EU-CIVCAP

Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU CIVilian CAPabilities for a sustainable peace

Partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: How the EU, UN and OSCE exchange civilian capabilities in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia

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Hylke Dijkstra, Ewa Mahr, Petar Petrov, Katarina Đokić and Peter Horne Zartsdahl

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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The European Union (EU) cooperates closely with international partners in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. As there are few places around the world where the EU operates as the only security actor, a better understanding of how the EU interacts with partners on the ground is critical. Indeed, the recent EU Global Strategy has made relations with partners a priority for EU external relations, including the EU's conflict response strategies. Coordination between partners is relevant, but it is even more important to examine how the EU and its partners can genuinely work together to achieve a unity of effort.

This report analyses to extent to which the EU and other international organisations exchange civilian resources within target countries for the purpose of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. The EU and international organisations, for instance, exchange material resources such as funding, personnel, and even equipment. Yet they can also provide non-material resources to each other, such as political or diplomatic support. To provide evidence of the synergies between the EU and its partners, we conduct a unique study of exchanges of civilian resources on the ground in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. These are cases where the position of the EU varies from lead actor to important actor to secondary actor.

Our analysis shows that what the EU and other international organisations bring to crises across the world is, largely, complementary. While there are the occasional conflicts, on the whole cooperation has been positive. At the same time, there is potential for further synergies. Coordination tends to take place at the operational and tactical level, whereas a genuinely joint strategic approach to crises is lacking. And when complementarities are achieved, they tend to be implicit and the result of parallel civilian missions rather than a truly collective and integrated approach.

We also find that cooperation often takes place either via formal or informal channels, but not a combination of both. This is problematic as formal and informal channels offer complementary advantages. Formal channels for coordination allow for inclusivity and are permanent forums. Yet there is also a need for informal channels. These are efficient coordination opportunities in the event of political obstacles. But informal channels are largely people-driven and the approach of the international community cannot hinge solely on whether heads of mission are cooperative.

Our research has revealed that the EU and other international organisations exchange resources extensively. At the same time, the exchange tends to be limited to financial resources and diplomatic and political support. The EU member states do make considerable staff contributions to the other international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE, but this takes place outside the EU context. More recently, we have seen more ambitious resource exchanges. In Mali, for instance, CSDP missions may rely extensively on the UN mission support structure in the future. This goes beyond financial and/or diplomatic support.

Finally, the EU does not always think in political and strategic terms about its contribution to the broader international community. It gets insufficient leverage from its financial contribution. Part of the problem is the EU’s institutional fragmentation. Also, the EU should be more aware of how it is perceived among other international organisations. In Kosovo, Mali and Armenia, the image of the EU as a security actor is sub-optimal for various reasons, ranging from a lack of preferences (Kosovo), risk aversion (Mali), or the perception that the EU is more generously funded (Armenia). A greater awareness of such perceptions is needed and public diplomacy is relevant in inter-organisational relations.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy recommendation 1 (strategic approach)

The joint strategic approach of international actors and organisations to conflict countries should be strengthened. Despite complementarities, international actors continue to work alongside each other and coordination on the ground is often limited to operational and tactical issues. Strategic discussions, including at headquarters, should be better coordinated with other international partners.

Policy recommendation 2 (diplomatic support)

The EU should further recognise the importance of political and diplomatic support for the activities of other international organisations. Backing up partners, for instance through statements from Brussels by the High Representative or the Council or on the ground by the local EU missions, can have significant effects at limited cost. It increases the authority of international partners.

Policy recommendation 3 (coordination channels)

There is a need for both formal and informal coordination channels between international actors and organisations in crisis regions. Informal channels rely on personalities, while formal channels can be limited in scope. Successful coordination requires both. Even when formal coordination meetings are perceived as less useful, EU officials are well-advised to make the investment and attend them at the appropriate level.

Policy recommendation 4 (scope of capability exchange)

The exchange of resources between international actors and organisations largely centres around funding and information exchange. There could be further efficiency gains through resource exchange in other domains, such as staff, equipment, and mission support. This could be discussed during the strategic coordination meetings, such as the EU-UN Steering Committee.

Policy recommendation 5 (leveraging resources)

There needs to be a more strategic approach to how the EU leverages its resources. As a result of institutional fragmentation within the EU and even within the EEAS, the funding of other international organisations does not necessarily result in political gain. This requires better intra-EU coordination and clearer lines of authority within the EEAS and its delegations.

Policy recommendation 6 (managing perceptions)

The EU should monitor how it is perceived by other international organisations to avoid damage to its reputation and to improve its inter-organisational public diplomacy. A general perception is that the EU does not always use its significant resources to the fullest extent, while other international organisations are pushed to their limits with fewer resources.
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>ASIFU</td>
<td>All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit</td>
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<td>ATNP</td>
<td>Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EPNK</td>
<td>European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>European Union Capacity-Building Mission</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Civilian Office</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>International Civilian Representative</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Forces</td>
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<td>MaAF</td>
<td>Malian armed forces</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Sahel Regional Action Plan</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>African Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>SMM</td>
<td>Special Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNOM</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Mali</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>UN-CMCoord</td>
<td>Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination office</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) has made cooperation with other partners, and particularly other international organisations, a priority in its external relations and its conflict response strategies (European Union 2016: 18, 33-37, 43). Synergies with the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are critically important for the EU to promote its interests and values abroad. Importantly, while there is always a potential for competition between international actors, the interaction between the EU and other international organisations is largely based on complementarities. The mandates and scope of international crisis response missions vary and the EU generally adds unique value to the efforts of the international community (Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr 2016).

Interactions between the EU and other international actors have been the focus of attention for scholars and policy practitioners (e.g. Biermann and Koops 2017; Biermann 2008; Kolb 2013; Hofmann 2013; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Tardy 2005). Despite the wealth of studies on inter-organisational relations covering a range of empirical case studies with increased theoretical sophistication, the full potential of the study of relations between the EU and other international organisations remains under-utilised. There are four key shortcomings in the academic and policy literature. First, many of the academic contributions centre around questions of competition or cooperation, which are simply too abstract to have much policy relevance. Second, many studies emphasise formal arrangements between international organisations, which tend to be only the tip of the iceberg. For a more accurate picture, informal arrangements need to be included into the analysis. Third, because of obvious practical reasons, many studies focus on interactions at the level of headquarters, even though the rationale for synergies may be in the field. Finally, many publications are based on case studies between one pair of international organisations (e.g. EU-NATO or EU-UN) rather than a more comprehensive analysis of interactions between multiple organisations and actors.

In this report we focus on synergies from a more practical perspective. We analyse the extent to which the EU and other international organisations exchange civilian resources within target countries. Civilian resources include material resources such as funding, personnel, and even equipment, but also non-material resources such as information exchange and political or diplomatic support for initiatives by other international organisations. This question is important. First, as part of the broader EU-CIVCAP project, we are interested in the civilian resource base of the EU. If the EU can help other international actors and vice versa, there are important policy consequences. Second, as the EU Global Strategy moves towards resilience and more indirect forms of EU intervention, it is important to analyse how the EU can provide tangible support to other actors (Wagner and Anholt 2016; Juncos 2017). Third, from an organisation theory perspective, the exchange of resources and resource dependence drives interaction in the first place (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Harsch 2015). We can thus rely on a wide range of concepts and assumptions to inform this report.

To provide evidence of the (potential) synergies between the EU and relevant other international organisations, uniquely we study exchanges of civilian resources on the

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1 See, for more information: https://www.eu-civcap.net
ground in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. The choice of these three case studies is informed by the varying contributions that the EU makes to the international community. The EU is a lead actor in Kosovo through its Rule of Law (EULEX) mission, the EUSR and the EU Office. In Mali, the EU also has a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) presence and a development portfolio, but plays a secondary role compared to the UN peacekeeping mission. The EU’s role in Armenia is much more limited, in the absence of a CSDP mission, and in light the key historical role of the OSCE as well as the Russian Federation. Such variation in case studies allows us to better appreciate dependencies and therefore the potential for synergies between the EU and other international organisations. All three case studies benefit from in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in those conflict countries. These include EU and international officials as well as local civil servants and experts.

To compare these different case studies, we have structured them along the same four issues. First, we provide an overview of the general (political) approach of the international community to the country and region. Second, we analyse the informal and formal division of labour between the international organisations in the relevant conflict. Third, the formal agreements, mechanisms for liaison and standard operating procedures between these organisations are discussed. Finally, we examine the exchange of capabilities and dependencies between these organisations. As such this report covers all the relevant dimensions of inter-organisational relations (formalisation, intensity, dependence, standardisation) (Marrett 1971; Aldrich 1977; Dijkstra 2017). This structure allows us to come to conclusions and recommendations informed by all three cases.

The main findings of our report include:

• The effort of the EU and other international organisations in crises across the world is largely complementary. There are naturally occasional conflicts between the EU and its partners, for instance during politically charged moments of mission handovers, but on the whole cooperation has largely been positive. There is a strong attempt at unity of effort, particularly in crisis regions. At the same time, there is potential for further synergies between the EU and other international organisations. A joint strategic approach for conflict regions and countries is lacking. Furthermore, when complementarities are achieved, they are largely implicit and the result of parallel civilian missions rather than a truly collective and integrated approach.

• Cooperation between international organisations, at headquarters and on the ground, takes place through both formal and informal channels. It is not either/or. To achieve synergies among themselves, international actors need both. The advantage of formal channels for coordination is that they allow for inclusivity and are permanent forums. The absence of such channels, for instance, in Armenia in the security domain, is noteworthy. Yet there is also a need for informal channels. These allow for direct and efficient coordination opportunities, particularly in case of political obstacles. Kosovo is an example. But informal channels are largely people driven. The approach of the international community to peacebuilding in Kosovo cannot hinge solely on whether heads of mission are cooperative and go for

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2 The focus of this report is largely the interactions among international organisations. This is not to deny, however, the importance of other actors, particularly the individual EU member states and other countries. Indeed, it is difficult to understand international policy in Kosovo, Mali or Armenia without reference to lead actors such as the United States, France and Russia. These are naturally actors by themselves, with their own policies, but also the main principals within the relevant international organisations.

3 See the complete list of 29 interviews at the end of this document.
lunch together regularly.

- Our research has revealed that *international organisations exchange resources extensively*. At the same time, the exchange tends to be limited to financial resources and diplomatic and political support. The EU member states do make considerable staff contributions to the other international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE, but this takes place outside the EU context, which reduces EU leverage. More recently, we have seen more ambitious resource exchanges. In Mali, for instance, CSDP missions may rely, in the future, on the UN mission support structure. It is important to examine whether such a model can be applied also elsewhere.

