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providing details and we will investigate your claim.
rarian *colons,* however, Republicans found a base that helped them hone and refine their message. Twelve thousand radicals had been deported to Algeria after the workers’ uprising of 1848, and thousands more after the coup that brought Napoleon III to power. In the 1860s, the emperor—fluenced by Saint-Simonian advisors such as Ismael Urbain, the French Guianian of mixed ancestry who converted to Islam—declared Algeria an “Arab Kingdom” under French rule rather than a full territorial extension of French sovereignty (111). Allying themselves with the discontented *colons,* Republicans transformed Algeria into a national cause and a “microcosm of Bonapartist tyranny” (236). Thus Algeria became the “alternative theater” in which Republicans, as Murray-Miller writes, “sought to fashion a political identity for themselves rooted in respect for public opinion and liberal practices contrary to Bonapartist tyranny” (236, 237). In this sense, Algeria was central to the framing of the Third Republic even before it came into being.

The title may mislead readers into thinking that the book reworks debates about French modernity long familiar in the works of historians such as Eugen Weber, Paul Rabinow, and Kristin Ross. While the concept of modernity is integral to the argument about the Second Empire and its continuities with both 1789 and the Third Republic, the originality of the book lies less in tracing the contours of a long-range “cult of modernity” than in revealing modernity as a multiple and contested terrain, and the emergence of Algeria as a key battleground by the 1860s. Early chapters explore the construction of “Bonapartist modernity” as a conscious governmental project, with a particular focus on Saint-Simonian and Comtean conceptions of modernization. Instead of a single “bourgeois” modernity, we see rival versions that drew on different conceptions of the spiritual and the material, the national and the cosmopolitan, centralization and decentralization. The second half of the book explores the emergence of the ultimately triumphant republican modernity, and the way it reopened divisions that Bonapartism had sought to dissolve in what Murray-Miller calls “an expansive and exceedingly cosmopolitan idea of Frenchness” (109). Republicans succeeded in inverting the terms in which Bonapartist modernity was understood, “transforming the self-consciously ‘modern’ imperial regime into a living anachronism” (177). For this inversion to succeed, Algeria was necessary as the “primitive” backdrop against which Republican modernity could be articulated, setting up the framework for the new “ethnopolitical colonial order” of the Third Republic (239).

This is an important and refreshing rethinking of the Second Empire, not as a “liminal period” between old and new, but as a “crucible” in which republican discourses around modernity, nationality, and colonialism were forged (6, 117). The book’s strongest elements emerge in the later chapters, in particular those sections that focus directly on Algeria. Its weaker parts are in the relatively thin characterization of the Revolutionary era, uncritically adopting language about the “intolerant republicanism of Robespierre and the Jacobins” (156) (and misdating the First Republic to 1791 [154, 160]). Moreover, a missed opportunity arises to think about how Muslim Algerians themselves experienced the shifts of modernity: the only Algerian subjects to appear in the book are the “half dozen Arab military commanders” brought to Paris to lend authority to the Bonapartist coup, who have a brief cameo in chapter 3 (93). The book might also have paid more attention to the wider imperial context, such as the French interventions in Mexico and Indochina, and the 1857 uprisings and transition to imperial rule in India.

Overall, though, the book’s chief virtue is in demonstrating that the lens of “trans-Mediterranean France”—what Tyler Stovall has elsewhere called “transnational France”—can shed important new light on a period once caricatured as the “Carnival Empire,” and its role in the framing of modern French political culture. The work of Pamela Pilibean, Osama Abi-Mershed, Michel Levallois, and others has brought new attention to the Saint-Simonians in Algeria, as Patricia Lorcin and Annie Rey-Goldzieger did for the “Royaume Arabe.” Murray-Miller brings these important insights back to the metropole to show how Algeria functioned as a laboratory for French republican modernity, leaving modern France more deeply imbregnated with colonial conceptions of ethnopolitical order than most historians have been willing to acknowledge, but also revealing other, unexplored paths for governing a diverse and complex polity.

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The late nineteenth century witnessed a growing concern among doctors, lawyers, anthropologists, social thinkers, educators, politicians, and administrators about the apparent increase in various forms of deviance: criminality, vagrancy, and antisocial behavior; feeblemindedness, insanity, hysteria, nervousness, and neurological disorders such as epilepsy; sexual perversion, alcoholism, and suicide; and also genius. In her study about French and Italian thinking on these issues, “Misfits” in *Fin-de-Siècle France and Italy,* Susan A. Ashley lumps together the wide variety of aberrations under the label of mental and social “misfits.” She describes how these misfits were diagnosed and understood in biomedical as well as sociocultural terms. Abnormal and immoral behavior was associated with inborn and acquired defects of the brain and the nervous system, caused by developmental anomalies and the strains of modernization. The prevailing explanatory framework was a mix of Darwinism, degeneration theory, current notions about the exhaustibility of psychical and mental energy, and cultural pessimism: misfits showed either atavism (a regression toward primitivism) or a digression from regular evolutionary and sociocultural progress.

