1) c5	(2) c5	(3) c5	(4) c10	(5) c10	(6) c10
Constant	15.77** (7.94)	22.50 (17.60)	25.09 (19.79)	115.74*** (32.85)	156.46** (62.47)	167.31** (71.46)
North America	-5.06 (4.39)	-15.52** (7.54)	-17.02** (8.07)	-24.17 (18.69)	-59.56** (27.33)	-76.03** (28.99)
Experiment Quality						
P1 (total nr. of part.)		-0.01 (0.02)			0.02 (0.08)	
P2 (part. per treatm.)			-0.03 (0.03)			-0.14 (0.11)
P3 (treatments)			-0.64 (1.53)			-5.59 (9.34)
P4 (incentives)		-1.21 (15.10)	-1.42 (15.60)		10.56 (45.03)	7.85 (47.42)
Paper Quality						
P5 (pages)	-0.39 (0.28)	-0.25 (0.49)	-0.16 (0.51)	-2.00 (1.31)	-0.06 (2.45)	1.54 (3.11)
P6 (references)	0.65*** (0.17)	0.54* (0.27)	0.52* (0.28)	0.67 (0.91)	-2.00 (1.38)	-1.94 (1.78)
P7 (reputation)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.24)	0.04 (0.30)
Papers&Proceed.	-12.46 (8.22)	-9.28 (17.66)	-5.90 (19.76)	-69.30** (29.80)	-37.83 (61.74)	-15.80 (68.05)
N	118	61	59	70	26	25
Pseudo R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03

Table 18: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on place of experimentation, experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. Only AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	(1) c5	(2) c5	(3) c5	(4) c10	(5) c10	(6) c10
Constant	8.30*** (2.60)	7.20** (3.32)	6.34* (3.70)	30.81** (12.45)	14.74 (16.59)	-1.75 (17.28)
North America	-2.71* (1.50)	-2.91* (1.61)	-2.73* (1.60)	-11.25* (6.29)	-10.23 (7.88)	-10.78 (7.34)
Experiment Quality						
P1 (total nr. of part.)		0.00 (0.01)			0.07 (0.04)	
P2 (part. per treatm.)			0.00 (0.02)			0.07 (0.15)
P3 (treatments)			0.51 (0.37)			6.69*** (2.15)
P4 (incentives)		4.35 (4.42)	3.04 (4.50)		22.95 (24.64)	25.08 (23.11)
Paper Quality						
P5 (pages)	-0.44*** (0.13)	-0.44*** (0.13)	-0.45*** (0.13)	-1.22** (0.59)	-1.33* (0.67)	-1.09* (0.63)
P6 (references)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.56** (0.28)	0.55 (0.34)	0.50 (0.32)
P7 (reputation)	0.01** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
N	201	138	138	84	50	50
Pseudo R ²	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04

Table 19: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on place of experimentation, experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. Only EE papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

FULL LIST OF PAPERS IN OUR DATA SET

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