- Finally, despite its laudable efforts, the EU does not always think in *political and strategic terms* about its contribution to the broader international community. It is, for instance, not clear that it sufficiently leverages its financial contribution to other international organisations. Part of the problem is the EU's and the European External Action Service's (EEAS) institutional fragmentation, in which entirely different sets of actors are responsible for funding and policy. Also, the EU should be more aware of the negative perceptions it occasionally creates among other international organisations. Small-scale, token-like, EU missions are not always appreciated, if other international organisations make major efforts in a crisis. Similarly, on the ground, it is important that the EU makes use of its capabilities rather than constraining its capabilities with caveats. It is also important to understand that a well-resourced EU presence can create resentment among the staff of other international organisations.

The importance of synergies between the EU and its partners cannot be overestimated. The EU, for instance, repeatedly notes its capacity for rapid response and its potential to reduce the *warning-response gap*. This is potentially a valuable contribution for the broader international community. Similarly, while the EU can, for example, focus on the *short-term* timeframe in crises (end-date), other international organisations can subsequently focus on the *long-term*, including through peacebuilding projects (end-state) and vice versa. Finally, the EU can achieve *civil-military synergies* by contributing a component to the wider presence of the international community. As such, it is critical for the EU to consider better how it can maximise its exchange of resources with other international organisations and optimise the joint performance of the international community.

This report starts with a discussion of the bilateral cooperation channels between the EU, on the one hand, and the UN, NATO, AU and OSCE. This section builds on official documents and existing publications. It serves as a basis and a recap of all the interactions the EU has with other relevant international organisations. The report continues with case studies of how the EU cooperates with other international organisations on the ground in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. As noted above, all the case studies have the same structure to allow for comparisons. The report concludes with general observations and policy recommendations on how the EU can improve its cooperation and synergies with other international organisations.

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4 The warning-response gap, short-term versus long-term approaches, and civil-military synergies are key cross-cutting issues in the wider EU-CIVCAP project. See further: https://www.eu-civcap.net
2. EU INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The majority of EU conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding activities do not take place in isolation; they are carried out in areas where other international organisations are also actively involved. This interdependence has been acknowledged by the EU in its Global Strategy, which commits it to work more systematically with both international and regional organisations on the ground (European Union 2016: 18, 33-37, 43). The bilateral cooperation between the EU, on the one hand, and important partners, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, and AU, on the other hand, is at various stages of development and formalisation. This first section of the report focuses on the formalisation and exchanges of resources between these organisations, mainly at the strategic level. Multilateral cooperation on the ground in selected crisis regions will be discussed in the second half of this report. Since other scholars have analysed the formal modalities of interaction between the EU and other international organisations, this section seeks to consolidate the existing literature.

2.1. EU-UN COOPERATION

2.1.1. General and institutional framework

The EU’s partnership with the UN is the most developed of all the EU’s relationships with other international organisations (Tardy 2015). It is the outcome of the EU’s willingness to cooperate, resulting from its growing autonomous role in crisis management, which was reciprocated by the UN. Faced with increased deployments and complex crises during the 2000s, the UN discovered the regional organisations as important partners (see e.g. UN Security Council 2005; UN Secretary-General 2009, 2015). The EU-UN cooperation has from the beginning been driven by the particular operations and missions, starting with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003. Following such operational experience, the EU and UN adopted a joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management, which identified four areas for coordination: planning, training, communication and best practices (Council of the European Union 2003a). A series of documents has followed, building on the initial declaration (Council of the European Union 2007a; European External Action Service 2011; 2012; also Council of the European Union 2004: Annex II).

Beyond these conceptual documents, EU-UN cooperation is based on three pillars. First, the EU and UN adopt multi-annual strategic documents. The current document Strategic Partnership in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping: Priorities 2015-2018 lists a number of priorities for EU-UN cooperation such as rapid response, joint support for the AU, filling critical gaps in UN missions, partnerships, mission support, and enhanced information exchange. Second, the twice-yearly meetings of the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management provide overall guidance and these meetings are complemented by the cooperation on staff level. Third, the cooperation on the ground between missions is the final pillar of interaction (European External Action Service 2015).

2.1.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities

The EU has identified several possible modalities for its engagement with UN missions. First, it can serve as a clearing house for the UN troop and staff contributions of the member states. Second, it can provide a component to a UN operation (modular approach). Third, the EU can autonomously deploy in theatre in support of the UN (European External Action Service 2012). This final option can, in turn, involve several specific scenarios. These include a stand-alone EU mission mandated by UN Security Council (UNSC); an EU mission followed by the UN (bridging model, e.g. EU Force [EUFOR])
in the Central African Republic [CAR]); an EU operation taking over from the UN (e.g. EU Police Mission in BiH); the EU providing a strategic reserve to a UN peacekeeping operation (over the horizon troops, e.g. EUCAP DRC); or the EU and the UN dividing responsibility for civilian or military missions (e.g. EUSEC DRC) (Novosseloff 2012; Tardy 2005).

Complementarities in the EU’s and UN’s peacekeeping activities make synergies beneficial for both organisations. On the one hand, the EU’s mostly small-scale missions, often deployed on a short-term basis, have most impact on the ground when they are part of a multinational presence, including a bigger UN mission which provides a strategic framework (e.g. in DRC and Chad) (Brosig 2011). Moreover, the EU’s cooperation with UN allows it to 'present its defence identity as part of a global collective security strategy' (Gowan 2009: 11). On the other hand, EU operations can provide much-needed temporary support and relief to UN missions as demonstrated, for instance, during the elections in DRC in 2006. However, the interests of the two organisations do not always overlap. This situation has sometimes led to operational and political frictions. For instance, the handovers in Chad and Kosovo were less than ideal (Dijkstra 2010, 2011). And the UN’s request for EU’s mission in DRC in 2008 went unheeded (Gowan 2009: 11).

2.1.3. Sharing of resources

The EU member states are collectively the biggest donor to UN peacekeeping operations (31.98% in 2017) (UN General Assembly 2015). Conversely, EU countries seem to be relatively reluctant personnel contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. In 2016, their share of deployed UN personnel in peacekeeping missions amounted only to 5,790 (or 5.77% out of a total of 100,376). This number should, however, be compared to 6,600 EU staff participating in the CSDP missions (European External Action Service 2017: 9). One potential tool of relevance here are the EU's Battlegroups, which can be deployed in response to a request from the UNSC. However, in spite of the UN’s interest, and the fact that it is the subject of consultations between the EU and the UN, including in the Strategic Partnership in Crisis Management and Peacekeeping: Priorities 2015-2018, the EU has so far not yet deployed them in support of UN missions (Reykers 2017).

Besides peacekeeping contributions, the EU member states are also collectively the biggest donor to the general UN budget (30.38% in 2017 budget) (UN Secretariat 2016). Moreover, their level of voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes amounts to about half of all the voluntary contributions. An important part of those contributions are peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian assistance, which help to tackle the root causes of crises. Such contributions therefore have an indirect but considerable impact on international peacekeeping activities.

2.2. EU-NATO COOPERATION

2.2.1. General and institutional framework

The EU and NATO share values and a largely similar membership, as 22 EU member states are also NATO members and five other participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The EU and NATO have similar understandings of external threats and, as far as the European members of NATO are concerned, they have access to largely the same capabilities (Michel 2012). However, despite these similarities, EU-NATO cooperation has been shallow and has proved very challenging.

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The Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 is the cornerstone document covering the modalities of EU’s use of NATO capabilities for the EU’s autonomous military actions. However, Berlin Plus had hardly been tried in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and BiH, when Cyprus became an EU member state in May 2004. As a result of its own bilateral conflict with Turkey, EU-NATO cooperation has practically come to a halt. It currently only covers issues that fall under Berlin Plus, which only involves the EU military operation in BiH, which has been gradually downsized since 2006 (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2016). This long-term impasse seems to have been broken by the declaration signed at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016, which agreed on seven strategic areas in which the EU-NATO cooperation should be strengthened: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation including maritime issues; cyber security and defence; defence capabilities; defence industry and research; parallel and coordinated exercises and defence and security capacity building (European Commission 2016a). This declaration was followed by the adoption of a list of 40 proposals for its implementation in December. The actual results of this renewed cooperation attempt remain to be seen.

2.2.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities between organisations

Cooperation between the EU and NATO takes place on several levels. Firstly, Berlin Plus-related cooperation is discussed at the joint ambassadorial meetings between North Atlantic Council and EU’s Political and Security Committee. Secondly, cooperation still exists (on paper) at lower levels. NATO has a Permanent Liaison Team operating in the EU Military Staff. The EU has a planning cell located at NATO's Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe. However, since the Cyprus-Turkey problem continues to provide political blockages, most of the real coordination of activities is carried out through informal contacts and channels. Notably the NATO Secretary-General regularly attends EU ministerial meetings (while not a formal member), while the EU High Representative attends NATO meetings. At staff levels there are exchanges facilitated by the fact that both organisations are located in Brussels. And importantly, informal cooperation has been developed on the ground (Michel 2012), including through the co-location of headquarters (Leakey 2006; Gebhard and Smith 2015).

Several cooperation models have been so far deployed by the two organisations: (a) formal Berlin Plus agreements; (b) division of labour: a EU civilian mission complementing a NATO military operation (EULEX / Kosovo Force [KFOR], EU Police Mission / International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan); (c) parallel deployment of similar type of mission (counter-piracy missions off the Somali coast EU Naval Force [EUNAVFOR] Atalanta / NATO Ocean Shield); and (d) similar types of missions in the same theatre with complementary mandates (e.g. EU Operation Sophia and the recently deployed NATO Sea Guardian, mandated to provide support to Sophia). Moreover, the idea of ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’, NATO conducting civilian operations using EU’s capabilities, has been floated at several occasions (Michel 2012).

The past Berlin Plus missions are an example of successful cooperation and complementarities between EU and NATO. Similarly, both complementary and parallel missions have been reported to work well together, thanks to pragmatic informal coordination, mostly on the ground. Moreover, in case of anti-piracy missions the cooperation is greatly facilitated by the use of international coordination channels with all the actors in the area (instead of bilateral contacts) and, importantly, co-location of operational headquarters of both operations in Northwood, United Kingdom. However, the necessity to continuously think of ad hoc solutions to overcome political blocks is a

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7 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm?selectedLocale=en
considerable source of frustration on part of the personnel (Gebhard and Smith 2015).

2.2.3. Sharing of resources

The division of resources between the two organisations at the level of the member states is flexible as the same troops and capabilities are used to honour the commitments to both organisations. The two Berlin Plus missions are the only cases of official use of NATO resources by the EU. However, on the ground the two organisations unofficially assist each other with their resources. In Kosovo four draft technical agreements were negotiated to cover mutual support and both organisations informally agreed to abide by those drafts. In Afghanistan, agreements on physical protection of EU personnel by NATO was agreed between the EU and the relevant ‘lead nation’ within NATO (not NATO as an organisation). However, relying on such arrangements, without official agreements between EU and NATO, is still a major problem, hampering the work on the ground and adding to coordination problems (Smith 2011).

