Abstract
Infinite time horizon stationary cooperative games are considered where at each date the instantaneous ntu-game is determined by the state of nature. The strong sequential core selects those utility streams that no coalition can improve upon by deviating at any moment in time. The main result of the paper states that the strong sequential core is non-empty provided that (i) the instantaneous ntu-games in all states are additively b-balanced, (ii) at least one of these games is strongly additively b-balanced, and (iii) the discount factor is close enough to one.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 50-66 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2007 |