In her interpretation of the discourses and practices regarding deviance, Ashley takes some distance from social constructivism and the prevalent Foucauldian emphasis on the disciplinary effects of the power-knowledge nexus. She stresses that scientists used various empirical methods...
—statistics, detailed comparison, and classification; case studies, clinical observation, and interviewing; tests and laboratory experiments; ethnographic description and photography—and responded to social realities, even though their explanations were mediated by particular scientific theories, social preoccupations, and ideological assumptions. The empiricist perspective implied a differentiated evaluation of deviance: dangerous, shocking, die-hard, and incorrigible misfits were contrasted to pitiful, benign, occasional, and improvable ones.

The diversity of the proposed or implemented practical measures reflected such distinctions. Next to repressive responses such as confinement and surveillance (in asylums, prisons, workhouses, reformatories, and penal colonies), a hardening of penal law, proposals for sterilization, and the curtailing of civil liberties, more humanitarian and melioristic perspectives sought to promote medical care, treatment, and advice, education, and social reform targeting deprivation. More or less subtle approaches of misfits were advanced by the growing awareness that the disruptive conditions of modern life put everyone at risk, not only those in the lower classes but also the respectable upper and middle classes.

Moreover, clear distinctions between the normal and abnormal were increasingly put into perspective. Sometimes deviants, including geniuses, were seen in a more positive light, as the bearers of variation capable of surpassing mediocrity and stagnation and initiating innovation. They brought to light that human nature was generally more complex, chaotic, and vulnerable than the rather optimistic enlightened view of man had suggested: deep-rooted reflexes and instincts incessantly tended to overwhelm the more fragile intellect and will. All of this affected the basic liberal belief in individual self-development on the basis of reason, autonomy, rights, and freedom.

The ambition of physicians and other experts to enlarge their professional domain and sociopolitical authority, and the urge of governments to control the population in mass society did play a role, but in France and Italy, Ashley suggests, other sociopolitical factors were even more relevant. Lawyers and doctors, the foremost experts on misfits, often played a role as public intellectuals, and they were overrepresented in the French and Italian parliaments. After Italy’s national unification in the 1860s and the foundation of the French Third Republic in the early 1870s, both countries struggled with tensions between the optimistic worldview of the leading liberal bourgeoisie seeking to establish the legitimacy of its political authority, on the one hand, and the emergence of mass democracy and the felt need to integrate those in society’s lower strata into the nation, on the other.

The preoccupation with and alarm about misfits among scientists and the liberal elites revealed worries about social disorder, political turmoil, remnants of backwardness, and possible national decline. The avalanche of abnormality challenged the liberal belief in progress and the bourgeois ethos of reasonable self-control, self-reliance, balance, willpower, social adjustment, and productivity, all of which were deemed essential for responsible citizenship. Lacking such qualities, misfits seemed to be unable or unwilling to realize individual autonomy in a well-ordered way. As such, they were impossible citizens who had to be either excluded from society or elevated to normality in order to guarantee the stability of democratized mass society. Scientific knowledge about abnormality was used as a nonpolitical and positivist means to set liberal-bourgeois standards for democratic citizenship. The demand to manage the multilayered and divided individual body and mind matched the need for a balanced and effective government of the expanding body politic.

Unfortunately, Ashley mentions such sociopolitical factors only in passing, without any further analysis of the significance of democracy and citizenship, including the interrelated worries about the upper echelons of French and Italian society about the consequences of the inevitable advent of universal suffrage and emancipation of unprivileged groups. Nor does she compare the French and Italian attitudes toward misfits with those in other countries. Instead, she provides a comparison of the nineteenth-century terminology for abnormality and present-day sociological vocabulary, as if there would be some sort of objective social reality of normality and abnormality beyond the historical and cultural formation of such categories. Although Ashley’s study offers a detailed and nuanced account of diverse understandings of deviance, its explanatory scope is limited. As such, the book adds almost no new information or fresh interpretations to what we have learned from numerous historical works about the role of medicine, psychiatry, psychology, criminology, and sexology in the modernization of Western societies. Moreover, the book’s eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion, display quite a bit of overlap, and the resulting repetition taxes the reader’s patience.

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In The Courtesan and the Gigolo, Aaron Freundschuh explores the brutal murders of Marie Regnault (forty years old), Annette Gremeret (early forties), and Marie Gremeret (twelve years old), as well as the execution of the man convicted of killing them, Enrico Pranzini, who may have been innocent. Freundschuh convincingly argues that the entire affair serves as an entrée into the broader forces that shaped the history of the early Third Republic, including late-nineteenth-century migration patterns, powerful gender norms, colonial expansion, the rise of the mass press, and shifts in policing and medical practices. The murders and ensuing trial made huge news in 1887, and the compelling story that Freundschuh tells at once humanizes the people involved and reconstructs the world in which they lived.

The first scholarly work about the murders, this fascinating account is divided into eight chapters that are the-