2.3. EU-OSCE COOPERATION

2.3.1. General and institutional framework

The relationship between EU and the OSCE dates back to co-signing of Helsinki Final Act of 1975 by the Commission and the rotating Presidency. Yet for most of this time the EU and OSCE did not have many contacts due to their different mandates. The inter-institutional contacts intensified in the 2000s following the development of the CSDP. As the EU became active in crisis management, the activities of the two organisations began to (potentially) overlap. The contacts between the EU and OSCE are facilitated by the fact that the 28 EU member states are also part of the 57 participating member members of OSCE. The EU member states normally coordinate their positions in OSCE and the EU behaves as a block.

There is indeed a considerable overlap in the activities of the two organisations, due to similar definitions of external threats, objectives, geographical reach, and scope of activities. Overlap with the EU activities primarily falls within what for OSCE constitutes the human dimension of its security concept. However, no general agreements have been signed by the two organisations to govern their cooperation. Therefore, the EU is guided by its own 2003 Council draft conclusions, which identified five areas of potential cooperation: ‘exchange of information and analyses, co-operation on fact-finding missions, co-ordination of diplomatic activity and statements, including consultations between special representatives, training, and in-field co-operation’ (Council of the European Union 2003b). A particularly concern during the 2000s has been whether the EU would appropriate the role of the OSCE in crises, particularly in the Western Balkans and the Southern Caucasus, thereby further draining the OSCE of its resources. As a result of the revival of the OSCE through its large-scale Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, this seems now less of a concern.

2.3.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities between organisations

Several contact opportunities have been created to facilitate cooperation between the EU and the OSCE. Besides EU’s presence in OSCE meetings in Vienna (both through its member states and in its own capacity), regular meetings take place at the level of Ministerial Political Dialogue, between the OSCE Secretary General and the EU High Representative, staff in the headquarters as well as between the OSCE field missions and the respective EU

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8OSCE’s concept also includes less-developed politico-military, and economic and environmental dimensions (Van Willigen and Koops 2015).
Delegations and the CSDP Missions.\footnote{See \url{https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2297/organisation-security-co-operation-europe-osce_en}}

The cooperation between EU and OSCE includes activities such as police reforms and training, inter-ethnic issues, and media and election monitoring. Yet there is scope for their further cooperation and building on each other's respective strengths. One potential geographical area is Central Asia, where the OSCE has a stronger position and considerable expertise, as the countries in this region are OSCE members. This fact facilitates OSCE's activities, including the area of security and democracy promotion (Stewart 2008). A similar observation could also be made about the Southern Caucasus, with possibly the exception of Georgia. In addition, the recent OSCE mission in Ukraine creates incentives for close EU-OSCE cooperation. However, the overlap in activities, and the growing predominance of EU in the eastern neighbourhood, has also created some difficulties in relations between the two organisations. This includes limited information flows (particularly from the EU), in general slow progress in stepping up cooperation, and perhaps some jealousy on the part of the OSCE concerning the much better-funded EU.

2.3.3. Sharing of resources

EU member states are major contributors to the OSCE. In 2016, they contributed 70% of the OSCE's annual budget of €141.1 million and 57.47% of staff in the field operations. Moreover, both the EU and its member states contribute to extra-budgetary pledges and expenditures. In 2015, their pledges amounted to 56.8% of the total value of €25.5 million (OSCE 2016a). Indeed, the EU (excluding its member states) is consistently the single biggest extra-budgetary donor of the OSCE. The EU also donates equipment, such as cars, to the OSCE SMM in Ukraine. It is worth highlighting this mission, which is kept out of the normal OSCE annual budget due to its extraordinary size. In January 2017, the monitors from the EU member states comprised 403 out of a total of 688 monitors. It is therefore clear that the OSCE is strongly dependent on the resources of the EU and its member states.

2.4. EU-AU COOPERATION

2.4.1. General and institutional framework

The EU's cooperation with the AU is based on the EU's premise that “[t]he primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves” (Council of the European Union 2005). Cooperation started soon after the AU's creation in 2002. With its broad mandate the organisation symbolised a new African willingness to engage in the crisis prevention, management and peacebuilding. EU-AU cooperation was further intensified through the adoption of the Africa-EU strategic partnership and of the Joint Africa-EU strategy in 2007, where 'peace and security' was designated as part of the priority areas. Current cooperation is covered by the Roadmap 2014-2017, adopted by the 4th Africa-EU Summit in Brussels in April 2014. It focuses on three elements: enhancing the political dialogue on peace and security, operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force (ASF), and providing funding for African-led peace operations. Importantly, the EU's support is not only aimed at the AU but also at the eight African Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
2.4.2. Modalities of cooperation and complementarities between organisations

The coordination between the EU and AU takes place on several levels, including the ministerial and Troika meetings, the joint meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and AU Peace and Security Council, and the work of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the AU. Coordination also includes staff contacts, such as the EU Delegation to the AU, the AU permanent mission to the European Union, and the missions in theatre. Overall, the shared EU-AU preference for African-led activities in Africa is a strong basis for the division of work between the EU and AU. Similar to the cooperation with the UN, the EU commits considerable funds to the AU. The EU prefers the AU to undertake large-scale operations instead of committing its own personnel (see e.g. Olsen 2009). The EU can potentially complement AU operations with its own missions, such as the EU Training Mission in Somalia.

The main instrument of EU support to the AU is African Peace Facility (APF). It was established in December 2003 at the AU’s request. The APF is used for three purposes: funding African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), supporting long-term development and capacity building of the institutions of the APSA, and funding Early Response Mechanism (ERM), a tool to prevent crises and their escalation, through among others mediation efforts. The APF is a very substantial funding mechanism that largely keeps the AU’s activities in the field of security afloat.

2.4.3. Sharing of resources

Through the APF, the EU is a principal donor for AU activities, in view of the scarce resources of the AU’s member states. The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) which does not constitute a part of the general EU budget. More than €2 billion were allocated to the APF in the period 2004 until 2016 (European Commission 2016b). Under the 11th EDF (2014-2016), the total committed amount is €900 million. Since 2004, the division of funds between the three priorities has been as follows: 89.9% for PSOs (€1 555 million); 7.59% for APSA (€131 million) and 1.74% for ERM (€30 million). However, this high level of financial commitments has become increasingly problematic, particularly in view of the EU’s discussions on using the development funds for APF, and the need to ensure sustainable funds for PSOs. Thus the EU has been making efforts to reach out to other potential contributors, including the African countries themselves.

The APF is complemented by the regional programmes under the European Development Fund, the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the CSDP missions and bilateral cooperation on part of individual EU member states. Moreover, the EU and its member states are the biggest provider of official development assistance to the African continent, with approximately €20 billion per year. Similarly to the EU’s assistance to the UN (which is also to large extent focused on Africa), a large part of these funds tackles root causes of crises and therefore has an important complementary role to EU’s direct peacekeeping activities.

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10 In 2015 the EU supported four African-led missions: AMISOM in Somalia; ECOMIB in Guinea-Bissau; RCI-LRA in Uganda, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan; and AFISMA in Mali.

2.5. CONCLUSION

This first section on the EU’s relations with other international organisations has highlighted considerable consultation and synergies. While there is variation in the density of interactions between the EU and its partners, with the EU-UN and EU-NATO relations perhaps more developed than the EU-AU and EU-OSCE relations, it is clear that the EU sees significant potential in cooperation with partners and that relations are largely complementary. It is important, however, to contrast the interactions at the headquarters and strategic level with the experiences in the field. To that end, the next sections provide evidence of three countries - Kosovo, Mali and Armenia - where the EU works to varying degrees with other international partners. These case studies show that while also on the ground relations tend to be cooperative, the data also show that there clearly is further potential for cooperation and particularly the exchange of relevant civilian capabilities.
Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, after having been de facto independent since the NATO military intervention in 1999. Kosovo has been subject to state building by various international actors and its statehood still remains contested in the international community. The EU has become the primary international actor, particularly after 2008. Since the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2015, Kosovo is not only the focus of the EU peacebuilding policy, but of pre-enlargement policy as well. The EU also facilitates the high-level political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Despite the prominent role of the EU, other international actors remain intensively engaged with Kosovo. While the EU has managed to use some of their capabilities, the overall strategic coordination between international actors still has plenty of room for improvement.

3.1. APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

During and following the civil war in Kosovo in 1998-1999, the international community - foremost NATO, the United States and several key western European countries - played a vital role in the developments that led to Kosovo's eventual secession from Serbia (King and Mason 2006; Papadimitriou, Petrov and Greicevci 2007; Ker-Lindsay 2009; Weller 2009; Perritt 2010; Koeth 2010; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012; Eckhard 2016). This has considerably influenced the position of the conflict parties towards the international community. At the same time, the international community does not have a single approach, particularly with respect to the question of Kosovo's status. Kosovo's independence is not only contested by Serbia but has also split the international community, including the membership of the EU, UN, NATO and the OSCE. Hence, international organisations have a limited space for formulating their policy towards Kosovo, which is seen as a major challenge to peacebuilding and development (e.g. Eckhard and Dijkstra 2017). International organisations therefore work on the basis of a 'status neutral' mandate, which implies that they have to support the Kosovar institutions without prejudice to the formal status of Kosovo.

Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia, which was itself a republic in former Yugoslavia. Its population is mostly ethnic Albanian. Following the civil war and the NATO intervention, the international community negotiated a peace agreement in June 1999, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Serbian institutions from Kosovo and the deployment of an international civilian and security presence under United Nations auspices, as decided in UNSC Resolution 1244. The NATO-led KFOR provided the international security presence whose mandate included deterring renewed hostilities, demilitarising armed Kosovo Albanian groups and ensuring public safety “until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task”. After the Serbian withdrawal, Kosovo was emptied of any form of governance and administration and the role of civilian presence was to fill that vacuum and facilitate state-building. The UN deployed a civilian presence, in this respect, through its United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its main tasks were to perform basic civilian administrative functions, maintain law and order promote the establishment of self-government in Kosovo, and support the reconstruction of key infrastructure.

After Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, the role of international community has remained substantial. That said, a transition took place in which the UNMIK presence was very significantly reduced, whereas the EU took over the leading role in civilian presence in the field as the EULEX mission was launched in 2008. The EU has also facilitated the political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina at the highest political level since 2011.
3.2. ACTORS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

Since 1999, many international actors have been active in Kosovo. Informally, the United States has been by far the most influential actor. In the words of one interviewee, the “space left for the EU is really small compared to the US in terms of how much we owe it”, because “the US invested ninety per cent of the bombs”.\(^{12}\) A government official notes that the US-financed projects are easier to implement because the US embassy can use its influence “if something goes wrong”.\(^{13}\) A foreign diplomat has remarked that “because of the US involvement here, they [the Kosovo authorities] instinctively trust the Americans”.\(^{14}\) Even when asked by the EU to align certain legislation with EU standards, the Kosovo authorities tend to double-check with the US embassy first if they could do that.\(^{15}\) It is therefore not surprising that the US is a key partner with respect to major political developments. The United States has been active in the broadest range of fields relevant for peacebuilding, from support to security sector reform (SSR), to mediation and support for local level dialogue projects, to development assistance.

Through UNMIK, the UN has also played a central role in Kosovo since 1999. Interestingly, for the purpose of this report, UNMIK did not rely solely on UN capabilities. Instead, it established a system of four so-called pillars with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing humanitarian assistance, the UN civil administration, OSCE democratisation and institution building, and EU reconstruction and economic development. This umbrella model was therefore geared toward synergies and different international organisations adding value. The UNMIK model was abandoned after 2008, following the unilateral declaration of independence and the adoption of a new constitution, when the functions of rule of law transitioned from the UN to EULEX (Dijkstra 2011). There is a widespread perception that the UNMIK has outlived its mandate and ceased to be a relevant actor in Kosovo.\(^{16}\) However, its continuing albeit very small presence is still strongly supported by the UN members that do not recognise Kosovo independence.\(^{17}\)

Apart from UNMIK, the UN system comprises several agencies, funds, programmes and affiliates, such as UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN WOMEN). A particularly notable actor is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provides support for democratic governance and peacebuilding, including support for the rule of law initiatives, small arms and light weapons control and setting up municipal safety councils in several municipalities.\(^{18}\)

The EU presence in Kosovo was initially limited to reconstruction and economic development. In anticipation of Kosovo status settlement, the EU decided to take up a

\(^{12}\) Interview #5.

\(^{13}\) Interview #4.

\(^{14}\) Interview #9.

\(^{15}\) Interview #9.

\(^{16}\) Interviews #7 and 9.

\(^{17}\) Interview #7.

more significant political role (Solana and Rehn 2005a, 2005b). It was generally understood that the EU would take the lead, after independence, in terms of capacity building in the area of the rule of law (see Dijkstra 2013: 169). In 2006 preparatory teams for the future EU presences were established (Council of the European Union 2007b). The international community, for instance in the context of the Ahtisaari plans of 2007, to a large degree followed the ‘BiH template’, with an International Civilian Office (ICO) to be set up and led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR) with vast political authority. While the ICR would represent the international community, the function would be ‘double-hatted’ with the position of the EUSR for Kosovo implying that the EU would indirectly take the lead. Due to the ultimate lack of consensus among the international community over Kosovar independence, the ICO was eventually only established in 2008 as an institution representing those countries that recognised Kosovo. This immediately put the ICO at odds with the EU, which was to be status neutral, and therefore caused several headaches for the double-hatted ICR/EUSR. The ICO was closed in 2012. ¹⁹

Currently, the EU is present through the EU Office, whose head is at the same time EUSR, and the EULEX mission launched in 2008 (Council of the European Union 2008). The EU Office is engaged politically and with projects, such as Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funding which also includes rule of law and public administration reform. EULEX has two objectives: ‘Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA)’ of the local Kosovar authorities as well as a limited set of ‘Executive’ functions in cases of serious crimes (war crimes, organised crime, corruption, etc.) (ibid.: Articles 2 and 3(d)). Following the 2014 extension of the EULEX mandate, it no longer takes on new cases and gradually hands over its remaining competencies to the Kosovo judicial system, with the exception of north Kosovo, where EULEX will remain in charge until a solution is found in the context of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (EULEX n.d.).

NATO has led the military peace-supporting operation KFOR since 1999 as well as the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Furthermore, the NATO Advisory Liaison Team, situated in the Ministry for Kosovo Security Forces headquarters, has an advisory role in the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) capacity building (Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces 2016). Through KFOR, NATO remains the ultimate guarantor of security and stability in Kosovo and also provides security support to the other international organisations.

The OSCE has been active in Kosovo since the early 1990s. In 1992, it set up a mission in the three regions of Serbia with significant minority populations (Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina), but was forced out within a year (OSCE 2016b: 50-51). In autumn 1998, a new OSCE verification mission was established in agreement with Serbian authorities to monitor compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UNSC Resolution 1199, which called for a ceasefire, an improved humanitarian situation and a political solution to the Kosovo conflict. The Mission was withdrawn in March 1999, shortly before the beginning of the NATO intervention (ibid.: 54-57). After the intervention, the OSCE returned as the coordinator of the democratisation and institution-building pillar under UNMIK. The OSCE mission continues to work in the areas of human and community rights, democratisation and public safety.

3.3. FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LIAISON MECHANISMS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

In Kosovo, international actors rely on five mechanisms for coordination: 1) memorandums of understanding; 2) liaison and coordination officers; 3) regular meetings; 4) participation in working groups and consultations coordinated by Kosovar institutions; and 5) informal

¹⁹ For a comprehensive report on ICO work in Kosovo, see ICO 2012.
communication. Not all of these mechanisms are equally utilised, with informal communication appearing as more important than formal mechanisms.

Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed between some international organisations, but do not appear as a regular tool for arranging inter-organisational relations, nor do they imply coordination at a more strategic level. KFOR has MoUs with the UNMIK and EULEX, but these are described as evacuation plans for UNMIK and EULEX international employees “in case something happens”.\(^{20}\) OSCE has separate MoUs with two UN agencies, UNHCR and UNDP.\(^{21}\) However, formal agreements have generally not been recognised as necessary by international actors. What is more, the UNSCR 1244 still formally serves as a basis for the division of labour and coordination among international organisations in the field, influencing perception among some internationals that no further formal documents are needed as everything is set in the resolution.\(^{22}\)

KFOR has liaison officers with UNMIK, UNDP, UNHCR, EULEX, EU Office and OSCE. In addition, the NATO Advisory Liaison Team has an officer whose task is to coordinate KSF capacity-building activities implemented by different international actors.\(^{23}\) UNMIK has a civil-military liaison office which coordinates with KFOR.

International actors meet regularly through several meeting channels. The best known are UNMIK interagency Monday morning meetings, which started as executive committee meetings gathering heads of pillars and senior KFOR representatives. In the meantime, EULEX and Council of Europe representatives have also been included ‘on board’. However, Monday morning meetings have been described by representatives of various international actors as rather futile and a leftover from the pillar structure.\(^{24}\) Only UNMIK and OSCE currently send heads of missions to these meetings, while other participating organisations are represented by lower-level staff such as political officers.\(^{25}\) Regular meetings among chiefs of staff of five international organisations, EU Office, EULEX, OSCE, UNMIK and KFOR are organised.

These meetings are not used for strategic planning, but to discuss more practical issues, such as situational relations and staffing.\(^{26}\) EU, EULEX, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and UNMIK have monthly coordination meetings at which they share information on their work with Kosovo Police. The EU Office also holds monthly meetings gathering the heads of missions of the member states as well as the head of EULEX. In the rule of law area, UNMIK, EU Office, EULEX, OSCE and the United States have their own working group. At the local level, there are Tuesday morning interagency security meetings in Mitrovica. Despite the organisation of all these regular formal meetings, it appears, however, that the most important interactions between the heads of missions take place over ad hoc informal lunches.

Officials from the international organisations tend to point to Kosovar institutions as

\(^{20}\) Interview #6.
\(^{21}\) Interview #10.
\(^{22}\) Interview #7.
\(^{23}\) Interview #2.
\(^{24}\) Interviews #6, #9 and #10.
\(^{25}\) Interview #10.
\(^{26}\) Interview #9.
places where international actors' work is coordinated. The Ministry for European Integrations has a department that coordinates development assistance in various sectors, including the rule of law. The scope of coordination encompasses not only bilateral donors, but international organisations as well. In addition, each ministry has an internal unit for aid coordination. However, in the rule of law sector coordination remains a major challenge, in particular when a number of donors “want to get their hands on certain legislation”.  

It appears that the bulk of communication among international actors runs informally. Crucial for UNMIK’s relation with ICO and, to some extent, EULEX was the fact that the latter employed many former UNMIK staff. On the other hand, interpersonal tensions between UNMIK and EULEX are said to have made cooperation between the two missions quite uneasy at the beginning of the EULEX mandate. The physical proximity of offices is regarded as important for efficient communication and coordination. The size of Pristina and the limited number of places frequented by internationals is deemed to be a factor facilitating communication: “This is a small city. They [internationals] meet in the same restaurants; everyone knows what everyone else is doing”.  

Despite having several coordination mechanisms, the locals’ perception is that the internationals do not coordinate much. If they do, it is on political matters and not in regard to technical project funding. Coordination seems to be implemented on ad hoc basis and joint planning at strategic level is missing, either when it comes to security (there are even no joint threat assessments) or when it comes to development. With few formal agreements, there are no clear procedures and coordination depends on individual initiative. Leadership in missions has been singled out as a factor contributing to coordination or lack of it: with heads of missions meeting over lunch, but not engaging in any joint strategic planning, there is hardly a basis for lower-level staff to develop working relations.

### 3.4. EXCHANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES

In spite of the identified coordination deficiencies, the international actors have found ways to effectively exchange capabilities and manage dependencies. Three prominent instances of such exchange are monitoring and reporting, funding and co-funding activities, and ‘logo switching’ i.e. channelling certain programmes through an organisation whose stance on Kosovo status is most adequate for the purpose.

