Propositions

Incentives in Multi-Task Settings

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1. In their effort choice, individuals are not only concerned with their monetary payoff, but also with their social status, reputation and ethical concerns. (this dissertation)

2. In multi-task settings with labor market reputation concerns, the relationship between risk and incentive weights can be positive. (this dissertation)

3. In multi-task settings, fixed wages are not necessarily optimal for the effort allocation of agents. (this dissertation)

4. Incentives due to career concerns and explicit financial incentives are not substitutes, but complement each other in a multi-task setting. (this dissertation)

5. Students who are highly active in student clubs have a different perception of university grades as a signal of their ability, than students who are not active in student clubs.

6. The optimal compensation contract for pilots is a fixed wage.

7. Signals of politicians (agents) during election campaigns can be harmful when voters (principals) lack the necessary skills to evaluate the signals.

8. The developments of the labor market for academics leads academics with career concerns to focus more on research.