Abstract
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design features on bilateral cross-border deposits (CBD) in a gravity model setting. We find that both the absolute quality of a country''s DI and its relative quality vis-a-vis other countries'' DI generally affect depositor behavior. However, during systemic banking crises, cross-border depositors primarily seek countries with the best DI schemes. Similarly, during the 2008-2009 great financial crisis, the emergency actions taken by the governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of CBD. (JEL F34, G18)
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 980-997 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Volume | 58 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 29 Sept 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2020 |
JEL classifications
- f34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
- g18 - General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Keywords
- deposit insurance
- cross-border deposits
- banking crisis