The EU Office makes use of the OSCE and UNMIK (in the case of North Kosovo) presence in the field for monitoring and reporting, which shows the significance of information

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27 Interview #3.  
28 Interview #7.  
29 Interview #7.  
30 Interview #2.  
31 Interview #5.  
32 Interview #11.  
33 Interview #5.  
34 Interview #10.  
35 Interview #6.
exchange. The OSCE and UNMIK field offices monitor the position of minorities in particular.\(^{36}\) The information from the OSCE and UNMIK monitoring reports is integrated into the reports that the EU Office sends to the EEAS. The OSCE also contributes to the reports of the UN Secretary-General on UNMIK by providing inputs on the situation in the field.\(^{37}\)

International actors often co-fund particular projects or even take over follow-up projects started by other international actors when they run out of money. It is not unusual that, for instance, one international organisation brings over an expert to deliver training, but has no money for a follow-up study visit, which is then financed by someone else.\(^{38}\) The EU relies on implementing partners, foremost UN agencies and the Council of Europe for the projects it funds in Kosovo. There are no clear guidelines for selecting an implementation partner, but it depends on the field of work and capacities of an international actor. The position of international organisations towards the status of Kosovo also plays an important role. For instance, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has been selected by the EU to construct border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo (UNOPS n.d.). Construction of the crossings falls under the implementation of the Integrated Border Management agreement, reached in the framework of the EU-led Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The UNOPS has been assigned this task, both owing to its previous experience and knowhow, but also because the UN is status-neutral and thus a UN agency is more acceptable for Serbia.\(^{39}\)

This reasoning has paved the way for a specific type of exchange, which could be described as ‘logo switching’. International organisations tend to shift visible support for certain programmes, depending on which side in conflict they are primarily seeking to address. The UN flag is auspicious for the Serbian side, but on the other hand, UNMIK does not enjoy popularity among central authorities in Pristina. There have been instances of UNMIK and OSCE co-organising an event, when UNMIK would provide more funding, but only the OSCE logo would be visible, in order to attract Kosovar institutions.\(^{40}\) Similarly, the EU may use its logo to lend support to the other international organisations, even if it is not funding their activities. For instance, the EU provided the Media Justice Transparency Initiative of the OSCE with such support, while its contribution was limited to the simple participation of EULEX judges in panel discussions among Kosovar judiciary and journalists.

When observing the EU’s engagement in Kosovo in comparison with that of other international organisations, there is an impression that the EU wields relatively high political influence and has the most funds, but that it relies on other international organisations for field presence and project implementation. The EU has been criticised by some international officials for shunning the leadership role in the international community, despite having the strongest mandate and the most money at its disposal.\(^{41}\) This is an observation we have witness in the other two case studies as well.

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\(^{36}\) Interview #9.

\(^{37}\) Interview #10.

\(^{38}\) Interview #10.

\(^{39}\) Interview #9.

\(^{40}\) Interview #10.

\(^{41}\) Interview #10.
In 2012, a spillover of Tuareg fighters from a collapsed Libya reignited the longstanding Tuareg and Arab armed struggle for independence of the northern Malian provinces, collectively known as Azawad (see Shaw 2013; Zounmenou 2013; Sabrow 2017). The rebellion was initially met with restraint and an attempt at containment by Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré. Such an approach had settled similar disputes in 2006 and 2009 without antagonising the neutral Tuaregs (Rabasa et al. 2011: 151-155; Zounmenou 2013). This time around, however, the defensive approach put a significant strain on the Malian armed forces (MaAF). President Touré was deposed through a coup d'état by military officers for his alleged mishandling of the insurgency and for failing to provide adequate resources for the military (‘Mali mutiny’ 2012; Oluwadare 2014). The coup backfired for the MaAF, as an insurgent rag-tag alliance of Tuareg nationalists and Islamist groups exploited the disruption of government and quickly seized the provincial capitals of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. By 6 April 2012 the insurgents proclaimed Azawad as an independent state (‘Tuaregs claim’, 2012; Sabrow 2017: 171; Luengo-Cabrera 2013). Following the immediate condemnation of the coup by the international community, an agreement was reached, mediated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whereby both the coup-makers and the incumbent President Touré would resign to allow power to pass to an interim government. ECOWAS would then deploy UN-mandated troops in support of Malian territorial integrity (ECOWAS 2012; Oluwadare 2014). This became the impetus for an extensive international involvement with the aims of preserving Malian territorial integrity, disrupting Islamist terrorism in the northern territories and rebuilding a functional state authority and security services (Ramsbotham et al. 2016; Oluwadare 2014).

4.1. APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The presidency of Amadou Touré had been perceived as a period of general stability in Mali (Rabasa et al. 2011: 151-155; Sabrow 2017). With his sudden fall in 2012, the need for immediate international support to prevent state collapse and the secession of Azawad became obvious. ECOWAS, with the support of France, proposed an immediate intervention force which was put into effect through UNSC Resolutions 2071 and 2085. It resulted in the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) from January 2013, mandated inter alia to rebuild the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and support Malian authorities in recovering the terrorist-held areas of the north in order to transition to stabilisation activities, assist in protecting the population and create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (ibid.; Oluwadare 2014).

After six months, AFISMA transferred authority to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA simultaneously subsumed the former United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) to act as an integrated UN presence. It also included a UN country team to coordinate all activities of UN agencies, funds and programmes and provide a coordinating basis for the general efforts of the international community (UNSC Resolution 2100). The most recent version of MINUSMA’s mandate tasks the mission to provide security, stabilisation and protection of civilians and to support national political dialogue and reconciliation, re-establishment of state authority, rebuilding of the Malian security sector, promotion and protection of human rights, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNSC Resolution 2164).

In line with UNSC Resolution 2085 and the subsequent mandate updates, the Malian government - and implicitly AFISMA and MINUSMA - has been supported by French national
counter-terrorist operations. The French Operation Serval, which lasted from 2012 to 2014, was dedicated to ousting Islamic militants specifically in northern Mali. The subsequent Operation Barkhane expanded the focus to regional counter-terrorism across the Sahel. French counter-terrorism operations have worked in conjunction with US and NATO Special Operations Forces in building local capacities and conducting multinational training exercises and operations across the region (US-led exercise in Chad, 2015; United States Africa Command n.d.).

With respect to the CSDP, the EU initially launched the mission EU capacity-building mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger to support capacity building of Nigerian security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime and improve regional coordination of security challenges - namely between Niger, Mauritania and Mali (Council of the European Union 2012b). A few days after its approval in July 2012, the Council noted that the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Mali was having a negative impact on regional and international peace and stability. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was tasked to provide specific proposals for immediate actions to remedy the situation as envisioned in the Sahel strategy (Council of the European Union 2012a), leading to the launch of EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali in February 2013 and of EUCAP Sahel Mali in March 2014 (Council of the European Union 2013a; Council of the European Union 2014). EUTM Mali is mandated to provide advice and training to MaAF, whereas EUCAP Mali provides advice and training to the three components of Malian internal security forces: the police, gendarmerie and National Guard.

In addition to its CSDP missions, the EU is engaged in Mali through its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (European Commission 2011), recently becoming the Sahel Regional Action Plan (RAP) (Council of the European Union 2015). The RAP is implemented through the EU Delegation in Bamako overseeing parts of EU National Indicative Programmes wherein €615 million has been pledged for 2014-2020 towards peace consolidation, state reform, rural development, food security, and education and infrastructure (European Union & Government of the Republic of Mali 2015). In addition, Mali receives approximately €40 million in yearly humanitarian assistance from the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). In total, the EU and its member states provide a combined €660 million annually, making up more than 50% of the overall assistance to Mali (European External Action Service 2016).

4.2. ACTORS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

Throughout the conflict in northern Mali, the AU and neighbouring ECOWAS countries have played a central role as mediators and negotiators, brokering several ceasefires with conflict parties. Most significantly the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of May 2015, which included most of the political opposition groups as signatories, effectively isolating remaining Islamist terrorist groups from the larger Tuareg insurgency.42 The international community has welcomed African responsibility and has followed through with significant support to the initial intervention and ongoing mediation (UNSC Resolution 2100: 3; Council of the European Union 2013a). France, as the former colonial power in the region, has been instrumental both within the UN and the EU to ensure the deployment of considerable missions, after its unilateral operation Serval and Barkhane. As such France remains one of the most important, if not the most important actor, in the country.

With the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA, the UN has taken on the lead role

42 Interviews #13 and #15.
in counter-insurgency, the protection of civilians and establishing a framework for the coordination of other international actors. Key parts of the Resolutions 2085 and 2100 mandates, specifically training of military and internal security forces, has been taken up by the EU, while national support to direct counter-terrorism operations has been provided by United States, France and other NATO countries. The majority of humanitarian assistance to Mali is coordinated through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), although several international NGOs are still operating relatively independently of OCHA coordination mechanisms.

There is a clear division of labour, on military matters, between the MINUSMA Military Component and EUTM, as MINUSMA is not directly involved with capacity building and training of MaAF. The division of labour is, however, less clear, on police matters, between the MINUSMA Police Component and EUCAP, as the MINUSMA Police Component includes a capacity-building pillar as part of its mandate. In practical terms, EUCAP training has focused mostly on strategic and national level training of internal security force leadership, whereas MINUSMA Police Component mainly engages in capacity building at the tactical level, focusing on operational units and specialists’ training. There are, however, several overlapping areas as both missions also conduct basic police training programmes. UN police officers and EUCAP experts therefore regularly work in the same locations and often conduct trainings together.

4.3. FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LIAISON MECHANISMS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Following the eruption of the conflict in 2012, a Joint Task Force for Mali was established by the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and the UN (UNSC Resolution 2100: 3). This task force, and the subsequent Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali formed by the AU Peace and Security Council, with UN, EU and ECOWAS, has sought to coordinate a coherent international initial response to the conflict (UNSC Resolution 2100: 3). The overarching framework for international support became Resolution 2085 and currently Resolution 2164, under which MINUSMA has taken on responsibility for coordinating international support with respect to the stabilisation of Mali. This is mirrored in the mandates for EUTM and EUCAP Mali, where both missions are tasked to coordinate and harmonise their actions with MINUSMA and other international actors (Council of the European Union 2013b: 5; Council of the European Union 2014: 6).

This has led to a construct whereby links have been established between the EU Delegation and MINUSMA mission leadership, between EUTM and the MINUSMA Military Component, and between EUCAP and MINUSMA Police Component. In addition, there are internal coordination mechanisms between the EU Delegation and the two CSDP missions. All three EU missions have links of varying strengths and intensity with the humanitarian community and development actors, as well as with the EU member states directly supporting mission mandates in Mali.

The EU Delegation chairs a weekly meeting in Bamako, where the EU Heads of Mission for EUCAP and EUTM and member states’ representatives coordinate engagements at the

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43 Interviews #13, #15 and #20.

44 Interview #16.

45 Interviews #16, #18 and #19.

46 Interviews #13, #15, #16, #17, #18, #19 and #20.
Additional lower level coordination is conducted on an ad hoc basis, typically based on relevant operational coordination, such as the provision of equipment for MaAF from individual member and non-member states, and EUTM conducting subsequent training and equipment familiarisation. The unilateral contributions of individual member states and non-member states, such as the United States and Switzerland, are particularly significant as, so far, the EU does not have the mandate to provide local forces with equipment.

