1. The threat of shareholder litigation – if employed for meritorious objectives – can be an effective tool for corporate control. (Chapters 2 and 3)

2. Adverse stock price and reputation effects following shareholder litigation can offer one potential explanation for the high levels of executive compensation in the United States. (Chapters 2 and 3)

3. Executive compensation can be a panacea to the principal-agent conflict but at the same time also the root of market-wide externalities. (Chapter 2)

4. Research on the (under-)pricing of initial public offerings should focus more on the agency relation between issuer and the underwriter instead of dwelling more deeply into signaling models. (Chapter 4)

5. The origins of the financial crisis, the behavior of the involved investment banks, their quick recovery rate, and the surge of executive compensation in financial service providers all lend further support to “captive regulation”. (Chapter 4)

6. Not only the ongoing financial crisis has shown that in the investment banking business morale and integrity are less likely to constitute a viable component of the business model.

7. Regulation and restriction of managerial compensation to curtail excessive risk-taking will only be able to succeed on a global level.

8. Talk is cheap – and everybody should be aware of that.

9. Success is more a function of personal sacrifices, ingenuity and social background rather than intelligence and giftedness…,

10. …. and intelligence has little to do with cleverness and being slick. Only the latter constitutes an essential skill nowadays.

11. Through continuous updating of beliefs supporters of certain soccer clubs might eventually settle with the idea that they will always have to miss out on the big hit – a phenomenon called “self-fulfilling prophecy”.