The leadership of international military component - specifically MINUSMA Force Commander, Commander EUTM and Commander of operation Barkhane - meets at bi-weekly intervals to coordinate at the operational and national military level. At lower levels, an exchange of liaison officers has been established between MINUSMA Military HQ and EUTM. And, to coordinate intelligence assessments, a direct coordination and exchange of information has been established between EUTM and the MINUSMA All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU). The ASIFU is tasked with collecting, analysing and providing military intelligence products to MINUSMA and relevant partners, including embassies and the EU delegation. To avoid a potential inflation of validity assessments on duplicate intelligence reports, military analysts and subject matter experts informally coordinate between mission headquarters. There is no formal structure for this interface and sharing of information. It is managed on an ad hoc basis between individual subject matter experts and analysts.

With respect to police, a strategic meeting is held quarterly between EUCAP Head of Mission and MINUSMA Police Commissioner to identify strategic objectives and possible actions at political and national levels to support mandate implementation. At lower levels, a monthly technical meeting is held between EUCAP Head of Operations and MINUSMA Deputy Police Commissioner where all ongoing and planned operations are examined to avoid duplication of efforts, create complementarities and identify partners for projects and funding. On a by-project and location basis ad hoc coordination is conducted between the UN international police officers and EUCAP experts, where close-coordinated cases meetings take place several times a week.

In addition to formal and informal meeting structures, liaison officers have been appointed to improve communication between EUTM and the MINUSMA military headquarters, between EUCAP and the MINUSMA Police Component, and between EUTM and the humanitarian community. Between the EUCAP and MINUSMA Police Component, the liaison exchange has been fruitful, whereas the exchanges between EUTM and MINUSMA Military Component have met challenges in terms of lacking transparency for external partners and issues with security clearances when the MINUSMA liaison officer is not from an EU member state. For instance, during the fieldwork period in the autumn of 2016, the appointed MINUSMA liaison officer to EUTM was not allowed independent

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47 Interviews #18 and #20.
48 Interview #20.
49 Interviews #13, #15 and #20.
50 Interviews #15 and #20.
51 Interview #14.
52 Interviews #16 and #18.
53 Interviews #16 and #18.
54 Interview #20.
access to the EUTM headquarters,\textsuperscript{55} and the EUTM appointed liaison officer to the humanitarian community was unknown by OCHA's Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination office (UN-CMCoord) and instead coordinated directly with individual actors.\textsuperscript{56}

As part of a shared interest by EUTM and MINUSMA to have the training of MaAF conducted closer to their areas of operation, EUTM and MINUSMA have gone through extensive negotiations and planning for an MoU in which MINUSMA may provide logistical support and local facilities for EUTM to extend their presence into Gao and Kidal as part of its newest mandate.\textsuperscript{57} The decision to allow EUTM to move out into the northern sectors has been long underway, and implementation has suffered delays, primarily from coordinating the extensive support required from MINUSMA Mission Support Division.\textsuperscript{58} It has not been straightforward to put the necessary exchange of capabilities in place.

In general, external partners to the EU tend to state that there are well-functioning formal mechanisms for coordination, and that flexible ad hoc solutions are established when necessary. Their key points of concern have had little to do with challenges at the operational level but are focused much more on structural challenges within CSDP mission mandates and their restrictions (see further below).\textsuperscript{59} Previous research has suggested challenges from the high staff turnover caused by the CSDP six-monthly rotations, but all external parties included have stated the CSDP personnel have conducted effective transfers and hand-overs with little effect on operational continuity (Jayasundara-smits 2016).\textsuperscript{60}

### 4.4. EXCHANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES

There is a significant exchange of capabilities between MINUSMA, EUTM and EUCAP. Links have been established between the Military and Police Components of MINUSMA and the respective corresponding CSDP mission. There have been successful exchanges and coordination of specific training requirements for Malian security actors from MINUSMA to the EU training missions.\textsuperscript{61} The MINUSMA Force is conducting coordinated and combined missions with Malian forces. As such it has a significant dependency on EUCAP and EUTM training quality and content.\textsuperscript{62} While there has been an observably positive response from both EUCAP and EUTM to suggested training requirements being put forward by MINUSMA, significant concerns have been voiced towards the lack of on-ground training and follow-up from both CSDP missions. Particularly strong emphasis, from the UN perspective, is on the risk averseness by EUTM.\textsuperscript{63}

The MINUSMA Military Component is satisfied with the cooperation provided within the scope of the EUTM mandate, but a key problem identified is the fact that the current

\textsuperscript{55} Interview #20.

\textsuperscript{56} Interview #17 and #20.

\textsuperscript{57} Interviews #13, #14, #15 and #20.

\textsuperscript{58} Interviews #15 and #20.

\textsuperscript{59} Interviews #13, #14, #15 and #17.

\textsuperscript{60} Interviews #13, #14, #15 and #17.

\textsuperscript{61} Interviews #13 and #20.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview #15.

\textsuperscript{63} Interview #13, #14 and #15.
EUTM mandate prevents qualified training and follow-up with Malian forces, because the EUTM trainers are not permitted to follow them on operations. A particularly striking example of EUTM risk averseness (to avoid casualties) is the observation that even EUTM Head of Mission could not join the MINUSMA Force Commander for a field visit outside Central Mali without previous approval from Brussels.\(^6^4\) The net result is significant damage to the reputation of EU missions when they are perceived by other international actors to have extensive resources and capabilities at hand, but remain unwilling to put them to maximal effect on the ground. An observation leading a key MINUSMA officer to label EU’s risk averseness as “laughable”.\(^6^5\) Similar levels of risk assessment therefore seem significant for effective inter-organisational relations.

For its renewed mandate, EUTM will be largely dependent on MINUSMA Mission Support Division for logistical support in the transport and sustainment of both equipment and personnel to the training bases in Gao and Timbuktu. Progress in this area has been slow and the exact modes of coordination and support were still under negotiation during the research for this report. Such close cooperation between a UN logistics component and EU missions is likely to provide valuable lessons for future praxis and warrants a more detailed analysis in future research.\(^6^6\)

For the cooperation between EUCAP and MINUSMA Police Component, UN officials state that the exchange of capabilities has been between equals and of a satisfactory standard.\(^6^7\) EUCAP staff, on the other hand, voiced concern about the quality of UN training. They also expressed a tendency from UN officials to approach EUCAP mainly for funding and support in complex training tasks that they were either unwilling or incapable of completing themselves.\(^6^8\) With respect to the objective of achieving actual synergies in the international community, such perceptions are not particularly helpful.

In the humanitarian community, there is a sense of non-reciprocity in relation to EUTM and EUCAP. Cooperation is generally perceived as positive towards the EU delegation, but concerns were raised that neither EUTM nor EUCAP were reporting their interactions with local communities and active community support allegedly conducted along with their training activities. This has resulted in difficulties for OCHA and humanitarian actors in their deconflicting operations. Although both missions have frequented the weekly OCHA CMCoord meetings, their interaction is considered one-directional by external partners. Concerns have been raised whether information received at these humanitarian coordination meetings make their way into EU intelligence products, which may compromise humanitarian actors in the field if shared with MaAF.\(^6^9\) This tension is likely to increase as EUTM move activities to Timbuktu and Gao in the north.

\(^6^4\) Interview #13.

\(^6^5\) Interview #13.

\(^6^6\) On the significant UN resources in terms of mission support, e.g. Global Services Centre, see Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr (2016).

\(^6^7\) Interview #16.

\(^6^8\) Interview #19.

\(^6^9\) Interview #17 and #20.
5. EU INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN ARMENIA

The long-lasting conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has affected Armenian security policy for nearly three decades. While Armenia is not an international priority, the EU and other international organisations are active in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The EU provides political support for the peace negotiations led by the OSCE Minsk Group and it has funded complementary people-to-people projects. This provides credibility to the OSCE process. The EU also plays a limited role in SSR, through its focus on judiciary reform. Other international organizations, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe address different aspects of SSR (respectively police and judiciary projects). While the effort of the broader international community is largely complementary, there is certainly scope for more effective cooperation.

5.4. APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Armenia is a country with difficult neighbourly relations. Most significantly, it has been in conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh for nearly 30 years. The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally considered part of Azerbaijan, but the Armenian ethnic majority has been ruling the territory as a de facto independent state. Ever since the Russian-brokered ceasefire of 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in prolonged peace talks in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States (De Waal 2010). This remains the principal platform for the peace negotiations. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have recently considerably deteriorated as a result of the four-day April 2016 war, which led to several hundreds of casualties (Broers 2016; Crisis Group 2017). The conflict has resulted in a Primat der Außenpolitik. Domestic politics in Armenia is heavily influenced by it.

Relations with Turkey are only slightly better. Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (Cornell 1998). Furthermore, Turkey does not recognise the Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman Empire in 1915. As a result, there are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and the border remains closed. Russia, which is the main guarantor of Armenia’s security - including through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - has its 102nd military base located close to the Turkish border. While a normalisation process was foreseen between Armenia and Turkey with the Zurich Protocols signed in 2009, the protocols were never ratified as a result of domestic opposition in both states. Normalisation of relations nevertheless remains the ambition of the international community, also sponsored through project funding. Particularly the potential opening of the border post would present welcome economic relief for Armenia.

Armenian relations with Georgia and Iran are considerably better. Even though Georgia supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, for Armenia, it is the only gateway to global commerce. Furthermore, Georgia presents in several respects a positive example for Armenia. For instance, a European diplomat notes that while Georgia has almost successfully completed visa liberalisation with the EU, Armenia is about to start talks on this topic. The relations with Iran are good. Somewhat paradoxically, Iran openly supported Christian Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh worried about Azari nationalism within Iran. Following the Iran nuclear deal of 2015, and the unfreezing of the sanctions, Armenia has high hopes for Iranian investment and an upgrading of the border infrastructure. This was underlined during a visit of the Iranian President to Armenia on 21 December 2016 (Joint Statement of the President of Armenia and President of Iran 2016).

Interview #25.
In light of the challenging geopolitical position of Armenia, it is not surprising that the engagement of the international community has been relatively low-key. The OSCE Minsk Group, and its three co-chairmen, has the monopoly on the peace negotiations and offers channels for quiet diplomacy between Yerevan and Baku regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU (and UN) strongly supports the OSCE Minsk Group including through regular statements and other diplomatic efforts. They do not engage in their own peace initiatives. The EU, and the rest of the international community, largely focus on people-to-people exchanges both between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Turkey.

Because of the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan, it is difficult for Armenia to engage domestically in SSR, let alone demobilisation and disarmament. The limited SSR projects relating to the military tend to focus on human rights and democratic control. SSR policy with respect to the police is more extensive and run by the OSCE with an emphasis on introducing community policing. The EU and several member states have projects focusing on the judiciary and anti-corruption efforts. Indeed, corruption is high on the agenda of donors, as corruption is endemic and Armenia has not made significant improvements over the last two decades in this respect. The UN family largely focuses on development issues.

5.2. ACTORS: INFORMAL AND FORMAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

Russia remains the most important international actor in Armenia. Through both the CSTO and its military presence, it is the ultimate guarantor of the Armenian state. And Armenia has proven, by and large, a loyal subject. For instance, it was one of the ten countries siding with Russia on the UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine (along with Belarus, North Korea, Syria and others). This strategic alliance does not necessarily make the Russo-Armenian relations cordial: Armenia understands it has no choice. For instance, in a surprise move, under Russian pressure, it walked away from a potential Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 2013. It signed up to the Eurasian Economic Union instead (Paul and Sammut 2016; Kostanyan and Giragosian 2016; Stronski 2016). Public confidence in Russia was, however, undermined by the April War, with Armenia considering that Russia provided insufficient support. It resented also that Russia had sold advanced weaponry to Azerbaijan, which was now used at Armenia’s expense.

The OSCE Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the ‘Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference’, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, take the lead role in the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The OSCE is a logical institution to address this conflict. As a collective security organisation, which includes the relevant stakeholders, it is the best forum for negotiations. The drawback of the OSCE is that it does not have the resources, leverage or visibility of the EU and UN. The EU, however, cannot take a lead role in peace negotiations due to the position of Russia and the geopolitical implications. The EU has also not shown a clear interest in getting involved (De Waal 2010: 174). Armenia has furthermore a fraught relation with the UN (see below).

The Minsk Group itself is a rather opaque institution. While it consists on paper of a small dozen stages plus Armenia and Azerbaijan, in practice it is run by the co-chairmen, which have their occasional meetings with the two parties, but not with Karabakh

71 According to the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, Armenia ranked consistently low (2015: 95/168 [35]; 2010: 123/178 [2.6]; 2005: 88/158 [2.9]; 2000: 76/90 [2.5]; the absolute score of 2015 is not comparable due to a change in methodology).

72 Interviews #21 and #25.
representatives. The Group nor the co-chairs ever met in Minsk (De Waal 2010: 161). The discussions between the two parties and the co-chairs are secret and the process is hardly transparent. This has the advantage that the meetings allow for a channel of quiet diplomacy between the parties and a possibility to cool off. The flip-side is that it prevents the parties from making concrete progress, let alone preparing their own citizens for the required compromises. Apart from the peace talks, the OSCE also has a limited role and capacity in monitoring the conflict: ambassador Kasprzyk and five monitors routinely deploy to the Line of Contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and write up a report (De Waal 2010: 160, 166).

Entirely separate from the Minsk Group, the OSCE office in Yerevan provides bilateral support in line with the three pillars of OSCE policy: the politico-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension. Given the presence of larger developmental actors (e.g. UN/World Bank), the emphasis on the first and third pillar.73 Under the third pillar, the OSCE office engages in a range of activities of which support for democratisation and elections is important. While the actual election monitoring is carried out by a separate and independent branch of the OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which sets up its own shop in the run up to elections, the OSCE office is active in following up on ODIHR election recommendations as well as supporting the local government with electoral law.

With respect to SSR, the OSCE activities under the politico-military dimension are the most important. In the context of the conflict with Azerbaijan, SSR is constrained and does not include demobilisation and other sensitive issues. Instead, SSR in the military domain is limited to strengthening the oversight by parliamentary committees, through workshops and study trips, and on human rights. In the area of the police, the OSCE leads on SSR by introducing community-based policing.74 This includes helping to establish police outreach stations. The OSCE has also focused on the Armenian police training centre, the police college and the police academy. To counter corruption and establish the police as a profession, it has insisted on an admission committee which includes an OSCE staff member. The OSCE relies on the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) for experts. It is furthermore important to note that these SSR activities remain modest in terms of scope and budget.75

In the area of security, the EU plays second violin. With respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh, its main instrument is the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia. The team of the EUSR includes a single policy officer in Yerevan (and another one in Baku). The EUSR does not have an independent role in the conflict and supports the OSCE Minsk Group. Through the regular back-to-back visits between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EUSR is in a position to provide a limited channel of quiet diplomacy between the highest levels (Paul and Sammut 2016: 3).76 One problem is that the EUSR has little leverage with the parties. EU funding is largely run through the bilateral EU Delegations. Both countries do not have an Association Agreement, which would be in any event negotiated by a different branch of the EU executive. The EUSR does lead on the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK). This multi-million project (2010-date), funded through the IcSP, focuses on civil society and people-to-people contacts and is implemented by NGOs (Conciliation Resources, Crisis Management

73 Interview #22.
74 Interview #23.
75 Interview #27.
76 Interview #24.
In addition to, yet separate from, the work of the EUSR, the EU Delegation in Yerevan has several engagements in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It runs a people-to-people project for exchanges between Armenia and Turkey through the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process (ATNP), which is largely similar to EPNK and also funded through the IcSP. More significant is project support under the European Neighbourhood Instrument and its dedicated Single Support Framework for EU support to Armenia (2014-2017) (European External Action Service and European Commission n.d.). One of the three priorities is justice section reform. This includes providing support for the drafting of new legislation that strengthens the independence of the judiciary. The EU also provided funding to build 12 court houses across Armenia (‘Piotr Switalski: “Armenia is not just a neighbour but part of the European family”’, 2016). The EU furthermore helped to upgrade the infrastructure at the border crossings between Armenia and Georgia, as well as improving the road between the border and Yerevan (EU Delegation n.d.).

The Council of Europe also plays a role in Armenia through a range of projects related to human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. In the area of justice, it focuses on penitentiary reform and probation by making its specialised expertise available (Council of Europe 2015). The largest amount of SSR funding of the Council of Europe comes from the EU through the CoE/EU Eastern Partnership Programmatic Co-operation Framework (Council of Europe 2015: 29). In addition to the Council of Europe, there are a range of specialised NGOs, such as the Geneva-based DCAF, and bilateral development programmes which have SSR projects.

The role of the UN family is largely limited to its development agenda in Armenia. The background is political. As a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Azerbaijan has utilised the ‘islamic solidarity’ clause to rally against ‘aggression by the Republic of Armenia’ and the OIC has adopted several resolutions to that effect. Azerbaijan escalated the situation when it introduced UN General Assembly resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008 on ‘The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan’. While the resolution passed with 39 votes in favour and 7 votes against, an exceptional 100 UN member states abstained from voting. Importantly, the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group voted against. This resolution exemplifies the difficulty for the UN and Armenia to engage in a political way. That having been said, the Department of Political Affairs in New York takes an interest. Furthermore, UNHCR helped to address the refugee situation resulting from the April War.78

5.3. FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LIAISON MECHANISMS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

While interviewees uniformly commented on the good collaboration of the international community in Armenia, there are hardly any formal mechanisms for liaison and there is only a limited interaction between the international organisations. The division of labour is largely tacit and based on both path dependence (i.e. who came first?) and specialised expertise. Perhaps also because the international engagement is relatively small, actors do not get into each other’s way and provide largely a complementary effort.79

The most explicit forms of a division of labour are on both extremes of the security-
development nexus. It is uncontested that the OSCE Minsk Group leads the peace negotiations. This creates a focal point for other international actors. For instance, any time the co-chairmen meet, the EUSR flies in to have consultations with all actors in the margins of the meeting. At the other side of the spectrum, the development agencies have clearly worked out profiles. Local donor coordination follows standard UNDP template, which is present in most development countries across the globe, and also involves the local authorities. There is no formal coordination between the OSCE, EU and Council of Europe in the area of security sector reform. Consultation takes place on a bilateral basis, particularly when co-funding or extra-budgetary EU project funding is involved.

5.4. EXCHANGE OF CAPABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES

Despite the limited formal agreements between the international organisations, there is a relevant exchange of ‘capabilities’ between international actors and we can identify several dependencies. Most important is that the OSCE Minsk Group derives its continued authority from the international community, most notably the three co-chair countries but also other international organisations, such as the EU/UN. These international organisations provide explicit support for the OSCE-led process and offer several complementary activities in support of the peace process. In addition, the EU funds various SSR projects that are implemented by other international organisations.

First of all, it is important to recognise the public and diplomatic support that the EU and the UN provide for the OSCE Minsk Group. This gives the OSCE additional authority as the only feasible forum for negotiations. For instance, High Representative Federica Mogherini has attended all three OSCE Ministerial Council meetings during her tenure and has made explicit reference to Nagorno-Karabakh in her statements. Similarly, during the April War, she noted that “The European Union fully supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and the three Co-Chairs” (Mogherini 2016a). Similarly, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman (2016) stated, during a visit to Armenia shortly after the April War, that “There is no alternative to a political process as proposed by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and to restore trust between the sides”. Such public support by other key international organisations is significant, also because it shows the two parties that there is no alternative.

Second, through the EUSR, the EU provides an additional channel of communication between the highest political and societal levels in Armenia and Azerbaijan (Paul and Sammut 2016: 3). This complements the irregular activities of the OSCE co-chairmen and the work of Ambassador Kasprzyk. In 2016, the EUSR paid six visits to Armenia, which are normally scheduled with back-to-back visits to Azerbaijan. During those visits, the EUSR meets with key political leaders, including the powerful Armenian President. This allows the EUSR to address the concerns of the day and convey the EU position on these matters and, if necessary, to calm things down.

Third, the EU and its member states provide various ‘flanking’ measures for the Minsk Group through the EPNK project, and indirectly ATNP. It is widely recognised that, apart from the peace negotiations between the political leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, public and societal outreach is required to make a potential deal sustainable (so-called Track II diplomacy) (Montville 1987; Diamond and McDonald 1996; De Waal 2010). The risk, after all, is that the peace deal ultimately fails to be implemented, because of local

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80 e.g. in Hamburg: “the European Union calls for re-engagement in good faith on the basis of proposals put forward by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs” (Mogherini 2016b).
factions and domestic political considerations.\footnote{Many Armenian politicians, for instance, are either from Nagorno-Karabakh or have fought there. National elections partially revolve around the question of which politicians take the strongest position on the conflict. Furthermore, following the April War, and several subsequent peace efforts, pro-Nagorno-Karabakh groups took seven people hostage in a bank in Yerevan for two weeks in July 2016, demanding the resignation of the president. This unprecedented event is an indicator of the difficulty that any normalisation of relations would pose for domestic societal relations. Armenian society has simply not been prepared for any concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh.} The OSCE, however, has a restricted mandate with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh and a limited budget.\footnote{Ambassador Kaspryzk has a budget of 1.2m euros for his mediation and monitoring activities. The budget of the OSCE office in Yerevan is for bilateral support. The OSCE has no presence in Baku, after the mandate of the project coordinator expired in 2015 (Azerbaijan closed the OSCE office in 2014).} It cannot therefore engage in any extensive confidence-building projects or civil society outreach. The EU usefully contributes in this regard.

Finally, it is also widely recognised that if Armenia and Azerbaijan were to reach an agreement, the implementation would probably require a lot of donor money (to ‘buy off’ the affected parties) and likely a peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh (to credibly monitor implementation and keep the parties apart). While no plans are explicitly on the table or being discussed, it is well-known (and regularly repeated to the parties) that the EU would be ready to make significant financial contributions. Furthermore, it is generally thought that the United Nations would be the most appropriate actor to deliver peacekeepers. As the credibility of a peace plan depends on both commitments, one can see this as indirect support to the OSCE process as well.

With respect to SSR, there seems to be an informal division of labour, in which the OSCE focuses on police and military reform, while the EU and Council of Europe are active in the area of rule of law and justice. The Council of Europe has become the implementing partner of choice for the EU in these areas, with the EU making 90% of the funding available for co-financed projects (Council of Europe and European Union n.d.). While the EU is also the largest funder of OSCE extra-budgetary projects in general, the EU does not significantly support the OSCE office in Yerevan in terms of SSR. The OSCE staff, in particular, feel they are underfunded and recall with some nostalgia the times that the EU provided significant funding for the OSCE projects. Combined with the fact that OSCE staff is on significantly lower salaries, this can give rise to mistaken perceptions and friction.
6. CONCLUSION

International organisations require civilian capabilities for their increasingly substantial, varied, and complex civilian missions. International organisations, including the EU, UN and OSCE, have worked hard since the end of the Cold War to improve their civilian capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacebuilding (Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr 2016). Yet international organisations rarely deploy their capabilities alone. They are almost always part of a broader international presence. This is for good reason. The different international organisations bring different strengths to the table, such as different sorts of civilian capabilities. There is thus scope for synergies and complementarities, something which the EU clearly recognised in its Global Strategy (European Union 2016). In this report we specifically study such synergies by analysing to what extent do the EU and other international organisations exchange civilian resources in target countries? To get detailed insights into such synergies, we have conducted case studies informed by on-the-ground interviews in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. We have studied relations between the EU and the various actors in those conflict areas, including the informal and formal division of labour, mechanisms for cooperation and resource exchanges and dependencies.

When comparing the different cases, we have observed that the effort of the EU and other international organisations and actors in crises across the world is largely complementary. There are naturally occasional conflicts between the EU and its partners. For instance, during the politically charged moments of mission handovers, such as the handover from UNMIK to EULEX in Kosovo in 2008 and 2009, technical discussions over the demarcation of mandates and which actors can use which equipment and facilities have the potential to quickly become political stumbling blocks. Yet even in the case of Kosovo, the EU and UN found a modus operandi relatively quickly. Both on the side of the officials from the international organisations themselves and on the side of the member states there was little interest in conducting petty politics and institutional rivalry for a long time.

It is often said that cooperation on the ground is easier than at the headquarters. And indeed, we have noticed that particularly in crisis regions, there is a strong attempt at unity of effort. At the same time, there is much potential for further synergies between international actors and organisations. We found that a joint strategic approach among international actors for conflict regions and countries is missing. When complementarities are being achieved, they are largely implicit and the result of parallel (civilian) missions rather than a truly collective and integrated approach. Coordination on the ground, by contrast, seems to focus on operational and tactical issues, such as deconfliction. A more strategic joint approach is not something one can assign separately to the headquarters or the field missions of international organisations. And naturally the different command and control structures pose significant challenges. But throughout the three cases we found that a strategic approach was lacking. This leads us to our first policy recommendation:

Policy recommendation 1: The joint strategic approach of international actors and organisations to conflict countries should be strengthened. Despite complementarities, international actors continue to work alongside each other and coordination on the ground is often limited to operational and tactical issues. Strategic discussions, including at headquarters, should be better coordinated with other international partners.

When it comes to a joint strategic approach, something that is often insufficiently recognised in Brussels and local EU missions is the weight of the EU as a political and diplomatic actor. Officials in countries across the world listen to the EU because it is the EU. The EU should use this political and diplomatic leverage much more to back up its
international partners. Armenia is a prime example. With respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for instance, the conflicting parties have repeatedly questioned the lead role of the OSCE in mediation and the composition of the Minsk Group. The EU’s (and UN) strong diplomatic statements in support of the Minsk Group have, however, made clear that the OSCE is the only game in town, which in turn has given the OSCE considerably more authority. It is worth repeating that a simple statement or press research from Brussels carried significant weight in various conflict countries.

Policy recommendation 2: The EU should further recognise the importance of political and diplomatic support for the activities of other international organisations. Backing up partners, for instance through statements from Brussels by the High Representative or the Council or on the ground by the local EU missions, can have significant effects at limited cost. It increases the authority of international partners.

Cooperation between international organisations, at headquarters and on the ground, takes place through both formal and informal channels. We noticed that there is significant variation across the case studies in how formal and informal channels are established and operationalised. In Kosovo, for instance, significant formal coordination mechanisms are present, but they are a relic of the UNMIK past when UNMIK was an umbrella organisation that involved different international organisations. The ICO was supposed to take charge of coordination after independence in 2008, but since it was only supported by the recognising states, it was in a compromised position from the very start. In Mali we have also seen some formalisation of cooperation, albeit to a lesser degree. The EU and UN, for example, have made liaison arrangements, which is an indicator of formalisation (Dijkstra 2017), but in practice this has not worked out sufficiently well. In Armenia, there is no ‘donor’ coordination in the area of security and all coordination goes via the local authorities.

Formal coordination therefore varies on paper and in practice, and overall it is typically sub-optimal for political reasons. It is therefore often complemented by informal channels for coordination. In Kosovo, for instance, it was noted that bilateral lunches between the heads of mission seem to be the most important forum for coordination. This also directly shows the drawback of informal coordination. While informal channels can often be efficient (Gebhard and Smith 2015), they are also largely people-driven and their quality depends on personalities. They are also less inclusive than formal channels. When it comes to coordination, it cannot be either/or. International organisations need both formal and informal channels, and the EU is wise to invest more in both. This leads to the following policy recommendation:

Policy recommendation 3: There is a need for both formal and informal coordination channels between international actors and organisations in crisis regions. Informal channels rely on personalities, while formal channels can be limited in scope. Successful coordination requires both. Even when formal coordination meetings are perceived as less useful, EU officials are well-advised to make the investment and attend them at the appropriate level.

Our research has also shown that international organisations exchange resources extensively. At the same time, the exchange in civilian capabilities between the EU and its international partners tends to be limited to financial resources, diplomatic and political support for each other, and information exchange (with the exception of EU-NATO Berlin Plus military cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina). The EU member states do make considerable staff contributions to the other international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE, but this takes place outside the EU context, which naturally reduces EU leverage. While member states probably like it this way as they are keen to preserve
control over their own capabilities, it is worth stating that the idea of an EU clearing house has been repeatedly mentioned in official documents. In any event, it would be good, also for individual member states, to link staff deployments to international organisations to general EU objectives in security policy. More recently, we have seen more ambitious resource exchanges directly between the EU and other international organisations. In Mali, for instance, CSDP missions may rely extensively on the UN mission support structure in the future. This is particularly promising as the UN has significant service centres, warehouses and general mission support. It would be important to examine whether such a model can also be applied elsewhere. In the military sphere, for all its unrelated difficulties, the EU-NATO Berlin Plus cooperation is an obvious example. As we noted in a previous report (Dijkstra, Petrov and Mahr 2016), civilian capabilities include finance, staff resources, equipment and mission support. It may be beneficial to expand the exchanges beyond finance. In an earlier section of the report, we noted various strategic coordination meetings between the EU and other international organisations, such as the EU-UN Steering Committee. These would be the obvious forums to discuss more elaborate exchanges.

Policy recommendation 4: The exchange of resources between international actors and organisations largely centres around funding and information exchange. There could be further efficiency gains through resource exchange in other domains, such as staff, equipment, and mission support. This could be discussed during the strategic coordination meetings, such as the EU-UN Steering Committee.

Despite its best efforts, the EU does not always think in political and strategic terms about its contribution to the broader international community. For instance, it is not clear that it sufficiently leverages its financial contribution to other international organisations. Part of the problem is the EU's and the EEAS's institutional fragmentation, in which entirely different sets of actors are responsible for funding and policy. This is not only the gap between Brussels and the theatre. On the ground, different EU actors may coordinate themselves, but they rarely use each other's leverage in any meaningful way. For instance, CSDP missions and EU delegations tend to operate alongside each other, as in the case of Kosovo or Mali. In Kosovo, EU institutional fragmentation was highlighted as a weakness in a damming EU Court of Auditors (2012) report and our interviews show that this is still a challenge. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the work of the EUSR for the South Caucasus is barely supported by the EU Delegations on the ground (even though staff of the EUSR is co-located in the delegation). While there may be good political reasons to keep activities separate, without doubt, much of the EU leverage, particularly in the neighbourhood, comes from its trade policy and neighbourhood funding.

Policy recommendation 5: There needs to be a more strategic approach to how the EU leverages its resources. As a result of institutional fragmentation within the EU and even within the EEAS, the funding of other international organisations does not necessarily result in political gain. This requires better intra-EU coordination and clearer lines of authority within the EEAS and its delegations.

Finally, the EU should be more aware of the negative perceptions it occasionally creates among other international organisations. There is often a gap between what the international community and local actors expect from the EU and what it actually delivers. The EU is typically seen as a major and wealthy international actor. Small-scale, token-like, EU missions are, in this respect, not always appreciated, particularly if some other international organisations make major efforts in a crisis. Similarly, it is important that the EU makes use of its deployed capabilities rather than constraining its capabilities with caveats. For instance, in Mali, the EU head of mission could not visit the UN
commander due to security restrictions. Also, it is important to understand that an EU presence can create resentment among the staff of other international organisations, who typically have much lower salaries and whose organisations are poorly funded. OSCE officials in Armenia talk with some nostalgia about the time when the EU provided them with a multi-million euro project for democratisation, for instance. If the EU wants to contribute to the work of the international community, it needs to be more aware of its presence and privilege and engage in public diplomacy, also among other international organisations, and try to manage expectations better.

**Policy recommendation 6:** The EU should monitor how it is perceived by other international organisations to avoid damage to its reputation and to improve its inter-organisational public diplomacy. A general perception is that the EU does not always use its significant resources to the fullest extent, while other international organisations are pushed to their limits with fewer resources.
### LIST OF INTERVIEWS

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All interviews took place on the basis of informed consent and anonymity. Due to the small number of officials, it is not possible to provide more detail on the affiliations without disclosing identities. “European Union” includes the EEAS, Commission, Parliament, and Council Secretariat. “International organisation” includes the UN, NATO and OSCE.
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